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Abstract
This dissertation examines the activities of the Bowood Set, a group of merchants, 
intellectuals and radicals centred on Lord Shelburne, and their struggle with the 
late-eighteenth-century port of London. Having read Adam Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations, they were awakened to his idea of markets and, more pointedly, the 
existence of the mercantilist institutions that were inhibiting them. Their response 
was to use technologies like the Docks, pensions, policeman and insurance 
companies to physically reorder the Thames and break the monopoly of London’s 
trading companies on political and economic power. The Bowood Set were not 
always successful. However, their belief that technology and infrastructure could 
shift political and economic culture simultaneously opens up a series of questions 
about the type of ‘things’ underpinning both mercantilism and liberalism. 
Drawing on actor network theorists like Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, the notion 
that the economy and state are simply networks held together by artefacts is here 
used to suggest that political economy is a material culture and, moreover, one that 
shifted in the late-eighteenth century from something resembling mercantilism 
towards something that increasingly recognisable as liberalism. Examining the 
Shelburnite Sir William Musgrave’s attempt to fight corruption in the Customs in 
London and the role of the West India Merchants lobby in coordinating London’s 
Quays shows clearly that the bureaucratic structures they mobilised were effective 
in altering the information that fiscal and commercial decisions were based on. 
Networks which were previously held together by close-knit cultural ties of 
friendship, patronage or customary agreements became increasingly contractual 
and monetised around the port. However, this was not always the case. Two 
investigations of London’s micro-economies suggests that Smith’s faceless markets 
were retarded by the cultures of consumption across London, and warehousing in 
the City, which were both sectors that accustomed communities to certain 
commercial practices that were not easily dislodged.
What Michel Callon calls ‘calculative agency’, or the capacity to make economic 
decisions, was unevenly distributed across London because of material, political or 
social considerations, and the market was not understood by contemporaries as 
detached from them. As a result, the political economy advocated by Adam Smith 
progressed slowly across different social groups, geographies and networks. 
Examining how his discourse progressed in tandem with bureaucratic and material 
‘things’ shows markets to have been multifaceted and socially embedded but not 
incapable of being redirected. Conversely, it shows that technologies designed to 
break open mercantilist monopolies, like the Docks, could become entangled in the 
social and political institutions they were designed to overpower. Examining the 
Dock campaign through the lense of material and bureaucratic culture in the City, 
this dissertation concludes that Vaughan and his associates surely did have some 
impact on shifting mercantilist commercial practices, though their’s was far from an 
outright victory. 
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Introduction: Capitalism, the State and Things in the Port of London, 
1730-1800
Between 1730 and 1800 City businessmen mobilised forces—from philosophy to 
fire-engines and from politicians to pensioners—to reorder the Thames-side 
economy. By looking at the spaces connected by bureaucracies in the port of 
London, and the relations between them, this dissertation seeks to discover how the 
City reinvented not only its waterfront but its political economic outlook. My starting 
point is the figure of William Vaughan (1752-1850), a planter-merchant from 
Jamaica, who, along with pioneering the Docks that would come to dominate East 
London, was an acolyte of Adam Smith. Vaughan’s unflinching faith in the 
enlightened economy Smith outlined in the Wealth of Nations (1776), was rare even 
among the well-educated merchants of London. He firmly believed that utilities like 
Docks, which promoted access to markets through impersonal management 
strategies, remunerated employees through wages rather than fees or perquisites 
and facilitated commercial interaction regardless of national interests would spell 
the death-knell for the monopolies retarding economic development. The squabbling 
that the Docks provoked in the City suggests that his utilitarian economics were by 
no means the norm. Yet despite being conceived of to challenge the chartered 
companies in London, Vaughan’s Dock was pirated by several mercantilist interest 
groups, who had formerly advocated economic protectionism. 
! In accounting for the about face in the position of the chartered companies 
and lobbies, this dissertation draws on actor network theory to suggest the Docks 
were active agents in social, political and economic transformation whose effects 
had not been predetermined by economic discourses of the day or subsequent 
historical treatments of mercantilism. The Docks were co-producers of a political 
economy that joined the Thames to the market in new ways, impacting not only on 
Quayside labour but the mercantile City and politicians in Westminster by 
restructuring the information economic decisions were based on. These 
architectural and bureaucratic structures will be set against other City entities like 
the insurance industry, chartered companies, Customs, mercantilist lobbies and 
warehousing businesses to show that they formed part of a web of alliances in the 
City aimed at making commerce more easily predictable. Each network gathered 
groups together and created patterns of sociability that altered how the market was 
understood and how it functioned. Further, this dissertation argues that this was no 
different for politicians and the shift from mercantilism to liberalism was driven by 
material circumstances that facilitated or prohibited certain exchanges – 
10
practicalities that must be considered alongside any conceptual victory for Smith’s 
reasoning.    
Figure 1.1: Anon., ‘A Bird’s Eye View of London from the Bridge’, c. 1780. The 
‘Legal Quays’ ran from the Bridge to the Tower of London on the north (right-hand) 
bank. Source: British Museum.
Figure 1.2: William Daniell, ‘An Elevated View of the West India Docks’, 1802: 
Source: British Museum.
Section 1: The Meanings of Political Economy
The central proposition this dissertation develops is simply that political economy is 
made and that this is a collaborative effort. Part of this process involves being 
conversant with ideas, concepts or jargon, which is why much of this introduction 
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revolves around a discussion of Adam Smith. His Wealth of Nations had lots to say 
about eighteenth-century political economy, most of it critical, which left a clear mark 
on William Vaughan who understood the London Dock project as antithetical to the 
‘mercantile system’ and beneficial to commerce. However, making political economy 
also involves being able to use more concrete tools like the stationary, money and 
architecture that allowed Vaughan replace City’s old Legal Quays, illustrated in 
Figure 1.1, with the walled wet Docks at the Isle of Dogs shown in Figure 1.2. My 
contention is that both the ideas and the infrastructure built one another and, before 
getting bogged down in a more technical description of either the Docks or Wealth 
of Nations, it is useful to develop this argument a little more. Smith’s thought has 
often been framed by historians within various competences or skill sets and, whilst 
this dissertation builds on that tradition by using actor network theory, it will spell out 
exactly how by recapitulating some important previous examples of this technique.
! Modern histories of economic thought have continually awarded Smith an 
exulted position in the pantheon of economic theorists, although he was not 
immediately recognised as such in the eighteenth century. Some of the most 
insightful readings of Smith have therefore built on the more sophisticated 
Cambridge School method, pioneered by Quentin Skinner, J.G.A Pocock and 
Richard Tucker that tries to contextualise ideas within the prevalent languages of 
the day. No longer a history of strictly economic ideas marching towards maturity, 
works like Smith’s are seen as contributing to the more nebulous tropes that 
structure modern political action, like republicanism or liberalism. This approach has 
opened up the political, philosophical and sociological undergirding of Smith’s 
thought by putting him in conversation with his contemporaries- Edmund Burke, 
Josiah Tucker, Thomas Paine, etc. - and drawing attention to their shared values, 
rhetorical constructs or persistent debates.1 The Wealth of Nations becomes, then, 
a multifaceted text amongst a constellation of others, generating meaning as ideas 
and literary tropes are refracted, contested and recapitulated by other well-read 
ideologues.
! The emphasis on printed texts, manuscripts and correspondence has been 
useful in historicising Smith, but limiting in many regards. The analysis of these 
12
1 I. Hont & M. Ignatieff eds., Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the 
Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Donald Winch, 
Riches and Poverty: An Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1750-1834 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn To Empire: The Rise 
of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); 
Frederick Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (London: Routledge, 2003).
discourses means there is relatively little need to explain the social factors which 
might be at play in constructing a text. Indeed, they are largely invisible, bar 
studious examinations of authors’ libraries and reconstructing their reading habits.2 
Vivienne Brown has taken this indifference to non-literary contexts to posit a post-
structuralist conclusion, arguing that there is nothing outside the text, that “Smith” is 
a critical construct and she provides near hermeneutically sealed readings of his 
canonical works.3 
! It should be said that excising the Wealth of Nations from its social and 
historical context is not hard. Smith burnt his surviving manuscripts and letters 
before he died, as did his close friend David Hume, and though one volume of his 
correspondence has been uncovered in other collections, alongside some 
manuscripts and notes made by his students on his Lecture series on 
Jurisprudence, the Glasgow Edition (1976-83) of his works amount to just a handful 
of volumes. This has proved hard work for his biographers. R.H. Campbell and A.S. 
Skinner’s positively skeletal Adam Smith (1982) was superseded by Ian Ross’ The 
Life of Adam Smith (1995), which was described by one critic as indulging in ‘heroic 
speculation’ in dealing with the philosophe’s experiences.4 Evidently not perturbed, 
Ross, an editor of the Glasgow Edition, expanded and revised the Life in 2010, now 
weighing in at four hundred densely typed pages, easily three times that of the 1982 
attempt. Where Campbell and Skinner rarely ventured far beyond the material left 
by Smith or his contemporaries, Ross is increasingly inclined to entangle Smith in 
philosophical issues. At one stage, for instance, he considers where on the moral 
spectrum outlined in Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith’s own recommendation that 
Hume’s papers be burnt should fit.5 Other more pointed analyses have looked at 
Smith’s institutional presence as a lecturer at Glasgow and Customs Commissioner 
at Edinburgh, also addressing if he put his thought into action.6 Brown’s warning 
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2 H. Mizuta ed., Adam Smith’s Library, A Catalogue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
3 Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith’s Discourse: Canonicity, Commerce and Conscience 
(London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-10.
4 R.H. Campbell & A.S Skinner, Adam Smith (Croom Smith: London & Canberra, 1982); I.S. 
Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Keith Tribe, ‘Adam Smith: 
Critical Theorist?’, Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 20 (1999), p. 614.
5 I.S. Ross, The Life of Adam Smith (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp.
358-60. 
6 G.M. Anderson, W.F. Shughart & R.D Tollison, ‘Adam Smith in the Customs House’, 
Journal of Political Economy, 93, 4 (1985), pp. 740-59; William Scott, Adam Smith as 
Student and Professor (Glasgow: Jackson & Co., 1937).
that scholars are falsely comparing a real “author”, constructed on slight material, 
with an infinitely reinterpretable textual corpus cannot be denied.
! One way around this has been to suggest that a text is a consciously and 
carefully crafted adjunct to the author’s identity. ‘Smith’s distinct achievement’ in the 
Wealth of Nations, writes Till Duppe in a recent critique of economics as ‘science’:
was to solve the rhetorical dilemma of doing two things at once: abstracting from 
particular political interests by means of relying on a theoretical perception of the 
economy- represented by the system that coordinated the division of labour- and 
addressing political interest. He managed to argue in a disinterested tone while 
nonetheless coming down in favour of particular interests...the Wealth of Nations is 
policy orientated but not a pamphlet! He neither had to defend himself against the 
suspicion of being guided by self-interest (like all merchants), nor did he fall back 
into the clergy’s moral lament. Beyond the clergy and merchants, there was the 
scholar.7
Duppe suggests here that Smith’s ‘rhetoric’ overcame the problem that merchants 
were not trusted and draws on Simon Shapin and Steve Schaffer’s elaboration of 
the gentlemanly markers that underpinned truth in the seventeenth century. Unseen 
but continually acting markets certainly have parallels with Shapin and Schaffer’s 
interpretation of the debates between Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle over the 
Royal Society’s air pump.8 For Shapin and Schaffer, Boyle and Hobbes’ 
disagreement was not about the objective properties of air but epistemic, involving a 
contest about which socio-political arrangements had access to truth in the midst of 
seventeenth-century constitutional upheaval. Boyle’s victory for empiricism was 
predicated on a number of battles in the Royal Society and in print where his 
science was invested with trustworthy qualities by mobilising existing social 
hierarchies, based on Boyle’s own gentlemanly status, through rhetoric, images and 
even the genre of the publications he penned. These provided contexts for ‘the 
great civility [of] granting the conditions in which others can colonise our minds and 
expecting the conditions which allow us to colonise theirs’.9 Appearing apolitical, 
impartial and theoretically inclined was a social posture. Continuing Duppe’s tack, it 
is clear that, in Edinburgh, Smith did play an active and immediate role in promoting 
14
7 Till Duppe, The Making of the Economic: A Phenomenology of Economic Science 
(Plymouth: lexington Books, 2011), pp.120-1.
8 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, The Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle and 
the Experimental Life (2nd Ed., Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011).   
9 Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century 
England (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994) p. 36.
his ideas to specific social groups. Smith’s friends were hungry for his treatise on 
political economy in 1776, for which they had been suitably primed through private 
communications.10 On reading The Wealth of Nations, this coterie of philosophes, 
churchmen, and academics echoed William Robertson’s praise: ‘You have formed 
into a regular and consistent system one of the most intricate and important parts of 
political science, and if the English be capable of extending their ideas beyond the 
narrow and illiberal arrangements introduced by the mercantile supporters of 
Revolution principles, and countenanced by Mr. Locke, and some of their favourite 
writers, I think your book will occasion a total change in several important articles 
both in police and finance.’11
! A related avenue has been to explore how Smith’s works have been read 
and their meaning structured by educational institutions. The rise of economics as a 
discipline in the late-eighteenth century not only provides the resources to see how 
the Wealth of Nations was interpreted but how those ideas were sustained and 
managed over time. Here the lectures of Dugald Stewart at Glasgow University, 
Thomas Malthus’ installation as chair of political economy at East India College, 
J.R. McCulloch’s elevation to similar post at University College, and the Political 
Economy Club in London, built around Malthus, McCulloch and David Ricardo have 
all been cited as steps towards the diffusion and canonisation of Smithian 
liberalism.12 The raft of articles, text-books and treatises these men penned after 
1815, McCulloch’s heavily edited collections of mercantilist tracts, all expunged of 
theoretical heresies, and their advice to government surrounding the ‘machinery 
question’ of the 1830s and ‘40s further established the “school” of classical 
economics.13 Liberalism was constructed by texts, teachers and policy-makers.
! The weakness of studying Smith’s ideas through the Wealth of Nations’ 
ability to produce discourse or create a canon is that historians find it hard to look 
15
10 Adam Smith, Correspondence of Adam Smith, eds. E.C. Mossner & I.R. Ross (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), esp. John Glassford to Smith 5 Nov. 1765, p. 104; Hume to 
Smith 8 Feb 1776 p. 185; ‘Early draft of the wealth of Nations’, Scott, Smith as Student, pp. 
317-59.
11 Smith, Correspondence, Robertson to Smith, 8 Apr. 1776, p. 192; see also Hume to 
Smith, 1 Apr. 1776; Blair to Smith, 3 Apr. 1776; Ferguson to Smith, 18 Apr. 1776.
12 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of 
Wealth and Society (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1998 pp, 214-94; I.S. 
Ross ed., On the Wealth of Nations: Contemporary Responses to Adam Smith (Bristol: 
Thoemmes Press, 1998).
13 Maxine Berg, The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy, 1815-1848 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 34-40.
beyond a relatively narrow elite or, rather, an elite constituted by literary criteria. 
Indeed, we know in some detail about what academics, politicians, a smattering of 
Reverends and, latterly, some economists wrote and how their discourses or 
speech acts changed the institutions around them. What historians know far less 
about is whether any of them or the pin-makers, butchers, brewers and merchants 
who populated Smith’s book acted on it in the economic sphere he so painstakingly 
outlined. This is especially intriguing in light of a series of books considering the 
relationship between the enlightenment and the economy. Joel Mokyr opens his 
Enlightened Economy with the line ‘economic change in all periods depends, more 
than most economists believe, on what people believe.’14 Industrial take-off stems 
from a proliferation of useful knowledge in his account. A slightly different thesis has 
been put forwards by Jan de Vries and Maxine Berg, who both put considerable 
weight on the notion that the enlightened discourse of the philosophes played a 
major role in sparking a shift in consumption patterns Britain in their recent works.15 
Connecting economic theory to economic practice is a necessary recognition that, if 
former was a construct, it might well be the case for the latter. As such, it seems to 
embrace the ideas that studies of economic discourse have taken as read for some 
time, chiefly that reality is altered by language, not only by rational ideas but on a 
broader terrain of political and cultural nuances. Economic rhetorics shifted, were 
institutionalised and, moreover, became associated with commodities and practices 
that spread them socially and geographically further afield than a study of Ricardo’s 
output would register. Mokyr’s focus on the workshop and factory, de Vries’ on the 
household and Berg’s on consumer culture pay testament the diversity of the 
economic spheres involved. `
! The resolution of the economy and the enlightenment is by no means perfect 
in these economic histories, which tend to work with a relatively small palette of 
canonical economic ideas to explain the culture behind British industrialisation and 
sustained economic growth. Extending the enlightenment to manufacturers and 
consumers is in many ways a reductive stance that flattens the diverse and 
challenging literary output catalogued by the Cambridge School and ignores most 
overseas variants, but opens up the possibility that economic ideas were diffused by 
16
14 Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1850 (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 1.
15 Jan de Vries, The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behaviour and the Household 
Economy, 1650 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 40-70; 
Maxine Berg, Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), pp. 21-45
practice and fixed in peoples’ minds by familiarity with certain processes or goods. 
Much like Foucault’s description of the panopticon, mental structures were a 
function of material circumstances as much as belief, albeit spread through the vast 
territory of the economy as opposed to concentrated in carceral institutions like the 
prison, factory or school.16 A Smithian only needs to be surrounded by things that 
make him or her act like one, though these are very difficult to put in place. As 
Deborah Valenze has shown through a sociology of early modern money, specie 
had a politics and discursive tropes directed at government but also local 
formulations, especially when it was compared to other modes of exchange like 
barter, gifting or credit.17 The size, shape, materiality, mobility and market for money 
was, then, important in establishing its significance in specific places as opposed to 
powerful places necessarily establishing its meaning. 
! Clearly Smith’s political economy had many associates that have made it 
historically meaningful, whether they were the other texts and debates that the 
Wealth of Nations was interpreted alongside of, his friends in Edinburgh, his 
students and subsequent advocates, the advancing material and economic culture 
of the day, architecture, or post-structuralist criticism, as for Brown. These, in turn, 
have allowed him and his thought to become part of the tapestry of 
institutionalisation, liberalisation, industrialisation, the scientific pretensions 
economics and other stories, which signify modernity. The skills or competences 
that historians have imbued Smith’s readers with are cardinal in determining what 
narratives he becomes ensconced in, and this dissertation builds on the idea that 
his market is and has been constructed by drawing closer attention to those skills 
and the artefacts that supported them using actor network theory. This, in turn, can 
help us think about liberalism and mercantilism. 
! Michel Callon argues that the market is made of ‘calculating agencies’ that 
make decisions on the basis of the information at hand, calculating tools and 
concepts accumulated through education or training. In order to calculate, ‘a 
number of entities are moved, arranged and ordered in a single space’ like an 
invoice, trading screen or shopping trolley. Next, the entities are ‘associated with 
one another, subject to manipulations and transformations’, such as classification, 
juxtaposition, applying some mathematical formula or ranking. Finally, a result is 
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extracted and a new entity produced, which corresponds to the previous processes 
but can ‘leave the calculative space and circulate elsewhere’ like the decision to 
ship goods or transfer stock.18 Markets are designed both in theory and through 
artefacts that help us count, remember and distinguish between the things at hand.
! Calculative agencies appear everywhere but are unevenly distributed 
throughout the economy due to the scarcity of goods, inequalities in knowledge 
about what goods are on offer, how to manipulate them, and the agent’s ability to 
formalise links between them.19 The focus is on the ‘things’ or technologies that that 
order, make possible and bound economic decisions. Developing Callon’s theory, 
Alex Preda suggests these technologies or combinations of technologies create the 
‘temporal structures, visualisation modes, representational and interpretive 
languages, cognitive tools and categories, and group boundaries’ of a market.20 In 
many respects they are similar to the ‘machines’ Giles Delueze and Felix Guattari 
have evoked. These machines are a set of interrelated components that are 
marshaled technically but also form ‘social, semiological and axiological avatars’.21 
Machines create meaning on a subjective and social level because people invest in 
them financially, intellectually and emotionally, not unlike the concept of economic 
interest in the eighteenth century. Several machines might interact to create an 
‘assemblage’, ‘easily matched with the each type of society - not that machines are 
determining, but because they express those social forms capable of generating 
and using them.’22 This is not to suggest economic theory like Smith’s is of 
secondary importance to concrete ‘things’, as they are both components of the 
machine and theory may radically alter the calculative procedures people adopt. 
However, theory should be considered within a skein of economic practices formed 
by channels of information, learned or embodied skills, and material and institutional 
resources. In combining the real and theoretical aspects of the economy Callon 
invites us to explore three connected processes: the material and conceptual 
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Social Studies of Science, 36, 5 (2006), p. 754.
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‘algorithms’ that make up the market and connect groups together, how those 
construct differentials of power within markets, and how economic theory becomes 
caught up within economic practice.
! Certainly, this framework forms a crucial bridge for transferring the insights 
surrounding the locally constructed yet globally reproducible aspects of scientific 
culture, already well assimilated by eighteenth-century scholars following Steven 
Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s The Leviathan and the Air Pump, to economics, the 
City and Vaughan’s Dock project. Vaughan was a reader of Smith and his Docks 
might also be seen as an attempt to institute Smith’s political economy and abstract 
markets in London to make Londoners think differently about trade. The key 
question driving this dissertation is, then, could the things that Vaughan brought into 
London change the market? 
! The Docks have a scattered literature, which encompasses the political 
campaign that precipitated their establishment between 1793 and 1799, their 
financing by City merchants, architecture and subsequent impact on labour.23 
Typically they have been seen in terms of shipping, and the Docks have been read 
as a response to the gluts that afflicted the Thames in the 1790s and the criminals 
that gravitated towards vessels stranded in the river. Docks were a rational solution, 
especially for merchants invested in overseas trade, because they increased the 
flow of traffic into London and controlled the flow of goods through it. Peter 
Linebaugh has presented an influential counter-thesis, claiming that the Docks 
effected the subordination of peripatetic Thames-side coopers and stevedores to 
the ideological dictates of the dominant utilitarian political economists, Vaughan and 
his friend Jeremy Bentham, who favoured factory-style production.24 In this 
narrative, the Docks become an expression of class interest where political and 
social capital was aggressively deployed to create docile labour. Following Callon, 
the suggestion made here is that both the markets Smith proposed and the Docks 
should be considered together, but no single rationality was in play.
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! Certainly, Vaughan’s docks split opinions, causing huge debate in the City of 
London about their merits compared to the older Legal Quays and resulting in two 
major Parliamentary Inquiries in 1796 and 1799. Moreover, Vaughan’s ideas were 
adopted by mercantilist institutions of some pedigree, not least the East India Dock 
Company and West India Docks run by the West India lobby. The resulting Docks 
were an unlikely hybrid of liberal intentions, utilitarian technologies and mercantilist 
management, and it is this mongrel quality that makes them excellent vehicles to 
probe where and how Smith’s thought was established within existing markets and 
the state through things.  
! Focusing on the activities of William Vaughan and his colleagues in the port 
of London, we get a glimpse of how a group of politicians, merchants and 
philosophes used Smith’s ideas to interpret the world around them, advance 
themselves and put Smith’s ideas into action before they became canonical. It did 
not always work. What I want to suggest using the Docks as an example is that 
constructing a Smithian world relied on a whole series of alliances that were just as 
capable of obscuring and neglecting his influence as triumphantly recognising him. 
As we will see later in this introduction, Smith’s name did not open doors in London, 
both because he was fairly rude about the City’s merchants companies, and his 
abstract markets were speculations. Tools designed to alter Londoners’ idea of the 
economy, like books, and their economic choices, like the Docks, were increasingly 
important to the Bowood Set’s endeavour precisely because they could try to shift 
their opponents’ calculative agendas using them. As such, the bigger claim that I 
want to make is not that the liberalism of the Docks was constructed in Smith’s 
image by his acolytes like Vaughan, but that it significantly changed because of 
hostility from the commercial community and politicians. 
! Viewing Smith’s political economy not as simply linked or associated with the 
Docks, but as contested, altered and refined through the practices, relationships 
and institutions the Docks housed gives this dissertation the chance to step into the 
controversy surrounding mercantilism. This has a geographical and methodological 
aspect. As Michael Ball and David Sunderland have put it, analysis of the 
nineteenth-century capital has tended to revolve around the conceit that, ‘Despite all 
its apparent modernity, the metropolis was a unique throwback to a bygone 
mercantilist age: with its scale generated by the conspicuous consumption of the 
wealthy, the world-wide tentacles of the City and Empire, and a terrible exploitation 
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of a mass of the population’.25 When compared to other industrial towns, London 
becomes a ‘unique jewel encrusted terror’ and the site of P.J. Cain and A.G. 
Hopkins’ gentlemanly capitalists, who used the Bank and Westminster to deny 
power to the industrial bourgeoisie. More recently it has been contended that 
provincial manufacturing interests toppled the mercantilist hegemony, or found room 
in the corridors of power, channelling their free-trading ideas and specific interests 
into policy.26 What the Docks campaign illustrates is that the City was necessarily 
not a fortress that needed to be stormed because men like Vaughan were already 
trying to dynamite the foundations. As such, the next section considers how the 
Docks can help think through the relationships between groups in the metropolis, 
London and the provinces, and the capital and empire.
! The idea that a merchant like Vaughan might hold strong political convictions 
based solely on a reading Adam Smith also sits uncomfortably with two 
methodologically different ways of describing of merchant practice. Students of 
political economy tend to consider mercantilism a necessary evil to describe a 
culture fixated on the potential of commerce but far from useful in explaining the 
economy: ‘there is no such thing as mercantilism, but nonetheless this is a book 
about it’ write the editors of a recent collection of essays.27 Historians of merchant 
culture have also largely dispensed with the term, Perry Gauci pointedly describing 
a ‘mercantile’ politics emanating out from the City’s institutions rather than some 
notion of the balance of trade. Yet Vaughan and his circle were convinced that 
mercantilism or the ‘mercantile system’, as Smith described it, was choking both 
trade in London and British culture more generally. His attempt to use infrastructure 
like the Docks to overcome mercantilism presents the opportunity to consider the 
problem afresh using Callon’s notion of calculative agency, by suggesting that 
mercantilism was, at least, a distinct way of processing commercial information that 
was technologically and socially embedded in London. Moreover, Vaughan did 
manage to redesign some aspects of this culture, materially if not intellectually. This 
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is a complex argument and the second half of this introduction explains Smith’s 
ideas, Vaughan’s actions and the historical arguments over them in more detail.      
! !  
Section 2: London and the Docks     
The Legal Quays and subsequently the Docks were sites that could be found on 
maps but defining them solely as places does little to reveal their importance in 
generating and structuring economic information or its varied conduits. Rather, here 
they are seen as nodes connected to a host of overlapping and sometimes jarring 
economic zones. London was a juggernaut of an economic entity in the eighteenth 
century, but the expansion of provincial towns was causing London merchants to 
question their role in the economy and shaped the Docks campaign. Strengthening 
and expanding London’s commercial reach through the Docks project offered a 
palliative that played to the capital’s mercantile strengths. This section seeks to 
show how the Docks fit into a long history of merchant dominance in the City and 
East London centered on shipping, large City companies and financial services.!
! The eighteenth-century port of London consisted of two distinct zones, both 
nominally under the auspices of the Customs Commission, established in 1670. At 
the centre were the Legal (‘Lawful’) Quays that ran from London Bridge to the Tower 
on the north bank of the Thames, with the Customs House situated in the middle. 
Colonial and highly taxed commodities, including tea, coffee, wine, East India 
goods, sugar and tobacco had to be landed on this 600-yard reach in the Eastern 
City. On both banks stretching from Battersea in the west to Blackwall in the east 
were ‘sufferance wharfs’, where merchants were allowed to land and load any other 
products on application to the Commission, mostly bulky staples like Baltic fir, iron, 
and domestically produced goods. Spatially there was a well-established division 
between long-distance trade and high-value goods landed in the City, and shorter 
trading networks operating outside. On the Legal Quays, the nineteen abutting 
wharfs had been rebuilt after the Fire, their dimensions defined and monopoly 
status enshrined in statute.28 By 1695, however, their managers had formed a 
‘combination’ modeled explicitly on a joint stock company in order to co-ordinate 
their engrossing of the lightermen’s and porters’ contracts, causing periodic 
headaches for merchants when goods were delayed by gluts of goods or 
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coordinated action by the wharfingers.29 City merchants had quickly subscribed 
£500,000 to Vaughan’s dock shares in 1796, and when this venture splintered in the 
face of interest group politics they would go on to finance the subsequent initiatives 
of the West India (1802), London (1805), East India (1807), Surrey (1808) and St 
Katherine’s (1828) Dock Companies that added some 100 acres of enclosed basins 
to the Pool of London and employed more than 5,000 labourers daily by 1830.30  
! The merchants’ response was understandable as London’s share of British 
overseas imports had declined from 75% in 1700 to around 66% by 1800, although 
it clearly remained the largest port in the country in absolute terms. In fact, it was 
one of only seven or eight ports to take 10,000+ tons of foreign shipping in the 
1770s that collectively accounted for around 80% of all foreign tonnage. The 
remaining 20% was taken by 67 minor ports.31 Despite acquiring a small but 
growing fraction of overseas imports, table 1.1 shows that major port cities in the 
north were expanding rapidly, as was Bristol, though less quickly. Previously, 
medium-sized towns in the south and east grew far slower as, primarily expansion 
occurred in the few ports where newly industrialised hinterlands needed a vent for 
exportable goods. Industrialisation was dependent on imported raw materials such 
as cotton and silk, Baltic iron and fir, and oils, chemicals and dyestuffs for the cloth 
industry, all of which the Customs registered in growing quantities. Generally, the 
sale of woolen broadcloths to Europe in return for manufactured goods and wines 
was being superseded by the growth in exports of manufactured goods to colonial 
markets in return for raw materials and foodstuffs.32 Hence Exeter and Yarmouth 
remained fairly small whereas Liverpool and Bristol grew on the back of a thriving 
trade around the Atlantic, dealing in Caribbean sugar, African slaves and American 
tobacco, and exporting finished goods. Tropical commodities contributed to a 
growing re-export trade to Europe made up of sugar, rice, coffee, and tea, though 
this also tended to by-pass older staple towns. 
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Table 1.1, Population of port towns, ‘000s
1700 1750 1800
London 575 675 865
Bristol 25 45 65
Newcastle/Sunderland 19 39 52
Exeter 14 16 17
Ipswich 8 12 11
King’s Lynn 5 9 10
Yarmouth 10 10 15
Hull 6 6 28
Liverpool 6 22 78
London as percentage of these 86.1 80.9 75.9
Source: David Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the 
Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, p. 12, Table 1.2
! The relocation of the economy certainly challenged London’s trading 
hegemony but did not entirely eclipse it, mainly because the port of London was 
incredibly diverse by comparison with the ‘outports’ that took the rest of Britain’s 
shipping. Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow specialised, sending the majority of their 
shipping into the Atlantic. South-coast ports favoured trade with France and Spain. 
Hull looked towards the Baltic, Netherlands and Germany for fir, iron and linen. By 
contrast, as David French has shown, London sent fleets out to America, the West 
Indies, Ireland, Mediterranean and northern Europe.33 Additionally it held a 
monopoly over commodities imported by the East India Company, especially the 
growing volume of tea Britons were drinking over the course of the century. London 
shipping was less specialised than other port towns: ‘This concentration of exotic 
goods from India and the Far East, augmented by others from the West Indies, the 
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Levant and Africa, was the basis of a great national emporium which secured the 
lion’s share of both foreign and coastal trade.’34    
! In short, the Quays connected global commerce to the most vibrant 
economy in Britain. Long ago, E.A. Wrigley recognised that London dwarfed 
provincial and European cities, except Paris, making it the forcing house of pre-
industrial England.35 London’s growth from 400,000 to 675,000 souls between 1650 
and 1750, a relatively slight growth rate compared with other periods, would have 
required 8,000 immigrants a year to sustain, given the high-mortality rates. Not only 
did it house 11% of the population at any one time but over one sixth of all English-
men and -women would have lived there at some point by 1750.36 It stood at the 
cutting edge of consumer culture, boasting more shops, theatres, coffee houses, 
pleasure gardens, printing presses, and greater rates of literacy than any other 
town.37 Not just the cultural arbiter, London was a motor for economic change 
integrating the agricultural economy, stimulating shipping and transport to feed and 
heat it, and securing the position of merchants in the political and economic sphere. 
! In absolute terms, London remained the largest conurbation in England with 
its population rising to 865,000 in 1800. However, after 1750 it had competitors in 
the shape of manufacturing towns like Birmingham and Manchester, where 
urbanisation outpaced national population growth, and spa towns which were 
making Britain more culturally polycentric.38 Since the mid-seventeenth century, 
trade, and financial, political and legal services had made London exceptionally 
important to Britain. As shown in table 1.2, while Londoners made up 40% of the 
banking community nationally, about 25% of all government employees and other 
professions and 20% of the nation’s ‘dealers’ in 1851, these occupations combined 
represented just 20% of the metropolitan population.39 Leonard Schwartz has 
calculated that while London was made unique by its large trading and services 
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component, this did not preclude it still housing England’s largest manufacturing 
population in 1851. However, showing only a limited capacity to adopt the factory 
form outside of the brewing and shipping industries to the south and east, London 
remained defined by the image of the merchant into the nineteenth century.40   
Table 1.2, Occupational make-up of London, 1851 
Londoners as a percentage 
of the sector nationally
As a percentage of 
London’s population
Banking/insurance 42 1.6
Government 25 1.2
Other professional services 27 6.15
Dealing 22 11.9
Manufacture 13 33.5
Source: L.D. Schwartz, London in the Age of Industrialisation, 1700-1850, pp. 
11-12.
!
! Between the metropolis and the world of goods lay the merchants, a location 
which gave them a great amount of leverage when it came to maintaining the City’s 
exulted position. On ‘free’ Atlantic routes small firms were the primary commercial 
unit and merchant houses tended to trade with specific geographical zones in 
certain commodities. David Hancock’s superb elaboration of London 
countinghouses shows they were designed to accumulate data and create 
hierarchies from it.41 Architectural barriers dictated the circulation of documents and 
skills, where clerks were housed in different rooms from partners, but both had 
access to sophisticated bureaus that ordered correspondence, bills, receipts and 
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other documents, while on-site libraries concentrated mercantile knowledge.42 This 
architectural and material rigour was reflected, too, in professional training. 
Countinghouse juniors were tutored to the point of rote-learnt conservatism on the 
subject of correspondence, their interaction with customs officials, creditors and 
superiors.43 Certainly this broke some aspiring merchants, and Beeston Long 
despaired when his brother ‘Charles, whose lively spirit not brooking the sordid 
manners of a Dutch Comptinghouse, impelled him to take [the] very rash and 
impudent step’ of sailing back to London.44 Staff were expected to be literate and 
highly numerate, with Italian-style book-keeping another prime example of a 
technology that further grounded a merchant’s credibility in a bureaucratic web of 
books and procedures.45 Simple addition was not enough. Jacob Price has noted 
that the inability to grasp compound interest resulted in the dissolution of the great 
Perry tobacco house in London. And, as Malachy Postlethwayt’s monumental 
Dictionary of Trade and Commerce (London, 1753) makes plain, paying taxes, 
brokering insurance, investing in funds and calculating interest rates occupied 
merchants as much as marketing goods. Print certainly played a role in equipping 
merchants with skills, as is suggested in Natasha Glaisyer’s exploration of the 
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didactic literature directed at merchants, and other forms of commercial data that 
gave firms a common stock of information and gestures.46 
! Specialist skills served to localise flows of national and global news, goods 
and money. What Tom Devine observes of Glasgow tobacco merchants seems to 
hold true of their counterparts in London, Bristol and Hull:
In the eighteenth century, transatlantic trade was not a sector in which the arriviste 
adventurer whose only assets were cool nerves and business skill could easily or 
quickly prosper. Tobacco commerce, like most other area of colonial trade was 
dependent on personal relationships developed over several years... often 
strengthened by marriage or kinship ties...47 
Trust was absolutely central, and merchants relied on a great deal of interbreeding 
in order to shore-up their capital.48 Albeit with some variations, Londoners, 
Bristolians and Glaswegians were offering credit to colonial planters, with goods 
being sent to the metropolis in return for manufactured articles and provisions.49 
The outlay for such long-term ventures was high, meaning that a few firms tended 
to dominate the trades within each port, further shutting the door to under-
capitalised entrants wishing to enter the sector.50 Sheryllynne Haggerty’s recent 
assessment of merchant culture uses Liverpool’s trade with America, the West 
Indies and Africa to assess the role of risk, trust, reputation and obligation amongst 
the trading networks moving between them. Broadly, she argues that worries about 
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mercantile risk or reputation were not unique to Liverpool and that these were 
features of an Anglophone Atlantic merchant community.51 
! At the interface of private business and the state, however, London, and 
specifically the City, was unique. Some features of the relationship between state 
and commerce operated at a national level. Chambers of commerce, merchant 
associations and more ancient guilds in every town assembled when threatened by 
taxation or war, and lobbying parliament on local or national issues was 
commonplace. We find, for example, Bristol’s Merchant Venturers co-ordinating with 
their counterparts in London and Liverpool to combat the renewal of the Royal 
Africa Company’s charter and form the Anti-Abolition lobby.52 However, London’s 
proximity to centres of power gave it a special edge. Not only were the courts, 
monarch and parliament closer to London merchants than their competitors, but 
major administrative departments were on hand too, including Customs and Excise 
Commissions, Navy Board, Admiralty, Board of Trade and Treasury. Colonial 
assemblies did not send their representatives to Exeter or Newcastle but to London, 
and increasingly worked in tandem with merchants in the City.53 Perry Gauci 
observes that these institutions were woven into the fabric of merchant practice in 
the City, providing both services and information to them on a daily basis, as well as 
acting as lightning rods at times of turmoil.54 
! Alongside the major departments of state, London was also the home of the 
chartered trading companies, which shaped trade beyond the ‘free’ Atlantic. There 
were two types. Joint stock companies like the East India, South Sea, Hudson Bay 
and Royal Africa Companies were run on behalf of shareholders. Regulated 
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companies such as the Levant, Russia (‘Muscovy’) and Eastlands had no 
shareholders; instead merchants purchased membership, trading on their own 
capital. Both types held monopolies that gave them privileged access to certain 
geographic zones and the commodities produced there. When new taxes fell on 
their goods, they readily mobilised to present cases to the Treasury or Board of 
Trade. The triumvirate of trade, politics and finance received a great boost with the 
establishment of the national debt under the auspices of the City-based Bank of 
England in 1694. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins have famously argued that around the 
Bank, Parliament and City there grew up a socially and culturally homogenous elite 
that simultaneously allied the gentry to the moneyed interest to run the expanding 
empire.55 Prestigious City institutions gave local merchants an advantage in scaling 
the cultural barriers that disbarred many peripheral actors from political 
administration.56  Nicholas Rogers reiterates the plight of many Londoners in noting 
the ‘alliance of Whiggery and big business’ found expression in the Chartered 
Companies, nullifying ‘the efforts of the small merchants and traders formally to 
question the economic ramifications of high finance’.57 At the level of the Common 
Council and Court of Aldermen, ‘ministerial Whigs were the party of high finance 
and the more established sectors of the overseas trade closely connected to 
it...Their opponents were more solidly rooted in the middling trades, primarily 
industrialists of the riverside and the outer wards of the City. They were altogether 
more heterogeneous’.58 
! A final, though significant, difference between London and provincial 
merchants lies in the City’s proximity to the financial services sector. This 
dissertation seeks to demonstrate a discussion crucially missing from previous 
treatments of the subject: that City corporations furnished merchants with rationales 
beyond politics. Powerful City monopolies like the Bank and East India Company 
might have garnered the respect (and ire) of factions, but they must also be 
engaged with alongside far less controversial insurance companies and institutions, 
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such as Lloyds, which were leaders of the financial services sector throughout the 
century. London merchants were mainstays of their directorial boards, exerting huge 
influence over provincial commercial cultures that were dependent on these 
facilities.59 In comparison with the worldly social networks that were cementing the 
Court-City axis, and the cautious calibrations of personal credit and reputation used 
privately by Atlantic merchants, the financial services represent a mobile expertise. 
The larger fire insurance companies were City businesses that looked to national 
markets and, although they may have had qualms about certain forms of risk, had 
no compunction about insuring manufacturers, retailers or aristocrats more 
generally. Lloyd’s even underwrote foreign shipping until that was outlawed during 
the Napoleonic Wars.60 Within what might be caricatured as an inward-looking and 
clubbable City elite, these were forces working in the opposite direction. For 
example, actuarial expertise in the City, though varied and contradictory, served as 
an essential point of reference for those considering the Docks. In particular, 
financial institutions furnished merchants with profitable bureaucratic paradigms 
based on the centralisation of money and information.      
! The Quays also revealed the tangible differences between commercial 
institutions, something that was particularly apparent as the sheer number of 
differently constituted commercial actors actively interested in the port was unique. 
The monopoly companies provided their members with significant administrative 
support when it came to clearing goods through the port of London. Foremost, the 
East India Company maintained a permanent staff on Butolph wharf that transferred 
goods to a number of company-owned warehouses in the City. The operation was 
large enough to warrant the Customs and Excise employing a permanent branch to 
expedite their business, sharing offices near East India House. The Hudson Bay 
Company also maintained warehousing in the City and a ‘husbandman of the 
waterside’ to see goods off the Quays. The far-smaller Russia Company used 
customs statistics to police the trade, employing a full-time secretary to collate the 
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data and plead its members’ cause to the Customs Commissioners.61 Free-traders 
operating outside the chartered companies rented warehousing from the 
wharfingers. The situation outside of London was very different and less 
fragmented: typically a single body administered ports dominated by merchants 
trafficking between relatively discrete geographies, often on behalf of the leading 
merchants’. Bristol’s Merchant Venturers rented the quays from the city’s 
corporation; Hull’s grandees eschewed their corporation’s facilities in favour of 
incorporated and self-administered docks; Liverpool’s corporation owned its docks, 
while Whitehaven was developed almost exclusively by the Lowthers, Cumbria’s 
pre-eminent economic force.62 Contrasting with these monocultures, London had no 
single “Port Authority”, relying instead on a series of uneasy alliances between the 
Customs, wharfingers and merchant bodies, where each trade was on a different 
legal and economic footing,
! When the campaign to reform London’s docks emerged in the 1790s, other 
ports, chiefly Hull and Liverpool, provided architectural and managerial models for 
Vaughan.63 Alternative managerial strategies for the port were legion and there was 
no standard, so it is unsurprising that London merchants before him tended not to 
look elsewhere when thinking about the problems on their doorstep. It is crucial not 
to forget that a number of strategies had grown up organically in London around the 
chartered companies, Customs and wharfingers, and diverse measures were in 
operation to regulate the Quays. Vaughan acted as a mediator, aiming to displace 
London’s commercial structure with other models. We turn to the reasons for his 
dissatisfaction next.
Section 3: Adam Smith’s ‘Grand Principles’ in London
 Smith’s thought was taken up by the Bowood Set in London, an intimately 
connected group including William Vaughan, who were largely responsible for the 
Docks campaign, as well as several other attempts to render it more attuned to the 
markets depicted in The Wealth of Nations. This section starts with a recapitulation 
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of Smith’s thought, before moving on to discuss its uptake in by the Bowood Set, 
emphasising their commercial links in order to establish the peculiar enterprise that 
banded them together: to sell a critique of the City to the City. Initially they 
attempted to use Smith’s ideas to alter British commercial policy from a position of 
power at Westminster and through political channels. However, resistance to 
Smith’s conception of markets unfettered by mercantilist barriers from the 
established and incorporated trading elite appears to have frustrated the Bowood 
Set and proved Smith’s value. Given the counterfactual nature of Smith’s abstract 
markets, his uncharacteristically long, expensive, and theoretical text, the Scottish 
and academic seat of his supporters and disparaging treatment of the chartered 
companies, it is small wonder this combination found little immediate purchase in 
the City. Nevertheless, these initial set-backs were an important reason that the 
Dock plan took the form it did for Vaughan, and the concluding section describes the 
group’s turn to projects and useful devices as means to overcome their weak 
position.  
! Smith introduced the ‘mercantile system’ in Book IV, Chapter 1 of The 
Wealth of Nations.64 Here, Smith critiqued the position of Thomas Mun’s England’s 
Treasure in Foreign Trade (1664) as the ‘fundamental maxim of political oeconomy’ 
in Britain and internationally. This text outlined its defence of the East India Trade in 
the 1620s, although this remained unpublished until after the Restoration.65 Mun’s 
system rested on the misguided assumption that wealth consisted of gold and silver, 
meaning countries without a natural supply of these resources had to rely on a 
favourable balance of trade to secure their prosperity. It was a system that 
discouraged the export of bullion from the country to pay for goods, encouraging 
states to achieve Mun’s aims by restraining imports through prohibitions and high 
duties and promoting exports by bounties, drawbacks, commercial treaties and 
colonies.66 Smith continued by unpicking the system theoretically and showing the 
distortions it fostered. He argued that labour created wealth, ergo legislative 
interventions into markets not only disturbed their propensity to reach equilibrium 
when left at ‘liberty’, but proved a wasteful use of government resources. 
Monopolies ‘divert [capital] into a direction into which it might not otherwise have 
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gone; and it is by no means certain that this artificial direction is likely to be more 
advantageous to society than that into which it would have gone of its own 
accord.’67 The accretion of legislation, treaties, monopolies and imperial dominions 
since the 1660s had egregiously channeled wealth towards ‘merchant and 
manufacturers [,] the people who derive greatest advantage from monopoly’. Far 
from promoting the riches of the ‘people and the sovereign’, merchants had 
‘remonstrated’ and ‘represented’ to politicians ‘sophistical’, ‘ridiculous’ and ‘absurd’ 
arguments to produce ‘sanguinary’ restrictions.68 Smith was not shy about 
promoting this view privately, writing to the statesman William Eden that commercial 
regulation could ‘be demonstrated to be in every case a complete piece of dupery, 
by which the interests of the state and the nation is constantly sacrificed to that of 
some particular class of traders’.69 Worse still, cultures emerged around protected 
capitals that made shifting them without violent repercussions problematic, as:
The member of parliament who supports every proposal strengthening [a] monopoly, 
is sure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity 
and influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth render them of great 
importance. If he opposes them...[or is] able to thwart them neither the most 
acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest publick service can 
protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal insults, nor 
sometimes from real danger...70 
Extraneous social and political forces had been interfering with an economy Smith 
thought ought to remain pure.
! Before the third edition of the Wealth of Nations was published in 1784, 
Smith had refined his distinction between mercantilism and “pure” markets, 
developing his stance on utility to describe how commerce stabilised to form 
‘publick works and institutions’.71 Here Smith drew from British history and the 
recent past to show the social mechanics of mercantilist monopolies. He urged that 
commerce needed the protection of civil institutions, like embassies and forts, when 
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creating markets.72 These were costly, and it seemed sensible that their expense be 
defrayed by a tax on the trade so protected. However, with ringing predictability 
merchants intervened: rather than the executive, who collected the tax, going on to 
erect the forts, ‘companies of merchants have had the address to perswade the 
legislature to entrust them to the performance of this part of the duty of the 
sovereign’. Leaving these privileges in the hands of monopoly companies had in the 
‘long-run proved, universally, either burdensome or useless and have either 
mismanaged or confined trade’.73 Recounting the history of the regulated 
companies, Smith saw them as increasingly wretched barriers to trade, which could 
easily be carried on without any monopoly privileges on the understanding that the 
public paid for any ambassadors or protection out of a flat tax. Joint stocks were far 
more pernicious because their directors traded using capital that was largely not 
their own: ‘Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to give considerable 
attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour. Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail’.74 Smith poured particular scorn on the 
East India Company, telling its history in terms of a reliance on legislation, 
‘malversation’, Directorial bungling resulting in the 1773 Bengal famine, the 
‘plunder’ of India by Company share-holders appointing their kinsmen and growing 
indebtedness. Its directors, in short, were hampered by too many reciprocities:
To watch over, not only the occasional variations in the demand, but the much 
greater and more frequent variations in the competition, or in the supply which the 
demand is likely to get from other people, and to suit with dexterity and judgement 
both the quality and quantity of each assortment of goods to all these 
circumstances, is a species of warfare of which the operations are continually 
changing, and which can scarce ever be conducted successfully without such 
unremitting vigilance and attention, as cannot long be expected from the directors of 
a joint stock company.75
Smith’s position was that monopolies should be disbanded, having established their 
markets. There were, however, a few necessary exceptions: some trades could 
continue to operate as joint stocks, specifically those that could be reduced to a 
‘Routine’ and required no exclusive privileges, like banks and insurance companies. 
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Although he noted several were incorporated, the Bank England and chartered 
insurance companies had no private-sector monopoly and could be countenanced 
in the long-term because it ‘appeared, with the clearest evidence, that the 
undertaking is of greater and of more general utility than the greater part of common 
trades; and secondly that it required capital greater than can be easily collected by 
copartnery.’76 In these instances, routines and utilities formed connections between 
capitals, rather than friends, family, political cronies or creditors. 
! Smith’s critique fitted into his broader project of outlining the ideal conditions 
for innovation, an enterprise containing a strong technical element. Made up of 
wealth, material resources and skills conditioned by demand, capital flowed along 
the path of least resistance to connect these elements. Historically, these elements 
had spatial characteristics, but as the third chapter of the Wealth of Nations showed, 
their determining economic relationship was topological not topographic: oceans 
and mountain ranges posed a problem to man’s ‘natural propensity to truck, barter 
and exchange’ only inasmuch as they thwarted the technologies of the day. 
‘Improvements’ in transport and communications technology better connected 
capital, producers and consumers, creating more nodes in their networks, and were 
themselves the results of demand. What Smith found especially irksome about 
monopolies was that they impeded communications between self-interested 
individuals by misguidedly adding constraints to trade that were not technical but 
political and social.
! William Vaughan came to understand the mercantile system as ‘narrow’, in 
that trade did not flow ‘liberally’, creating corrupt cultures insulated from markets, 
primarily in commerce but also in the church and universities. Much like the later 
Political Economy Club, his understanding was structured by the radicals who 
formed London’s Bowood House Set, who formed around William Petty, Lord 
Shelburne (1737-1805), the Prime Minister in 1782-3. It is worth outlining the 
composition of the Bowood House Set in some detail to suggest how and why 
Smith’s ideas took root in this particular milieu. Shelburne had thought enough of 
Smith to engage him as tutor to accompany his son on a tour of the Continent in 
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1763-4, and stayed in contact with him thereafter.77 The dissenting firebrand Joseph 
Priestley (1733-1804) was Shelburne’s librarian between 1772 and 1780, after he 
left the non-conformist Warrington Academy. At Warrington, Priestley had taught 
and housed William Vaughan, the Dock campaigner, and his older brother Benjamin 
(1751-1835), the brilliant heir to the planter-merchant dynasty moved to London in 
1769. Both brothers held their time at Warrington in high regard, although 
Benjamin’s vast surviving papers suggest he took on the mantle of philosophe more 
readily than the more practically minded William, who spent his days in their father’s 
countinghouse and served as a director of the Royal Exchange Assurance. 
! Smith was an object of fascination and frustration to Benjamin, who visited 
him whilst studying with Dugald Stewart in Edinburgh, complaining that in his new 
role as Customs Commissioner, Smith ‘does not innovate’ fast enough.78 In 1782, 
Vaughan became Shelburne’s private secretary and was unofficially sent to Paris 
during the peace negotiations to influence their mutual friend, Benjamin Franklin. 
Bowood’s dissenting connection was reinforced by Richard Price (1723-91), whose 
actuarial innovations saw him criticise the growing national debt from a 
mathematical vantage that both Shelburne and Pitt the Younger applied to public 
business in their tenures at the Treasury.79 Shelburne also invited Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832) to join them in 1778 after reading his Fragment on Government (1776) 
and he, too, thought highly of Smith’s work.80 
! All these figures argued in their different ways for a re-distribution of Britain’s 
political, religious and fiscal resources, and maintained connections with the City 
Wilkites, the Association Movement, the Society for Constitutional Information and 
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reformers like Samuel Romilly.81 Philosophically well-informed, galvanised by 
political economy and international politics, sharing an interest in natural sciences, 
and dissatisfied with factional politics, the core had much in common and supported 
one another intellectually and materially. Their tendency to work from ‘abstract’ 
principles sparked Burke’s famous condemnation in the Reflexions, and both 
Priestley and Benjamin Vaughan would decamp to America after being tarred with 
the Jacobin brush.  
! Perhaps precisely because the Bowood House Set were outsiders, Smith’s 
adaptation of Hume’s commerce-as-conversation model provided a powerful set of 
secular resources with which to combat vested interests. Arguing that commerce 
brought peace, initially the group pinned its hopes on the ‘free-port’ system favoured 
by Smith, though known in commercial circles since Walpole’s premiership.82 Free-
port ideologues aimed to abolish the system of drawbacks used to encourage the 
re-export trade and other state restrictions on commercial activity by streamlining 
the revenue and setting the Customs on a more utilitarian footing. Rather than have 
the Customs tax goods entering the port and then pay rebates on those re-exported 
abroad, a system prone to abuse and costly to administer, a free-port would levy a 
single charge on goods entering the country from dock-side warehouses, leaving 
those for re-export untouched. During Shelburne’s tenure as prime minister, his 
secretary Benjamin Vaughan breathlessly reported to his mentor, Franklin, that 
Shelburne talked seriously of implementing the system so as to cement the Peace 
of Paris with a commercial union in the Atlantic. Vaughan thought Britain had 
declined under the weight of vested interest, unlike the uncorrupted Americans, and 
he hoped Britons would:
…be more or less cured of our fighting and monopolizing notions and look to an 
American’s friendship. The boldness of [Shelburne’s] conduct therefore has done 
infinite service to men’s minds, as his conversation has done to the royal mind. 
You will take pleasure in hearing that he talked of making England a free port, for 
which he said we were fitted by nature, capital, love of enterprise, marine, 
connections, and position between the old and new world and the north and south 
of Europe; and that those who were best circumstanced for trade could not but be 
gainers by having trade open. Indeed I may now say to you with courage that I 
38
81 Peter D.G. Thomas, John Wilkes: Friend to Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996) p. 112; Verner W. Crane, ‘The Club of Honest Whigs: Friends of Science and Liberty’, 
The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Apr., 1966), pp. 210-233; 
Norris, Shelburne, pp. 58, 165; Samuel Romilly, Memoirs (London, 1841), passim.
82 Smith, Wealth, ii pp. 884-6.
have scarcely seen or heard any thing of what has passed already... that I do not 
approve and applaud, as conducted upon grand principles.83
Echoing Smith’s arguments, Benjamin Vaughan despised the ‘vulgar politics of wars 
and counter wars, prohibitions of trade and counter-prohibitions, and checks and 
counter checks upon each other’s happiness; we shall follow the contemptible 
example of our European neighbours, instead of doing what between us was so 
very practicable, namely forming ourselves on new principles’.84 Benjamin further 
vented his frustration at Smith’s patchy uptake in his New and Old Principles of 
Trade Compared (London, 1788), a commercial treatise critical of ‘narrow’, ‘old’ and 
self-interested commerce.
! If a free port could foster trade between countries, it required new 
administrative forms because concentrating goods in State-run warehouses created 
new hazards. Smith capitalised on his position as Commissioner of the Scottish 
Customs to recommend a free-port scheme to Shelburne’s Treasury devised by 
Patrick Colquhoun (1745-1820), a Glasgow tobacco merchant. The chief ‘risque’ 
Smith foresaw was to the Revenue’s obligation to secure warehoused commodities 
from ‘fire etc.. [A]nd that by this mode of security the officers of the revenue will be 
put to great additional trouble by the care of warehouses, visitations, delivery of 
goods, etc. which is so much extraordinary duty’.85 Unsure as to whether the 
Customs were capable of reforming port administration without the help of the 
Excise, Smith doubtless influenced the Scottish Customs Commission’s 1783 report 
to Shelburne’s Treasury explaining that Customs officers’ remuneration in fees 
caused collusion between officers and the merchants that paid them.86 To improve 
the security of the revenue they recommended replacing them with wages, which 
more surely tied employee to employer in the long run. Shelburne’s administration 
failed to convince Parliament of the wisdom of this move before he was dismissed 
from office in March 1783. 
! The Bowood Set also developed Smith’s ideas outside of political 
institutions, but were frustrated by the self-defending secrecy practiced by 
government administrators. Jeremy Bentham, pursuing Charles Long in an effort to 
secure funding for his Panopticon, played a month-long game of cat and mouse in 
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the anterooms of the Treasury, the porters’ obfuscation driving him to despair at the 
chicanery of government.87 On 30 March 1785 Benjamin Vaughan wrote indignantly  
to Shelburne that ‘The Commissioners of the Customs were shut up on business 
unknown to me’ whilst they took refuge in offices in the Customs House away from 
public prying.88 A month earlier Benjamin had outlined 23 social groups likely to 
stand in the way of liberal reforms, including the present monopolies, their creditors, 
those making political capital from rotten boroughs, civic corporations, the court, 
those ‘bigoted’ to old ideas and ‘decided to remain in a state in which they have 
thriven’, ‘weak men who will not encounter present derangement for future gain’ and 
those inured to the navigation acts.89 
! Communication could win the opposition over, and the Vaughans went to 
great lengths to instill in their kin a respect for the moral and commercial 
advantages of a good hand and liberal mind working in unison. The imprint of 
Priestley’s materialist educational philosophy and capacity for devising new means 
to display information is palpable here. Benjamin’s son, Henry, practiced his 
penmanship on musical staves, copying such phrases as: ‘Keep such company as 
you may improve or may improve you’, ‘Force is repugnant to liberty’, ‘Grandeur 
cannot purchase peace’, and ‘Learning improves human nature’.90 Reiterating the 
link between clarity and communication, Benjamin Vaughan also wrote a major 
treatise advocating the reform of handwriting in Revolutionary France, claiming 
penmanship was ill-taught and too gothic to communicate information well enough 
in a society where ‘written intercourse with each other & with foreigners, & 
circulation of knowledge, of commerce, & of the arts... [will] constitute a change 
likely to be disseminated among such other nations as shall stand in need of it’.91 
Debate facilitated a ‘manly’ and energetic ‘enlightenment’, as in France, where the 
Tennis Court Oath was interpreted as causing the French ‘people’ to 
‘suddenly...know their own minds... [They] have suffered no new grievances but 
their minds have been opened to the old ones, as to make them operate in some 
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measure like novelties’.92 Faith in the liberating potential of enlightened ideas 
formed a backdrop to William Vaughan’s vision on the eve of the inauguration of 
London’s new Docks in 1805. He saw them as a means of forwarding an agenda in 
which a ‘pacific’, rather than factional, politics could be underpinned by commerce:
Friendly to internal improvement, I have always viewed with pleasure the growing 
objects that promoted them, from their happy tendency to call into activity that 
industry which contributes by principal means comforts, convenience and happiness 
of society[.] And nothing tends perhaps to change the face of country, or the 
manners of its people as the effects produced by canals, good roads and railways, 
which happily facilitate the means of supplying the wants they create. I hope as all 
countries advance in countenancy [sic], national industry and their internal wants 
increase, that commerce may cement their union by a pacific system, which may 
prove happy and beneficial to them all.93        
Communication was the market, which could be marshaled to promote interests as 
well as suppress them.
! William Vaughan’s genius was to graft ‘grand’ ideas onto local commercial 
grudges. London merchants had long objected to the intransigence of the 
wharfingers’ longstanding monopoly over the Quays that caused delays and 
supposedly mushroomed criminal activity amongst quayside porters as trade grew. 
By 1793 Vaughan was rallying this constituency in a series of pamphlets that used 
shipping statistics to show that London’s commercial might was being eclipsed by 
the outports.94 He argued that commercial space ought to reflect London’s 
commercial needs, which meant building facilities where goods could be easily 
taxed and stored in huge quantities for re-export. Part of the problem centered on 
disciplining pilfering dockside workers, and Vaughan and his West India Committee 
sponsored Patrick Colquhoun’s Thames Police aimed at putting the ‘sugar lumpers’ 
on wages rather than remunerating them with perquisites in the late-1790s. The 
scheme had Smithian credentials, allowing the merchants to better police the 
Thames, whilst granting the dockers easier access to the markets through cash, but 
met with resistance from the lumpers initially. Colquhoun worked actively with 
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another Shelburnite, Bentham, in designing the Thames Police force and drafting 
the bill, which would set it on a legal footing.95
! For William Vaughan and his associates the efficacy of Smith’s thought was 
clear despite continually provoking hostility from those outside the group. Traces of 
the intellectual processes Mark Philp identifies in relation to electoral reformers of 
the same period are evident. Like these reformers, the Bowood set presented their 
case:
…as a matter of moral truth and political integrity. Similarly, this feature also serves 
to sanctify personal preferences by representing them as demanded by a higher 
morality, and this in turn may lead people to ignore instrumental calculation: 
prudence may speak against demanding reform, but truth has a higher claim. And 
when the force of law is brought to bear against this morality, it loses its impartial 
character and becomes seen as progressively more corrupt, both forcing and 
making legitimate, active measures to challenge authority.96
Whilst the docks project was a battle over the conceptual underpinnings of British 
overseas policy, the form they took embodied a set of proscriptions about types of 
exchange and commercial authority at home. Locating the docks on the intersection 
of material, legal and economic forces raises a more complex point about the power 
of merchant backing for the project and their specific aims and objectives relative to 
the regulatory orthodoxies of the day. As the next section demonstrates, positioning 
the docks in terms of mercantilism is fundamental to unravelling how we understand 
both.  
!
Section 4: ‘In every case a complete piece of dupery’? Rethinking 
Mercantilism 
Although sacrosanct to the Vaughans, the argument that trade was being unduly 
confined by social and political institutions needs to be approached with caution. 
The ‘Mercantile System’ outlined above was conceptually loaded, being called into 
existence to satirically describe the vast tranche of previous economic literature and 
policy. It has also caused ongoing debate among historians about how best to 
deploy the concept. Mercantilism has variously been used to describe an ‘age’, a 
broadly accepted doctrine, a mode of economic analysis and a party-political trope, 
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categories that are highly questionably due to the difficulties inherent in finding 
criteria to test the classifications. Two theses are identifiable in the post-war 
historiography and will be outlined here. The first, very broad strand follows or 
responds to D.C. Colman’s suggestion that despite being an anachronism, 
mercantilism can be seen as epiphenomenon of economic forces already in place.97 
Mark Grannovetter’s work on socially embedded economies heralds a second 
school, which is far less sure the terms mercantilist or liberalism have any use, 
preferring to stress the informal strategies which held trade together.98 Whilst both 
points of view are hesitant to take Smith’s critique very seriously, the feeling that 
mercantilism was a more or less unstable, discontinuous, churning and unequal 
system is persistent. 
! Chaotic short-sightedness was precisely the quality Vaughan and the 
Bowood Set aimed to overcome in their activities around London. For them, 
mercantilism was a relatively loose framework which provided a means for 
interpreting social phenomena, as it has been for two generations of historians. It 
described non-market transactions as anachronisms that inhibited traders by 
investing parochial laws or social relations with erroneous economic weight. By 
contrast, liberalism validated relatively mobile data, prices and ‘things’ above 
legislative conspiracies and local customs. Following the discussion in the last 
section, mercantilism might be seen as a broad set of exchanges that the Bowood 
set tried to stamp out using technology. Their turn to infrastructural projects like 
docks, panopticons or the watchmaking factory Shelburne sponsored in Ireland, in 
addition to policies and ideas, is important in this respect. Returning to Callon and 
network theory, the section concludes by setting out a reconciliatory paradigm 
based around technology like the Docks that mediated between the state and 
market. The aim is to suggest these mediating technologies can keep the rhetorical 
and embedded strands of argument regarding mercantilism in play, whilst providing 
a vantage from which changes to their make-up can be analysed.      
! The complexity of mercantilism has resulted in historians spending an 
extraordinary amount of time blaming their colleagues for misusing the concept and 
attempting to refashion it in their own image. A.V. Judges in 1939 and D.C. Coleman 
in 1969 and 1980 suggested that mercantilism was a fiction devised by Smith and 
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that economists and historians are simply repeating counterfactuals. They both 
wondered whether expositions of mercantilism really offer anything other than ‘the 
canons of an imaginary system conceived by economists for the purposes of 
theoretical exposition and mishandled by historians in the service of their political 
ideas’.99 Noting the arbitrary chronology Smith imbued mercantilism with, Coleman 
urges that the mercantilist writers and their influence on policy must be approached 
as a pragmatic but disparate set of responses to the social and economic 
circumstances of their day. 
Working in this tradition Patrick O’Brien and S.L. Engerman have written that:
Aristocratic politicians disdainful of trade entertained few doubts about promoting 
and protecting foreign commerce. Merchants and industrialists lobbied in order to 
have lower colonial tariffs and to persuade their colonial cousins to buy more and 
more British manufactured goods. Mercantilists wrote pamphlet after pamphlet 
extolling the pursuit of power and profit. Was all this expenditure of aristocratic time, 
bourgeois money, and intellectual energy merely a sufficient, but in no way 
necessary, force behind British industrialisation from 1688 to 1802?100 
Mercantilists believed markets needed to be captured; what mercantilists 
 wrote about were associations between trade balances, money supplies, output, 
and employment. They did not expect automatic adjustment mechanisms to work 
any more effectively or quickly than they do today. Meanwhile, English mercantilists 
recommended policies designed to procure export surpluses and inflows of 
monetary reserves to support an expanding economy and aggressive polity on its 
way to achieving hegemony at sea.101
However, the historians glumly conclude that the role of exports and empire in 
facilitating British economic growth will never be fully resolved until ‘general 
equilibrium models of the international economy and Britain’s place within it are 
specified and empirically tested for the eighteenth century’.102 Nevertheless, some 
Customs statistical measures are available, as in Table 1.3 which displays David 
Ormrod’s calculation of the differences between the gross and net customs receipts 
to show that significant payments by the mercantilist state were made in bounties to 
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encourage exports prior to 1770. Kenneth Morgan also sees campaigns by 
merchants as having had a decisive role in shaping British fiscal and colonial policy 
in the period, stressing that the ideology stood firm after Smith’s criticisms until the 
1830s, though making fewer claims for their politics facilitating industrialisation.103  
! Historians of political thought have contested the idea that mercantilism was 
a homogenous and continuous set of arguments easily attributed to the propertied. 
According to Terrence Hutchinson, Smith tarred with a single brush a diverse and 
vigorous economic literature published between 1660 and 1776 for polemical 
reasons, before the classical economists of the nineteenth century, David Ricardo, 
John Stuart Mill and J.R. McCulloch, thoroughly infantilised mercantilist thought in 
their economic histories and heavily edited anthologies. ‘For it was with the 
publication of the Wealth of Nations in 1776 that the rise to dominance can be 
traced of the first major, modern theoretical orthodoxy, which in Britain, largely 
excluded or obliterated some of the most significant ideas regarding utility and 
value, aggregate demand and employment, expectation and uncertainty, which had 
emerged in the preceding century of theoretical pluralism.’104 
Table 1.3, British Customs Receipts
Year Gross (£m) Net (£m)
1720 2.8 1.7
1730 3.0 1.6
1740 2.9 1.4
1750 3.7 1.7
1760 3.9 1.9
1770 - 2.6
Source: David Ormrod, The Rise of Commercial Empires: England and the 
Netherlands in the Age of Mercantilism, p. 24. 
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! To be sure, many English mercantilists can be linked to the chartered trading 
companies, but this does not, as Smith implied, preclude them from making 
theoretical contributions alongside advancing their own interests. Although rather 
more cautious in their teleology, others have built on Hutchinson’s focus on 
arguments. Lars Magnusson, for instance, sees mercantilist ‘discourse‘ as a series 
of important self-referential texts, but by no means doctrinaire.105 As such, state 
intervention or lobbying is seen as a reaction to economic ‘reality’ and removes from 
the field of analysis any of the organising concepts that linked them to a wider and 
historically constituted culture, emphasising, instead, that mercantilist discourse was 
limited, coherent and paradigmatic.106
! However, Julian Hoppit’s tentative analysis of the circulation of economic 
literature suggests that the focus on economic theory is somewhat misguided.107 
Not only did mercantilist writers operate in an intellectual terrain in which there was 
little disciplinary structure before Stewart in Edinburgh, ‘oeconomy’ did not fit well 
into eighteenth-century schemes of knowledge, generally being seen as branch of 
household management. Hoppit’s bibliographic examination of collections of 
economic literature from the century after 1660 suggests four key features. First, 
more works were produced after the lapse of the Licensing Act (1695) with peaks in 
publication occurring around political crises, and this literature was therefore tied to 
the growth of parliamentary legislation. Second, most works were between one and 
a dozen pages. Third, they were increasingly published anonymously. And finally, 
most works engaged with the tertiary sector of trade, finance, and exchange, where 
the executive could make the biggest impact.108 All of this shows that economic 
literary boundaries were fluid, multifarious, hard to classify for contemporaries and 
much scrappier than scholars who exclusively focus on the mercantilist canon, 
which often circulated in manuscript, are likely to recognise.
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! More recently, Steve Pincus’s intervention in mercantilist studies aims at 
rethinking metropole-periphery debates from an Atlantic perspective.109 Quoting 
approvingly from Judges and Coleman, Pincus sees mercantilism as an explanatory  
tool embedded in the discipline of history, and falsely assumed to have several 
inter-related fundamentals. First, mercantilism is taken by historians to have 
provided a broadly accepted framework for British imperialism, guiding legislators, 
politicians and polemicists from the late-Elizabethans until the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century, and, as an uncontested set of principles, has been seen to deny  
empire a party-political dimension. Next, the defining feature of mercantilist thought 
is assumed to be that economic resources were finite, and that the gain of one 
nation or empire came at the expense of another; attaining wealth was, thus, a 
‘zero-sum game’ supported by the balance of trade theory and encouraging 
interventionist strategies. Rejecting these ideas, Pincus argues that we ought to see 
no formal consensus over mercantilism, but should, instead, acknowledge from 
1660 onwards a party-political dimension to discussions, identifying a Tory camp 
committed to a landed and finite view in dialogue with a Whig camp prone to see 
labour as the fount of prosperity. While the Whigs may have won key battles over 
empire around the time of the Glorious Revolution,110 this did not dampen or 
foreclose debate in the metropole or colonies:
partisan politics, which became increasingly multifaceted over the course of the 
eighteenth century, served to structure the reception and deployment of new 
economic information and policy recommendations. The reactions to those policies 
in the colonies and dependencies and in England were always deeply informed by 
partisan perceptions.111
Pincus argues that his formulation narrows the distance between imperial centre 
and periphery, while also recognising the vibrant dynamics of colonial policy. This, 
he suggests, means that we do not need to resort to ‘cultural earthquakes’ brought 
about by extraneous forces to explain away the collapse of the mercantilist system 
after 1760. The published commentary on Pincus’s intervention points to some 
problems in his reasoning, not least that historians have been rather more 
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circumspect than he allows in deploying mercantilism as a doctrinaire or organising 
principle.112 
! Several prominent historians have gone so far as to completely jettison the 
label of ‘mercantilist’ from their analyses of mercantile politics, arguing that it is 
decidedly unclear whether economic life generates a normative politics. Business 
records show that early modern men and women bought from known suppliers, sold 
to repeat customers, employed kin or relatives and favoured political factions. Much 
work has been devoted to examining the ties of obligation, credit and reciprocity that 
facilitated such exchanges.113 As economic theorist Mark Granovetter has argued, 
market relations are ‘embedded’ within social frameworks and develop their own 
conventions, which gives them context. Writing in 1985, in riposte to neo-classical 
economists, Granovetter objected to their view that commerce was socially 
‘atomised’, but equally rejected Marxist and other explanations of commerce that 
retreated into over-socialised dyads like workers and bosses. Firms have weak but 
friendly contacts with other firms, he argued, with the corollary that firms have 
imperfect operational information about themselves, opening the door to 
malfeasance within them. That is, firms can be altered from the inside and 
potentially impressed by the activities of other firms, either of which may change 
their strategies.114   
! Historians of the eighteenth century, such as David Hancock and 
Sheryllynne Haggerty, have put Granovetter’s ideas and other economic network 
theories to good use, reconstructing the cultural milieu of merchants and showing 
48
112 See Cathy Matson, ‘Imperial Political Economy: Ideological Debate and Shifting Practice’, 
pp. 35-40, Trevor Burnard, ‘Making a Whig Empire Work:Transatlantic Politics and the 
Imperial Economy in Britain and British America’, pp. 51-56 and Susan D. Amussen, 
‘Political Economy and Imperial Practice’ p. 50 all in William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 69, 
1 (2012).
113 Barry Carruthers, City of Capital: Politics and the Markets in the English Financial 
Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Margaret Hunt, The Middling Sort: 
Commerce, Gender, and the Family in England, 1680-1780 (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1996); Craig Muldrew, Culture of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social 
Relations in Early Modern England (London: St Martin’s, 1998); Naomi Tadmor, Family and 
Friends in Eighteenth-Century. Household, Patronage and Kinship (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999); Richard Grassby, Kinship and Capitalism: Marriage, Family, and 
Business in the English-Speaking World, 1580-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); Margot Finn, The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture 
1740-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, 
The Culture of Giving. Informal Support and Gift-Exchange in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); for titles focused on merchants see below.
114 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness’, American Journal of Sociology 91, 3 (1985), pp. 481-510.
them to have negotiated diverse layers of trust and obligation.115 They have 
suggested that merchants formed robust mechanisms to monitor one another, 
assess risk and formulate long-term commercial bonds, leaving the way open for 
interaction between competitive firms and the development of markets abroad. 
Situated in a longer tradition of anthropological studies of merchant practice, focus 
on ‘embeddedness’ has been illuminating insofar as it links together mercantile 
business strategies with the preoccupations found in the correspondence, genetic 
capital and other artefacts left behind by merchants.116 The stress on caution, 
context and stability amongst inter- and intra-firm neworks in this literature makes 
identifying changes relatively difficult, and certainly the state is largely discounted as 
a motor for change. As Haggerty argues, the British state was relatively well trusted 
by merchants, paying back loans, encouraging re-exports and maintaining convoys 
during conflicts. Consequently, efficient ‘private order’ cultures embedded 
merchants in social relations across the United Kingdom that meant their recourse 
to politics was a last resort rather than natural right.117 Gauci’s extensive surveys of 
London merchant politics found economic pragmatism, shifting administrations and 
internal fractures to have concealed the traces of a balance of trade argument. 
Attending to the full variety of economic behaviours historians of consumption, 
empire and credit have unearthed recently, Gauci explicitly argues that narratives of 
growing liberalisation in the eighteenth century look less convincing than ever 
before, and that ‘regulation’ might prove a less teleologically charged framework.118 
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! Researching commerce from the vantage of ‘embedded’ markets makes 
mercantilism seem a blunt analytical instrument. Smith certainly did favour some 
forms of exchange over others but why should firms of any description take heed of 
economic theories? Despite his pioneering work on embedded relationships, 
Granovetter was similarly dismissive of the notion that arguments constitute 
markets, noting Smith had written in The Wealth of Nations that ‘people of the same 
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation 
ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.’ 
Granovetter explains that Smith inaugurated laissez faire by suggesting formal 
regulations be repealed in favour of publicly accessible trade directories (similar in 
function to the Yellow Pages) that might ‘connect individuals who might never 
otherwise be known to one another’. ‘Noteworthy here’, Granovetter states, ‘is not 
the rather lame policy prescription but the recognition that social atomisation is 
prerequisite to perfect competition’, suggesting that the counterfactuals of 
economists are best ignored.119 
! Certainly one must be cautious in applying economic models to complex 
historical situations, where success and failure had potentially disastrous 
consequences. Yet given the directory was explicitly envisaged to make 
‘connections between people who might not otherwise know one another’, one 
could argue that Smith was not ‘atomising’ society but, theoretically, adding a new 
‘policy’ to the mix. As Michel Callon observes, economic actors may well become 
more distant but the gap between them is closed by things, sometimes endorsed by  
economists, especially the objects that constitute ‘markets’, such as data from 
directories, market-places and commodities, that connect them differently.120 Trade 
directories were relatively sophisticated by the standards of the day. Remuneration 
in perquisites, annual rents and the use of credit and tokens in the eighteenth 
century meant cash exchanges might not be daily practices or remain relatively 
customary.121 Valenze tentatively suggests that by the mid-eighteenth century 
attitudes towards acquiring and spending money were losing their immoral 
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character, and the fungibility, alienability and mobility of sovereign currency was 
seen as giving its users independence compared to other remunerative practices.122 
Vaughan and Bentham certainly saw money as a potentially liberating technology 
and both advocated the use of saving banks to buttress the ‘industry and frugality’ of 
the poor.123 Certainly this was ‘regulation’ in the sense that Gauci uses the term, but 
it relied on calculative agencies being uneven and malleable at a local level.
! The Dock project was similarly an attempt to force, in a material sense, new 
systems of exchange or calculative frameworks on the chartered companies. 
Evidently Smith and his coterie favoured the ‘routine’ economic technologies that 
spread the ‘calculative agency’ of economic actors by being mobile, predictable, 
comparable and enmeshed in formal systems of knowledge. Uninformed East India 
Directors, politicians with ‘popular’ agendas, scheming trade associations and even 
indebted dependents all had the potential to disrupt exchanges. Smith’s abstract 
markets were not really so abstract in practice just more regular, open to scrutiny 
and objective: ‘To abstract’, notes Callon in a jointly written essay, is ‘to transport 
[data] into formal calculative space’.124 If Vaughan was trying to realise Smith’s 
unseen markets amongst a resistant merchant community, disrupting or ‘improving’ 
the flow of information and goods which mercantilist sociability was based on in the 
chartered companies was a natural ploy. Not only does this strategy explain 
Bowood Set’s turn to projects after Shelburne’s fall from power but also the outcry in 
the City, who fully recognised what was being attempted. 
! Callon’s idea of networked competences to account for the market draws on 
Bruno Latour’s notion of calculative agencies, which is of further analytical value. 
Latour has been concerned to show how knowledge circulates and creates 
specialist ‘centres of calculation’, like laboratories, universities or banks.125 The 
‘centres’ establish ‘networks’, gather material and information and lay down 
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protocols as to how to change the form of knowledge.126 These engines of change 
can be highly resistant to change themselves, not least because objects can be 
unruly, making innovation difficult without specialist equipment, skills and 
technologies (‘things’), but also because even rational scientific communities require 
‘nature’ to be represented and socialised in specific scholarly ways. However, inertia 
is relative, and less strongly socialised networks may move faster or in different 
directions. The stress here is on connections between actors or institutions that 
erect more or less effective barriers and, moreover, the material and conceptual 
‘things’ that need to be in place to make lasting relationships. It is in this sense that 
we might consider Vaughan’s Docks and the whole campaign surrounding them as 
‘things’ aimed at building a new political economy, i.e. Smith’s. Nevertheless, it also 
entails recognising that the various networks attached to the Docks experienced 
Smith’s political economy differently and even Vaughan’s understanding was by no 
means pure, but socialised by his associates.!
! This multiplication of meaning stems from Latour’s refusal to let ‘modernity’ 
become an explanatory category for the success of projects like the Docks. To 
explain how Vaughan succeeded, one ‘is not allowed to use external reality to 
explain society’ by drawing on notions like class, science, rationality or the market 
because these imply some meta-principles are at play, which cannot be sustained if 
one examines past or different cultures.127 Rather, success and failure must be 
judged by the highly individuated networks on hand to actors, each with its own 
conceptual, physical and “thingy” potentials and limitations. It is from these that 
social life and theoretical reductions are ‘constructed.’ ‘Without the countless objects 
that ensured their durability as well as their solidity, the traditional objects of social 
theory - empire, classes, professions, organisations, States- become so many 
mysteries.’128 Consequently, the most contentious claim made by these theorists is 
that agency is distributed across networks, using different strategies depending on 
the local circumstances. For instance, Callon has argued that whilst many actors 
like fishermen, meteorologists, supermarkets and boat-builders are enrolled in the 
fishing industry in response to complex socio-economic and scientific rationales, the 
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fish enroll for more instinctive reasons. Although the fish are easy targets given the 
sophisticated technologies mobilised to catch them, they still exert pressure on 
humans because without them the fishing industry evaporates.129!Equally, all the 
strategies historians have used to give Adam Smith meaning, from the Cambridge 
School’s rhetorics to Foucault’s panopticon, might be in play in a single network, just 
at different points. 
! ‘Things’ provide a median point to overcome some of the problems intrinsic 
to mercantilism. On the one hand, whilst following networks is never going to give 
O’Brien a satisfactory answer to the effect mercantilism had on British 
competitiveness, they can be used to measure the expansion or contraction of the 
agencies involved in regulating the market. On the other hand, shifts in the 
technologies used to underpin merchant life reveal not only different regulatory 
patterns but processes of disembedding as well. Such shifts might well have been 
slow and utilitarian such as the adoption of practices like bookkeeping, as economic 
network theorists imply, but they might also have been responses to intellectual 
currents, such as reading Adam Smith and turning to politics. Insofar as policies do 
shape the market, preeminently through taxation, it seems churlish to discount any 
activity as economically invalid, though erecting new networks may be difficult. 
Indeed, network theory suggests any two cultures might be brought together by 
actors, political or commercial, because they are simply socialised by things. The 
key question is how lasting the connection and how radical the change.  !
Section 5: The Structure of the Thesis
Vaughan’s Dock project and the work of the Bowood Set on the Quays serve as a 
series of case studies in ‘enrolling’ people into a liberal consensus, in the sense that 
Latour and Callon use the word, to mean the erecting of sustainable networks that 
displaced mercantilist sociabilities. Each of the case studies that form the 
subsequent chapters is considered through the lense of different networks. To an 
extent this has been driven by the availability of sources, though the extensive 
Vaughan family have left private papers in London and America and, like most of the 
characters explored here, were well connected men who lead lives within the 
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confines of well documented institutions, like the Customs, insurance, colonial 
lobbies and chartered companies. Nevertheless, the aim in each case has been to 
explore how the things involved in the Docks campaign contributed to ‘embedding’ 
Smithian political economy in London or can help problematise historical 
understandings of how markets were constructed and functioned during the 
eighteenth century. Consequently, chapter one explores the capacity of Vaughan’s 
Dock campaign to enrage Londoners in order to unpick the relationship between the 
enlightenment and local economies in light of the enlightened economy theses 
associated with Berg and Mokyr. The next chapter examines how Smith’s ideas took 
root in the Customs under Shelburne in an attempt to combat corruption on the 
Quays. Chapter three turns to the Bowood Set’s relationship with the insurance 
industry to question the role of routine utilities in promoting improvements in 
London. Finally, the fourth chapter examines the role of the West India Merchants 
lobby in establishing the Vaughan’s Docks as well as pirating his ideas wholesale in 
a rival scheme. 
! Although this choice of topics may sound bewildering, Latour admits one of 
the difficulties in ‘using’ ‘ANT [actor network theory] is not to be intimidated by the 
type of figuration’ or language used to describe a network, which may be statistical, 
discursive, geographical or pictorial. Instead, he argues all registers are valid in that 
‘ideo-, or techno- or bio-morphisms are all just “morphisms’’, or ways of representing 
interaction between networks.130 Let actors provide ‘their own metaphysics’ and 
generate your own expertise as a researcher, he says. Whether this descriptive 
strategy creates value for historians relative to more critical and predetermined 
theories of modernisation is left for fuller discussion in my conclusion. However, 
within each body of evidence moments of acceleration, new connections between 
institutions and discourses have been inventoried to capture the dynamism of the 
economy and the radicalisation of specific elements under the Bowood Set.    !
! Chapter one situates the City within a spectrum of different of calculating 
agencies in London through insurance records, emphasising that this agency had 
an intellectual as well as economic dimension. Despite Vaughan’s enlightened 
credentials, the 1796 campaign for the Docks saw petitions flood Parliament from 
Thames-side parishes objecting to the scheme, although residents of Westminster 
were simply indifferent to them. These very different reactions to Vaughan’s 
proposals speak of a capital where various interests were active and that the 
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‘enlightened economy’ Joel Mokyr and Maxine Berg have heralded needs refining. 
In systematically sampling insurance records from the silk and iron trades, it is 
possible to read this theory through changes in the built environment and choices 
available to consumers. Using 1,400 policies it is possible to build up a crude but 
essentially static picture of a capital divided into several distinct economic zones 
from 1710 to 1814. The policies show that highly nuanced and geographically 
specific architectural forms underpinned the business strategies in each area, 
cutting across both trades. Whether it took the form of the West End classicism that 
was essential for mercers, or the City coaching inns used by wholesalers, the built 
environment profoundly shaped the flow of business information in and around the 
capital, and with it the calculative agency of the native populations. Parochialism 
abounded and changes in consumption patterns were slow and highly uneven, 
causing a pronounced east-west divide in the capital. This birds-eye view suggests 
that several enlightenments were possible in London, and that both the politics and 
economic aims merchants like Vaughan pursued should be examined through the 
information networks operating in the City, which were distinctive.
! Chapter two investigates officers of London’s Customs House in order to 
ascertain how City merchants interacted with the state, and how the projected 
Docks merged with fiscal policy. The Excise has been hailed by John Brewer and 
others as characterising a modern bureaucracy, but these traits arrived relatively 
late in the port of London, which was largely administered by the Customs.131 A 
prosopographical analysis of all 230 landwaiters, the middle-ranking officers in daily 
contact with merchants on the Legal Quays, between 1738 and 1785, shows the 
Customs to have been a pasture for Treasury appointees and a classic instance of 
Georgian corruption. By 1776 the link between political patronage and fiscal 
inefficiency was clear to Customs Commissioner Sir William Musgrave, and 
attempts to discipline officers through wages and pensions were underway from 
1783. This chapter nevertheless argues against any simple model of bureaucratic 
evolution, suggesting that political corruption only got worse in the period 
immediately prior to the ‘age of reform’, as instigated by administrators like 
Musgrave and extra-parliamentary political campaigners. Not only was corruption 
political, it was biological, manifest in the aging bodies of the officers and causing a 
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breakdown in the relationships with London’s merchants as they became 
increasingly reliant on merchant fees to build up retirement funds. Although London 
merchants frequently bribed officers, their growing appreciation of a regularly 
remunerated Customs service suggests that close, reciprocal and corrupt 
relationships with them were becoming unworkable after the extreme 
mismanagement of the 1770s. 
! Chapter three explores the limits of Musgrave’s methods by examining the 
insurance industry in the City, one of the ‘routine’ utilities applauded by Smith for its 
unflinching administration of money and things, as opposed to people. Vaughan 
himself was a director of the Royal Exchange Assurance, and the City’s insurance 
industry has been associated with many shifts in the calculative agency of 
policyholders as a result of the future-orientated and predictive capabilities of 
actuarial science. However, Robin Pearson’s work suggests that while fire was a 
particular threat to the City’s mercantile warehouses, in no way did this translate into 
investment in fire-proof buildings in that sector or in the later Docks.132 Examining 
the career of East India Company warehouse builder and insurance surveyor, 
Richard Jupp, it becomes clear that although the insurance companies collected a 
lot of data about their policy holders this knowledge was hard to process or 
formalise. Jupp continued to use traditional, highly flammable material in his 
warehouses. Explaining this, a further investigation of the warehousing economy 
suggests that the sector was heavily dependent on high-levels of continuity and 
trust, which focused on investment into human capital rather than plant. It is argued 
that warehouses were themselves were well articulated calculative spaces that 
used the signs frequently carried by people, like badges, licenses and tickets, to 
assess the risk they posed to buildings    
! Chapter four outlines the role of Legal Quays and Docks in creating 
commercial writing. Drawing on ideas used by Miles Ogborn in Indian Ink, it suggest 
that the Quays were a crucial site in generating knowledge about trade, which 
contributed to the political, economic and cultural values deployed by merchants like 
Vaughan.133 Exploring several genres of writing about the Quays emanating from 
the Customs, merchant lobbies and the 1796 Inquiry into the Port of London, the 
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chapter suggests that the volume and reach of commercial information grew 
considerably over the eighteenth century. Each of these genres of writing described 
or formed networks aimed at making members of the commercial community more 
compliant, whilst also spreading that information more widely. Commercial 
information made both new ideas about political economy and labour processes on 
the Quays more accessible as well as making commercial networks more 
bureaucratic. It served, therefore, to reshape mercantilist sensibilities by reaching 
beyond merchants to politicians and other members of the commercial community. 
Further it is suggested that Vaughan’s Docks were another iteration of this process, 
creating better commercial information with which to press down on Quayside 
labour but also altering the calculative agency of City merchants. Combined with 
shares, these disrupted the colonial lobbies still further, and suggesting that the top-
down analyses of the Docks by Linebaugh, following Marx, and Ashworth, following 
Foucault, are obscuring the interactions between knowledge, sociability and 
property that made the Docks capable of forming elite sensibilities as opposed to 
only offending them.134    
! Focusing on the port of London in depth, this dissertation shows that 
Vaughan and his associates not only tried to fight mercantilism but that they had 
some success in materially changing how it operated. In doing so they contributed 
to a shift towards more Smithian markets. However, the Bowood Set were by no 
means entirely successful, and their plans were both resisted and highjacked; saw 
many objectors bought-off rather than convinced; and gentlemanly standards 
amongst themselves and at the upper echelons of the large bureaucracies that they  
courted, or ran, were never questioned. Enrolling people into a Smithian consensus 
took many ‘things’ but the networks got larger, more complicated, and more 
regularly bureaucratic in most cases.   
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Chapter 1: Calculative Agency in London
This chapter aims to do two related things. First it will consider London in the 
eighteenth century, giving a sense of its breadth and growth, as well as 
distinguishing between the business cultures prevalent in each district. In doing so it 
aims explore Michel Callon’s notion of calculative agency and how historians might 
use it as an analytical tool. In particular, it will add to the debate surrounding the role 
of consumption in crafting ‘enlightened’ economies and novel identities in Britain. 
Through a study of around 1,400 insurance policies this chapter shows that the 
economic identities of different parts of London were peculiar. Relationships 
sustained through trade in silk and ironware were unevenly spread throughout 
London, occurring in different social contexts and spaces. The research suggests 
that communities saw and experienced commodities in relatively unchanging 
economic settings like the shop or warehouse. Radical changes in either sector 
were rare, which rendered the break promised by the Docks campaign particularly 
disconcerting for those in the distribution sector. It is the furore surrounding 
William’s Vaughan Docks campaign that prompts the second claim made here, 
chiefly that these materially embedded economic identities had a political element, 
which meant his Smithian agenda was understood variously across the capital. 
Politeness has been used to explore how ideas, sociability and political agency 
were structured in certain cultural milieu in the eighteenth century, and it is 
suggested that similar canons existed in less affluent communities as well. These 
milieux were preeminently experienced through geography in such a way as to 
create several fairly intractable calculative frameworks around London that, far from 
rendering new ideas like Vaughan’s inadmissible to certain communities, did limit 
their uptake. Ultimately, this chapter argues that the idea of an economic 
enlightenment was by no means broadly accepted as rational because it was one of 
many ways of understanding an economy where local cultures had very different 
ideas about how economic activity should be sustained culturally, politically and 
materially. 
Section 1: Calculative Agency
Callon’s concept of calculative agency foregrounds information of any kind, the 
ability to process it and the ability to act on it in making economic decisions.135 
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Everybody is potentially an economic agent but there are barriers to how that 
agency is deployed. In Callon’s argument, data occupy real spaces, with a definition 
of ‘space’ that stretches from the supermarket shelf to the computer screen. Whilst 
processing these data requires education, vocational training or experience, 
“computing” also happens in space, where the data can be arranged, compared or 
mathematically manipulated. The ability to realise an outcome from a calculation 
further requires that one has the opportunity to go through the formal channels 
appropriate to that kind of transaction, such as selling (‘objectifying’) a share or 
choosing (‘singularising’) a particular product. None of these steps is evenly 
distributed across society at any one time, though communication technologies are 
important at all three stages. For instance, portable digital technologies make 
comparisons of price and quality with other retail outlets possible, even when one is 
immediately confronted with the limited stock of an individual store.136 ‘A new way of 
conceiving of the relations of domination running through and structuring markets 
thus emerges, by considering that they are inscribed in relations of calculation.’137
! In the eighteenth century pronounced inequalities in education, wealth and 
the distribution of products and services, compounded by slow communications, 
resulted in sharp differentials in calculative agency across the economy. 
Contemporaries perceived the City as the heart of the moneyed interests. It was 
underpinned by an accumulation of agencies that processed and circulated 
uncommon information-rich objects like bills of exchange quickly by virtue of their 
social and geographical proximity. For example, the urban-rural divide, issues 
around literacy and the simple fact of poverty meant it was highly unlikely that a 
Cumberland spinster could acquire shares, let alone play the stock market. Markets 
were not even and Callon’s concept asks one to distinguish the ‘algorithmic 
configurations’ that ‘circumscribe calculative agencies’, ‘organise their encounter’ 
and ‘establish rules and conventions’.138 
! The same applies when looking at the more quotidian commodities passing 
through the port of London, like sugar, lead or East India goods. Although 
transported around the United Kingdom and re-exported, these commodities existed 
within networks of marketing agencies of differing scales, geographical penetration 
and social constitution, as Sheryllynne Haggerty has shown for the ports of 
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Liverpool and Philadelphia.139  Agricultural and primary products could have highly 
uncertain qualities, putting wholesalers, who had a greater choice of goods and 
more information about sellers, at an advantage. Retail shoppers also had limited 
ranges of goods to choose from in terms of quality, although the number of shops in 
a particular area had the potential to extend this spectrum. Alternative materials 
might also be a factor, as in the cloth trade, where woolens, linens, cottons and silks 
of various grades and mixtures had to compete at varying prices.140 Fashionable 
designs in anything from porcelain to shoe-buckles further distinguished the 
calculative potential of consumers, both in their ability to afford premium goods and 
respond to information about the tastes of others. Things themselves constituted 
information in use, when seen in combination with other similar things, and seen in 
certain spatial contexts like the pleasure garden, street market or warehouse.  
! Putting to one side momentarily the challenges inherent in undertaking a 
mass inventory of calculation, it is useful to elaborate why this approach matters 
and the historical debates the research speaks to. From the perspective of 
historians of the last 15 years or so, it has become orthodox to argue that 
consumption needs to be integrated with production in any explanation of the British 
economy. This tack argues that an examination of consumers results in better 
understanding of the diverse range of products, design practices and production 
processes that preceded, accompanied and eased large-scale factory output. Not 
only does this make sense from the point of view of classical economics but it is at 
the heart of the ‘consumer revolution’ thesis floated in the early 1980s. As John 
Plumb, John Brewer and Neil McKendrick forcefully pointed out, marketing worked 
in tandem with productive forces.141 Jan de Vries also influentially re-modeled the 
concept in his ‘industrious revolution’ paradigm, locating in the seventeenth-century 
household a turn away from traditional self-sufficiency and home-produced goods 
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towards novel services and products acquired on the market.142 Purchasing rather 
than producing commodities required cash and, as such, an income necessarily 
derived from the market as a specialist supplier of goods or services. De Vries’ 
theory refigured the place of men and, importantly, women in the economy across 
social strata, imbuing them with a rational and self-interested outlook, and providing 
them with an agency in the economic landscape that was to take shape slowly in 
the eighteenth century.
! In perhaps the most sophisticated synthesis of this scholarship, Maxine Berg 
has stridently put the case for changing attitudes toward ‘Luxury and Pleasure’ 
amongst middle-class consumers as prompting and hastening the exploitation of a 
range of novel products, materials and styles. Berg finds in late-seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century economic discourse of Bernard Mandeville, David Hume, Adam 
Smith and others the idea that identities could be crafted through the acquisition of 
goods rather than schooling or church.143 Their thought shifted consumption of 
luxuries from a morally-charged problem to a socially useful and economically 
desirable phenomenon that spurred on the manufacture of endless consumer 
novelties. Berg simultaneously reveals the luxury and semi-luxury commodities 
capable of firing middling imaginations and opening their purses. Such goods came 
from the Far East, were dispatched to America and were imitated, pirated and 
redeveloped in new materials to suit middling Britons. Though global in scale and 
conducive in some instances to factory-style production, the palette of processes, 
markets and materials was one prone to elaboration rather than standardisation, 
profoundly diverse and innovative. 
! Berg’s work provides an excellent model, showcasing the insights gained by 
connecting producers with consumers through material culture. Her approach is 
doubly important for this study because she poses the question of how London fits 
into this system. London had an extensive middling population throughout the 
eighteenth century, and it exerted a significant cultural pull. However, Berg points to 
the more noticeably expanding, confident and upwardly mobile industrial towns like 
Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Sheffield that ‘carried forward the 
61
142 Jan de Vries, ‘The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution’, Journal of 
Economic History, 52, 4 (1994), pp. 249-270; idem., ‘Between Purchasing Power and the 
World of Goods’, Brewer and Porter eds., World of Goods, pp. 85-132; Cf. Mark Overton, 
Jane Whittle, Darren Dean and Andrew Hann, Production and Consumption in the English 
Household (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 173-4.
143 Maxine Berg, Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth Century Britain (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 21-46.
great dynamic of modernity based on provincial and industrial enlightenment. They 
were not poor copies of London, but distinctive centers of intellectual ferment, 
industrial and scientific innovation and provincial and regional pride.’144 Here, Berg 
echoes Ferdinand Braudel and T.S. Ashton in foregrounding the role of the 
provinces in galvanising British economic activity by joining taste with productive 
forces.145 The argument also rubs shoulders with Joel Moykr’s vision of an 
Enlightened Economy in Britain, slightly different to Berg’s, where a free market in 
‘useful knowledge’ allowed industrial savants and fabricants to develop the 
productive processes which led to sustained economic growth.146 Evangelists of 
Mokyr’s thesis have also given Birmingham a central role, but have questioned 
whether Berg’s notion of changing consumer demand and expectations ‘belong in 
any causal sense to the history of the Industrial Revolution’.147  
! Chris Evans has used the example of plantation hoes to argue that any 
association of enlightenment and consumption must be highly qualified, and 
provides another cogent reasons to probe the “production-consumption” model. 
Evans suggests that the mass-produced hoe was redesigned continually in 
eighteenth-century Britain, adapted to different climates and crops, branded and 
became a signifier for colonial agricultural politics. However, this process had a 
disjointed relationship with its primary market, slaves, who had little choice in their 
tools or location as consumers. He goes on to argue that, in terms of hoe-design,
! It is the masters whose voices appear in the written record, and they who wrote the 
! script, but the instructions issued by planters must have stemmed from observation 
! of their enslaved workers and consultation with them...Yet even here, slave 
! consumers remain inscrutable, rendered so by their servitude and kept so by the 
! accumulated contempt that surrounds the implement with which they labored.148 
He continues, ‘The case of the hoe suggests that some goods were in themselves 
protean; the intrusion of psychocultural variables—“desire” and the like— was not 
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required. (And if psycho-cultural factors explain so little in the case of the hoe, how 
much are they really explaining with regard to other goods?).’ Evans makes the 
case that some products exist in a milieu removed from the processes of identity 
crafting elaborated by consumer theorists, occupying a place that actually rendered 
their users invisible. 
! As John Styles has further explained, plebeian expenditure in Britain 
represents an important social category that should cause historians to pause when 
assessing the impact and depth of consumerism in the period preceding 
industrialisation. His work suggests the acquisition of fashionable clothes and 
accessories could be achieved on credit, but thrift often prevailed, especially when 
young families were setting up home.149 Studies of second-hand markets, from 
auctions to pawn shops, have also suggested the persistence of strategies of 
appropriation and adaptation in the eighteenth century.150 Army and navy provisions, 
uniforms and ordnance contracts suggest that a further dislocation between 
consumers and those who realised use-value was not uncommon in the period.151 
Various forms of what Styles calls ‘involuntary consumption’ meant that the 
enlightening potential of consumer choice was blocked, circumscribed or highly 
mediated for large swathes of the population.152 
! Given Smith and, subsequently, the Bowood House Set’s concern with the 
proper method for achieving material wealth, as described in the introduction, 
debates over the enlightening capabilities of the economy are of no small moment 
to this thesis. Berg and Mokyr are no doubt correct in suggesting that some towns 
or sections of the economy did grow spectacularly, Birmingham being the prime 
example, and this could lead to new found confidence and radical ideas. It could 
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also lead to profound discontent heaped with moral and political implications, as 
Patrick O’Brien and Giorgio Riello have illustrated using foreign travellers’ accounts 
of the British industrial revolution.153 Ironically, Berg also begins her book by 
recounting the sacking of Joseph Priestley’s house in Birmingham in 1791, though 
does not interrogate the ‘Church and King’ riots further. Likewise, Mandeville, the 
often quoted arch-priest of consumerism, saw his scandalous Fable burnt by the 
public hangman in London. The enlightenments presented by economic historians 
do little to assuage the criticism that they are too limited to account for the range of 
social groups that engaged with the world of goods at differing intensities and their 
varied reactions to the thoughts of philosophers and critics. 
! What Lawrence Klein wrote of the British capacity for ‘politeness’ applies 
equally to the term ‘enlightenment’ in its current formulation:
! Cultural capacity is like linguistic ability in a polyglot setting, which can be activated 
! by different individuals to different extents, depending on their abilities, needs and 
! interests...It follows that stable and fixed relations do not exist between cultural traits 
! and groups of people: clearly cultural traits are patterned but the patterns are fluid 
! and unpredictable. The sort of cultural interpretation that is called for here is not 
! therefore a correlation of cultural traits with a level of social hierarchy but rather an 
! account of what people think they are doing and expressing when they perform 
! social actions.154
Politeness has, of course, been a particularly productive way of examining middling 
British culture, but the research questions Klein outlines can be generalised through 
Callon’s calculative agency quite easily. Klein from a historical vantage and Callon 
from a Deleuzean one are pursuing a similar tack in asking what material, economic 
and cultural factors need to be in place to “activate” agents in relation to exchange, 
how it is conceptualised, discussed and reiterated socially. The advantage of 
Callon’s more abstract model is that it does not rely on antimonies (polite-impolite) 
but can allow for a more nuanced analysis that might range the enlightened, the 
polite, the thrifty and the enslaved together. Nor should it exclude the political 
connotations of the market.   
! Like Mandeville, Vaughan’s Docks equally caused Londoners to question the 
wisdom of his ideas despite his promises that they would enhance London’s 
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prosperity. The Dock campaign of 1796 saw 39 petitions reach Parliament and clear 
distinctions can be drawn between, on the one hand, chartered and overseas 
merchant groups ‘for’ the docks and, on the other, petitioners grouped along 
parochial, ward or district lines ‘against’ them.155 Apart from the opposition that 
came from the Corporation of London and the wharfingers, who were directly 
interested in maintaining their monopoly, petitions originated from three Southwark 
parishes, Rotherhithe, the Thames-side wards of Billingsgate, Tower, Queenhithe 
and Vintry, and Candlewick and Aldersgate. All these communities predictably 
complained that established networks linking the docks to the wider economy would 
be rendered redundant by removing the protected Legal Quays from their current 
location. By contrast, Westminster residents made no petitions. 
! Statistics generated in the nineteenth century continually suggest to 
historians that the maritime East End and industrial suburbs on the northern fringes 
of the City suffered endemic poverty when compared with the City and West End.156 
Yet poverty itself does not explain the political form or content of the opposition to 
improving programmes put forward by the merchant groups promoting the Docks. 
As the residents of St John, Southwark, stated, 3,000 feet of wharfs and 
considerable investment in warehousing meant, 
! That full Four Parts in Five of the Housekeepers of the said parish consist of 
! lightermen, warehousemen, watermen and persons who are led to reside in the said 
! parish on accounts of the local benefits arising to them therein from its 
! advantageous situation immediately at the seat of commerce [i.e. the Legal Quays] 
! and, who, in consequence of any removal of trade therefrom will either be totally 
! deprived of their connection and livelihood or otherwise compelled to move 
! therefrom under great uncertainty of obtaining a living elsewhere157
They envisaged getting poorer if the goods that they housed, transported and 
administered were removed. And so would the other ‘shopkeepers’ and tradesmen 
of the parish, alongside those dependent on the poor rates they produced, which 
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had been propped up by sophisticated annuities schemes. The petitioners were far 
from plebeian in the sense used by E.P. Thompson.158 
! The Docks suggest debates over the location and nature of economic 
activity were as much about preserving communities as wholesale endorsements of 
enlightened political economy that promised progress. Expectations formed around 
persisting types of economic activity, and not just production or consumption but 
lumpen and mercantile activity too, shaped the reception of ideas or projections of 
economic futures, as the Docks were at the time. Whilst the well-educated and 
theoretically informed Vaughan can be seen as an exponent of an enlightened view 
of the economy, Callon’s notion of calculative agency is very useful for exploring the 
structures which meant several conflicting interpretations of his ideas emerged in 
response, i.e., the merchants’ backing, the bankside parishioners’ discontent and 
the West End’s indifference. What Callon understands as information, education 
and access (and Klein as ‘polyglot...abilities, needs and interest’) had material 
supports which can be measured, compared and localised in time and space. The 
quantifiable nature of these ‘things’ also reveals patterns and variations in economic 
practice that add to rather than detract from Berg’s central proposition, that material 
culture matters, albeit not to the exclusion of related forms of expression.
! The next section elaborates how to uncover these populations of economic 
artefacts, in London at least, with the aim of producing a dynamic analysis of 
difference and continuities of economic practice by looking at the location, material 
culture and capitalisation of firms engaged in the silk and iron trades there. 
Subsequent sections will outline the resulting findings in aggregate and through 
detailed case-studies of specific business configurations revealed in the sample. As 
a whole this chapter is not an attempt to assess the economic viability of the Docks, 
so much as explore of a methodology designed to reveal why they, as an 
enlightened idea, could generate different meanings.    
!     
Section 2: Modelling Agency
This section looks at the London economy in order to think about how we might 
begin using calculative agency to probe claims about the coincidence of economic 
practices and ideas concerning the market. In particular, it draws attention to a 
phenomenon known as ‘clustering’, prevalent in the literature on industrialisation, 
the work of Alfred Marshall and historically minded economic network theorists like 
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Mark Casson. Clusters form a platform to interpret data harvested from insurance 
records, which are seen as markers of growing economy agency and as spatially 
bounded. Even within London, regional specialisation did create benefits for 
manufacturers and retailers. However, it is argued that certain firms were often fairly  
limited in their business outlook, albeit for different reasons. While this left City 
merchants to play an intermediary role between regions, it also created pockets of 
radically different calculating agencies, which can be crudely compared using the 
insurance policies. As we will see, economic growth was not necessarily matched 
by a decline in parochialism because economic calculations had more or less fixed 
material constituents.    
! Leonard Schwarz’s analysis of the capital during the period of 
industrialisation provides an excellent description of London’s economic structures. 
London’s two ‘heroic’ periods of demographic expansion occurred in the centuries 
before 1660 and after 1850.159 The thrusting dynamism of the provinces evoked by 
Berg is rather lacking and the picture is murkier: ‘Under the apparently stable 
surface, however, change was constant.’160 Trade, trafficking, finance and legal and 
government services made London distinctive and were highly lucrative.161 
However, as Schwartz stresses, London also remained the biggest manufacturing 
centre in Britain, its strength lying in extensively integrating traditional workshop 
manufacture. Industries requiring larger plant simply found London too expensive to 
undergo expansions in scale, except on the peripheries. Instead, London comprised 
sets of interlocking businesses, where production, finishing and marketing were 
undertaken by a series of sub-contractors, as in Clerkenwell watchmaking or Fleet 
Street engraving, publishing and printing.162 The standing and wealth of retailers 
and wholesalers grew into to ‘a shopocracy’ as a result of the productive gains 
caused by linking highly specialised craft processes with the ‘Court’ in the West End 
taking finer goods and the port in the City servicing the export trade.163 
! David Barnett has re-iterated this analysis in his exhaustive study of 
London’s economy using insurance records from between 1770 and 1825. In his 
view, London supported an extraordinary and increasing variety of businesses, with 
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the capital’s strength founded on diversity and finishing trades but not necessarily 
on large-scale works. He, too, points towards the retailers and wholesalers who 
made up a culturally significant and wealthy portion of his sample.164 Again, this 
proliferation in the diversity and size of firms was based on existing structures rather 
than the creation of an ostensibly new one built on extensive coal-powered 
machinery. Even by the seventeenth century, London dwarfed provincial towns, but 
it was not ‘homogenous’, consisting of ‘distinct but interdependent economic 
districts’.165  
! The emphasis on specialisation evident in all the secondary literature 
concerned with industrialisation can be clarified by reference to Alfred Marshall’s 
concept of industrial ‘clusters’. His Industry and Trade suggested that while heavy 
industries need to be located near sources of power and material, and whereas 
plant cannot be economically accommodated in towns, smaller workshop-style 
production could still flourish. ‘An industry which does not use massive material, and 
needs skill that cannot be quickly acquired remains as of yore loth to quit a good 
market for its labour.’166 Drawing an example from cutlery, precisely the consumer 
durables Berg sees as constitutive of enlightened production, Marshall wrote: 
‘Sheffield and Solingen have acquired industrial atmospheres of their own; which 
yield gratis to manufacturers great advantages, that are not easily to be had 
elsewhere: and an atmosphere cannot be moved.’ Clusters of firms need not be 
provincial towns per se, but simply bunched in areas that allowed them to exploit 
relative advantages they had over other neighbourhoods, regions or nations. Their 
capabilities are also well suited to flexible production, in that,
! their industrial specialities are mainly of two kinds. They do nearly the whole of the 
! finest manual work, and especially the artistic element; while of course they use 
! subtle mechanical appliances, where these are serviceable. They also make goods 
! of all kinds, and especially clothes to the order of rich customers, that are conveyed 
! to the producers through a special class of shopkeeper; who themselves do much of 
68
164 David Barnett, London, Hub of the Industrial Revolution. A Revisionary History, 
1775-1825 (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies,1998), Ch. 6, esp. pp. 131-9
165 Charles Harvey, Edmund Green and P.J. Corfield, ‘Continuity, Change, and 
Specialization Within Metropolitan London: The Economy of Westminster, 1750-1820’, 
Economic History Review, 52, 3, (1999), p. 490.
166 Alfred Marshall, Industry and Trade: A Study of Industrial Technique and Business 
Organsiation; and Their Influence on the Conditions and Various Classes and Nations 
(London: MacMillan & Co., 1919), pp. 284-5.   
! the constructive work in designing; pay very highly for the work they put out; and at 
! the same time make extraordinarily high profits and turnover.167
The emphasis on materiality underpinning craft skills prompts Marshall’s opinion 
that ‘a man can generally pass easily from one machine to another; but that the 
manual handling of a material often requires fine skill that is not easily acquired in 
middle-age: for that is the characteristic of an industrial atmosphere.’168 Firms 
concentrating, thus, in a small area gain from more efficient marketing, competition 
between small firms, pooling of information and the relatively easy transmission of 
design practices. 
! Clustering creates benefits for those close by, especially in marketing. 
Marketing is the type of information about goods available to consumers, and 
necessarily these forms have a spatial aspect. A sign or shop front requires people 
to walk past it; a newspaper advert is mobile but limited by the distribution network; 
lists of prices are adequate when contracts are relatively secure across distances. 
Physical or cultural distance are registered by the forms of information economic 
agents choose to pursue or generate and, as Mark Casson argues with Marshall in 
mind, the quality of this information implies access to specific networks.169 The 
further up the supply chain one is, the greater the likely investment in impersonal 
marketing, like branding, in order to benefit from economies of scale, as opposed to 
cultivating trusted patrons or clients through direct contact.170 
! How, then, might clusters in eighteenth-century London be mapped? First, 
one might look in trade directories like Kent’s, published throughout the century, 
which list the names of firms, the trades they pursued and their addresses in order 
to build up a picture of where different industries gathered. Second, one might 
examine insurance policies and follow roughly the same procedure. The Sun 
Policies, running continuously from 1710 onwards, provide an excellent resource. 
Typically fire insurance policies contained a date, the name and address of the 
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policyholder, their occupation and the sum covered. This last feature is of signal 
importance in that it gives a gauge of how much capital each business insured. 
Thus, richer clusters can be distinguished from poorer ones. Moreover, later policies 
even break down the capitals insured into the categories of real estate, household 
goods, stock and utensils, books, plate, apparel and china and glass, which gives 
unrivalled insights into the priorities of policyholders. Buildings or pieces of industrial 
equipment that were considered outlandish or rare like mills were also noted on the 
policies.171!
! The policies permit an insight into the relative calculative agency of the 
policyholder. This is especially apparent in terms of retail and marketing. Whereas in 
productive sectors a large policy might signify a high investment in fixed plant, in 
sales-orientated sectors this implies consumers had a large choice of products and 
a wider knowledge of the market. It also suggests whether they were able to sell 
expensive goods in that district or not. Clearly overlaps existed between 
wholesaling and retailing, and it is not suggested here that wholesalers strictly 
abstained from shopkeeping or vice versa.172 Nevertheless, given that stock in trade 
represented 70-90% of the total capital insured by the firms studied here, focusing 
on shops gives us at least some measure of how “the market” was territorialised in 
different districts of London, in terms of the density of retail or wholesale outlets and 
the abundance of goods in them. 
! Insurance policies are not without their problems as a source, as the detailed 
technical discussion in Appendix 1 shows. However, they do offer the opportunity to 
start thinking about the choices facing businesses and their customers in a manner 
different to those suggested by other kinds of business records, like account books 
or journals. Their combination of location with the sums covered highlights the 
existence of clusters in London and helps us to identify relatively affluent ones, 
thereby signalling areas with distinct cultures of production and consumption. In 
doing so, insurance records can be used to corroborate insights found in the 
extensive secondary literature on London trade, but also draw our attention to what 
made particular environments lucrative or not. This pushes further a preoccupation 
of this thesis, where close attention to insurance strategies over time, the use of 
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buildings and the information provided by sources including advertisements, 
criminal depositions and business records have been used to explore business 
models that are largely absent from existing secondary literatures, especially with 
reference to the wholesaling and distribution sectors. It is these patterns which 
made the Docks so highly contested.
Section 3: The Silk and Iron Trades in London!  
The next two sections outline the statistical case for the argument that Londoners 
enjoyed different levels of access to commodities depending on their location. In this 
context, the selection of silk and iron for these studies invites elaboration. 
! Silk was the choicest textile in early modern Britain due to its exotic origin 
and consequent expense. Importing silks, other than raw bails, was subject to a 
high degree of mercantilist interference, as cloths processed by aliens were seen as 
robbing British weavers of work. London’s Legal Quays were the focus for these 
imports, not only because it was the largest single market for silks but also because 
it was the seat of the Customs Commission, who worked with the Weavers 
Company and City merchant houses to police the trade.173 Domestic silk weaving 
centered on Spitalfields, though many processes, especially dying and throwing, 
were completed outside of London, where labour was less fractious and water was 
more accessible. Coventry ribbons and Macclesfield handkerchiefs were amongst 
the standardised products sent back to London from the provinces, though Norwich 
and Essex also produced broad cloths of mixed fibres, crepes and gauzes.174 
! Rioting weavers caused the 1765 prohibition of foreign silk imports into 
Britain, protecting Spitalfields weavers from French competitors. The latter produced 
cheaper goods as the fibres used in the production of French silk were acquired 
domestically.175 More legislation arrived in the Spitalfields Act of 1773 that 
empowered City Aldermen to fix the wages of weavers in order to dampen industrial 
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unrest.176 Silk production in London was increasingly uncompetitive, and wares 
produced in the provinces were cheaper, although in 1822 provincial manufacturers 
were said to ‘have had not the taste’ of Londoners.177 Catering for the fashionable 
London market, however, Spitalfields could capitalise on the industrial atmosphere 
and circuits of knowledge generated by London’s retailing mercers. Vaunted 
designers of seasonal ‘flowered’ silks, such as Anne Maria Garthwaite, emerged as 
professional taste-makers. Geographical fixity in combination with an abundance of 
existing secondary studies makes processing the policies generated by Spitalfields 
weaving a somewhat fruitless enterprise. Instead, this study will focus on those 
policies associated with the more mobile throwsters to represent the productive part 
of the trade, alongside those of mercantile silkmen and retailing mercers, which are 
less well known. 
! Richard Cambell’s London Tradesman provides a concise description of 
what these terms meant, though he understates the complexity of the interaction 
between them and their customers. Silkmen bought raw silk, which they acquired 
through City merchants importing from the Levant and Italy, like John and Thomas 
March whose letterbooks survive, the East India Company or on their own account. 
Campbell saw them as straddling overseas and inland distribution, though his 
description speaks of the exalted status overseas merchants enjoyed despite the 
fact they probably shared plenty of skills: ‘If we consider him as a warehouse-
keeper and retailer, he requires no great genius...if as a merchant, we refer him to 
that chapter where his qualifications are comprehended under the description of a 
general merchant’.178 Silkmen sold raw silk to throwsters who converted the ‘skein’ 
into yarn in sheds, employing both drawing mills and a large number of hands in the 
winding stage, ‘mostly women’.179 In turn, the throwsters sold to dyers and weavers 
both in London and elsewhere. Mercers retailed finished silk cloths bought from 
them, though, as we shall see, this was not straightforward.   
! Iron was subjected to far less formal regulation than silk, despite the fact that 
domestic production was substantially supplemented by higher quality imports from 
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the Baltic.180 By the end of the seventeenth century, London’s Ironmongers 
Company was a dining club that administered charitable bequests not the trade.181 
Finished iron goods came to London from the Midlands overland or by river via 
Oxford, while the Sussex Weald supplied ordnance to the Navy Board and London 
Merchants until the 1770s.182 After 1770, large-scale ironworks in Wales, the north 
and Scotland began to dominate the process of casting goods, although outworking 
remained the dominant mode of organisation in the Midland trades.183 However, 
large volumes of Baltic bar-iron were landed in London and even if most was 
shipped to regional centres of production, the policies sampled in this study reveal 
some founding was carried on in London, as well as detailed working and finishing. 
Fashionable ironwork ranged alongside staple products, especially hand-tools, 
locks and nails, meaning the imperatives of ironmongers and iron-founders differed 
materially from fashionable mercers in scope.
! Insuring as an ironmonger or mercer did not necessarily mean that the 
policyholder was confined to selling iron or silk. At the retail end of both trades, the 
necessity of offering customers a large range of products doubtless meant that 
goods other than silk and iron would be stocked.184 Mercer Richard Perkin insured 
the King’s Arms, Henrietta Street, and Covent Garden in 1720. On his death in April 
1722, his shop was inventoried: in addition to silks it included cottons, woolens, and 
shagreens.185 Similarly Campbell asserted that ‘the brazier and ironmongers shops 
are generally united, and in them you find Grates, and Stoves of all fashions, 
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Pokers, Fire Shovels, [etc.]’.186 Likewise, a trade card for the Ironmongers Edward 
and William Martin of Foster Lane from 1776 advertised a dizzying range of 
products, including
! all sorts of files and tools for goldsmiths, jewelers, engravers, clock and 
! watchmakers; also for blacksmiths, gunmakers, braziers, tin-men, upholsterers, 
! carpenters, joyners, carvers [etc.], Curriers knives and implements for gardening, all 
! sorts of nails, locks, hinges, brass works for cabinets &c., furniture for coffins; all 
! sorts of brass and iron wire, spinnet and harpsichord ditto, watch keys, glasses 
! springs [etc.]. Melting pots of all sorts, Houghs [hoes], bills, axes and other iron work 
! for ye plantations.187
Given the diversity of materials and the forms they were worked into, it is likely 
several suppliers would be engaged, although it is impossible to be sure which 
goods constituted the primary source of income for an individual trader. A good 
number of policy-holders insured with dual occupations, usually in cognate sectors: 
for example ironmonger-braziers, or, mercer-drapers. The wide range of contacts 
fostered in amassing these inventories still helps explain the lateral movement of, 
say, mercers to woolen drapers.         !
! The aggregated insurance policies reflect the buoyancy of the silk and iron 
trades across the eighteenth century. Outlining the key movements briefly serves to 
provide a basis for a more detailed discussion of the trends and strategies 
considered later in the chapter.! !
! For the silk trades, the chronology delineated by table 2.1 is relatively 
straightforward and conforms to the narrative drawn by earlier historians of the 
industry.188 The early eighteenth century was a golden period, the mid-century saw 
a dip in activity, which was arrested in the 1770s, before declining again towards the 
end of the century. Before the early-1710s most of the policies state that £300 had 
been covered by the policyholder, reflecting the cap that applied in these early years 
for the Sun Office, hence their omission from this table and others. However, in 
terms of numbers of policies taken out, the 1710s and 1720s were positively hectic 
for the mercers, with a quarter of total policies falling in these years for all 
occupations.  After that, sums covered were variable, and on the whole tended to 
rise in real terms until the 1760s, though the volume of policies declined after 1724. 
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As Natalie Rothstein has suggested, the capture of French overseas colonies in the 
Seven Years War led to an unsustainable boom in British silk production for the 
export market, followed by a spectacular collapse immediately after the Peace of 
Paris, and the statutory intervention to protect the industry after the Parliamentary 
Inquiry of 1764-5.189 
Table 2.1: London Sun Policies, Silk trades 
Mercers Silkmen Throwsters
Number of 
Policies
Average 
deflated 
Policy (£)
Number of 
Policies
Average 
deflated 
Policy (£)
Number of 
Policies
Average 
deflated 
Policy (£)
1710-14 79 10 8
1720-24 88 637 4 546 9 603
1730-34 44 1405 5 1916 10 720
1740-44 31 1519 1 309 8 1037
1750-54 22 1638 3 1804 2 722
1760-64 37 2077 6 598 18 1712
1770-74 52 2161 15 823 19 859
1780-84 38 2243 11 1899 4 712
1790-94 59 1564 4 1842 3 1624
1800-1804 20 1630 2 1862
1810-14 29 1438 5 5257 2 286
Total 499 66 83
Sources: V&A Sun Index (V&A Sun). Values deflated using the Schumpeter-Gilboy 
price index, industrial products (B).
! These strains were felt unevenly in the industry: the period 1760-3 saw a 
high number of policies taken out by mercers and throwsters, who exploited 
favourable conditions before a near complete cessation in 1764. By comparison, 
although few silkmen insured before the war, and silkmen completely ceased 
insuring between 1756 and 1759, activity in this sector also rose after 1760. By the 
1770s, the number of policies had risen, though it must be noted that inflation also 
decreased the real values of the capitals insured by throwsters and mercers. 
Silkmen insured slightly more in real terms when compared with the 1760s. 
However, they were also most affected by the dangers wartime posed to shipping 
and cargos; the early 1760s meant both unforeseen risks and a buoyant demand for 
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their product at home. Overseas conflicts raged during all the sample periods after 
1774 and made themselves felt across all the silk-related occupations assessed 
here, as did inflation. By this point, the industry was in terminal decline measured by  
both the volume of policies and real values. The rate of decline was not the same 
across the industry, happening comparatively slowly for mercers and much more 
dramatically for throwsters and silkmen, as silk processing increasingly moved away 
from London.
Table 2.2: London Sun Policies, Iron trades
Ironmongers Iron founders
Number of 
Policies
Average deflated 
Policy (£)
Number of 
Policies
Average deflated 
Policy (£)
1710-14 28
1720-24 30 460
1730-34 22 953
1740-44 28 710
1750-54 19 942 2 941
1760-64 53 894 2 821
1770-74 58 1176 3 1100
1780-84 28 975 4 1856
1790-94 84 1046 ! ! 4 992
1800-1804 41 867 1 268
1810-14 67 1149 5 1054
Total 458 21
Sources: Museum of London Library Sun Index (ML Sun). Values deflated using the 
Schumpeter-Gilboy price index, industrial products (B).
! The historical narrative for London’s iron trade is not so clearly defined. And 
yet, proper attention to insurance records reveals that its trajectory stands in stark 
contrast to that of silk. Illustrated in table 2.2, its story was one of slow, hard-fought 
growth. For ironmongers, the real values covered by policies rose on average from 
£460 in 1720-24 to £1,149 in 1810-14, with twice as many policies being taken out 
at the end of the period. Given the domestic origin of iron and its use in ordnance 
and shot production, it comes as no surprise that wars did not have the same 
adverse effect on the trade as they did for silk, though locating a pattern for the 
growth of the trade is tricky. Seemingly, war did check growth in the 1740s when 
there was a fall in average real-coverage, although this was without a 
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corresponding decline in the numbers of policies filed. In the latter periods, this 
changed: a notable period of regression occurred in the 1780s, when policy 
numbers and real-coverage dropped during the American Revolutionary Wars. 
Colonial exports represented a major component of British hardware, and problems 
in this sector filtered through to the London trade, indicating the extent to which 
global, in addition to local markets, were significant.190 Nevertheless, the London 
trade had rebounded by the 1790s, before a similar cycle occurred between 1800 
and 1815. By this time, ironmongers had overtaken mercers in terms of coverage by  
volume and average policy value. The resilience of the industry in straitened 
circumstances was, perhaps, sustained by advances in forging, puddling and 
casting in the Midlands and Wales, which resulted in lowered production costs. 
Equally, the increasing number of policies also suggests ironmongers adapted to 
increasingly variegated markets in London.
Section 4: Location
Insurance policies were assiduous in noting the addresses and locations of the 
goods they concerned. However, there was no generic form of street address in the 
eighteenth century, which complicates any attempt to map this information. The 
addresses given in the policy documents testify to the layered nature of place, 
usually combining one or more of the following signifiers: a shop-sign or, after 1767, 
house number; a street name; a parish or district (Wapping); or a local landmark 
(Monument). Contemporary maps allow street names to be traced with reasonable 
accuracy, but rarely do they allow, say, the precise location of the King’s Head, 
Paternoster Street, as insured by Charles South, mercer, in 1742, which on long 
shopping streets could make a considerable difference to the character of the 
area.191 Moreover, major thoroughfares like Cheapside crossed several knots of 
parish boundaries, making the omission of the nearest parish by the Sun clerks 
especially irksome. Addresses outside central London were noted with little 
attention to detail, with Joseph Cook, mercer, insuring a business at ‘Uxbridge’ in 
1743.192 Presumably this indifference to detail reflects the scarcity of mercers there, 
and therefore the relative ease with which he could be located at the time. 
Consequently, the following attempt to locate these trades is at best a splicing of 
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often-imperfect information taken from the policies with cartographic sources that 
are inevitably silent on some points. 
! With this caveat in mind, this section proceeds by utilising an anachronistic 
analysis concerned with broad geographical trends. To outline general trends, the 
policies were assigned a geographical district within London, shown in Figure 2.1. 
From west to east these are Westminster, Covent Garden, Western City Suburbs, 
West City, East City, Eastern City Suburbs, South London and Other Suburbs. The 
district boundaries are consonant with that of the modern day post-coding of central 
London (WC1, EC1, etc.), though these have been modified in order to retain a 
sense of the City of London’s integrity relative to the rest of the capital. The City has 
been broken into two large sectors, west and east on a line running from London 
Bridge to Bishopsgate Street. The Eastern City includes the Legal Quays and 
primary overseas mercantile district. Each of these City sectors has been assigned 
a suburban component, roughly equating with areas ‘without’ the traditional City 
walls and radiating outward. The West Suburbs include Holborn, Clerkenwell and 
Hoxton; the East Suburbs include Spitalfields, Whitechapel and Shadwell. The 
Covent Garden district stretches down to the Thames, bounded by Clare Market on 
the East and Leicester Square in the West. Anything further west is assumed to be 
Westminster. Urban south London is counted as one district, though areas like 
Greenwich are included in a zone designated Other, made up of outlying villages 
including Chelsea and Uxbridge. 
Figure 2.1: Districts used for the study: Source: Motco.co.uk
! In terms of the geographical distribution of policyholders, Table 2.3 shows a 
clear distinction can be made between the iron and silk trades. Divisions of labour 
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were reiterated by location in the silk trades. For the throwsters, the Eastern 
Suburbs of Spitalfield and Whitechapel were the focus of most policies. Considering 
the concentration of the weavers here, this is hardly surprising. Despite a more 
varied distribution in the 1720s, most silkmen operated from the West City with 
some activity appearing in neighbouring districts in the East City and Western 
Suburbs from the 1730s. Given the silkmen’s mercantile function, their City location 
also seems sensible. The mercers generated the largest volume of policies, at 499. 
In combination, these suggest a trade that was similarly concentrated 
geographically, while also presenting a picture that was more complex than either 
the silkmen or throwsters. Two districts, Covent Garden and the West City around 
Cheapside, generated 157 and 109 policies respectively, comprising over half the 
sample. Westminster and the East City generated a quarter more, meaning the 
remaining four districts in the East, South and Suburbs supported under a fifth of 
the mercers between them. Such a disparity between north-west and south-east 
suggests wealth and fashionability were decisive factors in the location of mercers’ 
shops. Reiterating this relationship, ironmongers were far more evenly distributed 
around London. Despite a tilt towards Westminster and the West City, no single 
district dominated as lopsidedly as did Covent Garden’s mercers. The aggregate 
figures suggest two patterns: one shaped by occupational networks and the fairly 
static concentrations of silkmen and throwsters in particular areas of London; the 
other, prominent in the retailing trades, points to a relationship between markets, 
fashionability and goods, to which the mercers were particularly sensitive.
Table 2.3: Sun policy activity by district
Throwsters Westminst
er
Covent 
Garden
West 
suburbs
West 
City
East 
City
East 
Suburbs
South Other
1710-14 8
1720-24 7
1730-34 6
1740-44 1 7
1750-54 1 1
1760-64 16
1770-74 1 1 5
1780-84 2
1790-94 1
1800-1804
1810-14 2
Total 1 1 2 1 54
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Silkmen Westminster Covent 
Garden
West 
suburbs
West 
City
East 
City
East 
Suburb
South Other
1710-14 2 1 2 4
1720-24 1 1 1
1730-34 3 1
1740-44 1
1750-54 3
1760-64 5 1
1770-74 8 4 1
1780-84 2 7 1
1790-94 3 1
1800-18
04
2
1810-14 2 2
Total 2 1 4 39 8 5
Mercers Westminster Covent 
Garden
West 
suburbs
West 
City
East 
City
East 
Suburb
South Other
1710-14 6 31 2 26 7 1 2 1
1720-24 8 30 4 16 8 7 4
1730-34 1 15 1 13 4 2 1
1740-44 9 2 10 6 1
1750-54 1 7 2 5 1 1 1 1
1760-64 1 17 2 8 2 1 3
1770-74 1 14 8 16 6 1
1780-84 5 13 2 3 6 1 1
1790-94 15 12 7 6 8 3 4
1800-180
4
6 5 3 3 1 2
1810-14 13 4 3 3 1 2 1
Total 57 157 36 109 50 9 19 13
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IronmongersWestmins
ter
Covent 
Garden
West 
suburbs
West 
City
East 
City
East 
Suburbs
South Other
1710-14 8 6 2 2 2 2 1
1720-24 6 4 8 1 2 2 1
1730-34 6 1 3 6 1 1 1 1
1740-44 2 2 6 6 1 1 5 1
1750-54 4 4 3 4 1 1 1
1760-64 14 5 5 3 5 6 2
1770-74 14 3 7 9 2 8 3 3
1780-84 4 2 4 4 7 4
1790-94 13 3 13 12 5 11 8 6
1800-1804 8 1 6 11 6 1 1
1810-14 8 5 10 11 7 10 6 2
Total 87 32 63 76 25 54 32 18
Sources: V&A Sun and ML Sun.
! Viewed historically, a pronounced shift in the districts inhabited by mercers is 
identifiable in table 2.3. Again, this is far less noticeable amongst the ironmongers. 
Indeed, Covent Garden and the West City tailed off significantly as desirable 
locations for the silk trade after the industry’s partial recovery in the 1770s. The 
1790s is a particularly interesting period, showing how these two traditional 
heartlands of mercery lost ground to competitors in Westminster, the Western 
Suburbs and even the East City. Measured by the volume of policies in each district, 
Westminster seems to have become increasingly attractive during this later period, 
taking up a growing proportion of the declining trade. With the iron trade tending to 
be more active, and insuring larger capitals, no narrative of decline can be fixed to 
it, with no one district emerging as dominant at the end of the period. Westminster 
and the Eastern Suburbs engrossed a large proportion of the trade in the 1760s and 
1770s as the trade expanded as a whole, but only the latter managed to retain this 
share into the 1800s. Other than a very slight long-term increase in the share of the 
trade operating from the East City, little changed in the ironmongers’ geography, 
which remained fairly evenly spread across the entire period considered.
! In both trades, South and East London, and London’s outlying villages 
remained undesirable locations. Mercers and ironmongers, on average, covered 
markedly less valuable goods in these areas. Further, activity in these districts 
tended to coincide with peaks in the trade, falling off to nothing or negligible levels 
when the trades were doing badly elsewhere. For example, of 32 mercers’ polices 
taken out in South London and the Other suburbs, 24 came between 1710 and 
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1764 when the trade was in rude health. Similarly, 50 ironmongers insured in these 
districts, 34 of them after 1770 when the trade was doing well. Undoubtedly the lack 
of sufficiently wealthy markets deterred mercers. Suburban East London expanded 
in population by 213,809 between 1801 and 1841, but generated just 5 mercers 
between 1790 and 1814 compared with 27 ironmongers.193 The built environment 
also played its part, with mercers John Turner, John Barry and William Jones & 
Thomas Richard all expanding into the East City Minories in the 1770s and 1780s, 
only after George Dance’s square and crescent had gentrified the area.194 
! Assessing the liveliness of a trade by the number of policies taken out in 
each area can be a blunt tool, indicating enterprise without suggesting its scale. To 
further uncover levels of activity, it is necessary to make an assessment of the 
average value of assets insured by ironmongers and mercers in each of the 
districts. Doing so echoes the story outlined above, although Appendix 2 
complicates the matter somewhat by providing a detailed discussion of the problem 
posed by real property in the sample.195 Table 2.4 shows mercers preferred Covent 
Garden, which remained the area where they were keenest to locate until the 
1770s, whereupon Westminster, the Western Suburbs and West City began to take 
up a larger proportion of their capital. In 1760-4, Covent Garden accounted for 
£39,646 of £70,905 of capital insured by the mercers, and 17 of 34 policies. After 
1790, assets in Covent Garden were quite insignificant, signifying the area’s general 
decline. By contrast, mercer investment in the Western City remained heavy in the 
later sample periods, although with only small numbers of policyholders covering 
large sums. A comparison of the average policy taken out in each district makes the 
same point more directly. In 1790-4, 12 mercers insured in Covent Garden had an 
average policy value of only £786, whereas 6 were insured in the West City at an 
average of £1,756. In the same period, however, both districts lagged well behind 
the 15 Westminster policies, which covered an average of £2,148, and the 7 
Western Suburbs’ policies, which covered an average of £2,458. By 1810-14, 
Westminster saw 13 policies taken out, covering £1,423 on average; the West City, 
3 policies at £1,764, and the West Suburbs, 3 policies at a high average of £3,029. 
By any measure, Covent Garden, had gone from being the most buoyant of 
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193 David R. Green, Pauper Capital: London and the Poor Law, 1790-1870 (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2009),  Table 2.1, p. 52.
194 V&A Sun, Mercers, John Turner, 1772; William Jones & Thomas Richard, 1774; John 
Barry, 1791.
195 See Appendix 2 for a discussion of property.
mercery districts in the early-eighteenth century to being reduced to competing with 
small fry in the East End by the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Trade drifted 
westwards into Westminster, which was preeminent in terms of insurance activity 
and the large average values for policies. Towards the City something different 
happened: although the West City saw a decline in the number of mercers insuring, 
significant businesses remained there and in Western Suburbs, which housed a 
few, highly capitalised outlets. This was a significantly different wholesaling model 
making it presence felt.
! Until 1760 the ironmongers’ investments remained far steadier across the 
districts, when the Eastern Suburbs around the Thames became homes to high 
levels of capital, circumstances that might be related to the war. By the 1790s, 
Westminster, the West City and Western Suburbs accounted for the majority of 
capital insured. Like the mercers, Westminster saw much activity, with large 
average policies evident in the 1790s. Nevertheless, the West City and Western 
Suburbs were not left behind: 13 Ironmongers were insured in Westminster at an 
average of £1,569; 12 in the West City at £1,582; and 13 in the West Suburbs at 
£1,175. These districts continued to be home to bustling markets through to 
1810-14, and trade in the South, Eastern districts and Covent Garden also 
expanded, albeit with lower than average policies. Unlike the mercers, who formed 
a ring of fairly well capitalised outlets on the City’s eastern boundaries, ironmongers 
eschewed the district. Rather, the Eastern Suburbs supported a number small of 
ironmongers. By comparison with the mercers, ironmonger investment in specific 
districts did not experience dramatic fluctuations; nor did one district dominate the 
trade at the expense of others, while average capitals tended to be more proximal. 
This equality of distribution must be attributed to the ubiquity of iron goods in the 
household during the period, which made a local retailing ironmonger 
indispensable. That said, from 1770 a gradual acceleration of activity with 
expanding capitals in Westminster, Covent Garden, the Western Suburbs and West 
City saw the classic poor East-rich West division take shape.
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Table 2.4: Relative activity of mercers and ironmongers by district, selected years 
Mercers Westmins
ter
Covent 
Garden
West 
City
West 
suburbs
East 
City
East 
Suburbs
South Other
1720-24: 
average 
(£) 775 685 632 486 798 695 471
number 8 30 16 4 8 0 7 4
1760-64: 
average 
(£) 543 2332 2418 662 2583 2174 902
number 1 17 8 2 2 0 1 3
1790-94: 
average 
(£) 2148 786 1756 2458 166 626 633
number 15 12 6 7 8 3 4 0
1810-14: 
average 
(£) 1423 833 1764 3029 1772 1136 1421
number 13 4 3 3 1 2 1 0
Ironmongers
Westminst
er
Covent  
Garden
West 
City
West 
Suburbs
East 
City
East 
Suburbs South Other
1720-24: 
average (£) 520 457 424 300 427 718 500
number 6 0 8 4 1 2 2 1
1760-64: 
average (£) 644 1026 1216 1073 990 1459 696
number 14 5 3 5 5 6 0 2
1790-94: 
average (£) 1569 966 1582 1175 1194 389 596 319
number 13 3 12 13 5 11 8 6
1810-14: 
average (£) 1225 1160 1487 1130 867 875 1002 351
number 8 5 11 10 7 10 6 2
Sources: V&A Sun, and ML Sun. Values deflated using the Schumpeter-Gilboy price 
index, industrial products (B).    
! Dividing London into anachronistic districts is less than ideal. Clearly these 
districts fail to do analytical justice to the ironmongers in the same way they do the 
mercers, as the equivalent calculations tend to be much flatter in the former case. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to draw conclusions from the available evidence. Firstly, 
the distribution of the iron and silk trades differed considerably in London. Secondly, 
it is clear that, even if mercers were contracting and ironmongers expanding, in a 
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large city like London these general trends were not evenly spread. Some clusters 
could expand against the run of the trade, showing that their primary customers 
were substantially different despite similarities in occupation. Thirdly, in highlighting 
variations in the patterns of insurance across the districts, it is also clear that a 
degree of occupational variety existed within each trade, which also had spatial 
characteristics. Each of these points suggests that the calculative agency of 
Londoners differed considerably from place to place, though changed relatively 
slowly over time. 
! In order to highlight how these different economic cultures map onto the 
tripartite division the Docks campaign provoked, three case studies will be 
examined: first, what permitted mercers in Westminster to usurp the once 
fashionable Covent Garden; second, the structure of West City mercery and, third, 
the East-West division in ironmongery. In these next sections the stress is on how 
information systems built around polite culture and what I will term wholesaling and 
maritime culture actively framed the economic decisions of the policyholders in the 
sample set. It is not that these markets were rivals but constructed from different 
material and subsequently “activated” by different concerns. Accordingly, 
commodities, wealth, spaces, communications and the accessibility of goods were 
managed differently, combining the social, economic and material into one 
‘machine’, which, as Giles Delueze reminds us, should not be seen as determining 
but adapted to the agents capable of using it.196 
Section 5: Covent Garden and Westminster Mercery  
Claire Walsh, Linda Levy Peck, Maxine Berg and Nancy Cox have reinvigorated 
scholarly appreciations of early modern retail in the last twenty years or so. These 
writers have emphasised the breadth and sophistication of eighteenth-century 
marketing techniques as precursors to the department stores that emerged in the 
mid-nineteenth century, and which still prevail in Covent Garden and Westminster’s 
Oxford Street. Preeminently they have been at pains to describe how the location, 
design, layout and displays deployed by retailers could manipulate consumer 
expectations and define their markets in the higher ends of the trades they have 
considered. 
! Claire Walsh, for instance, has explained how retailers put great effort into 
adapting shops to attract customers through ornament, decoration and well-glazed 
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196 Giles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October, 1 (1992), p. 6.
windows, allowing them time and space to browse, providing quasi-private back-
rooms and arranging commodities within shops to set off their material qualities to 
best effect.197 This had implications, too, for salesmanship and the concept of 
shopping for leisure and pleasure. The interplay between retailer, customer, space 
and goods mattered in securing a sale or constructing a memorable experience for 
the shopper, which might be capitalised on later. These encounters were often 
dependent on gendered performances. As Linda Levy Peck has shown in her 
account of the novelty of the seventeenth-century Exchanges, these were not new 
to the eighteenth century.198 Trade cards and newspaper advertisements, as 
conduits for this kind of nuanced cultural information or branding, have also 
received attention. This scholarship has emphasised the role of both in the 
construction of consumers and legitimisation of consumption practices through 
image and text.199 On the other hand, Kate Smith has stressed the haptic skills 
shoppers required, and the embodied information needed to participate successfully  
in luxury marketing of this type.200 Intimate retail strategies, elaborately 
differentiated goods and the consumers’ search for wares at the right price 
contributed to the expansion of retailing districts, where individual trades or 
wealthier retailers gathered on certain streets to bewilder buyers through copia.
! Sadly, the rigidly generic Sun policies tell us relatively little about the 
adoption of these design practices by individuals, though it is very likely mercers in 
this district were at the forefront of these marketing tactics. Contemporary 
commentators like Campbell saw mercers as somewhat suspect characters: a 
gendered and xenophobic discourse that pervaded discussions of silk in the mid-
eighteenth century. Male mercers were ‘nimble, dancing [and] talkative’, furnished 
with ‘intelligence from the fashion office at Paris’: ‘The mercer who intends to 
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succeed in his business ought to humour the ladies, accommodate himself to their 
taste and understanding, as much as a rational creature can.’201 Likewise 
Mandeville’s anatomy of cupidity, The Fable of the Bees, pointedly detailed a young 
woman’s trip to a mercers, who ‘By precept, example, and great application, he has 
learned unobserved to slide into the inmost recesses of the soul, sound the capacity  
of his customers, and find out their blindside unknown to them: by all which he is 
instructed in fifty other stratagems to make her over-value her own judgment as well 
as the commodity she would purchase.’202 William Hinchcliffe insured his shop on 
Henrietta Street for £625 in 1774, which his will, proved a year later, stated 
contained his stock ‘and all the fixtures, utensils and other things in, about or 
belonging to the warehouse, shops, comptinghouse where my trade and business is 
now carried on for the best part’, suggesting a generous outlay on strategically used 
premises.203 Certainly many other mercers in Covent Garden, Westminster and 
parts of the City had sufficient capital and inclination to create the sumptuous sky-lit 
interiors represented in print by the end of the century, as in Figure 2.2.  
     
Figure 2.2: ‘Harding Howell & Co.’, Pall Mall, 1807. Source: 
britishlibrary.typepad.co.uk
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203 V&A Sun, Mercers, William Hinchcliffe, 1774; PROB 11/1013/40, 1775.
! The policies are far better at giving teeth to the argument that place 
mattered, and demonstrate how much benefit high-end retailers derived from prime 
locations. Jon Stobbart, Andrew Hann and Victoria Morgan have collectively put a 
great emphasis on ‘polite’ spaces of consumption, arguing that decorum in dress, 
manners, and built environment eased interactions between commercial and 
gentlemanly actors.204 The dream of orderly spaces populated by well-mannered 
people persisted throughout the century, with a strong emphasis on the exchange of 
goods as well as ideas. Theatres, assembly rooms, coffee houses, pleasure 
gardens and the spaces associated with polite sociability not only attracted shops 
but positively required them. Indeed, politeness needed to be ‘earned, 
demonstrated and defended’, not least through the acquisition of tasteful bundles of 
goods like tea and the equipment to serve it, which were novel, fashionable, exotic 
and expensive.205 Crucially, politeness was socially inclusive and economically 
exclusive, a double edge that meant it was continually contested, fretting and 
agitating. Politeness and consumption went hand in hand, and the policies 
generated in Covent Garden and Westminster suggest that policing through 
consumption underpinned the atmosphere in this district. As will be demonstrated, 
the hunt for fashionable consumers was not static and involved mercers disavowing 
older Covent Garden for novel locales despite courting a similarly affluent market 
with characteristically expensive wares.  
! The policies advise us that Covent Garden became increasingly undesirable 
to mercers, whereas Oxford Street and Bond Street’s stock rose in the minds of 
contemporaries. By 1813, John Nash’s flamboyant Regent Street was underway 
with fanfare, separating out the districts around Soho and Piccadilly from the 
opulently classicised streets to the north and west. In 1812, the story a few hundred 
yards east was very different: the vestry of St Paul’s, Covent Garden, complained to 
the Bedford estate that the central market was occupied by ‘China and other 
Crockery Ware, Poultry, Old Iron, and a variety of articles not enumerated in the 
Grant’, and that in consequence even the roadways round the Piazza were 
‘occupied by the Stalls and Baskets of those who cannot find Room within the 
Rails’.206 
88
204 Jon Stobbart, Andrew Hann and Victoria Morgan, Spaces of Consumption: Leisure and 
Shopping in the English Town, c. 1660-1830 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), pp. 4-8.
205 Stobbart et al, Spaces, p. 6.
206 Survey of London: Vol. 36- Covent Garden, pp. 129-150.
! By the time of these complaints, Covent Garden was nearing 180 years old. 
It had been a fashionable suburb designed by Inigo Jones in the 1630s with 
impeccable Palladian dignity. Robert Cecil had seen the potential of the area in 
1608, building the New Exchange on the nearby Strand, which housed retail 
concessions on two galleried stories surrounding a courtyard, in imitation of the 
City’s Royal Exchange. Classicism per se was not the problem, rather the area’s 
social standing had dropped. Throughout the seventeenth century it had been a hub 
for female seamstresses and milliners, and John Strype described it in 1720 as ‘a 
great resort of the nobility and gentry’.207 However, Strype’s confidence in the vigour 
of the Exchange, and its ability to attract the gentry, appears to have been 
misplaced, as it was demolished and built over in 1737. By the time of Hogarth, 
Covent Garden had a demotic, sleazy reputation, best encapsulated by Harris’s List 
of Covent Garden Ladies (1757-95), an annual trade directory and puff for the sex 
industry, and none too polite.  
! From the 1760s, it was the northern parts of Westminster and the new 
suburbs emerging around Oxford Street that began to vie for attention, a process 
that accelerated from the 1790s. Like Covent Garden, King’s, St James’, Grosvenor 
and other Squares in Westminster all had pretensions to rectilinear planning, albeit 
around grand residential piazzas as opposed to markets. Side streets were turned 
over to tradesmen and shop fronts installed in the ground floors in a manner 
equivalent to those found in King and Chandos Street and the thoroughfares around 
Covent Garden, with the building typology being similar throughout. In terms of the 
insurance policies, those of Westminster and Covent Garden silently articulate the 
desirability of classicised Georgian shops in their unwillingness to offer detailed 
descriptions of the properties covered. Where City or East End policies might 
include notes on odd out buildings, warehouses or describe where two properties 
were ‘knocked into one’, those for the West End are notably mute. Quite apart from 
the homogenous nature of West End town planning, the Covent Garden and 
Westminster abutted one another, with a corridor of mercers present throughout the 
century in Panton Street, Cranbourne Passage and the streets around the early 
eighteenth-century developments of Charing Cross and Piccadilly. Development of 
the de Walden-Cavendish-Portland and Bedford estates in the early 1750s and 
again after 1770 provided the impetus, and a suitably wealthy clientele for these 
mercers, as well as some of the bigger ironmongers. Busy thoroughfares and 
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distinct shopping streets like New Bond Street and Oxford Street stand out as 
popular locations. A polite district was defined less by radical architectural forms 
than fresh locations, which were singularly important to mercers, as they withdrew 
from older hubs into newer streets. As a result mercers moved, caterpillar-like, from 
the Strand and Covent Garden to ever-greener pastures.   
! Covent Garden remained associated with the fashion trades for at least 
another generation after the New Exchange shut. In the eighteenth century it was 
unique in some respects. We know the area was famed for retailing fashionable 
products intricately involved with the labour-intensive needle trades, like tailoring 
and millinery, allowing for disproportionate number of female entrepreneurs to set 
up.208 David Barnett has calculated that about 8% of all London policyholders were 
women without noting any geographic bunching in their distribution.209 Of 23 women 
taking out policies as mercers, 14 were Covent Garden residents, with other 
districts supporting just one woman each. Women were, therefore, under 
represented amongst mercers, but also far more likely to become properly 
established in Covent Garden than anywhere else. Clearly the industrial 
atmosphere was conducive to skills deemed female.  Nevertheless, female mercers 
were clearly vulnerable, tending to insure lower than average capitals, and their 
number fell off markedly after 1760, when the trade began to experience difficulties: 
12 insured before that date, 2 afterwards. Women were finding it increasing difficult 
to enter into the trade even in this district and quickly became confined to under-
average businesses between 1770 and 1820.210   
! The move away from Covent Garden towards Westminster was not 
immediate. In real values, some of the biggest mercers insured in Covent Garden in 
the 1770s and 1780s. Thomas King, William King, Thomas Thompson & William 
Padget insured £14,000 of stock there in March 1770, with an additional £6,000 of 
assets covered by the Union Fire Office.211 Another partnership made of William 
Barlow, William Ashburne, Richard Ellison & George Nelthorpe covered £10,000 in 
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King Street in November of the same year.212 By 1781, however, the partnership 
had been pared down to Barlow & Nelthorpe, and £4,000 of goods.213 Such 
partnerships speak of the massive outlays on stock needed to set up as a mercer, 
which were exacerbated by late-century inflation and doubtless put an additional bar 
on women, already socially and legally disadvantaged, as independent economic 
actors.   
! The coincidence of well-financed firms with an area’s peak affluence 
reiterates the centrality of economic exclusion in constructions of politeness. Poll 
books show that Westminster and Covent Garden were hubs for fashionable 
consumption throughout the century, with about two-thirds of the voters present 
involved in making or retailing luxury and semi-luxury goods.214 Westminster 
engaged in an extraordinary and burgeoning range of high-end manufacturing, 
finishing and retailing services, from coach and furniture making to professional 
‘bug-killers’ and actors. A significant body of legal and political professionals, 
alongside their genteel families, funded this diversity, drawn to the area from around 
the country by the courts, the Royal Court and Commons. Compared to the rest of 
London, Westminster was wealthy: the 1798 income tax assessment shows 
Westminster (including Covent Garden) could boast as large a proportion of 
highest-income residents earning over £128 per annum as the City, both 
significantly greater than the poorer eastern parishes, where the majority of those 
eligible for the tax earned less than £79 per annum. Retail contributed more to 
acquisition of wealth in Westminster than the City or the East: for every 100 shops 
in Westminster there were only 100 residential houses, whereas the City had 245 
and the Tower Division 187.215 Given their wealth, mercers could exploit the 
opportunities presented by polite consumption better than competing tradesmen.
! However, manufacturing the allure of fashionable shopping was a cumulative 
endeavour. In Westminster, few streets were deemed suitably well heeled, further 
underlining the point that polite consumption relied on accepted canons as much as 
change. Mercers gained strength not by being outliers but by banding together with 
other high-end retailers. Sophie Von La Roche’s breathless descriptions of the 
glittering streets in the West End pay testament to the spectacle in 1788:
91
212 V&A Sun, Mercers William Barlow, Richard Ellison & George Nelthorpe, 1770.
213 V&A Sun, Mercers, William Barlow & John Nelthorpe, 1781,
214 Harvey et al., ‘Occupations’, pp. 478-9.
215 L.D. Schwarz, ‘Social Class’, pp. 169-70.
First one passes a watchmaker, then a silk or fan shop, now a silversmiths, a china 
or glass shop. The spirit booths are particularly tempting...crystal flasks of every 
shape and form are exhibited: each one has a light just behind it which makes all the 
different colours sparkle. Just as alluring are the confectioners and fruiterers, where, 
behind handsome glass windows, pyramids of pineapples, figs, grapes, oranges and 
all manner of fruit are on show.216
For the cloth trades, touch had particular importance for making comparisons of 
quality and denier. By bunching together mercers were making a further play on the 
immediate, unrepresentable quality of their goods to distinguish this form of 
shopping. Comparisons between products by consumers were de rigeur and part of 
the excitement: ‘whether they are silks, chintzes or muslins, they hang down in folds 
behind fine high windows so that the effect of this or that material, as it would be in 
the ordinary folds of a woman’s dress, can be studied...Behind great glass windows 
absolutely everything one can think is neatly and attractively displayed, and in such 
an abundance of choice as to make one greedy.’217 
! That mercers were concentrated in particular locales suggests that retailers 
and consumers had an understanding, fostering a symbiosis of taste, market and 
place that was self-reinforcing. In continually gravitating towards- or creating- 
fashionable shopping streets, mercers were not static, but moved slowly and 
conservatively. Judging by the average policy valuation in Covent Garden and 
latterly in Westminster, this aura of exclusivity appears to have been a relatively 
effective means of ensnaring the most affluent patrons throughout the century. What 
needs to be stressed, however is that this form of polite consumption was highly 
contingent on the forms of novelty engineered with a specific socio-economic group 
in mind. In this respect, the focus of the business strategy, while undeniably 
successful, was shortsighted marketing ambitions, which remained squarely 
focused on using visual and material culture to lure in leisured shoppers. The 
modulations of consumer expectations, purchasing power and calculative spaces 
were highly specialised, and contrasting them with the mercers of the West City 
shows very different consumer-cultures could be carved out of the urban 
environment.
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Section 5: City Silk
The western fringes of the City of London around Wood Street, the Barbican and 
West Smithfield show that the saturation of sensory information which West London 
mercers used to entice customers was not the only route to a sale. According to the 
income tax assessment, the City’s wealth was on a par with Westminster’s, but it 
was acquired differently. For a start, there were fewer shops in the City. Where the 
Sun Policies demonstrate that the West End mercers followed novelty, City clothiers 
stayed put or moved into decidedly insalubrious neighbouring areas on the outskirts 
of the City walls. As described above, the community of mercers found in the vicinity  
of Cheapside in the beginning of the century contracted into increasingly large firms. 
From the 1770s, a small number of similarly well-capitalised firms emerged in the 
extramural parishes. Both these shifts seem counter intuitive given the hunt for 
genteel markets undertaken by the West End mercers: the City, though wealthy, 
was depopulating throughout the eighteenth century, whereas its outer-suburbs 
were increasingly populous but poor. 
! Stanley Chapman has noted the importance of Wood Street in the cloth 
trade, remarking that the growth of provincial textile manufacturers makes the 
resilience of London as a marketing hub ‘one of the apparent anomalies of 
economic history’.218 In explaining the situation he put great weight on the 
warehouse system in cementing and transforming London’s relationship with 
provincial producers. Eighteenth-century Wood Street dominated the outward 
distribution of yarns and the inwards reception of finished cloths. By the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, low-profit-high-turnover warehousing firms gave 
Londoners in this region the upper-hand, taking advantage of wars, overproduction 
and tumbling prices. Without discounting the importance of retailing in these 
districts, the policies indicate that the presence of wholesaling and mercantile 
concerns was much stronger here than elsewhere, broadly in line with Chapman’s 
thesis. Focusing on West City mercery shows that their customer were 
geographically distant and relied on different marketing information, not the forms 
specific to Covent Garden.
! Cheapside was the City’s most dazzling shopping route and well known for 
its luxury traders by 1600.219 The buildings surrounding Cheapside also housed the 
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most influential institutions in the City, and bounded its most affluent quarters, 
according to a 1695 tax assessments.220 At one end was the Royal Exchange, 
whose upper galleries were well stocked with ribbon and toy sellers. Probably past 
its fashionable prime even by the time Pepys frequented it, the Exchange’s cellars 
were let to the East India Company as a bonded silk and calicos warehouse in 
1767. The Bank of England and Mansion House were also located at this junction in 
the 1730s, clearing away Stock’s market and raising the profile of the area 
considerably. Halfway down Cheapside was King Street, leading to the Guildhall 
and neighbouring Blackwell Hall, home to the factor-merchants that supervised the 
Wool trade. At Cheapside’s west end was St Paul’s and the slope down towards 
Ludgate, the Fleet and West End, which constituted London’s primary east-west 
axis. Foster Lane, Wood Street, Milk Street and Aldermanbury to the north-west of 
Cheapside also boasted significant concentrations of mercers, although none were 
major shopping streets. Other City gates, Aldgate and Bishopsgate in the East City, 
produced similar concentrations around arterial roads. 
! Tracking the movement of silk from the Legal Quays and out of London 
shows that supply chains were long, convoluted and reliant on different kinds of 
information from those used by West End retailers. Bales of Italian and Levant silk 
came off the Quays into merchants’ houses or, in the case of Chinese silks, the East 
India Sale-room.221 From here, the silk was thrown into yarn. It is clear from the Sun 
policies, shown in table 2.5, that many throwsters operated out of Spitalfields and in 
adjacent districts. Much silk was also going to the provinces, especially to the 
Norwich weavers and a number of highly capitalised firms in Derby, where mills had 
been in use since the 1720s. Dying, finishing and weaving were undertaken in the 
provinces too, with yarns or ribbons returning to the capital from Coventry. For both 
silkmen and throwsters, London’s dominance was far from absolute and the 
interplay between different productive processes and competing regions was of 
great importance to their trades. The variety of fibres and finishes certainly put these 
occupations into contact and, sometimes, partnership in London. Throwster Samuel 
Spragg went into partnership with silkman Thomas Hopkins, insuring £3,000 worth 
of stock in a warehouse on Billiter Lane, advertising ‘Raw and Dy’d Belladine Silks; 
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China Cord; Blond & Lace Silks; Silver Silks, Stay, Watch and Purse Twist; Naples 
Floss; Legee; Bologna; Spun, Knitting and Sleeve.’222     
Table 2.5, Locations of 
Throwsters and Silkmen 
insuring with Sun, 
1777-1786
Throwsters Silkmen
London Clerkenwell 2 London Covent Garden 1
Spitalfields, 
Whitechapel
11 Spitalfields, 
Whitechapel
3
Derby 6 West City 1
4
Dorset 2 Unspecified 1
Essex 1 Bristol 1
Hants. 1 Coventry 1
3
Herts. 3 Derby 2
Norwich 16 Kendal 1
Notts. 1 Staffs. 1
Southampton 2 Surrey 1
Worcs. 3
Source: Sun and Royal Exchange Policies, LondonLives (Online).
!
! The West City mercery policies attest to the existence of a higher number of 
partnerships. Of 109 West City policies, 25 firms covered joint liabilities, comprising 
36 policies in total. This is rather higher than the 157 Covent Garden mercers for 
whom a similar breakdown reads 22 firms taking out 25 policies. That is, around 
23% of West City business entered into partnerships, as opposed to 14% of Covent 
Garden. In short, partnerships were 50% more likely in West City than in Covent 
Garden. While insuring jointly did not necessarily mean a pooling of capital, as 
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opposed to other resources like shared facilities, these partnerships are indicative of 
a distinctive business environment. 
! Moreover, only one woman, Susannah Cottle from 1792, was insured in the 
West City, albeit at well above the average value for that period at £4,000.223 
Accumulating capital was harder for women trading in the City femme sole but it is 
also apparent in the contrast to Covent Garden that the City inculcated different 
expectations of women’s role in the trade. Long-distance marketing, wholesaling 
and overseas merchant enterprise, which required extensive capital and credit, 
were far less accessible to female entrepreneurs, who found retail more amenable 
as a result.224 An important addition to West City retailing mercery, this mercantile 
aspect does much to explain quirks in the sample, not least the lack of female 
traders there.
! The surviving letter-books of Joseph Symson, a Westmorland mercer, 
provide further insight into the structure of the City cloth trade in the 1710s and 
1720s. These suggest that the transfer of funds and credit made a relatively tightly 
knit cloth trade convenient. Symson sent ‘linseys’, a local textile comprised of a 
wool and linen mix, to eight London cloth dealers by packhorse, purchasing stock in 
return from only two. Symson’s trade was not, therefore, bilateral, relying instead on 
his metropolitan correspondents transferring funds between one another. Of the 
eight, seven traded from the Wood Street area, and one from Hoxton ensuring this 
arrangement had a straightforwardly face-to-face aspect.225 One of the merchants 
Symson bought from, John Barwick of Fryday Street, is very likely one of the 
‘mercers’ insuring goods at the Saracens Head Inn in 1742 and 1753.226  
! Adequate transport was crucial in making City credit profitable, and the West 
City was a terminal for incoming City coaches. Symson regularly sent his goods by 
packhorse to the Castle in Wood Street and bought a range of household goods, 
including a bed, from a dozen other merchants trading from inns in the City. As John 
Chartres has shown, London’s post-Fire coaching inns provided a whole range of 
services from refreshments, lodgings and stabling, to concessions for wholesalers 
96
223 V&A Sun, Mercers, Susannah Cottle, 1791. 
224 Margaret Hunt, The Middling Sort: Commerce, Gender, and the Family in England, 
1680-1780 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 145; Haggerty, British, pp. 71-4; 
Barnett, Hub, pp. 208-10.
225 S.D. Smith ed./intro., ‘An Exact and Industrious Tradesman’: The Letter Book of Joseph 
Symson of Kendal, 1711-1720 (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. lxxi, cxxiii-iv.
226 V&A Sun, Mercers, John Barwick & Thomas Barwick, 1742 and 1753.
and warehousing, through subtenancy and subcontracting.227 Akin to coffee houses, 
they were crucial in facilitating the flow of people, information and goods between 
London and the provinces, with coaches from the North and Midlands terminating at 
inns like the Saracens Head in the streets around Cheapside, Aldersgate and 
Holborn. Dispatching goods from inns was relatively routine, though it created 
security problems, as the Old Bailey Depositions from porters and warehouse-
keepers attest. Wood Street mercer William Everitt had 70lb of raw silk stolen from 
a coach to Glasgow; alongside the Inn’s warehouse-keeper, his dyer vouched for 
his claim that he had marked his products with specially tied knots to identify 
them.228 Long distance traders communicating through knots were a very different 
breed to West End mercers chattering with their clients.
! The majority of stock in the West City sample was still housed with their 
owners, with some addresses being obviously substantial. For example, William 
Neale’s 1772 policy outlined his dwelling, comprising five wainscotted stories to the 
front, three to the back, a garret, leaded lights and a marble chimney piece.229 
However, many policies suggest arrangements that were more haphazard, with 
goods located outside the policy holder’s address: Thomas & John Barwick housed 
their stock in the Saracen’s Head Taphouse in 1753; Jabez Willet & Co. stored 
goods under his house and in another communicating house in 1762; and Robert 
Nettleton & Thomas Railes insured deliveries of hemp and flax, one in a warehouse 
near Symmonds Wharf and one at Crosses Brewhouse worth £4,400.230 John 
Everett and Thompson Wayne insured £3,000 of goods in Everett’s dwelling at the 
Kings Arms, Cheapside, and a further £1,000 in May Lloyd’s warehouse in Star 
Court, Cheapside, in 1726, before simply insuring the ‘Red Lyon Inn’ in 1734.231 The 
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fondness for mercers to house goods at inns complemented that of provincial cloth-
merchants, who similarly had interests in coaching centres in market towns.232 
! The improving state of British inland communication due to turn-piking put 
pressure on London’s road-traffic capacity by the mid-century, focused on the City’s 
rim. A raft of infrastructural alterations to ease congestion came in the mid-century, 
including the piloting of the New Road to bypass Westminster (1750), demolition of 
the City’s Gates (1761), widening of London Bridge (1758-62) and the building of 
Blackfriars Bridge (1760-9), alongside a number of minor street alterations outlined 
by George Dance the Younger to eradicate bottlenecks in 1769.233 Such moves 
simultaneously facilitated the movement of bulk goods and communication between 
producers and marketing-men; developments that were particularly significant for 
dealers in perishable or fashionable produce.234 Faster, cheaper and more regular 
deliveries in or out of London meant less capital needed to be tied up in stock, and 
that Spitalfield silks could be marketed to the provinces with less risk of peddling 
last season’s patterns. Jon Stobbart has shown how provincial mercers and drapers 
advertised goods originating in London with increasing frequency in the late-
eighteenth century, suggesting the extent to which London signified quality materials 
and workmanship.235 Cloth warehouses around Wood Street exploited Spitalfields’ 
status as a luxury producer, creating a business model that was workable precisely 
because of better transport links.
! Changes directed by local government only went so far. The extramural 
parishes grew unchecked, a benign neglect that was seized upon by West 
Suburban mercers. Busy Fleet Street had always been home to an enclave of 
mercers, but the rate of investment in the area from the 1770s was astonishing. The 
pattern followed the West City merchants, with few policy-holders insuring valuable 
assets. This phenomenon is particularly interesting because of the disheveled state 
of some of the neighbourhoods in this comparatively poor district. Clothfair, next to 
St Bartholomew’s Hospital, with its longstanding association with the cloth trade, 
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had managed to avoid the Great Fire in 1666 and, as a result, had retained its 
increasingly antiquated wooden-framed housing stock. Contemporaries were not 
shy in linking these buildings with the plagues and fire that blighted the 
seventeenth-century, and Smithfield’s live cattle market and attendant butchers 
nearby were perennially seen as the cause of dirt and disorder that spilled out 
around the metropolis. Mercer Michael Buxton’s address, ‘above the passage into 
Clothfair’, distinguishes the insalubrious district, still without numbered doors, from 
retailing on the West End model.236 And yet, a string of policies taken out by 
Thomas Divett illustrate the unmistakable presence of expansion despite testing 
times late in the century. Divett’s firm fits Chapman’s model, where Morrison and 
Co. led a wholesaling vanguard in London during the Napoleonic Wars, described in 
1834 as
breaking down the manufacturers owing to changes in the value of money. When 
the manufacturers’ property began to diminish they made very ready use of the 
credit being offered them to obtain their raw materials. They could maintain 
themselves for years vending their goods under prime costs at the low priced 
warehouses of London.237
Divett covered 58-9 Clothfair, plus stock, for £2,000 in 1786. By 1794, the two 
houses knocked together were valued at £1,000 and the stock £7,800; and by 1814 
the business had grown to occupy three houses and had acquired goods worth 
£12,000, which despite vicious inflation figured as a slight gain.238 Divett & Co.’s 
successes, while pronounced, were not isolated. Other firms in the district also 
measuring their assets in thousands of pounds, when Fleet Street and even Covent 
Garden traders were pegged back in the hundreds.
! The West End-residing Elizabeth Montagu wrote to fellow Blustocking, Sarah 
Scott, in 1790 in the midst of fitting out her country residence: ‘I am going to the city 
end of Town this morning to bespeak 280 yards of white satin for the window 
curtains of my great house, and about 200 for the hanging.’239 Unlike La Roche it 
was not the experience of shopping that excited Montague, or the prospect of 
coming across some novel commodity, so much as the wholesale bargains to be 
found in the West City.     
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! With a bi-weekly influx of cattle, drovers, farmers and agricultural dealers, 
Smithfield was well placed in terms of broader distribution networks. Whether 
Smithfield’s mercers cultivated the same client and credit relationships as the City 
mercers in Symson’s day is moot, yet they certainly maintained large stocks in an 
area whose key feature was mobility.  In this they must be considered an offshoot of 
the country-orientated trade found earlier about Cheapside. All of this suggests the 
operation in West City of a business model based on mobile forms and coded forms 
of information, vehicular accessibility and economies of scale, standing in stark 
contrast to the fashionable gentility of Westminster. Despite both nominally being 
mercers two very different calculating frameworks were at play, which set them in 
contrasting social networks. Both these models, however, are again different to the 
ironmongery business where haulage and the requirements of the maritime markets 
shaped the calculations of producers and consumers involved with the trade. 
Section 6: Ironmongery, East and West  
The geography of ironmongery was dependent on the Thames. However, it must be 
stressed that this relationship with the River did not result in a contiguous settlement 
of ironmongers along the Thames. Rather, the policies suggest that few 
ironmongers operated in the East City around the Legal Quays or in Westminster, 
both of which were costly. On an educational trip down the Thames, Sir Thomas 
Pennant framed these areas in terms of genteel trade where West End consumption 
fueled City industry: 
I never regretted the want of gardens or ornamental embankments when I saw the 
various docks and wharfs covered with the great objects of commerce, the 
subsistence of millions the support of our empire - I no longer wished for an 
extension of the former. Let them be confined to the Western part of the metropolis. 
It is the duty of our opulent nobility to honour their country by a display of taste: of 
our industrious merchants to increase the busy scene, casting every now and then 
an eye to the west.240 
Yet the East End, home to a transport-manufacturing community, was absent from 
Pennant’s and many other elite reckonings of London. Parochialism certainly played 
its part: Horace Walpole of St James’ claimed never to have seen the Southwark 
side of Blackfriars Bridge.241 As Justice John Fielding explained, Rotherhithe and 
Wapping, dominated by shipping, were rendered culturally alien, being ‘chiefly 
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inhabited by sailors, [where] a man would be apt to suspect himself in another 
country. Their manner of living, speaking, acting, dressing and behaving, are so 
very peculiar to themselves.’242 Consequently, the opportunities that existed in the 
East End, South London and those parts of the West City attached to the River 
were rather different for the ironmongers who concentrated there. 
! From the policies, centres for the distribution of iron around the capital can 
be identified in three key areas, all of which were within the riparian zone set aside 
for sufferance wharfs. Farthest east, Gun and Bell Docks in Wapping and East Lane 
Stairs in Rotherhithe had a continual presence of ironmongers after the 1760s. In 
amongst the shipbuilding and shipbreaking yards, several described themselves as 
Anchorsmiths, chandlers or dealers in old rope and were evidently latching on to the 
needs of the maritime community.243 Dockhead, Bermondsey, the more urbanised 
Southwark and Horsleydown could all boast ironmongers, and were areas known 
for timber yards, coal dealers and other bulk trades. The north bank of the river saw 
a concentration in the City on Upper Thames Street and Dowgate Hill. Adjacent to 
the Legal Quays, this was the site of the Steelyard, a concession to the defunct 
Hanse Merchants, where Customs Officers recorded large quantities of bar-iron 
landed in London from the Baltic region. 
! Access to water transport had obvious advantages for dealers in heavy bar-
iron or bulk cargos, as well as the Navy and Thames shipbuilders who were a major 
market for guns and anchors. Indeed, Thomas Westerne, who acquired Wiggin’s 
Quay, came from a background in forging and ordnance in the Weald.244 Other 
ironmonger-merchants with interests in Sussex ordnance, like the Fullers, 
contracted sufferance wharfs, ad hoc.245 David Fuller dined with John Legas, the 
London agent of a third Wealdean ordnance firm, Harrison & Legas, owners of 
Stone Wharf in Southwark.246 Robert Plumsted shipped iron goods to the North 
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Atlantic from his countinghouse at the Minories, using nearby Irongate Wharf, 
because it was less expensive than incurring lighterage costs to busy Legal 
Quays.247
! Metal working in the Midlands and northeast of England was well 
established by the beginning of the eighteenth century. It would develop from the 
production of stock products, like locks and nails, to the creation of semi-luxury 
buckles, toys and polished steel jewelry by the nineteenth century.248 Clues present 
in the insurance policies suggest that, as with silk, the West City and Western 
Suburbs formed something of an entrepôt for the inland trade. John Dunn & 
Jonathan Lees described themselves as ironmonger-warehousemen in 1734, as did 
Norman Mabbank in 1791, while Henry Atkinson insured as a wholesaling 
ironmonger there in 1801.249 Pellatt Apsley covered a complex of sheds, 
warehousing, stables and a countinghouse on St John Street, Clerkenwell, in 1791 
worth £1,750 with £3,720 of goods, which would seem characteristic of the type of 
outlet in question.250 William Scales & Henry Weatherfield quickly filled a house and 
warehouse near the gateway to the Saracens Head, Snow Hill, with £1,300 of 
goods in 1772.251 Identifying wholesaling ironmongers in this district easily fits the 
pattern established by Marie B. Rowlands, where provincial dealers formed 
alliances with London wholesalers in order to access other national and colonial 
markets.252
! Bankside parishes in the East and South were favoured by ironfounders, 
alongside a number in Clerkenwell. Within the periods sampled, founders took out 
27 policies in London. Just 20 businesses are represented by the policies, the result 
of a succession of partners prolonging a firm or, as in the case of Edward and 
Alexander Raby, a continuing family interest. It may well have been that adequate 
facilities were rare, or that the premium cost of insuring such hazardous pieces of 
equipment deterred others from insuring. However, while it is clear there was some 
production, no doubt bolstered by those ironmonger-anchorsmiths on the eastern 
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reaches of the Thames, it is improbable that these operations were capable of 
consuming the quantity of raw material landed on London’s wharfs. Much, if not 
most, of the 8,360 tons of Baltic iron recorded by the Customs as landed at the 
Steelyard between July and October 1762 must have been destined for other towns 
in the United Kingdom.253 
Table 2.6, Locations of London Gunsmiths’ and Mathematical Instrument Makers’ 
firms insuring with Sun 1777-1786.
Gunsmiths’ firms Median Policy
Covent Garden 5 700
East Suburb 16 200
South London 1 1000
West City 4 1000
Westminster 5 700
Mathematical instrument 
makers’ firms
Median Policy
Covent Garden 2 100
East City 4 300
East Suburbs 18 300
South London 6 100
West City 1 500
West Suburbs 23 200
Westminster 6 300
Source: Sun Registers, London Lives. One policy per firm.
! In spite of the strength of the Midlands manufactories, some metalworking 
continued to be carried out in the capital. Robert Plumsted defended ironware sent 
to an overseas correspondent in 1757, claiming he only bought ‘London Work at 
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ready money’, though this might have simply meant Londoners were finishing or 
assembling goods.254 Specialist metalworking continued to be located in the 
metropolis: gunsmiths and mathematical instrument makers are two examples of 
manufacturers who had yet to succumb to competition from the Midlands in the 
1780s. Table 2.6 shows how both trades exhibited clear signs of clustering. Many 
large instrument makers-cum-chandlers were insured in maritime Wapping, with 
another distinct cluster appearing around Fetter Lane, near Clerkenwell’s 
watchmakers. Small-time gunmakers congregated around the Minories where the 
Ordnance Office, located in the nearby Tower, bought fire-arms parts from the 
midlands and had local subcontractors make them up for military use.255 By 
contrast, bespoke gunmakers, like Durs Egg, were located in the better-appointed 
West End. Again, whereas west London was angled towards retail and fashionable 
consumption, the poorer east London makers were dependent on maritime outlets. 
Small subcontractors appear to have serviced big bureaucracies, like the navy and 
ship-yards, allowing a few large consumers to dictate terms, control the flow of 
goods and even fix wages, leaving little room for those producers to market their 
goods or diversify their stock.
! Analysis of the iron trade in London shows that physical geographies, chiefly 
the Thames and sea, played a much more important role in defining the industry 
than in the silk trade. The merchant and naval marine provided a vent for goods 
alongside polite consumers. William Brittle’s conversion of two houses in aristocratic 
Mount Street, Mayfair, contained £2,500 of stock in 1772, twice the average for that 
period.256 Compared to Francis Willson, trading from the thickly developed Ratcliffe 
area, Brittle’s was a world away. Presumably a small-time chandler, Willson insured 
only £200 of stock and £100 of clothes and housing in 1773.257 The far smaller 
capitals insured in the East suggest that elaboration and choice were less important 
in design terms than they were for West End traders. Further, the propensity of 
traders in the East to insure clothes as well as hardware suggests convenience was 
a more marked factor for consumers who needed to gather together relatively 
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standard products in some haste.258 Seemingly, these ironmongers-cum-chandlers 
were selling to the East End mariners, whose calculative agency was limited by 
penury, uncertain working lives and the futility of display onboard vessels that could 
be at sea for years. 
! Iron was re-fashionable and we get the occasional glimpse of the 
secondhand economy of iron in the East London policies, which reinforces the 
notion that markets took very different forms. In 1791, Barnett Cohen described 
himself as a ‘broker of household goods’, with Robert Lucas of Rosemary Lane 
dealing in ‘old iron and rags’.259 No less than 27 ironmongers insured ‘workshops’, 
which makes plausible the suggestion that efforts were made to preserve and repair 
goods. Little is known about dealers in used iron in London or the capacity of 
ironmongers to undertake repairs, as these activities tend to fall in the zone 
between the economically necessary poles of production and consumption.260 
! Durability, thrift and repair seem to characterise the economy of the East 
End more noticeably than the West, where abundance and immediacy reigned. 
These were different temporal registers through which to understand designed 
products, conditioned by long-standing continuities in the spatial elaboration of 
consumption. Commercial vernaculars that set architectural styles, products and the 
wealth of the local population into algorithms operated across London, fixing both 
inequalities of economic agency across broad networks of people and things but 
also localising how the market was understood and approached.    
Conclusions
The Sun insurance policies show clear signs of economic clustering in both the silk 
and iron trades. Considering both over extended time periods highlights that the 
pace of change was glacial, which would support Schwarz’s careful analysis based 
on a series of snapshots drawn from different sources. London was not 
unproductive, but was sustained through the better integration of workshops and 
retailers that had taken hold in the seventeenth century or earlier. However, as 
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Schwarz predicted, each trade had its idiosyncrasies, exhibiting signs of change, 
pulling in opposite directions and frequently deploying markedly different business 
strategies. 
! The West End mercers snaked into newly fashionable areas as they were 
created north and west of the Strand, whereas the West City mercers concentrated 
on wholesaling. Throwsters and silkmen stayed fairly well rooted in the East and 
West City respectively, before fleeing the expensive capital. For the iron trades the 
distinction needs to be made between wholesaling towards the north-west of the 
City, retailing in the West End and a group either exporting to the colonies or 
providing for the shipping industry in the East. Each trade responded to different 
communities, some of which were near at hand, as in the West End, and some of 
which were national or international, as for the Holborn wholesalers and those 
located in East London, who targeted the merchant marine and Navy. Consumers in 
the West End seem to have had access to a greater choice of shops and goods, 
especially at the higher end of the quality spectrum, where mercers showed a 
distinct preference for genteel streets with classical facades. In other parts of 
London fewer shops existed, and those that did usually carried less of a range. 
Moreover, there was a greater likelihood that goods would be encountered in the 
course of production or transportation from wholesaling warehouses and wharfs as 
alienable unfinished products. Necessarily, “the market” looked very different from 
these perspectives. Indeed, the insurance policies are descriptors of the market on 
one hand but, on the other, wholly different cultures, from the polite to the pragmatic 
wholesalers to the pinched maritime east end. 
! The capacity of things and spaces to ground commercial strategies and 
economic expectations sheds new light on the panic caused by the Docks 
campaign. The polite consumption of luxury and fashionable goods which typified 
the West End was not a factor here, as Berg might suggest, but material culture and 
the rhythms of commercial life were important in contextualising Vaughan’s plans. 
There is no doubt the uses of the urban environment were changing, with some 
flexibility possible in the City and warehouse districts on its fringes, but the Docks 
promised massive upheaval. From this perspective, the petitions to parliament for a 
political settlement reflect that livelihoods that had evolved over time and largely in 
private were threatened with thoroughgoing change. Expectations based on 
previous commercial strategies shaped how Vaughan’s utilitarian project was 
understood. Both the merchants and parishes recognised that trade was essential 
to their survival but quibbled about where and how it was to take material form. 
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Conceptualising change was as much a question of linking “the market” to broader, 
material networks of information, each with their own complex patterns of 
circulation, as being enlightened.
! Callon’s notion of calculative agency is helpful in unpicking the idea of an 
enlightened economy, not because merchants, manufacturers and even weavers 
were uninterested in Hume or Smith, but because economic theory had to contend 
with other embedded factors. Far more so than Casson or Marshall, this forces 
historians to recognise that, while books of enlightened theory were hugely powerful 
tools that created an economic literati, their ideas were not universally understood 
or recognised simply through contact with the world of goods. To be sure, new types 
of consumption do signal change in some sense but, if asked to articulate its 
meaning, economists are likely to describe something very different to shoppers, 
who will differ again from shopkeepers with a detailed knowledge of the supply 
chain. Calculative agency is not solely material, however we need to recognise that 
enlightened theory was bounded by books that operated in different networks. The 
intersection of both “theory” and “practice” was not straightforward but certainly 
important in understanding the shifting the contours of economic life because it 
allowed agents to envision new connections between people and things.   
! This point raises a further question about the interpolation of Smithian ideas 
with the calculative practices of City merchants. Clearly the merchants that 
supported the Docks differed from other Londoners, both the warehousing sector 
who protested and the silent shopkeepers of Covent Garden. Indeed, if Smithian 
theory encouraged people to think more globally about economic relationships, and 
the Docks embodied that ideal, it is frankly unsurprising that merchant practice 
buoyed their interest in Vaughan’s project. The great weakness of single or 
aggregate insurance policies is that they give few insights into the links between 
firms or their correspondence with provincial hubs and other institutions. It is the 
essentially bureaucratic and mobile information like customs bills, insurance policies 
or colonial correspondence that countinghouses based their calculations on that the 
next chapters investigate in further detail. 
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Chapter 2: The Age of Corruption
This chapter examines the corruption of Customs officers on London’s Legal Quays 
to question the role of the Treasury in underpinning utilitarianism in Britain. In the 
decade after 1777, Customs Commissioner Sir William Musgrave (1735-1800) 
spearheaded the fight against corruption by producing a number of reports critical of 
the service’s bureaucratic inconsistency, reliance on fees and the Treasury’s 
mismanagement of it. I argue that recent sociological models provide some valuable 
insights into corruption better at explaining the timing and resonance of Musgrave’s 
intervention. These prove more effective than orthodox historical approaches, which 
focus on languages of corruption or administrative evolution. In this discussion, 
greater attention is given to contextualising bureaucratic culture within conflicting 
notions of exchange that were found not only in the market but also in the family, 
politics and patronage. Charting the shifting age profiles of middling Customs 
officers, ‘Landwaiters’, provides a means to assess the relative weight each form of 
exchange had in the service. A prosopographical analysis of these 230 officers 
between 1738 and 1787 confirms that Treasury interference with the appointment of 
officers changed after the coronation of George III, causing shifts in the economic 
and political expectations of its Customs personnel. By 1780 the practice of officers 
taking fees from merchants on the Legal Quays no longer being seen as question of 
their avariciousness but a function of the Treasury’s patronage, causing Musgrave 
to institute an alternative disciplinary and administrative structure aimed at 
regularising his officers’ interaction with merchants and the Treasury’s appointment 
strategy.    
! In terms of the broader dissertation, this chapter looks at the exchange of 
the goods, services and ideas involved in mercantile taxation. Regular taxation was 
a necessary criterion for the City’s investment in the Docks. The Excise crisis of 
1733 shows  a real shift in how the proper relationships between the state and 
merchants were constituted. At this time, Sir Robert Walpole had attempted to 
extend the bonding system used for tea to wine and tobacco, commissioning a 
report from the Customs Commissioners to explain that the current regulations 
encouraged abuses and frauds by merchants and Customs officers.261 Walpole 
argued that putting the system in the hands of the incorruptible Excise would 
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improve the revenue. However, the threat of increasing the ambit of the much-hated 
Excise caused such animosity in Parliament, in the country and amongst the usually  
pro-Walpole City merchants that Walpole was forced to drop the bill. Noteworthy 
here is Walpole’s attempt to institute a free port, a position echoed by Musgrave and 
London’s Dock advocates from the 1780s. London merchants also aped Musgrave 
in moving away from irregular appointments and towards salaried Officers in their 
dealings with labourers on the Quays. I suggest that Customs officers mediated 
between the market and state, and thereby caused both to change, ultimately 
engendering a shift toward liberal policies. This was not due to their inherent 
rationality but because of the difficulties faced when maintaining the social niceties 
that underpinned corrupt transactions. While this marked an alteration in attitudes to 
bureaucracy, the issue of who taxed commerce and for what reward were vexed 
questions, providing valuable insight into how political economy was embedded in 
institutions, modes of sociability and, as we shall see, in the bodies of revenue 
officers themselves.   
Section 1: Musgrave and Reform
This study follows in the tradition of institutional history and aims to develop a new 
approach to corruption using the career of Customs Commissioner Sir William 
Musgrave. Corruption has proved a relatively easy phenomena for historians to 
identify in the eighteenth century, but they have struggled to understand how its 
definitions shifted from the classically inspired model used to chastise Sir Robert 
Walpole and other politicians in the political sphere to the utilitarian model adopted 
by Musgrave and the reformers who took their cues from the Association 
Movement. Following the Cambridge School, some have looked to historicise 
charges of corruption and located the problem on the plane of language and 
discourse.262 The fiscal military state thesis has adopted a more functionalist model, 
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focused on the increasing separation of private commerce from the public good at 
the behest of the Treasury.263 Despite the subtlety of the former and the analytical 
value of the latter, Musgrave’s career presents a problem for both, in that he quickly 
redefined the problem for the Customs after years of neglect from his notional 
superiors at the Treasury. As this introduction will argue, the models of corruption 
emerging from political theory and economic sociology offer helpful ways of 
navigating between the virtues of older historiographies, because they see 
bureaucracies as socially constituted, interdependent and open to new language. 
Like Callon’s notion of calculative agency, they aim to describe how ‘“cultural 
frames” and “logics of action” come into existence...wielded by skilled social actors 
[like Musgrave], sometimes called “institutional entrepreneurs”, who come to 
innovate, propagate and organize strategic fields of action’ at times of dramatic 
change.’264 
! As ever, constructing historical research around the relativist criteria 
advocated by this school presents some difficulty, leading this chapter to maintain 
an uncommon methodological concern with age. Documents shedding light on 
patterns of experience and promotion in the Customs are readily available and 
present fertile ground for exploring corruption. By considering the age and 
expectations of Musgrave’s officers, it is possible to imbue the decisions 
surrounding their posts with a more pointed sense of strategy, either developed by 
the officers themselves or emanating from the Customs hierarchy. Put simply, an 
officer leaving a lucrative post aged 45, an officer promoted aged 28 and an officer 
dying in their post aged 85 tell us very different stories about corruption. Analysing 
one class of officer systematically between 1738 and 1788 shows that Musgrave 
faced very different managerial challenges at the beginning and end of his career, 
and that corruption changed as well as his definition of it. In exploring these ideas 
further, this introduction will spell out some of the essentials of Musgrave’s career 
and his importance in terms of British state formation. Next, his work will be placed 
in the context of recent historiographies of corruption to suggest some of their 
limitations. Finally, the more recent theoretical models used to guide this research 
are outlined with a view to showing how the rest of the chapter is structured.
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! Musgrave was appointed to the London Customs Commission in 1763 aged 
28, following the Earl of Bute’s rise to office.265 Customs Commissioners including 
Musgrave regularly ‘waited’ on the Treasury and in 1777, after fourteen 
undistinguished years of service, he passed them a memorandum that showcased 
his dissatisfaction with the cumbersome Customs procedures.266 The document 
outlined a plan to consolidate the Book of Rates and, thus, the methods used by the 
Customs to collect duties from merchants and pay them to the Exchequer. Since the 
introduction of the relatively comprehensible Tonnage and Poundage Act in 1660, 
the piecemeal addition of ‘clashing and interfering’ duties had increased the number 
of charges commodities were liable for. This meant the difficulty of calculating duties 
had ‘also [been] enhanced, till now it is really become a perfect science, not always 
well understood by the officers, and much less by the merchants’.267 The Treasury 
well knew that wartime loans had been underwritten by additional ‘imposts’ to 
customs duties, but Musgrave highlighted additional examples, like wine and paper, 
where ad valorem charges combined with charges on quantity to produce hard 
sums and hideous fractions. He drily noted that the confusion engendered 
concealed frauds and caused officers to act as merchants’ agents. By contrast, 
Musgrave’s system favoured clarity, proposing that duties on each article could be 
reduced to a single figure that would allow ‘officers in computing or the merchants in 
paying [to] detect errors’; in addition he argued for the reproduction of the whole 
scheme ‘in some authenticated book’.268 The consolidation act introduced by Pitt in 
1787 touched on no less than 3,000 resolutions of the House of Commons, amply 
illustrating the complexity of Musgrave’s task. Sir Grey Cooper, secretary to the 
Treasury in 1777, publicly acknowledged the contribution to reform made by this 
‘very intelligent commissioner of the Customs’.269 Despite the extensive 
complications involved in decoupling imposts from loans, ‘consolidating’ the Book of 
Rates was not only beneficial to the Treasury, in allowing funds to move around the 
exchequer more freely, but as Musgrave argued, it would make commerce more 
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certain, allowing merchants to act ‘boldly’ and make it easier to enter the profession. 
From the outset, the plan was to encourage markets by reducing Custom officers’ 
work to routines.
! Musgrave’s memorandum was the first salvo in an extensive body of reports, 
audits and commissions from 1780 onwards that were aimed at streamlining 
government spending and increasing revenue. In December 1782, he framed the 
‘Bill for Vacating Various Places in the Customs’. Its preamble asserted that wilful 
absenteeism and ‘Useless’ patentee sinecures were just as detrimental to the 
Revenue as incomprehension; that diligent Officers should be rewarded by 
promotion; that residence should be a qualification for service; and that fees should 
be replaced by higher salaries.270 Musgrave’s concerns were taken up by the 
Commission for Stating the Public Accounts, whose painstaking reconstruction of 
the administrative hierarchies and lacunae of the major departments of state were 
intended to reduce government expenditure from 1782. Its 1785 Reports on the 
Customs wholly endorsed the reformation of cash handling, quoting Musgrave’s 
1777 conclusions on clashing duties.271 The Commission revisited the question of 
fees, unequivocally seconding Musgrave’s attack on sinecurists, which argued that: 
the tenure of offices should foster accountability; every office was to perform a 
‘useful duty’; every officer ought to execute his duty in person; and duplicate offices 
should be amalgamated.272 The report made clear that, in reducing the burden of 
Customs collection, ‘the public’ had no interest in supporting unproductive offices 
within the service, and that many useful officers were corrupted by conditions of 
service which rendered them unaccountable.273 No doubt because the National 
Debt had doubled in pursuit of imperial claims in America, office-holding was 
increasingly presented as a duty undertaken on behalf of a tax-paying public facing 
national bankruptcy. The Public Accounts Commission recommended that 
‘Everyman may dedicate a portion of his income... according to his faculties to this 
great national object’, namely the National Debt.274 Like Musgrave, the Commission 
112
270 PP, Sessional Papers of the House of Commons, xxxv, p. 93; PRO 30/8/285, Chatham 
Papers: Musgrave to Pitt, 10 Dec. 1782, ff. 1-7.
271 PP, ‘Thirteenth Report of the Commission for Stating the Public Accounts’ (1785), p. 46.  
272 PP ‘Fourteenth Report’, p. 29.
273 PP, ‘Fourteenth Report’, p. 46.
274 Journal of the House of Commons, cited in John Torrance, ‘Social Class and 
Bureaucratic Innovation: The Commissioners for Examining Public Accounts’, Past & 
Present, 78 (Feb. 1978), p. 72.
advocated a system of ‘oeconomy’, where bureaucratic rationalisation and frugality 
could render public business cheap, uniform, regular and impersonal. This series of 
Reports formed the blueprint for attacks on bribery, sinecurism and ‘Old corruption’ 
from Parliamentary Commissions throughout the Napoleonic era.275 
! Approached from the perspective of the nineteenth century Musgrave was a 
paragon of administrative virtue, but from that of the eighteenth his career embodies 
a paradox. Corruption is a well-established trope in eighteenth-century 
historiography, with the image of venal aristocratic dynasties, like Musgrave’s own, 
profiteering from office and borough-mongering a staple of the work of Sir Lewis 
Namier and E.P. Thompson.276 More recently, Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos has 
explored the reciprocity of elite ‘protection’, where jobs or offices were exchanged 
for political and social subservience amongst their clients. This constituted
…a vast infrastructure of personal [contacts]... bringing benefits to those who 
managed to acquire access to it, and linking individuals from different social milieu in 
bonds of loyalties, services and dependencies that spread beyond the immediate 
locality and place of abode. The system was fluid and rife with tension and rivalries, 
for patronage, especially at the upper echelons, [and] involved men of equal social 
standing who exchanged favours...[Whereas] in the lower ranks, patronage implied 
that clients remained indebted to their patrons for many years, offering them not only 
personal loyalty and but also gratitude and deference and remaining dependent on 
them for support well after they were materially secure in their positions.277
Ben-Amos argues that corruption was not confined to the elite but was a broadly 
based social system, which, though ‘grossly unequal’ and alien to modern eyes, 
was fairly unremarkable. And yet, as Rosemary Sweet objects, once understood as 
a norm corruption can be
…reinterpreted as the links in the chains of deference and obligation which held 
early modern societies together. However, we are left with the problem of identifying 
when and why society’s tacit acceptance of such practices, punctuated by periodic 
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outbursts against venality or bribery, was transformed into a system of values which 
was based on ideals of probity, accountability and impartiality.278 
Musgrave’s work helps unpick this knot by highlighting the ever-changing cast 
involved in utilitarian reform during the 1780s.                         
Defining Corruption!
We start with the problem of definitions of, and discourses around, corruption. For 
historians of the Cambridge School, early modern political discourse illuminates the 
ideological underpinnings of the state, a stance developed in reaction to the 
Namierite view that Georgian politics was simply the management of places. J.G.A. 
Pocock and Quentin Skinner have argued that the Excise Crisis marks the high 
point of the neo-republican critique of corrupt government, which focused on 
Walpole’s erosion of Legislative independence by manipulations of the patronage 
afforded by the Treasury, army and established church.279 This saw bills aimed at 
removing placemen and contractors from parliament, circumscribing the civil list, 
reducing the army by strengthening civic militias and re-introducing triennial 
Parliaments become staples of the republican-inspired ‘Country’ opposition. In 
tandem, periodicals like Lord Bolingbroke’s Craftsmen denounced Walpole’s grip 
over the King, his clients in the House, the foreign, immoral culture of luxury and 
Italian masques he supposedly ushered in and his use of office to enrich himself 
and his family.280 Ultimately, that critique was backward looking, aimed at rescuing a 
past or endangered socio-political order from the credit relations enshrined in the 
National Debt, which was seen to erode the independence of the citizenry. 
! After Walpole’s fall in 1742, republican language was still used to harass 
government, but began to look increasingly ragged as opposition groups failed to 
dislodge the Pelhams. Joanna Innes stresses that in both Machiavellian and 
Christian discourses magistrates created virtuous institutions from which morality 
flowed, with the image of the secular reformer underdeveloped.281 Bolingbroke’s 
Patriot King gave Pitt the Elder’s opposition and imperial vision credibility, although 
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in 1774 James Burgh pointedly lamented the cyclical quality of opposition, where ‘In 
this blessed country of ours, the men in power have pursued one uniform trick of 
taxing and corrupting the people, and increasing court influence in parliament, while 
the pretended patriots have exclaimed against those measures, at least until they 
have got themselves into power.’282 
! The language of republican virtue signalled the supposedly novel intrusion of 
mercantile immorality into the realm of politics. However, traders rarely singled out 
other traders as corrupt, using, instead, the labels of ‘sharp’ or ‘dishonest’ when 
picking faults with one another. The philosophes increasingly saw men as shaped 
by civil institutions, including potentially luxurious trade, coming to see corruption in 
somewhat similar terms as the merchants, as the willful mismanagement or 
misallocation of resources that might be more equitably distributed. Accordingly, the 
‘enlightened sociology’ of Adam Smith and David Hume replace ‘virtue’ with ‘utility’ 
as the antonym to corruption.283 The historical focus on linguistic semantics can be 
unconvincing in explaining why, given the many counter-arguments political thought 
elicited, Smith’s distinction between private enterprise and public office constitutes a 
‘modern’ success story. Indeed, for sociologist Susan Rose-Ackerman, locating 
corruption is still a question of distinguishing Smithian markets from the state, and 
she makes relatively few concessions to local or historical contingencies in 
forwarding her neoliberal argument.284 However, the host of reformers that exploded 
onto the political scene after 1780, like the Clapham Sect, Christopher Wyvill’s 
Association Movement, Samuel Romilly, Jeremy Bentham, the Vaughans and 
Musgrave, confronted ‘markets’ in an industrialising and often war-torn economy 
that had not yet become an explanatory category in their own right. They were not 
solely playing a ‘language game’ but actively grappling with an embedded market 
and state that had developed considerably since Walpole.285        
! Entering into this institutional problem, advocates of the fiscal-military-state 
thesis have seriously questioned whether fluid extra-parliamentary politics and 
115
282 James Burgh, Political Disquisitions (London, 1774), p iii.
283 Hill, ‘Adam Smith’, pp. 79-85. 
284 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and 
Reform (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 39.
285 Eckhart Hellmuth, ‘Why Does Corruption Matter? Reforms and Reform Movements in 
Britain and Germany in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century’, T.W.C. Blanning & Peter 
Wende eds., Reform in Great Britain and Germany, 1750-1850 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p. 6.
critiques of corruption could impact on a Treasury burdened with long-term 
commitments. Patrick O’Brien and John Brewer have both stressed that the funded 
National Debt necessitated the extension of the popularly despised Excise and 
diminished the impact of popular politics on state building.286 Brewer especially 
turned the orthodoxy of a small and amateur State on its head, showing that the 
scale of the wars Britain fought forced a major expansion and ruthless 
professionalisation of the revenue in order to tax Britons sufficiently. As a 
department, the Excise was the Treasury’s favoured tool because its entrance 
exams, marriage qualifications, salaries, pensions, policy of having officers patrol in 
areas where they were not natives and service ethos met Weberian standards of 
incorruptibility. Such ‘Foucauldian’ technologies underpinned the startling modernity 
of the Excise compared to other departments of state, insulating Excisemen from 
the communities they taxed by disbarring them from the corrupting sociability of 
friendship, kinship and marriage.287 
Building on Gerald Aymler’s studies of office-holding, Brewer extended these 
insights to a bureaucratic corps in the upper strata of several major departments, 
who melded patronage with active work in public offices, implying that malfeasance 
and peculation did not characterise the State entirely. He points to a series of career 
administrators, including Musgrave, who were keen to reform the Navy Board, 
Customs and Excise Office from within and claims that a well-developed notion of 
‘public duty’ pervaded their schemes.288 Such plans were the result of experienced 
professionals taking the reins and, while fortuitous compromise played its part, 
following any series of departmental records after the Glorious Revolution conveys:
…the overwhelming impression...of growing institutional definition. The roles of 
officials are more precisely drawn, the procedures they are obliged to follow become 
set in tablets of stone, the public and other departments are kept at arms length and 
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their actions are treated as regrettable and ill-informed intrusions upon the orderly 
workings of office.289
In short, fiscal commitments were deemed to structure an essentially modern, 
utilitarian attitude to office holding.
! Musgrave’s reforms in the 1780s mirrored well-established practices in 
Excise, which might have formed a blueprint for the Customs when it was removed 
from Customs farmers in the 1680s if it had not been for Charles II’s need for a 
revenue stream outside of Parliamentary influence. Even after the Treasury and, 
subsequently, the Commons began demanding more of the Customs during the 
War of Spanish Succession, evidence for any evolutionary strategy co-ordinated by 
Whitehall to regularise the Customs is weak.290 In fact, the principles of irregular 
office holding, as outlined by Aymler, were still a feature the Customs in 1780:
1) Entry to office by means of patronage, patrimony, purchase or some combination of 
these
2) Tenure for life or during pleasure
3) Entry often through acquisition of a reversionary interest; venality
4) The employment of deputies by part-time or wholly absentee office-holders, and the de 
facto acceptance of sinecurism
5) Remuneration of officials by fees, gratuities and perquisites, as much as by salaries, 
stipends or wages from the Crown or State
6) Regarding office as a private right or interest, rather than as a public service291
! As scholars synthesising the language and institutional view of corruption 
have recently argued, early modern bureaucratic efficiency was often the result of 
office-holders responding to upsurges of opposition pressure in Parliament or 
bullying Treasury masters, rather than practices internalised by the departments 
themselves.292 Hence, after Country success in using Parliamentary Commissions 
to audit the revenue during the reign of Queen Anne, Walpole found the same 
tactics incendiary after the Excise crisis cursed attempts at Courtly innovation. Mid-
century Treasuries were scarcely held to account or, likewise, saw fit to interfere 
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with other departments.293 Internal reports on aspects of public finance appeared 
intermittently but were short term in their modus operandi and rarely built on one 
another. James Postlethwayt, Charles Whitworth and Timothy Cunningham each 
produced Histories of the revenue after the Seven Years War, signaling a nervous 
extra-parliamentary interest in taxation and suggesting the possibility of national 
bankruptcy. Disregarding the politics of office-holding per se, these publications 
filled the void created by inertia within the Treasury, where between 1740 and Lord 
Shelburne’s call for a review of spending in 1780, no attempts were made to 
coordinate revenue departments. And yet, significantly, Musgrave’s 1777 
memorandum challenges the accepted historiography of the Customs and Treasury 
by prefiguring the ‘political will’ attributed to the economical reformers of the 1780s 
and, more importantly, by emerging from an inefficient service that had been 
coasting for a generation.
Alternative Approaches to Corruption
Given the timing of Musgrave’s intervention historians need to think more carefully 
about the penetration of languages and ideas into the corridors of power outlined by  
Brewer and their ability to rapidly reform their regulations. The preoccupation with 
the Treasury’s relations with other departments of state has not been helpful here, 
and has caused other voices to fall out of ear shot. In the case of the Customs that 
means the officers themselves. The Public Accounts Commission reported that 
Musgrave and the other Customs commissioners linked the Treasury to some 1,600 
officers in London and a similar number in the provinces in 1784. In turn, these men 
formed relationships with politicians, merchants, friends and kin who inevitably had 
their own ideas about the proper modes of interaction between the state and 
themselves.294 These are important in light of Mark Philp’s argument that to 
legitimately resolve disputes, the ‘political sphere’ must establish norms regulating 
other forms of exchange, namely the community or family, the market or patron-
client relations. Charges of corruption register the instability of political culture 
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relative to one or more of these modes of distribution.295 For example, Walpole’s 
trick of appointing his supporters to administrative offices was formally within his 
Treasury remit, but appeared corrupt to contemporaries outside because of his 
supposed rapacity. Not only do different social spheres provide the means to 
identify transactions as an illegitimate or corrupt “other”, but they also create their 
own inertia. As such, Mark Granovetter argues that bureaucratic dictates can often 
be ‘neutralised’ by appeals to other modes of distribution on the part of those 
accused of corrupt behaviour.296 Italy, for example, is often cited as a culture where 
those in positions of authority are expected to support their families in lieu of other 
institutions.297 
! When expectations of the services offered by one group to another become 
deformed would expect charges of corruption to be formulated. The major challenge 
historians face when dealing with corruption is how to measure ‘expectations’ and 
‘norms’ across multiple fields of social activity. As Philp says
! …through the use of counterfactual speculation, detailed historical research, and 
! careful !theoretical construction, the student of politics can construct a case by 
! identifying the type of imperatives these states really faced, the extent to which the 
! political authority they sought to exercise was (or could have been) directed to 
! resolving these imperatives, and the degree to which the actions of those in power 
! came to be subverted by a range of aspirations and motives which imposed 
! avoidable costs on those subject to them. It is extremely difficult to construct such 
! arguments - not least in an academic culture increasingly dedicated more to 
! publishing than to thinking - but it is in principle possible so to do.298
For the eighteenth-century Customs the conventions surrounding political patronage 
and office-holding have received little empirical attention. However, as the next 
section describes, these can be followed through the Customs establishment 
records and Treasury records of appointment. Looking at types of appointment and 
tenures of offices reveals whether patronage changed in the Customs. However, 
exclusively considering these political sources inevitably renders the officers 
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themselves one-dimensional by failing to engage with the other modes of exchange 
that were relevant to them and limiting the opportunity to locate extraneous 
influences. 
! Age presents itself as one way of nuancing the world of low-ranking officials. 
Gerontocratic ideals were pervasive in early modern society, but becoming 
increasingly complex as Britons found themselves attached to multiplying 
institutions that crossed between social spheres. The guilds, Church, universities 
and many popular customs showed a preference for the ‘wisdom’ and ‘gravity’ 
signified by old age, erecting explicit age qualifications or barriers of apprenticeship 
to prevent youths progressing up the ranks too quickly. Figures who crossed into the 
world of civil and ecclesiastical government – Aldermen, Provosts, Deans – were 
consistently between 40 and 60 years of age, having accumulated the social and 
economic capital that made these roles attractive and possible. However, as Keith 
Thomas has noted, powerful patrons could ‘bend normal rules of seniority. The 
upper class went through life on a fast stream.’299 If youth or inexperience signaled 
privilege, recent work on old age shows retirement to be another sticking point. The 
ability to support a family economically could be seriously compromised by old age, 
forcing a more or less ignominious admission of dependence on those who turned 
to alms, charity or the poor rates.300 Whether Customs officers married, had 
children, or suffered from debilitating illnesses must all have altered their uses of 
office, propensity to accept or solicit bribes, quest for advancement and plans for 
retirement. Conversely, the officers’ shifting use of office, patterns of tenure and 
demands for rewards consummate with a certain point in their life cycles was likely 
to start alerting Musgrave to shifts in service.
! The records of appointments to Customs places show that the fragile series 
of alliances that made the Customs workable during Walpole and the Pelhams’ 
hegemony was becoming unstuck during Musgrave’s tenure as Commissioner of 
the Customs. The evidence presented in the third section shows that successive 
Treasuries exploited patronage differently after the accession of George III, leading 
to the hierarchy of promotion becoming confused, creating an imbalance between 
old, long-serving officers and young, quickly advancing officers. Customs officers 
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became disaffected by venal promotion strategies, Treasury discipline lapsed and 
perennially overlooked officers clung onto jobs they were simply too old to do. What 
we discover is that personnel increasingly changed due to the electoral cycle rather 
than to facilitate the collection of taxes.
! The appointment data shows the Customs were becoming more in thrall to 
the Treasury’s political rather than fiscal commitments, causing friction between the 
Customs Commissions and officers on the ground. The fourth section investigates 
whether the increasingly erratic appointments disrupted relationships between 
merchants and officers on the Quays, and whether we can identify deformations in 
the economic aspect of corruption. Diego Gambetta’s careful ontology of economic 
corruption encourages this reading of the situation. Economic corruption involves 
three agents, a Truster (T), a Fiduciary (F) and a Corrupter (C) of F.301 Corruption is 
a breach of trust, which implies that T has entrusted F with something, and that F 
has some ‘trust-worthy making property’, such as T’s payments to F, T’s monitoring 
of F, or F’s character. Corruption requires an act of ‘mimicry’ or ‘camouflage’, where 
F takes on the appearance of trustworthiness long enough for C to consume the 
goods F has delivered him before T finds out. ‘A [third] condition for corruption to 
become a relevant option is that the cost of reaching a permissive domain, where 
the rules that prevent C from obtaining what C is after do not obtain, must be more 
expensive for C than corrupting someone in the domain where C resides.’ As public 
servants tend to have a monopoly on the allocation of services, they often become 
the focus for corrupt practices. Gambetta thus predicts that corruption exists where 
‘lawlessness’, collusion between Fs and Cs and intimidation are great; mistakes and 
mimicry are hard to detect; and where the belief that corruption is prevalent is 
greatest, as this encourages parties to attempt circumventing given rules. 
! If Customs officers fit the role of Fs and Merchants Cs, it is not clear whether 
Ts were the Treasury, who appointed officers, or the Commission, who managed 
them, making the system appear more ‘lawless’ to those who dealt with it on a daily 
basis. Whilst relatively few descriptions of bribery on the Quays exist, it is clear that 
providing a social context for corrupt relationships took time and investment on the 
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behalf of both parties, but was not necessarily an arrangement between equals.302 
Looking to information in the Customs records and the sources used by social 
historians, including parochial, probate and insurance records, it is possible to build 
up a broad picture of the officers working on the Legal Quays and make some 
comparisons with London’s merchants. These indicate that the disruption caused by  
war, Treasury promotion strategies and the aging bodies of the officers reduced the 
store either party might invest in cultivating these contacts. The reliability of officers 
to make good on corrupt arrangements was not what it had been and by the 1780s 
the status of officers had declined in the eyes of merchants – a situation that 
precipitated their lobbying for greater levels of regulation from the Commission.    
! The merchants’ decision to back Musgrave’s reforms highlights the problems 
associated with sustaining corrupt relations with officers, but how did he make 
himself such a powerful, well-regarded administrator at Westminster where different 
norms existed? The fifth section takes its lead from actor network theory to think 
about how Musgrave effected a paradigm shift in the Customs by drawing on local 
resources to circulate and represent knowledge in new ways, enroll allies and 
embed alternative conceptual tools in powerful organisations. What is clear from 
examining Musgrave’s efforts between 1777 and 1800 is that his reform of pensions 
and salaries was intended to shift the criteria both his officers and the Treasury 
used to make decisions. He was quietly critical of his superiors in the Treasury, who 
prioritised their patronage networks above fiscal interests. His social networking, 
combined with his administrative innovations, sought to represent his officers to the 
Treasury as both costs on the public and as economic agents whose self-interest 
could be structured and channeled. This was novel, and Musgrave’s reforms must 
be viewed in the context of the local and unstable controls that operated in the 
service before, such as verbal assurances, fees or non-monetary remuneration in 
the form of food or informal Treasury negotiations. While the outcome was to 
inculcate classical economic rationalism by stripping the service of practices that 
could camouflage illicit transactions, his success was contingent on drawing 
together contemporary resources not conspicuous in the Customs before, including 
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his own interest in librarianship, the economic ideas of Shelburne and Pitt, and the 
declining bodies of his officers.!
Section 2: The Customs Archive 
Historians have only been brought so far by viewing political corruption as the 
ubiquitous evil decried by gloomy Country critics or a phenomenon the utilitarianism 
of the Treasury unconsciously militated against. Producing a satisfactory 
explanation of Musgrave means understanding the process by which these two 
‘solids’ go ‘plastic’, to borrow a phrase from physics. In describing the Customs 
archive, this section outlines how my research into the age profile of its personnel in 
the 50 years before Musgrave’s panic in 1777 was undertaken. Additionally, it 
provides an administrative and historical context for the discussion in the final 
section of what Musgrave did differently to convince his Treasury masters of his 
plans, outlined in the final section.
! Although charged with administering the Customs service nationally, the 
Commission’s seat at Customs House on the Legal Quays saw London matters 
preoccupy Musgrave, and ‘the business of the waterside’ in London formed a model 
for the outports in the rest of the country. The Commission and their secretariat 
formally sat on a raised platform observing the intricate process of merchants 
paying duties in the ‘Longroom’, the bureaucratic hub for Customs duties that were 
generated along the Thames. Ships passing Gravesend would be boarded and 
‘rummaged’ by pairs of ‘Tidewaiters’, who would draw up inventories of the ship’s 
freight. On arriving at the Legal Quays, the ship’s master would make for the 
Customs House in order to swear an Oath confirming the Ships’ manifest to the 
Deputy Collector Inwards and either a Comptroller, Surveyor or General Surveyor. 
Subsequently, the importing merchants would present a bill of lading in the 
Longroom, whereon a ‘Bench’ officer would make out a warrant detailing any duties 
on the goods the merchant wished to land. From the warrant, six extracts would be 
copied up and forwarded to a Clerk of Rates to compute the duties for which the 
goods might be liable. The warrant and six bills would then be taken by the 
merchant to the Receiver, who would take payment of the taxes or securities on 
bonds, return one extract to the merchant and pass the rest to the Computer, 
Surveyor, Controller, Surveyor-General and Examiners to double check. Examined 
again by the Clerk of Warrants, details were transcribed into a warrant book, which 
would be delivered to two ‘Landwaiters’ on the waterside. On receiving these books, 
Landwaiters would specify to the on-board Tidewaiters what goods were coming 
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inwards. Noting all the landed articles, the Landwaiters would then have the quantity  
of the goods announced by Weighers or Gaugers, making a discretionary deduction 
for the packaging. The ‘Landsurveyors’ would assess any damaged goods. Should 
more dutiable goods be landed than warranted, the merchant would make a post-
entry in the Customs House, revising his liability for duties, and collecting a ‘cocket’, 
which attested to the fact that all securities had been made, with prompt cash 
payments receiving discounts. Goods would then be moved into warehouses and all 
the updated books returned to Customs House to be checked by the ‘Jerquers’. 
‘Searchers’ would further assess all goods leaving the warehouses and eligible for a 
drawback on re-export.  
! Customs officials drew merchants into an administrative nexus focused on 
the Longroom. The multiplication of paperwork caused officers to check the work of 
others along the line, whilst ensuring that those who handled duties did not 
calculate them. Complementing their salary, officers were entitled to fees for 
services rendered, transferring much of the up-front expense of the establishment 
from the state to merchants.303 Despite the ubiquity of fees, those who stood to gain 
most from the system were those with the social or financial capital to buy 
appointments and the privilege of collecting the juiciest ‘emoluments’. Clerical 
Longroom officers profited most, outdoors and ‘mechanick‘ places being less 
lucrative, less dependent on sinecures and the securities paid on entry to office 
being less steep.304 A study of Bench officers or the Secretariat in the Customs 
House would provide rich pickings from archives of England’s well-connected 
political grandees, but a fairly small number of officers from which to get a handle 
on their ages.305 Furthermore, finding employment histories for the incidental clerks 
or deputies these absentee sinecurists appointed is challenging, as these 
arrangements went unrecorded officially. By contrast, a study of the Tidewaiters, of 
which there were probably 150 operating on the mid-century Thames at any time, 
would yield a large sample but little material outside of the Customs archive as a 
result of their low pay and peripatetic lifestyle on the Thames. Finally, Customs 
records are better for some branches of the establishment than others and the 
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minute books for some branches are either missing or were not instituted until 
Musgrave’s intervention.
! Awareness of these constraints pushed this study towards consideration of 
the Landwaiters, who worked on the Legal Quays as outdoors staff, but were also 
clerical officers, rather than performing manual duties like weighing or portering. In 
addition, the Landwaiters were in daily contact with the merchants as a result of 
their role in landing goods and the location of this practice. The London 
establishment was officially composed of 56 Landwaiters throughout the period, 
with 230 men holding this office between 1738 and 1787, making a workable 
sample. Landwaiters also constituted the lowliest posts the Treasury took an active 
interest in appointing at London, meaning the duration of most officers’ employment 
can be calculated by consulting Treasury Warrants.306 Letters of Warrant give 
information about who was appointed, who they replaced and whether the latter 
was deceased, retired, superseded or dismissed. 
! Landwaiters’ duties were undertaken by three officer-types: 19 Deputy 
Kingswaiters, 37 Established Landwaiters and 6 Additional Landwaiters. The most 
important distinction was between Kingswaiters and Landwaiters, the former being 
a patent office salaried at £52 per annum, the latter being a warrant office receiving 
£60 or £80. Although their duties and training were the same, the patent Kingwaiters 
were pure sinecures, the patentee receiving the salary but appointing Deputies to 
act on the Quays in return for the fees.307 When new Kingswaiters were appointed 
the patentee was relieved but not necessarily the acting Deputy who featured in 
their supervisors’, the Landsurveyors, Report Books.308 Not only did the 
Landwaiters’ posts confer better remuneration, but promotion to the office of 
Landsurveyor required time spent as Established Landwaiter, revealing a customary  
career path for officers: Deputy Kingswaiter to Additional Landwaiter to Established 
Landwaiter to Landsurveyor. Thus a single officer might receive several warrants for 
essentially the same job, revealing plenty of information about his outgoing 
colleagues, rates of promotion and tenure in office. 
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! The disciplinary records for the Landwaiters include yearly registers of their 
‘ages and abilities’ from 1738. These Report Books were used to create a list of the 
Landwaiters’ names and ages at five-year intervals from 1738 to 1786.309 In 1787 
the Report Books went missing for eight years, and ages disappear from all records 
until 1799, re-emerging in a different series. However, this break should not cause 
excessive worry as in 1782 the Customs Commissioners established a maximum 
age of 50 on Landwaiters appointments and Crewe’s Act disenfranchised all 
revenue officers.310 As such, the mid-1780s provide a convenient terminus and 
show the unreformed service to have experienced fluctuations in the age and 
experience of their personnel. 
! Having names and dates of birth for the individuals in the sample provides 
huge advantages, in that it is possible to go beyond official institutional records and 
start locating the officers in various private contexts, an important theoretical 
consideration in choosing this set. Sadly, a statistical analysis of the family lives of 
the officers in this sample has not been possible due to the sheer mass of parochial 
records in London, the high mortality rate and its complication of the question of 
surviving children, and the relatively scarce information we have regarding the 
officers’ incidental incomes from fees with which to make workable comparisons. 
Nevertheless, Musgrave does appear to have been haunted by the ‘age and ability’ 
of his officers. This issue will be returned to repeatedly in this chapter in qualitative 
discussions of officers’ attitudes to promotion, educations and upbringings, ability to 
perform their duties, pensions and in their attempts to sidestep Musgrave’s attacks 
on their fees.          
Section 3: Political Corruption in the Customs  
Between 1738 and 1786 there were 89 Deputy Kingswaiters and 161 Landwaiters. 
As there were nominally over two Landwaiters for every Kingswaiter at any time, the 
former seem to be slightly under-represented. As evident in table 1.1., Landwaiters 
tended to be marginally older on entering and much older on vacating their posts, 
and stayed in place longer on average than Deputy Kingswaiters. Correspondingly, 
Table 1.2 shows the average ages of Landwaiters were consistently higher until the 
last decade of the period. Even at this basic level, such shifts point to the danger of 
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assuming staffing policy stayed constant throughout the period. The rest of this 
section substantiates and explains this contention. 
 Table 3.1: Officers’ ages and tenures, 1738-1786
Landwaiters King’s waiters
Mean age when appointed 34.0 30.7
Mean age on vacating 52.1 40.1
Mean tenure 13.3 10.1
Source: Treasury Warrants and Landsurveyors’ Report Books
Table 3.2: Officers’ ages and tenures in January at 5-year intervals
1738 1743 1748 1753 1758 1763 1768 1773 1778 1783 1786
KW mean Age 38.6 36.4 37.6 39.6 39.2 35.6 41.1 45.0 44.8 46.1 44.4
KW collective 
experience
110 96 148 115 113 93 185 239 231 255
Number 16 19 19 18 17 19 19 19 19 18 17
Mean Tenure 6.9 5.1 7.7 6.4 6.6 4.9 9.7 12.6 12.2 14.2
LW mean Age 41.9 43.9 47.1 45.3 48.3 47.0 45.7 47.3 43.8 43.3 41.4
LW collective 
experience
209 266 344 425 486 466 482 488 414 429
Number 37 36 36 36 37 35 37 35 34 36 29
Mean tenure 5.6 7.3 9.6 11.8 13.1 13.3 13.0 13.9 12.2 11.9
Source: Treasury Warrants and Landsurveyors’ Report Books!
! Figure 3.1 shows the warrants for appointing Land- and Kingswaiters and 
suggests that entry into the service was dictated by changes in high office. One 
factor was the accession of George III in 1760. This saw a complete cessation of 
appointments when his grandfather died, followed by two years of frantic activity 
trying to fill the places left by vacating officers and establishing new patentees. 
George’s accession also precipitated the 1761 election. Lesser, perhaps purely 
administrative, peaks occur when new Lord Chancellors took office, as they were 
responsible for expediting new warrants. Indexes of Writ appointments show 
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Georgian monarchs were keen to establish men in their gift, and appointments or 
dispossessions of King’s waiters are markedly higher in the first few Regnal 
years.311 Courtly influence reached the Customs via high politics: George I ushered 
in the Whigs, and Stanhope’s notes on the establishment of the London Customs 
ominously marked out five Landwaiters as ‘Torys’. George III brought in Bute and 
purged supporters of the previous administration, the ‘massacre of the Pelhamite 
innocents’ coinciding with a high staff turnover in the Customs.312  
Figure 3.1: Treasury Warrants to London Officers: Kingswaiters in blue, Landwaiters 
in Green
 Source: Treasury Warrants
!  That Land- and Kingswaiters rose and fell with their patrons was a 
consequence of candidates having to be ‘presented’ to the Treasury, before being 
nominated by the Treasury to the Customs Commission.313 Begging letters 
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frequently appear in the correspondence of the political elite regarding Customs 
places in London. Lord Sunderland received an application from Mr Vincent in 
support of a Landwaiter’s post for Henry Hawkins, ‘who is the gentleman I had lately  
the honour to recommend your Lordships at Hampton Court’. Vincent added, ‘I 
should not be so troublesome but that this gentleman’s relations have a great deal 
of influence on affairs in the County of Cornwall’ and was sure that this favour 
constituted a ‘public service’.314 Landed grandees were often cited as backing 
claims or actively promoting their clients;the Earl of Orford, for example, credited 
Robert Luck as a ‘man of business in the County’.315 Henry Grenville simply ceded 
Sir James Lowther appointments in Cumberland in 1764 to gain his political 
support.316 Maintaining the servants of government took some juggling, as Lady 
Stawell found when her husband, ex-Chancellor Henry Bilson Legge, died in the 
post of Surveyor of the Petty Customs, leaving it to his son, aged 8. She hoped the 
Treasury would consider John Sainsbury in the interim.317 Horace Walpole had 
similar rights of reversion (the powers to nominate a successor) on his 
Collectorship, a mechanism that strengthened the association of government offices 
with dynastic forms while undermining Treasury influence.318 Well-connected 
merchants, Customs or Treasury officials cultivated empires of influence in the 
Customs. For example, David Garrick secured an outport place for his brother over 
dinners with the Devonshires.319 The same applied to promotions. After the 1768 
election, Charles Broomfield thanked the incoming Lord North for promoting him so 
speedily from an outport role to the position of superior Landwaiter at London, 
stating a Land Surveyor or Deputy Searcher’s post would be the ‘summit of his most 
sanguine wishes’.320 
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! However, greater attention to the officers’ tenures and ages show individual 
Treasuries to have had very different attitudes to how best to staff the service. As 
Elizabeth Hoon has noticed, the Treasury took a growing interest in the places 
available to them in the Customs, asking to be notified of all dismissals in 1757 and 
of any dangerously ill officers in 1759. By 1765, lists of any vacancies were 
presented by the Commission to the Treasury on Monday mornings.321 Not only was 
the Treasury becoming more interventionist, but the factional politics and short 
administrations that continued from the mid-1750s to the late-1760s stripped it of 
the experienced staff like Bilson Legge and George Lyttleton who provided a thread 
of continuity stretching back decades.322 Knowledge of Treasury business was not 
being passed through lengthy apprenticeship and nor was it being made public; 
both Shelburne and his successor Pitt the Younger availed themselves of guides to 
previous-practice made up by former secretaries before or on entering office 
there.323 
! The Treasury’s new attitude to the Customs that emerged in the 1760s and 
continued under North had a profound impact on the age profile of Landwaiters, 
unremarked upon by Hoon. Officer turnovers derived from the Surveyors Reports 
illustrated in Figure 3.2 show 4 or 5 appointments per annum were common for the 
first half of the period. Busy years between 1758 and 1763 were followed by a 
period of leveling off to settle at around 3.5 per annum before rising again during the 
American Revolt. Wars saw officers leave the Customs, when downturns in 
overseas trade drove out those who faced diminishing fees, if they were not pushed 
by the political instability that accompanied conflicts. Likewise, periods of economic 
buoyancy and political continuity also had distinctive characteristics. Broadly, the 
periods 1748-58 and 1763-1778 saw rises in the average age and collective 
experience of the officers, with younger men being preferred or leaving their posts, 
whilst older, experienced men clung on. 
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Figure 3.2: Turnover of Officers: Kingswaiters in blue, Landwaiters in Green.
 Source: Landsurveyors’ Reports
! The turnover of Kingswaiters before 1763 was well above the third of 
appointments we would expect (proportionally to the Landwaiters), whereas after 
1763 Kingswaiters’ tenures were increasing and their turnover slowed. Measured by  
time spent collectively on the quayside, the Deputy King’s waiters had spent 255 
years there in 1783 compared to nearer 115 in 1758. With no change in the number 
or remuneration of Kings waiters, the sustained changes in their patterns of service 
must be explained in relation to changing attitudes to patronage in the Treasury 
after George III’s accession. Kingswaiters’ mean ages also rose appreciably after 
the introduction of new blood in 1761-2. Yet, after 1769 those promoted to 
Landwaiters were far younger than in earlier years, and on average only had two 
years’ experience in their posts. This shows that certain officers were being hurried 
into more lucrative posts, serving to create a pool of overlooked old timers with few 
prospects of promotion.
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Figure 3.3: Why Landwiaters Vacated their places 
 
Source: Treasury Warrants
! Among the Landwaiters the situation was similar, although the effect of 
political and dynastic interference was less sharply felt in terms of mean and 
collective experience. The larger population conceals some shifts illustrated by the 
Treasury Warrants. The reasons for removing Landwaiters are shown in Figure 3.3, 
which illustrate distinct changes in the patterns of vacation. Most strikingly, the 
number and proportion of men dying in their posts doubled in the fifteen years after 
1763, while those dying after 1769 were about four years older and two years more 
experienced than previously. From 1773 the ‘capabilities’ of officers began to be 
noted in the Customs Reports assiduously, with five Landwaiters described as 
‘infirm’ in the 1778 sample. Not only did voluntary retirement become more common 
after 1763, but also the eight who did retire included two 60 year olds and two 
octogenarians. All of which suggests a problematically old population beginning to 
attract the attention of their superiors. 
! Like the Deputy Kingswaiters, Landwaiters may have had fewer incentives to 
leave their posts during this period, although they were less likely to be driven out. 
By the mid-century the ability to supersede officers had completely fallen into 
abeyance. Superseding was a means of forcing recalcitrant or failing officers 
serving at his majesty’s pleasure out of the service. It was generally applied to 
officers over fifty and with between ten and twenty years’ experience under their 
belts. Warrants made ‘for life’ seem to have taken hold after Walpole and could not 
132
be superseded, diminishing the power of the Treasury and Commission to force 
their will on officers. When superseding was revived in 1779, it included a special 
clause to superannuate officer James Cunningham, previously described as ‘infirm’ 
and a veteran officer of 38 years.324 Leaving officers to vountarily end their careers 
as public servants (or not) had become the norm by the 1760s and Treasury’s 
place-juggling appear to have overridden the more utilitarian concerns of the 
Commission.
!  The dynamics of preferment also changed dramatically in the 1760s, which 
were significant in creating a flow of officers through the ranks. Whereas before 
1769 it had been common to promote officers to the post of Landsurveyor, following 
five or more years in the post of Landwaiter, with additional experience if they had 
been King’s waiters, fast-tracking took hold in earnest after 1770. Indeed, the ten 
men promoted after 1769 had, on average, half the experience of office of their 
predecessors, with three officers boasting a single year in the job, the nominal 
period of qualification for the post. In any case, they also helped exacerbate the 
plight of long-serving officers, who increasingly found themselves in dead-end jobs 
with no prospect of promotion. 
! The years following Walpole’s administration saw officers preferred quickly 
through the ranks with growing frequency, ignoring conventions of seniority and 
experience. The process only accelerated with the factional turmoil caused by the 
Seven Years War and George II’s death, with the waning influence of the Pelhams 
in the Treasury coinciding with a period of rampant intervention. This culture of rapid 
preferment created a pool of overlooked, experienced Land and King’s waiters by 
the late 1750s and, while much new blood was introduced at the accession of 
George III, by the late 1770s the problem was far worse. Contrasted with conditions 
earlier in the century, when age and service were more noticeably rewarded, 
officers came to find frenetic change amongst inexperienced officers and a 
stagnation for experienced officers the norm. The structural problems facing the 
Customs had accelerated, demonstrating that Treasury policy was not as 
consistently rational as Brewer and O’Brien argue. Instead, this discussion has 
shown that the Customs was a stomping ground for the political cronies that 
rendered the Treasury unaccountable, thereby sustaining the extension of the 
Excise in the face of popular hostility, such as that unleashed by Bute’s cider tax 
proposals in 1763. 
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! The lack of direct evidence in the Customs and Treasury papers regarding 
the rationales for appointing individual officers means we do not know whether 
patronage resulted in venality and nepotism, or whether in some instances it got 
competent men into positions of authority in the Customs. The next section further 
examines the matter by turning to the officers’ educations, status and relationship 
with London’s merchants.   
Section 4: Corruption on the Quays
The following section examines how the officers in this sample exploited their social 
status to reap financial rewards and how far that strategy was limited by the 
expectations of London’s merchants. It will reiterate points made in the previous 
section by showing how the calculative agency of the officers was shaped by wars 
and politics. It will then describe how merchants responded, suggesting that they 
became increasingly alienated by the officers’ lawlessness, despite sharing many 
social and economic privileges. The section concludes by arguing that while many 
factors conditioning the officers’ erratic behaviour were beyond their direct control, 
increasing differentials in their perceived statuses meant they became safe targets 
when merchants wished to critique the Treasury or Customs Commission, during 
and after Musgrave’s tenure.     
! Musgrave’s attempts to cut fees out of the Customs resulted in three surveys 
of service ‘emoluments’ that show that Landwaiters’ fortunes fluctuated in line with 
London’s merchants. The first survey, aimed to support the 1782-3 Bill for Vacating 
Places, detailed officers’ earnings for the period 1779-81. The second was taken 
shortly afterwards, when the Landwaiters urged that compensation for fees should 
be calculated at peacetime levels during the years 1772-4, not the depressed 
wartime levels represented in the initial survey. The last came in 1784, as a result of 
the Public Accounts Commission, and detailed the previous year’s earnings. All 
were self-assessments. As the right-hand column of Table 3.3 shows, this class of 
officer profited when trade was buoyant because the fees paid by merchants were 
charged on a per-barrel or per-bail basis. The surveys also suggest that officers 
earned around one third more when shipping was not disrupted, as in 1779-81, or 
the economy not recovering from the dislocations caused by conflict, as in 1783-4. 
Even taking into account possible inaccuracies in the first survey, Deputy 
Kingswaiters must have viewed with trepidation any declaration of international 
hostilities, as they lacked the salaries that offered some vestige of security during 
testing times. Wars changed merchants’ attitudes as shipping fell away and 
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bankruptcy thinned the regular merchant herd. Generally, however, the officers 
commanded high incomes, equivalent to the lesser gentry or large retailers of the 
period.325 
Table 3.3: Officer Emoluments  
Year Place Salary 
(£)
Average yearly 
fees etc. (£)
Yearly 
emoluments (£)
Fees to salary 
ratio
1772-4 Landwaiters 80 275 355 3.4
Additional LW 60 279 339 4.65
Dept. KW 292 292
1779-81 Landwaiters 80 140 220 1.75
Additional LW 60 140 200 2.33
Dept. KW 20 20
1783-4 Landwaiters 80 223 303 3.1
Additional LW 60 215 275 3.6
Dept. KW 263 263
Sources: 1772-4, BL, Add. Mss. 8135, Musgrave papers; 1779-81, BL, Add. Mss. 
8135, Musgrave papers; 1783-4, PP, ‘Fourteenth Report’, Appendix 6.
!
! Collecting fees involved the Land or Kingswaiter being present on the 
Quayside with the merchant, swapping favours and building up contacts. 
Comparing the officers’ tenures on the Quays with similar occupational groups 
shows politics to have been a factor in curtailing officer-merchant alliance alongside 
wars. Table 3.4 illustrates the collective years of experience of East India Company 
warehouse-keepers, albeit based on a far smaller sample, and shows job tenure 
was markedly higher than for the Customs in the period after the purges of 1760-2. 
This would suggest Company warehouse-keepers survived the turmoil unscathed. 
Both groups had comparable duties, payment in fees and salaries, shared working 
conditions and won their posts through powerful connections. And yet, in spite of 
these similarities, Company employees boasted a mean of 18.8 years service in the 
job in 1763, compared to the Kingswaiters’ all-time low of 4.9 and Landwaiters’ 11.4.  
Only with an expansion of Company warehousing, alongside the sudden resignation 
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of several aged warehouse-keepers in 1772, did the tenure of East India servants 
drop below that of Customs men. Likewise, a sample of 100 licensed porters on the 
Legal Quays, appointed between 1770-9, shows a mean tenure of about 18 years. 
This was longer than the officers’ despite doing more physically demanding and less 
well paid work. All of which suggests that Landwaiters experienced much less job 
security than other proximate occupations, even those jobs that might be 
considered to have less social status, such as portering. The nature of Landwaiter 
clientage networks offers some explanation why, with the political cycle seeming to 
act as a break on acquiring contacts. 
Table 3.4, Years of Officer and East India Warehouse-keeper experience
1738 1743 1748 1753 1758 1763 1768 1773 1778 1783
KW mean 
experience
7 5 7.8 6.4 6.6 4.9 9.7 13 12.8 14.2
KW collective 
experience
110 96 148 115 113 93 185 239 231 255
LW mean 
experience
5.5 6.7 8.8 11.2 11.9 11.4 12.4 12.8 10.9 10.7
LW collective 
experience
209 266 344 425 486 466 482 488 414 429
EIC 
warehouse-
keepers 
mean 
experience
18.8 12.0 10.4
EIC 
warehouse-
keepers 
collective 
experience
413 
n=22
275
n=22
344 
n=33
 Source: Landsurveyors’ Report Book and LondonLives (Online)
! The Customs Commissioners also knew fees were dependent on time spent 
on active service, which gave them some leverage over the officers. Officers 
dismissed from the service were bullish younger men and the Commission routinely  
suspended officers acting carelessly or complacently. However, they seemed 
increasingly uneasy about how fees devolved into more personal alliances. After 
1764 the Commissioners decided that merchant-officer relationships should be 
routinely disrupted by annually ‘rotating’ officers through the Tobacco, East India, 
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Woodfarm (Timber) and Sufferance business.326 Each branch comprised of different 
geographies, warehouses and principal merchant houses. They hoped ‘that the 
attention of officers may not be drawn to that part of the business only which is most 
productive of gain, it is most particularly directed and enjoined that equal distribution 
of these profits arising from [the] business be justly made to all the officers engaged 
with this service agreeable to the practice on the lawful Quays.’327  That is, 
Landwaiters were to be appointed to merchants blindly and not paired repeatedly 
with individuals.
! Obviously, merchant-officer relationships were potentially lucrative because 
exchanges of fees could veil bribes. The Commission frequently ordered printed list 
of fees be displayed around the Quays to alert merchants to the correct levels of 
remuneration for any transaction.328 Merchant-instigated bribery involved subtly 
disrupting the Commission’s attempts to use the price-mechanism to structure 
Quayside transactions. Intimate relationships between merchants and officers 
doubtless stretched the Commission’s authority. The youngest brother of the 
famous merchant-politician William Beckford found a Landwaiters’ place in the 
1740s. Landwaiters Benjamin and Robert Hayes Bristow were satellites of a 
creaking City dynasty whose interests had included banking, government 
remittances, the Portugal trade, South Sea and East India directorships and court 
and parliamentary positions.329 Normally, however, merchants had to strike up some 
kind of friendship with the officers. West India merchant Henry Lascelles made an 
untimely petition to his acquaintance Walpole in favour of finding Mr Reid a waiters’ 
place in 1743.330 Sir Randolph Knipe, a ‘Turkey’ and Russia cloth merchant of 
standing in the City, serially abused the revenue by targeting the Landwaiters on the 
quayside, according to his warehouse-keeper, Joseph Shakwell. Shakwell had been 
ordered 
! to get Two proper landwaiters appointed to the ship and to acquaint them that it 
! would prove a good ship to them if they would pass the Dantzick linen; where upon 
! [Shakwell] applied himself to George Nodes and Thomas Wilkins, who both got 
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! themselves appointed to the ship...[Shakwell] dined several times with them...and 
! the Two landwaiters made up the account over a bottle of wine.331
Wining and dining constituted a courting stage where Nodes and Wilkins were 
assured that Knipe would be ‘honouralbe’ to them, but the real pay-off was a bill 
worth £70. The Commission also interpreted gifts as luring officers into longer-term 
alliances and in 1754 banned officers from accepting lunches bought by merchants. 
Bribery may have played with the egalitarian associations gift exchange implies, but 
the preponderance of cash rewards for the officers does not suggest they were held 
in particularly high regard by merchants.332 Indeed, Joshua Johnson described 
corruption in more business-like terms in 1774, claiming it was easy ‘to bribe the 
weighers to call wrong weights’.333  
! However valuable friends in the Customs were, merchants seem to have 
held the ‘business of the waterside’ in low regard. Like Knipe, Lascelles sent a junior 
to the Quays, describing it as ‘nothing more than standing still all day long by the 
weighing scales.’334 Learning the dull Customs procedure by rote was the lot of 
merchants’ apprentices and could reveal further tensions: the prominent German 
merchant Henry Voguell complained to the Commissioners when Landwaiter James 
Tottingham beat his assistant.335 Busy, smoky and dark, Joshua Johnson wrote to 
his firm in Maryland that ‘The plagued Customs House frights me; I shall be obliged 
to employ a broker or a clerk’.336 By contrast, John Baker, a Caribbean planter-
merchant turned solicitor, felt no shame in playing whist with the Commissioners’ 
Secretary, Edward Stanley, until 3 am before staggering home with him.337 
! These examples suggest that status differentials distanced Landwaiters from 
merchants, but how far? The Landsurveyors Reports record the officers’ ages, 
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meaning that birth years can be easily ascertained and making parochial records a 
useful tool to probe social backgrounds further. Firm identifications can be made of 
57 christenings, showing that officers came from parishes around the country, most 
of them rural. Few were born in mercantile centres like Bristol, Hull or Liverpool, and 
only ten were Londoners by birth. A prominent factor in officers finding appointments 
was elite social contacts but the political utility of this system of dependencies 
needs qualification. Namier has stressed that revenue officers were expected to 
support their patrons during election campaigns.338 London was a plum appointment 
in terms of fees and the Commissioners reminded the Treasury, ‘the knowledge [an 
officer] will acquire of Customhouse business in [London] will make the execution of 
his duty the more easy and creditable to him hereafter’.339 Yet it seems unlikely that 
metropolitan Customs officers had much impact on London polls, as the electorate 
of the City, Westminster and Southwark numbered 21,000 and generally sided with 
the opposition.340 However, Inspector of Prosecutions, Stephen Monteage, reported 
senior Customs staff traveling to the provinces to vote in 1747.341 As Paul Langford 
has suggested, it seems likely that the London establishment was significantly 
leavened by regional carpet-baggers, badgering politicians with Treasury 
connections where their landed holdings were greatest or electoral interests most 
precarious.342 
! As migrants, the officers did not necessarily tax their native communities, a 
de facto gain for the Commissioners, that was, perhaps, negated by the sense of 
genteel entitlement officers, like Maurice Butler, took from their associations with 
aristocratic grandees. When suspended from duty in 1750 Butler summarily and 
publicly appealed to his patrons, the Granvilles, in a short pamphlet.343 In spite of 
these friends in high places, Butler was not a gentleman. Appointed in 1743, Butler 
would not have been able to wear a sword, a mark of status forbidden to 
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Landwaiters in 1727, who had few of the traditional trappings of gentility.344 
Moreover, no officer in my set attended an English University, and no Treasury 
Warrant used the handle ‘gent.’ or ‘esq.’ as they did with patentees. Landwaiters did 
style themselves ‘gentlemen of the customs house’ in wills until the end of the 
century, an affectation common to clerics, book-keepers and scribes.345 
! Religious denomination provides further indication of who the Landwaiters 
were, and the picture that emerges is of a confessionally heterodox group. The 
religious conformity expected of public servants and English gentlemen was 
seemingly not a priority in London’s Customs House, although an anonymous 
complaint made around 1715 which angrily charged one Customs Commissioner 
with being a Catholic demonstrates that religious matters could raise hackles, 
especially during the uncertainty and upheaval of a Jacobite rebellion.346 Yet Moses 
Gomes Serra, a bench officer in the 1740s, was a scion of a successful merchant 
family hailing from the Sephardic community that congregated in Bevis Marks 
Synagogue in the east of the City.347 Landwaiters with Dissenting connections were 
much more prevalent mid-century: Jean-Jacques Lauzat, Matthew Mead, Frederick 
Gibson and Hothersal Hutchins were christened in Huguenot, Independent and 
Presbyterian chapels in the capital, whilst Edward Kenyon was a Presbyterian of 
Manchester. The five Scotsmen that can be identified in the sample of officers 
during this period presumably had non-conformist upbringing too. 
! Most officers did not enter the Customs until in their late twenties or thirties, 
by which time some had had jobs and acquired contacts elsewhere.348 Incidental 
references amongst the Warrants suggest five officers had mercantile upbringings, 
three from London, one from Bristol, with another, Scudamore Lazenby, a Leeds 
merchant who resurfaced in the London Customs in 1738. Searching for bankrupt 
officers in the London Gazette  can again be used to locate commercial 
backgrounds though the source is weighted toward urban merchants and clothiers, 
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and Julian Hoppit feels it is accurate from 1760.349 Of 120 candidates, only seven 
were bankrupts: three were from London, with one each from Surrey, Warwickshire, 
Bristol and Newcastle. Two of the Londoners in this pool were merchants, the 
second a brewer, with an additional officer, a Bristolian merchant-ironmonger. The 
remaining officers all issued from the cloth trade, being described as chapmen, an 
occupation closer to wholesaling than retailing. 
! Bankruptcy may have eroded an officer’s economic independence and made 
him a target for his former merchant associates, but commercial acumen, familiarity 
with the mysterious customs bills and book-keeping skills were considered 
‘trustworthy making qualities’ by the Treasury and Commission. An officer ‘who had 
been bred a merchant and had attended his business at the waterside – being 
reported qualified by the Landsurveyor – was admitted without the usual 
instruction.’350 Similarly, Benjamin Bristow was dismissed as a Landwaiter in 1781 
and immediately became a purser to the East India Company.351 The 
Commissioners put a premium on expertise and occasionally refused posts to 
officers failing to meet their criteria, like Francis Hammond, who was ordered to 
continue his training.352 They likewise proceeded ‘with utmost severity’ on 
discovering that six Landwaiters were unqualified for the East India business, while 
James Routh was discontinued from that branch because of his poor eyesight.353 
! The importance of commercial “sensibilities” extended into the handling of 
commodities on the Quays. Small changes in the qualities of goods could have 
major implications on their liability for duties. Wine-tasters were employed to 
distinguish between French and Iberian produce; and the misrecognition of caraway 
and cumin seeds provoked an entire pamphlet from one trader, condemning the 
Customs’ seizures, obfuscation and legalese.354 When Dutch linens were landed as 
if they were German at Hull it was found necessary to send a London Landwaiter, 
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‘who had been Surveyor in the Port of Exeter, & is particularly knowing in ye Linen 
trade, to which he was bred’ to investigate.355 Merchants were often called to 
arbitrate on disputes with the revenue regarding produce spoiled in transit, as was 
the case in a ruction over raisins in 1776 when two ‘indifferent merchants 
experienced in the value of such goods’ reported to the Landsurveyors on the 
‘nature and quantum’ of the damage.356 
! While average life-expectancy for Londoners was in their late forties or 
younger if poorer, Landwaiters enjoyed a relatively good standard of living as a 
result of these skills.357 43 officers died in the service at a median age of 56, while 
the median age of nine retirees was 63. Property records give us a fuller sense of 
how assiduously Landwaiters could accumulate capital and thereby sustain their 
quality of life. The Prerogative Court of Canterbury Wills and parochial records 
suggest officers congregated in certain areas, moving from the commercial parishes 
bordering the Legal Quays to the shabby gentility of districts like Hackney, 
Goodman’s Fields and Bermondsey after 1750, while by 1790 an enclave had 
appeared in buoyant Lambeth. The practice of commuting from the suburbs aped 
the condition of wealthier City merchants, who also kept second addresses in 
addition to their counting-houses by this period. However, officers were not 
purchasing villas for themselves like London’s plutocrats; their wills mention 
humbler tenements rather than grounds. 11 officers in the sample insured with the 
Sun Assurance between 1777 and 1784, covering properties and goods worth 
between £100 and £600, with the median policy worth £300. Few wills recorded any 
land, hinting at a preponderance of second sons or diehard suburbanites, and the 
bequests to kin ranged between hundreds of pounds and £5,000. Without 
inventories it is hard to be any more systematic about the evidence provided by the 
Prerogative Courts, which also fail to state wealth at death.358 It would seem, 
however, that officers left behind an upper ‘middling’ leasehold, annuities, plate and 
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a donation to the poor, with lucky Landwaiters scraping the lower end of the 
£5,000-15,000 wealth-bracket Earle reckons as typical of London merchants.359 
! The evidence presented here suggests that the relationships Landwaiters 
forged with London’s merchants could be sustained, yet were also socially 
attenuated. Fees allowed favours to be traded over long periods, permitting a 
language of honour to develop between these groups, but these activities were 
markedly professional in character and centered on the Quays. Despite a shared 
commercial knowledge, merchants occupied a very different social position to 
Landwaiters and exacerbated this difference by sending juniors to conduct 
‘waterside business.’ Merchants were not only inured to bribery at early stages in 
their career through this arrangement but, having established themselves in the 
upper-echelons of a counting house, could rely on the costs of the social networking 
required to fraudulently pass goods through the Customs to dissuade new entrants 
to the trade. 
! The great disadvantage of this compromise was its precarious foundations: 
aloof merchants commanded little loyalty from Landwaiters and their wealth was an 
obvious target for extortion. Treasury appointments to the service diminished the 
power of the Commission, creating an older staff establishing retirement funds and 
a politically protected cohort, while war corroded established merchant-officer 
relationships. In this context, one would expect escalating tensions around 
exchanges between the two groups in the 1770s. Although there is little direct 
evidence for growing rates of extortion amongst Landwaiters, in 1778 one 
pamphleteer was urging that merchants form a committee to treat with the Customs 
collectively in order to ensure that Landwaiters were prevented from using seizures 
to force their will on merchants.360 Benjamin Vaughan complained to Shelburne of 
the ‘absurd fees of the Customs House’, and asked for a consolidation of the book 
of rates and better attendance from the officers in 1783.361 
! On the related topic of replacing the fees of Treasury clerks with fixed 
salaries, Vaughan thought that ‘it is better not to cut too close. Matters of such 
immense consequence to individuals come through these officers that it is 
impossible not to suppose the individuals will bribe. But two or three hundred 
pounds a year will make the difference of its being a place for a man of credit; low 
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fellows are likely to make a better bargain for themselves and worse bargains for 
the country.’362 His associates in the West India Merchants Committee adopted a 
combative attitude to the Customs by loudly complaining to the Commission of 
irregular behaviour on the Quays in 1782.363 By 1792 the Commissioners reported 
to the Treasury that London merchants were increasingly willing to forego paying 
fees, registering a crucial change in attitude to the ‘business of the waterside’, 
though outport merchants were more equivocal on the issue.364 This mercantile 
push for waged officers points to historically low levels of trust in interpersonal 
allegiances as a mechanism to regulate the Quays. 
Section 5: Corruption and Stability !  
Complaints from merchants about the regulation of the officers in London were 
grounded in a commercial agenda, which was not necessarily shared by Musgrave 
or the politically motivated Treasury. Rather, the evidence presented so far flatly 
contradicts Brewer’s assertion that Weberian rationality was growing in revenue 
departments like the Customs, and that we should look to the Treasury for its roots. 
Unlike the Excise, regulations were not rigid and the will of the Treasury to discipline 
or dismiss officers abated after 1760. As such, this section aims to explain 
Musgrave’s success without recourse to the notion that a governing logic sprung 
from the Treasury. First of all this section outlines how the officers explained away 
their behaviour in order to build a picture of the challenges Musgrave faced. Next, it 
describes how his officers’ age provided him with leverage to overcome their moral 
rhetorics. Finally, we explore how Musgrave created a network of political allies and 
intellectual resources that allowed him to represent his officers to the Treasury in a 
manner which emphasised the public costs of their patronage policy.   
! Elizabeth Hoon’s brilliantly detailed history of the Customs frequently cites 
the reports Musgrave made to criticise the service after 1777, drawing a stark line 
between the organisation in his day and the ‘era of Pitt and Adam Smith’.365 Whilst 
the preceding sections have shed some light onto the causes of Musgrave’s 
discontent, this section will flesh out Hoon’s offhand but perceptive remark about the 
changing rationale of the Customs. What this section argues is that the startling 
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‘modernity’ of Musgrave’s work was constructed, in part, by the Reports Hoon cites, 
and involved three interconnected processes of ‘disembedding’ after 1777. 
Musgrave first overturned the Commission’s reticence to challenge their officers’ 
justifications for fees and inattentive behaviour. In doing so he developed 
remunerative forms that cemented the managerial power of the Commission. And 
he made strenuous efforts to represent the service systematically and displace the 
Treasury’s earlier models of trust, based on political assurances. In resituating the 
service, Musgrave connected together a broad range of resources, weaving 
together gentlemanly sociability, librarianship, political economy and his officers’ 
bodies to make his case. His success was not solely theoretical but material insofar 
as he instituted new practices, new ways of figuring officers in archival and 
administrative rationales, and created new channels of information that were longer-
lasting than the corrupt ones that went before. The term ‘longer-lasting’ is meant 
literally, in that paper trails replaced what the semi-formal, ill-documented and 
fleeting relationships that characterised corruption before. That said, the ‘tablets of 
stone’ Brewer evoked to describe the regulation of the revenue would not have 
allowed Musgrave to process and compare the information he gathered or 
disseminate it with anything like the speed he did.    
! A 1743 petition from the Kingswaiters to the Treasury, ‘praying that they may 
succeed according to seniority such Landwaiters, London Port, transferred from the 
inferior to superior list’, supports the notion that promotion by time in office was an 
expectation of early officers, something that was certainly not the case for later 
cohorts.366 By 1778, Treasury appointments to the Customs had created a situation 
where the Customs Commission had little say over the promotion and dismissal of 
their staff, while merchants, too, called for greater accountability. Only ten 
Landwaiters were dismissed in the period, indicating the problem Commissioners 
faced in getting rid of officers shielded by patents, friends at the Treasury and 
merchant complicity. When cornered, officers attempted to ‘neutralise’ the 
Commissioners’ concerns by explaining their actions in what they considered 
morally unimpeachable terms. Examining the officers’ answers to charges of 
corruption is revealing and shows that the categories identified by Philp as 
constituting forms of social distribution alongside politics, namely the family, 
community, patrons and the market, formed a distinct repertoire of excuses. No 
Landwaiter was naive enough to suggest soliciting or extorting bribes from 
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merchants was a right of office, yet the complexity of the service also provided 
plenty of opportunity for obfuscation. Indeed, it was only in the 1790s that the 
Commission realised to their horror that, while the fees of London officers were 
enshrined in statute, those of Outport officers were charged on a customary basis 
and revised under the purview of local merchant bodies or corporations.367 
! Local markets also provided a rationale and language for deflecting attention 
away from illicit transactions in London. As Musgrave noted in 1777, duties had 
been raised cumulatively, each war bringing another levy or ‘head’ to the bills 
merchants were faced with. Such was the bills’ complexity, a secondary market of 
expertise emerged, with established officers writing manuals that explained the 
Customs laws, which were marketed to both merchants and officers.368 Moreover, 
officers in the Longroom calculated the “correct” duties for merchants and got ‘more 
by their clients... than by the crown.’369 Edward Saxby’s expertise was valued at 
£700 per annum and on leaving the post his merchant ‘clients’ would revert to his 
clerks. Richard Frewin reckoned his income from this service amounted to £1,000 a 
year in the early 1780s, enough to consider forgoing Musgrave’s invitation to join 
the Customs secretariat.370 Landwaiters were frequently admonished for ‘crediting’ 
merchants with too much time in clearing their vessels and occasionally financed 
them whilst their goods were on the Quays too.371 The chief defence used by 
officers to justify these murky transactions was that fees ensured a quality service 
or ‘dispatch’, an argument identical to those used to justify private education today. 
When threatened with Musgrave’s bill abolishing fees, the Landsurveyors petitioned 
parliament, explaining that duty on the sufferance wharfs that stretched from 
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Battersea to Wapping would be impossible without additional compensation.372 
Musgrave’s emphasis on streamlining paperwork and creating adequately salaried 
posts dispossessed officers of this defence by having the Treasury monopolise the 
criteria on which the service was evaluated.  
! Such a technocratic strategy was an affront to officers, in that their 
appointment by the Treasury buttressed a discourse of judgement based on 
refinement and notions of honour. The correspondence of place seekers cited 
earlier frequently made assurance of the gentility of prospective officer. Landwaiter 
Maurice Butler protested his 1750 suspension and eventual dismissal by recounting 
the lineage of his patrons, the Granvilles, since the Conquest.373 Butler denied 
money was a factor informing his values, despite working in a palpably commercial 
environment. He claimed to remember the days when Landwaiters were ‘gentlemen 
and treated as such by their superiors’, evoking a golden age to disparage ‘modern’ 
Commissioners: ‘A man owes and has the same right to Justice on behalf of 
himself, to satisfy his friends and the rest of the world, when the interest of his 
suffering family and (what is more tender) his reputation is concern’d’.374 When 
Musgrave asked the Duke of Manchester’s Longroom deputies to divulge their 
income from fees, they claimed their remuneration was a matter for them and the 
Duke alone.375 In essence this was to turn the logic of aristocratic protection 
commonly found in letters soliciting Customs places against the pretensions of the 
bureaucrats by imbuing status and clan with a higher value than efficiency. 
Musgrave was forced to ask Lord Chancellor Thurlow to intervene and threaten 
Manchester with removal if he did not force his active servants to comply, causing 
the wisdom of appointments for life and reversionary interests to be seriously 
questioned by Pitt the Younger.376    
 ! Butler’s allusion to his family in defending his actions point towards another 
set of relationships that could be used to justify corruption. Musgrave himself was 
forced to the Old Bailey when an ex-officer, James Major threatened to kill him, 
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claiming the Commissioner owed him a living in the service. A series of letters Major 
sent to Musgrave was read in court, each stressing that ‘the loss and sufferings my 
family have felt, and the trouble I am now in, I should think some redress should be 
given me’.377 In 1765 Kingswaiter Thomas Butts, 46, sent a fruity letter of 
resignation to the Treasury that claimed he had never ‘sacrific’d his Duty to his 
interest’ for which the revenue ‘benefited many thousands of pounds‘, but 
complained the partiality of the Customs Commissioners bore ‘little regard to 
capacity, diligence or fidelity‘ amongst officers. Having contracted ‘rheumatic 
disorders’ on the chilly waterside, ‘his spirits at last quite broken’ from the 
indifference of his superiors, he begged the Treasury to ‘move [him] into another 
employment for the sake of his family’.378 
! Family proved a serious barrier to change, but old age provided a 
steppingstone to utilitarian reforms. When considering Musgrave’s bill to eradicate 
fees, Pitt the Younger was advised caution on this matter, as these monies provided 
‘the daily bread to the widows and orphans of their predecessors’.379 This referred to 
the fact that some Landwaiters’ posts were acquired on the proviso that the 
incumbent Officer paid his predecessor a portion of his fees. Whole families 
survived on these “pensions”, as the Customs Commissioners became aware when 
they assumed the management of the superannuation fund from the Receiver 
General in 1777. Landwaiters, who were increasingly being recognised as ‘infirm’ 
were forced on to the fund in 1779, the same year that the ancient John 
Cunningham was superseded with a pension. Indeed, Cunningham had been a 
worry for the Commission since Musgave arrived. In 1762 the Landwaiter had 
petitioned the Treasury to remind them he had been ‘presented’ for a 
Landsurveyor‘s place, writing, ‘your supplicant being old and in a declining state of 
proceeding from his constant attendance at the Waterside where he has been 
exposed to the inclemency of all weathers... he having a large family to maintain 
and nothing but the continuation of the service for their support.’380 Cunningham 
would have been 60 then and his plea received the backing of four Commissioners, 
but the post went to another, resulting in 17 more years of arduous service. 
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! The availability of pensions made the experience of discharging the growing 
number of old officers more comfortable for the Commission, who were well aware 
that the pressure of retirement ‘naturally’ made officers dependent on the fees that 
supported them and their kin and more likely to solicit bribes. Musgrave personally 
mobilised this logic, asking Shelburne to excuse ‘my submitting to your 
consideration whether my labours undertaken at your Lordships command do not 
deserve some reward so far at least as to give me a chance of a quiet retreat when 
I shall be worn out with age and infirmities.’ He hoped Shelburne would ‘have the 
goodness to carry into execution the promise you did me the honour to make... and 
Grant [me] the Reversion of the Office of Comptrollor General of the Customs to be 
held during my pleasure’, a reward that entirely contradicted his outwardly principled 
stance on office-holding.381 
! The discharge of aging officers was formalised with the introduction of an 
age cap. An age cap of 50 years was placed on officer appointments in 1782 and 
dropped to 45 in 1786. From then on officers could be superannuated aged 60, and 
Commissioner Richard Frewin extended their contributions to the scheme by linking 
it to Landwaiters’ salaries in 1798. Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘populations’ is 
particularly resonant here, as it positions eighteenth-century utilitarianism between 
‘biology’ and ‘the public’, seeing it as the economic shaping of populations through 
their ‘desires’.382 Populations
! were constantly accessible to agents and techniques of transformation, on 
! condition that these agents and techniques are at once enlightened, reflected, 
! analytical, calculated, and calculating. Not only must voluntary changes in the law be 
! considered if the laws are unfavorable to the population, but above all, if one wants 
! to encourage population, or achieve the right relationship between the population 
! and the state’s resources and possibilities, then one must act on a range of factors 
! and elements that seem far removed from the population itself and its immediate 
! behavior, fecundity, and desire to reproduce. One must act on the currency flows 
! that irrigate the country...383
The irreversibility of his officers’ decline provided the justification for fairly arbitrary 
age qualifications to replace the older qualities that justified office, like political 
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reliability or social standing. Evidently this binary way of representing officers as 
capable or, conversely, as 60 and incapable, had the advantage that it was easily 
policed by the Treasury and Commission, regardless of any personal relationships 
between individual officers and either institution. 
! Both the Commission and Treasury felt officers and their dependents should 
be provided for, and the problems of old age and failing bodies provided objective 
grounds to start disciplining unproductive officers. The material and rhetorical 
challenges of aging acted as a springboard for Musgrave’s increasingly Smithian 
sociology, based on legal clarity, administrative accuracy and quantifiable 
measures. Although the idea of streamlining duties was a staple of published 
Customs manuals, Musgrave’s emphasis on economising government, making 
officers themselves ‘useful’ and dependable, echoed Smith, whose complaints 
about the service centred on four heads.384 First, the fees and perquisites Customs 
officers charged were a burden on the public, as costs charged to merchants 
devolved onto consumers. By contrast, the Excise was ‘less corrupted than the 
customs’, whose ‘ignorant’ medieval origins made the institution prone to abuse. 
Second, duties, especially overtly protectionist tariffs, disrupted the ‘natural direction 
of national industry’. Third, high taxes caused smuggling and, as such, social 
dissent. And fourth and finally, Smith claimed that tax inspectors interfered in private 
business, which smacked of oppression, raising peoples’ hackles. Smith advocated 
radically dismantling the Customs by lightly taxing a few widely consumed articles 
inland, under the administration of the Excise, thereby doing away with complex 
‘drawbacks’ on re-exported goods.385 Citing Walpole Excise scheme as his model, 
his plan was politically contentious but must figure as part of the ideological 
framework that aimed to render government efficient and exercised Westminster 
politicians after the early successes of the economical reform movement around 
1780. 
! Significantly, Musgrave was reading the Wealth of Nations between 1778 
and 1784, just as he was getting closer to Shelburne.386 In August 1782, Musgrave 
advised Shelburne on how to ‘strengthen and enlarge the proper influence that 
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government ought to have’ over their officers.387 He advocated that Crown patents 
‘for life’ and fees be abolished from the service, and that officer loyalty could be 
improved by regular salaries and appointments made ‘at pleasure’, which meant 
remiss officers could be superseded. Unaccountable sinecures were deemed to 
blight the service, officers ‘having been of late years appointed from country fox-
hunters, bankrupt merchants and officers of the Army and Navy - without the least 
previous knowledge of the business of the revenue and too late to acquire it.’388 
Musgrave’s Bill for vacating places in the Customs floundered with Shelburne’s 
administration in early 1783, but similarly aimed to increase the Treasury’s power 
over officers by replacing their fees by wages and formalising their conditions of 
employment. The jovial correspondence between the two men reveals that 
gentlemanly gifts and favours cemented their intellectual alliance. Indeed, 
Musgrave, who decried venality in office, saw no contradiction in petitioning 
Shelburne for an unpaid but suitably enlightened Trusteeship of the British Museum 
and was similarly at pains to create an empire of contacts in the Customs and 
Treasury.389 
! In 1783, the Committee on Illicit Practices Used for Defrauding the Revenue 
chaired by William Eden reported to Parliament advice from both Customs and 
Excise Commissioners on the fiscal cost of frauds and smuggling. Eden provided 
another friendly link to Smith, who also contributed to the Report as a Scottish 
Customs Commissioner. They concurred with Musgrave, linking fees and 
misinformation with frauds
! This collusion [with merchants] and corrupt disposition among inferior officers is 
! productive also of improper allowances upon the quays, at the discharge of weight, 
! gauge and measure. In short, the established practice of fees, which is inseparable 
! from a complicated and difficult system of duties [combined] to produce an intimacy 
! and connection between inferior officers and merchants.390
Musgrave had drafted in Frewin and Stiles to form a task force that sought to 
liberalise Irish duties in 1782. The pair would continue his efforts to insulate officers 
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from merchants as Commissioners under Pitt the Younger by producing another 
report criticising fees in 1792 and extending the pension scheme to all officers as a 
mechanism to instil loyalty to the Treasury.391
! Marshalling and collecting data was important in establishing Musgrave as 
an impartial and publicly-minded force in the Customs and signals a departure from 
the otherwise informal (or corrupt) political networking he undertook to achieve his 
aims. An amateur compiler of biographical material, a bibliophile and collector of 
engravings, Musgrave’s cross-referenced ‘methodical’ and ‘alphabetical’ catalogues 
of the books he donated to the British Library show the powerful influence of 
archival processes over his thinking. Additionally, he published the volume, A 
Collection of All the Statutes Now in Force, Relating to the Revenue and Officers of 
the Customs in Great Britain and the Plantations (London, 1780), that formed the 
basis for the consolidation of the book of rates he had outlined in the 1777 
memorandum; a project that remained unfinished until 1787. Around this time he 
also began an indexed digest of Customs’ by-laws from 1694 onwards (CUST 
29/1-4). These manuscript tomes exponentially enhanced the navigability of the 
service for the Commissioners, who continued to update them, and replaced the 
unwieldy bundles of documents that had formally constituted their archive. The 
propensity of former Commission’s to repeat staffing regulations or lose sight of 
policies, and the service’s unsteady historical trajectory were laid open by these 
books, which became a valuable asset for a string of reformers hoping to improve 
the efficiency of the Customs. When another Shelburne brainchild, the Commission 
for Stating the Public Accounts, came to examine the Customs in 1784, Musgrave 
and his two protégés in the Customs secretariat, Frewin and Stiles, were on hand to 
provide a searing and thoroughgoing critique of the service’s administrative 
procedures, dependence on fees and appointment mechanism that actively 
undermined the accountability of officers.392 Without Musgrave’s index, this map of 
the service could scarcely have been drawn up so quickly, or have made such 
decisive inroads into the question of policing the service.
! The Reports also capitalised on Musgrave’s adaptation of tabular forms to 
display data about his officers, giving these documents a pointed rhetoric. 
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Appendixes attached to the fourteenth and fifteenth detailed the position, salary, 
fees, tax liability and mode of appointment of all London and outport officers, acting 
as a classificatory schema of the service’s archaic offices and split loyalties. 
Musgrave had piloted this form in manuscript surveys of the service drawn up to 
support his 1782-3 bill for Shelburne, when he asked officers to report their fees, 
specifying the headed columns in which the data should be returned to make it 
immediately comparable. These “questionnaires” were not unlike those used by the 
Society of Antiquaries, of which Musgrave was a member, to collect topographical 
information.393 Like the Duke of Manchester’s deputies, some officers had to be 
bullied into responding and the outports proved particularly resistant, cloaking their 
unease at the Commissioners exploration of the realm of fees in obfuscation and 
tardiness.394 They had good reason to be worried, as Shelburne had used this 
procedure to calculate the salaries of Treasury clerks once their fees had been 
abolished.395 
Both the Treasury and parliament were regularly passed tabulated 
‘accounts’ by the Customs, for the most part drawn up by Musgrave’s Surveyor 
General, meaning both institutions were familiar with the Appendix’s form.396 
Comparisons between types of officers were made easy and a running total made 
clear the expense of the establishment, especially the vast ‘net produce’ being 
extracted from offices. Despite not being able to guarantee the officers’ self-
assessments, information that represented his officers to the Treasury as public 
costs, rather than as friends or pleading clients, was a means of overcoming the 
contingency of his authority. Not only did the appendixes open the officers to fiscal 
scrutiny, which complemented his growing appreciation for quantifiable data, it 
strengthened Musgrave’s contention that extending Treasury authority into the 
officers’ private negotiations by eradicating fees was possible and desirable.
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Figure 3.4, Musgrave’s table of his officers’ ‘emoluments’.
Source: PP, ‘Fourteenth Report’. 
! Musgrave left the Customs in 1785 to join the Public Accounts Commission 
which had just visited the Customs and replaced the Auditor of the Imprest in 
disciplining the Exchequer. Answering directly to the First Lord of the Treasury 
(Prime Minister), the Commission further cemented the nexus of policy and 
administration. Informal connections eased this transition: Musgrave had dealt with 
the Prime Minister, Pitt the Younger, as Shelburne’s Chancellor, with Pitt continuing 
to implement many of his predecessor’s policies.397 Pitt’s long administration 
allowed him to follow economising policies silently, letting many Customs places ‘fall 
in’ by refusing to appoint successors when they were vacated. Policing the Customs 
with utility in mind was a function not just of the intelligence gathered in the reports 
but also Musgrave’s presence. Moreover, detecting abuses on the Quayside was 
made exponentially simpler by the Consolidation of the book of rates that made 
duties easier to compute. This monumental administrative endeavour had clear 
implications for the fiscal policies that the Treasury implemented, and also reveal 
the power of Musgrave’s bureaucratic devices to cement his own position. Eden’s 
1783 report had echoed Musgrave in expressing displeasure at the mercantilist 
system of drawbacks, prohibitions and bounties that overly-complicated duties.398 
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Musgrave counselled Pitt on the 1784 Commutation Act, which sought to raise 
revenue on tea by lowering duties, in order to undercut the price differential that 
made smuggling so attractive. Duties on wine, spirits and tobacco were lowered as 
a result of the success with tea. Tobacco warehousing was eventually passed over 
to the Excise for administration in 1788, succeeding where Walpole had failed. 
Similarly, Eden benefitted from Musgrave’s advice since 1783 and, having joined 
Pitt’s administration, would negotiate the 1786 treaty aimed at dismantling the 
protectionist barriers that depressed trade and encouraged smuggling with 
France.399 Again, the recodification of information into standardised and digested 
forms that could physically move more easily between the Treasury and Customs 
was central to making policy more Smithian and officers more accountable.    
! Musgrave was the conspicuous force in shaping the Customs service from 
1780, overseeing a shift away from mercantilist policy and introducing utilitarian 
reforms. Combining with figures like Shelburne, Eden and Pitt, who were 
sympathetic to the economical reform movement, he sought to curb waste in the 
Customs and elsewhere by unpicking byzantine procedures, extinguishing defunct 
offices, sinecures and reversionary interests, by having the Treasury engross all 
appointments and replace fees with salaries and pensions. 
! The rationality of his recommendations should not obscure the fact that they 
were a reaction to the fiscal short-termism of the Treasury, who palpably favoured 
political clients above longer-term plans. Equally, officers frequently explained that 
they were just as prone to supposedly universal frailties in order to legitimise their 
positions or cushion the force of the Commissioner’s ire. Self-interest, gentlemanly 
allegiances and family were presented as factors that could not be eradicated or 
penalised, establishing an alternative moral schema to those the Commission 
attempted to promote at the time. Local reciprocities and obligations coloured 
Musgrave’s view of both his officers and the Treasury and in every case he aimed to 
standardise their dealings with the Customs by establishing regular bureaucratic 
and remunerative procedures that encouraged accountability. Combatting corruption 
meant realigning the proper relations between interdependent groups: by having the 
Commission suppress markets detrimental to the long-term security of the revenue; 
by making the Treasury acknowledged their obligations to the National Debt by de-
politicsing the Customs; and ensuring officers relied on the Treasury to support their 
families. 
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! Musgrave’s attempts to centralise administrative procedures saw paperwork 
replace more ephemeral alliances. Not only did these archivable bureaucratic forms 
define corrupt ones with greater clarity but improved the quality and quantity of 
information, especially numerical information, that connected his officers to the 
Treasury. Seen as officers on a certain salary and pension, of so many years of 
age, and solely beholden to the Treasury rather than individual ministers, the 
calculative framework linking the officers to the Treasury radically altered, becoming 
invested with numerical precision and greater administrative regularity. To be sure, 
this system did not fully emerge until fees were abolished in 1802 due to Pitt’s non-
committal attitude to Treasury reform, Musgrave’s death in 1800 and the seemingly 
permanent crises engendered by the Napoleonic wars. However, Musgrave laid a 
foundation, both in the reports he made and the material and archivable 
administrative practices he introduced, which meant that slips backwards into 
informalities were now defined as corrupt and more visible in the paper-trail that 
connected officers to commissioner and the Treasury.  
Conclusions       
This chapter’s discussion of Musgrave’s utilitarianism was arrived at by a circuitous 
route, suggesting previous histories of the revenue have under-emphasised the 
proximity of corruption, in that those decrying it register something unwelcome but 
contemporary. Enlightened appreciations of corruption in the market and the state in 
economic discourse, such as Smith’s, shifted the horizons of administrators, but the 
continual evolution of transactions, like bribery or informal patron-client 
relationships, gave these ideas purchase at particular times and places. Indeed, the 
Treasury was not an autonomous entity guiding England, then Britain, to great 
power status on the basis of the inherent rationality of political economy. Certainly, it 
figured politics differently to other branches of the state and the public because of 
the national debt but this did not translate directly into a uniform or consistent 
attitude towards office-holding, as the Landwaiter appointments for London clearly 
show. Walpole’s and the Pelhams’ management of Customs appointments were 
fairly utilitarian and they made some effort to discipline officers for the good of the 
revenue. By contrast, George III’s ministers treated Customs places cynically, 
awarding places ‘for life’ in exchange for socio-political favours. 
! Furthermore, economic corruption was linked to political corruption, via 
attitudes to office-holding, and was variable too. As a socially coded, if 
asymmetrical, exchange of services, corrupt transactions forced certain obligations 
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on actors that needed to be sustained and reproduced. Whether through external 
shocks like war and elections or the economic requirements of old age, ruptures in 
the networks required to perform these expectations could deform the trusted norm. 
London’s merchants could be alienated from the Landwaiters because of their 
apparent arbitrariness, hastening merchant adoption of regular, collective and long-
term remunerative strategies. 
!  Finally, seeing corruption as involving a complex set of negotiations 
between several legitimate forms of distribution, any of which may gain political 
traction, acknowledges the heterogeniety of the eighteenth-century state. Just as 
successive Treasuries employed their own staffing strategies, so officers enrolled 
their own immediate concerns, presenting the Commissioners with seemingly 
timeless social categories, like family or self-interest, that had explanatory value 
precisely because they were so hard to police. Musgrave’s reforms became an 
unmistakable endorsement for debt-orientated political economy only after his 
increasingly infirm officers attempted to justify their inability to comply with existing 
regulations. An aging population sparked his utilitarian solution, causing him to seek 
to suppress the lazy ideals of gentility and honour that the Treasury fostered. 
! From cash fees to pensions to national debt, this chapter has featured 
various forms of circulation, and Musgrave’s Customs reforms were ultimately about 
shifting the culture of money in the Customs. He advocated that tax-payers buy-out 
and exclude the claims merchants, political patrons and families had on the 
Customs through wages and pensions, in return for extending the Treasury’s fiscal 
integrity. It validated the vertical transfer of wealth from merchants to the Treasury 
by denying the horizontal associations of officers and merchants embodied in the 
form of fees. And, through wages and pensions, it inculcated long-term rationales in 
order to increase officer’s dependence on the Treasury. For London’s merchants, 
this bureaucratic agenda became attractive on the basis that it promised regular, 
efficient and lighter taxation, and an alternative to their contested influence of the 
Quays. Officers were a conduit between the Treasury and counting-house, which 
changed the calculative agenda of merchants in the lead up to the Docks campaign, 
by fostering an appreciation for order and regularity at the interface of the state and 
economy. Extending the power of the Treasury remained contentious. Burke’s 
Reflections (London, 1790) stated a credible defense of fiscal inertia on the basis of 
the ancient social and moral hierarchies, which countenanced change only when ‘it 
is to be effected without a decomposition of the whole civil and political mass for the 
purpose of originating a new civil order out of the first elements of society.’ 
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Nevertheless, while commentators might find calculating bureaucratic centres 
politically unsettling, the next chapter will investigate the culture of insurance to 
demonstrate that these were an increasingly normal and popular part of the City’s 
commercial landscape.   
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Chapter 3: Mercantile Architecture: Insurance, Warehouses and the Limits of 
Improvement
As we have seen, the organisation of the Customs was becoming increasingly 
rigidly defined after 1780, with City merchants welcoming these measures. Indeed, 
propertied Londoners were far more trusting of bureaucratic institutions and fire 
insurance was a key means in effecting this shift in the eighteenth century. William 
Vaughan, who had been a Deputy Director of the London Assurance since 1783, 
attended the 1796 Parliamentary Inquiry into extending the Port of London, 
alongside three spokesmen from London insurance companies. In their statements 
to the Committee these delegates pondered over the insurability against fire of the 
wooden ships in the proposed Docks’ basins, as well as the warehouses around 
them, as both contained valuable concentrations of goods.400 
! Maximillian Novak suggests that the improvement projects of the later-
eighteenth century took their lead from the philosophes, who saw change as 
desirable if not inevitable.401 The Bowood Set’s appreciation of insurance stands out 
as an obvious example of the coupling of thinkers and practices that Novak has in 
mind. Richard Price had been working as an actuary in the City since the 
mid-1760s, published on annuities and been advocating their use to reduce the 
national debt to Shelburne and Pitt.402 Adam Smith used insurance to illustrate how 
the market had generated its own ‘routines’ that had already proved their worth as it 
‘appeared, with the clearest evidence, that the undertaking is of greater and of more 
general utility than the greater part of common trades’.403 The expertise on display 
at the Inquiry might be interpreted as testament to the pragmatic, enlightened and 
calculating qualities that Smith praised as latent within the City’s ‘routine’ 
commercial institutions. However, the insurance delegates present came to little 
consensus as to what the Docks or better warehousing would do to their premium 
rates. Digging a little deeper, Robin Pearson has found that evidence for the 
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insurance industry sparking technical innovation in architectural circles is scant.404 
As such, this chapter probes the limitations of bureaucratic strategies and money-
orientated technologies to alter commercial practices in London, in contrast to the 
success Musgrave had with them in Customs House. 
! Considering the role the insurance industry in providing a platform for 
market-driven improvement in the built environment requires melding architectural 
and economic history. Examining the career of Richard Jupp (1727-1799), a 
surveyor for the Hand in Hand fire office, the East India Company and several other 
City institutions we can get a sense of the limitations of the architectural expertise 
the insurance offices relied on. Undoubtedly London’s insurance companies number 
amongst the great bureaucratic feats of the eighteenth century, and they promoted 
“faceless” Smithian markets through their routine administration of money. By 
raising the premiums on risky buildings like warehouses the fire offices frequently 
advised their policyholders that investing in fire-proof building materials would save 
them money. As such, the insurance companies differentiated between building 
technologies in their understanding of risk, creating a market for improved 
architecture. However, refining Pearson’s work this chapter suggest that the 
seemingly modern insurance companies had no monopoly over how levels of risk 
were conceptualised or made visible within a calculative framework. Insurance 
principles did not find a public outlet in Jupp’s built-work and, through a case study 
of the warehousing industry, it becomes clear many other mechanisms were in 
place to offset any risks to buildings in that sector. Investments in forms of training, 
networking and discipline designed to mitigate the anxieties posed by circulating 
expensive goods were prevalent in London’s warehouses. Moreover, the money 
and time that had been invested in these qualities were all highly visible, taking 
physical form in licenses, badges, tickets, keys, tokens, the spaces people occupied 
within warehouses, and the age of warehouse-keepers. All of these were 
concentrated on specific warehouse spaces, normally the gates, that made the 
structures themselves quite adequate centres of calculation. Insurance policies may  
have fostered a numerically sophisticated understanding of risk but these coexisted 
with other calculative frameworks that diminished the novelty of the insurance 
offices’ understanding of risk, and, subsequently, their calls to invest in the built 
environment. 
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 Section 1: Architecture and Improvement !
Robin Pearson’s work has thrown open a series of questions for historians of 
architecture and commerce by questioning the role of the insurance industry in 
fostering a ‘risk society’. Pearson follows up on Ulrich Beck’s proposition that 
modern society characteristically identifies and neutralises risks of all kinds using 
technologies, both concrete and conceptual, in a self-reflexive manner.405 For Beck,  
Tools like insurance that combine predictive actuarial science with practical 
outcomes alter social relations, which, in turn, feed-back to the specialist wielding 
such instruments and refines their work. As Pearson argues in a recent essay, the 
expanding eighteenth-century insurance industry grew out of and fostered concerns 
about the risks fire posed, but relatively little changed in terms of building practices, 
which continued to use carpentry as a major structural element despite brick 
facades. ‘The transition to a physical environment characterised by durability rather 
than fragility...made less progress in eighteenth century England than historians 
have hitherto suggested’.406 Pearson also suggests that the insurance industry 
remained tied to pre-probabilistic statistical techniques that made insurance 
companies incapable of predicting risks and made the populous at large no more 
safety-conscious. Despite the growth of the insurance industry, popular attitudes to 
the risk of fire were relatively unchanging and few technical changes were piloted by  
the industry. Instead, ‘insurance offered a means of rebuilding after fire damage, 
and thereby realising urban reformers’ aspirations to greater public safety and 
order’, coinciding with the ‘dominant aesthetic of a polite street-scape’.407 What fire 
insurance companies could do was protect the value of property, abstracting it from 
its everyday use-value and making it a commodity or asset.408 That is, the 
companies were in the historically unique position of being able to calculate and 
isolate a value for a property without any view to enjoying or using it. 
! Pearson opens up a number of lines of enquiry which touch on the Docks 
both directly and indirectly because he questions the extent to which insurance 
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companies represented an interface between the rhetoric and practice of 
improvement. As we have seen, William Vaughan was a director of the Royal 
Exchange Assurance, a major London-based underwriter, and he was joined in the 
Parliamentary inquiry into the port of London of 1796 by the three other fire office 
directors. Furthermore, we know insurance was central to the merchant community 
in the City, who sat on the boards of the companies and took out policies on goods 
and ships entering the City. Broadly speaking, it was this community that invested 
most heavily in the Docks, and Vaughan’s own London Dock Company attracted 
more of London’s insurance directors than his rivals in the 1790s.409 What, then, 
was the connection between the body of knowledge shaped by the insurance 
companies and these City-investors in projects like the docks? What inhibited the 
understanding of hazard promoted by the insurance companies from manifesting 
itself as a change in building technologies? And how did merchants use, patronise 
and conceptualise architecture in the City otherwise? 
! A mild criticism of Pearson does arise when we consider how he sets up the 
“problem” of meaningful knowledge-transfers from the fire offices to Londoners at 
large. The failure of insurance to alter the City’s understanding of risk was, as 
Pearson implies, no failure at all inasmuch that it was under no obligation to do so 
except to prop up the theoretical agendas of sociologists like Beck. Yet Pearson 
also describes the ‘curious coexistence of extensive insurance against hazards with 
limited attempts to alleviate their physical threat’.410 His essay attempts to explain 
why rational economic agents failed to be spurred into action by pointing to cultural 
factors like the prevalent ‘psychology’ and ‘ideology of property’ of the eighteenth 
century that prevented probabilistic reasoning to register. My point here is that 
Pearson is no different from Beck in expecting the markets widely advertised by the 
insurance industry through its bureaucratic practices and calculative sophistication 
to displace older mechanisms of assessing risk and foster improving invention.   
! Investigating how the insurance industry interacted with the supposed 
market for improved architecture suggests that the insurance policy was not the 
only way people understood risk in London. Rather, the commercial community had 
developed many ways of representing and suppressing hazard, rooted in an 
established material culture, which was not invisible but circulated widely in the City. 
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The next section of this chapter simply describes the activities of Richard Jupp, an 
insurance surveyor with London’s Hand in Hand fire office, between 1754 and his 
death in 1799. Here, the aim is to explore the kinds of relationships he established 
with those outside the fire offices and what prevented him fostering a more 
sophisticated understanding of risk within them. The second part of this chapter 
looks at the problem of technological stasis from the perspective of potential City 
investors and explores merchant attitudes to risk in the built environment in London. 
The lens used to examine risk in this sections is warehouses, which were a special 
problem for merchants and underwriters in the period, and an obvious built-space 
where the commercial and actuarial imperatives of the City were reconciled. In 
mapping out the mundane institutional life of Jupp and recreating London 
warehouses from business records this chapters develops a practice-led analysis, 
where two different constellations of objects are, like other chapters, just as 
important as the people involved. The aim is to discover why neither interacted in a 
sustained manner.
! The chapter outlines two connected arguments. First, while insurance was a 
popular product and had utilitarian connotations, the rigid methods the industry 
employed resisted rather than facilitated innovation. In a sense the industry was a 
victim of its own success, where formulaic prescriptions discouraged well-meaning 
employees like Jupp from viewing buildings as anything other than a function of 
financial assets and disinterested in developing a knowledge of fire-safety publicly. 
Secondly, the merchant market for improved warehousing was confused because, 
historically, merchant understandings of risk were focused not on the warehouses 
as objects but the goods within them. This amalgamated fear of fires with concerns 
over theft and meant that warehouses traditionally relied upon investments in trust, 
education, networking and qualities thought of as ‘human capital’ as much as fixed-
capital or architecture. Crucially, these qualities were maintained by material and 
bureaucratic supports not entirely different from insurance policies, like licenses, 
badges and the spaces people occupied in warehouses that allow more 
sophisticated calculation of risk to be made by merchants or warehouse-keepers 
transporting goods. Warehouses were calculative spaces where information about 
labour and goods was collated, ranked and acted upon, in the precise manner 
Michel Callon has described in outlining calculative agency.411 Combining these two 
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strands of evidence into Callon’s framework, the suggestion is that the problems the 
insurance industry faced in developing ideas about risk should not be explained by 
examining culture in opposition to economic rationalism but recognising that 
different business cultures co-existed. The rationality of the insurance industry 
harboured a distinct type of sociability that this essay will explore through Jupp, and, 
conversely, the preoccupation with people in warehousing sector made good 
business sense. Risk was not invisible outside the insurance industry but deeply 
embedded the fabric of the City in such a manner as to blur the distinctiveness of 
the reasoning emanating from the fire offices. 
! In many ways this is a narrative of supposedly modern calculative tools of 
probabilistic reasoning not winning out over traditional methods. With merchants 
tending to underwrite goods rather than warehouses and the insurance companies 
being distinctly closed to technical developments in building, the market for 
improved architecture was nascent at best. Comparing insurance with other 
improving projects of the period does provide some compelling reasons for 
suggesting why it failed to connect these actors. This introduction continues by 
outlining the connections between Jupp, insurance and warehouses briefly, and 
then places those elements into a number of the frameworks that have been used 
to interrogate eighteenth-century improvement. What is immediately noticeable is 
that Jupp and the fire offices had startlingly low-public profiles and the knowledge 
Jupp acquired through the insurance industry was transmitted and accumulated 
through private channels rather than public forums. Likewise, warehousing existed 
outside of popular or learned discourses.  Although, this discussion is by no means 
exhaustive or intended to suggest that all modernising projects are inevitably linked 
to some notion of publicity, highlighting the importance of published text in thinking 
about improvement sets into relief the private, corporate and professional milleux 
that bounded both Jupp and warehousing that circulated knowledge far more slowly. 
As with chapter one, this section suggests the role of enlightened discourse to be 
vital because it could radically transform existing markets by altering the calculating 
agencies involved.
! Jupp himself is an under-researched character, in that he was very much 
part of the City’s architectural elite but has not received a monographic treatment 
like his contemporaries, George Dance the Younger, Sir John Soane or Henry 
Holland, with whom he was professionally associated and who were all comparable 
architect-surveyors. Part of this stems from the fact his great commission, East India 
House, was demolished in 1857 and that his career needs to be pieced together 
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from the traces he left in the archives of the Hand in Hand and his other surveying 
posts at Guy’s Hospital, the Carpenters’ Company and the East India Company. His 
work for the East India Company is important in that his warehouses were the most 
prominent in the City, if only because of their sheer scale, and made his a name to 
conjure with by the time of his death.  
! In following Jupp’s career it becomes clear that his work traces several 
circuits or networks which allow us to examine the insurance industry from multiple 
vantages. First, he was responsible for surveying properties for the Hand in Hand 
and therefore acted as mediator between a cross-section propertied Londoners and 
the board of his office. He was then crucial in the abstraction of value from property 
that Pearson notes was the great advantage of the industry. City insurance is often 
labelled an invisible export of the United Kingdom’s by economists and it is clear 
that Jupp was peddling something no less ephemeral to policyholders, a mode of 
calculation. Consequently, Jupp’s practice involved clear displays of mathematical 
expertise that put him in a position of power whilst interacting with policyholders. 
Looking at his work for the East India Company, Guy’s and the guilds, we see him 
connecting together a series of institutions into a more affable, second network. 
Jupp was clearly well respected and his patronage of builders into the offices and 
contracts his surveyorships afforded him further cemented links between the 
insurance industry and this corporate community in the City. These trustworthy 
business connections blended into a third network of professional associations 
between City builders like himself, Dance and Holland, and took the form of the 
Architects’ Club in 1791. Initially the Club was keen to lay down professional 
standards for surveyors and this manifested itself in an experiment aimed at testing 
fire-proofing technologies and publicly announcing the Club’s presence to influential 
Londoners, including George III, Pitt the Younger and the City’s companies and 
liveries. These were three overlapping networks but they figured the relationship 
between expertise, property and trust differently in each case. 
! Although the fire offices adamantly presented themselves as providing a 
service which aimed to support the infrastructure of civic life, looking at the social 
circles that Jupp moved through it is clear that the meanings of insurance were 
variegated and diffuse. Evidently there seems to be something of a disconnection 
between the ability of the insurance companies to marshal private interests and 
foster any kind of debate about improvement, amongst its policyholders, employees 
or in the public sphere. The research presented in the next section suggests Jupp 
was fairly good at drawing the building profession into the world of insurance, albeit 
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in what Stana Nenadic calls an environment where ‘Forging relationships with fellow 
architects through a drinking and dining club had a utility in circumstances where 
market co-operation was necessary’ because ‘co-operative business behaviour was 
a feature of expertise’.412 As such, the relatively impersonal business and public 
aspects of insurance are worth dwelling on for a moment because they suggest why  
the industry was so constipated. 
! The inertia of policyholders when it came to fire-safety is understandable as 
insurance companies developed a technocratic and highly monetised business 
model. Companies could protect “abstract value” by distributing it over a community 
of policyholders and retroactively mobilise it to rebuild properties damaged by fire. 
Significantly, this ‘protection’ only applied to policyholders: if a policyholder’s house 
burnt to the ground causing damage to a neighbour’s, the latter would not be 
entitled to compensation. Fire insurance, framed thus, could be seen as an engine 
of social atomisation, militating against communal values. As Geoffrey Clarke has 
argued of life insurance, ‘Assurance...entailed a collective embrace of the future’s 
potentialities; a self-willed conspiracy of faith in the future well-being of family and 
fortune. Subscribing together helped assure its truth. This really was Good News for 
the capitalist age.’413 That said, large fires frequently saw ad hoc charities 
established to relieve uninsured victims of fires in London and elsewhere, with the 
donations often being administered by City merchants and bankers.414 Fire 
insurance is probably best seen as akin to the kind of utility-maximising commodity 
Jan de Vries sees as restructuring household economies in early-modern Britain, in 
that coverage was not only acquired on the market but established primacy of the 
market as the conduit for goods and services above communal or home-
production.415
! At the public end of the spectrum, the relationship between fire, property and 
civic governance was much debated in the mid-eighteenth century in a manner 
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which gave the insurance companies a potentially political cachet. John Gwynn, 
who republished Wren’s celebrated post-fire design for London in 1748, as well as 
being an early advocate of the Royal Academy drew out the lessons to be learned 
when these elements were confused with particular virulence. His seminal London 
and Westminster Improved (1766) forcefully made the case for further regulating the 
Capital’s architecture, squarely blaming private interest for the deplorable state of 
post-fire London, and demonstrating a barely veiled contempt for the mere 
‘mechanic’ tradesmen who cobbled together jobs without reference to their social 
and intellectual superiors. In his view, pre-Fire London ‘was totally inelegant, 
inconvenient and unhealthy, its misfortunes many melancholy proofs are 
authenticated in [its] history, and which without doubt proceed from the narrowness 
of the streets and the unaccountable projections of the buildings.’416 In his 
subsequent account of London’s inequities, the City’s Thames Street was singled 
out for particular invective on the grounds that it was unsuited to its commercial 
purposes. The maps that accompanied the text overlaid in red Gwynn’s ideal city 
onto the current layout of the City. This saw the quayside regularised and streets 
widened in accordance with Wren. Gwynn’s text appealed to the enlightened 
absolutist, advocating that the capital be regularised and classicised wholesale, and 
not left in the hands of inherently self-interested builders, merchants and 
tradesmen, trading on the inviolability of ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ in England.
! Miles Ogborn has been at pains to explain how Gwynn’s vision fits within a 
wider philosophical and aesthetic project aimed at resolving the questions asked of 
the urban environment by a ‘modern’ commercial society. His argument draws on 
Jurgen Habermas’ notion of private individuals coming together to create a public 
that addresses the state. Ogborn argues that the aristocratic Lord Shaftesbury, 
cynical Bernard Mandeville and studious David Hume had all struggled with the 
question of how public space could reflect and impose just public values on self-
interested individuals. All three arrived at very different solutions: ‘the classical city, 
the filthy city, and the civilised city’ respectively. The uniform street-scape created by  
the Westminster Paving Act, and copied elsewhere in London, realised a Humean 
notion of public propriety ‘built on the foundations of free government and spiced 
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with a little innocent luxury’ quite unlike Gwynn’s.417 These acts caused 
homeowners, who had, by custom, tended the streets outside their residences 
however they saw fit, to turn to paving contractors funded by rates.418 It was 
understood that regular pavements and roads hastened communications and 
facilitated commerce. At least some willingly renounced the upkeep of the paving 
outside their houses, choosing to delegate responsibilities to publicly appointed 
paving commissioners for the sake of efficiency. The relationship between residents, 
commissioners and contractors was decidedly modern (as in non-classical), insofar 
as it monetised a previously civic duty. The fad for like-minded improvements in the 
transport sector, whether paving, turnpiking, canals or dock projects, is a marked 
feature of mid- to late-eighteenth-century Britain.419 Consumers and taxed citizens 
were connected by more numerous and different spaces at the expense of 
communities unable or unwilling to buy in. 
! Parallels between the Paving Commissions and insurance industry’s 
reorientation of domestic life towards the market are clear, although without local 
governing bodies, insurance cultivated a far less accountable expertise. Jupp’s 
engagement with the public sphere was very one-sided. His appointment to the 
East India Company and Hand in Hand surveyrorships were noted in the 
newspapers and the odd architectural review dealt with his built-work, but he was 
never moved to justify or defend his work from public criticism. Other than East 
India House (1799-1801), which was completed after his death and attributed to 
Henry Holland, Jupp’s major architectural works in London fell outside the 
architectural preoccupation with large private residences and public monuments.420 
Consequently, he was ignored by the majority of clubs, societies and informal 
cultures of appreciation that structured tastes up to, and beyond, the establishment 
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of the vehemently classical Royal Academy.421 Insofar as that this helps explain the 
lack of technical progress engendered by the insurance industry it is to suggest that 
surveyors had few forums in which to exchange ideas with outsiders. This speaks to 
a broader question surrounding a mercantile architectural culture. In turning to this 
‘market’ for Jupp’s expertise in the City in the third section it is also clear that what 
buildings were built, how and by whom, also shaped the channels of information 
open to the industry there too.
! Warehouses do not feature strongly in the architectural history of early-
modern London, which has been dominated by studies of the town-house, although 
the question of materiality permeates this scholarship and has clear implications for 
how we approach the idea of fire-proofing.422 John Summerson’s Georgian London 
(1948, many subsequent editions) argued that the Great Fire saw the Jacobean, 
walled and wooden City become a speculatively built, brick metropolis designed 
around the Palladian Square. In particular, Summerson put great weight on the 
1667 Building Regulation Act, strengthened in 1707 and 1709, that ruled on the 
dimensions and materials suitable for domestic architecture, asserting that bricks 
were the primary architectural unit and seeing legislation as buttressing the classical 
hegemony.423 The aristocratic owners of large estates in the West End leased land 
to developers. They, in turn, sold the leases to builders who quickly put up houses 
and were spurred by peppercorn rents into using mass produced materials from 
bricks to bannisters.424 These builders then sold the houses, whose leases would 
revert to the ground landlord, who were now the happy recipients of higher ground 
rents. The cycle encouraged increasingly large runs of uniform houses exploiting a 
market for the ergonomic classicism of Andrea Palladio and Inigo Jones, with the 
elegant monotony of Bloomsbury becoming the paradigmatic expression of 
Georgian ‘wealth’ and ‘taste’. 
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! Most subsequent writers on eighteenth-century London would accept that 
Summerson’s Palladian West End was notable, while questioning whether the brick 
deserves the exulted position he affords it. Linda Clarke’s analysis of the late 
eighteenth-century building trade, Building Capitalism, argues from a Marxist 
perspective that waged labour toppled the artisanal structure of the building trade, 
dominated by contractors involved in the brick trade, and from 1800 ‘produced’ 
distinctive working-class environments.425 Elizabeth McKellar, who has devoted 
much effort to dissecting Summerson, explored Georgian London’s central 
propositions in her Birth of Modern London, and through an analysis of builders, 
legislation, financing and architectural literature, found his ‘modernist teleology’ 
empirically wanting.426 In doing so, she has also highlighted the many survivals of 
‘vernacular’ non-Palladian and wooden-framed buildings that showcase the 
importance of materials like timber in creating hierarchies of buildings, which not 
only looked different to brick-built classical architecture but relied on a completely 
different set of architectonic principles. 
! Vernacular architecture in London is a rich seam that has been exhaustively 
mined by Peter Guillery and his idea of an industrial vernacular is extraordinarily 
helpful in positioning warehousing as a building type.427 His extensive and 
sophisticated work, The Small House in Eighteenth Century London, catalogues a 
number of vernacular traditions employed by low capital entries into the building 
trade, who were often prepared to disregard stylistic and legal injunctions. Guillery 
departs from other architectural commentators in his willingness to highlight and 
explain diverse building practices and styles through geographies. For Guillery, 
artisanal communities or clusters like Southwark tanners, Smithfield Butchers and 
Clerkenwell watchmakers each had their own building requirements determined by 
their industrial practices and familiarity. For instance, the Spitalfields’ silk industry 
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prompted a specific form of housing, built for multiple occupancies and with large 
upper-windows to enhance the availability of light and facilitate weaving.428 Guillery, 
like McKellar, also stresses the persistence of wooden framed and wooden clad 
buildings in peripheral areas of London, despite the Building Regulations Acts. 
Quoting John Gwynn, Guillery argues that ‘urban and social improvement, 
understood as the implementation of the rational and utilitarian ideas of the English 
Enlightenment’, and its corresponding legislation stacked in favour of larger 
builders, were detrimental to vernacular building and conducive to a metropolitan 
geography best understood by class.429 He describes the moves towards 
standarised production in housing by pointing to new laws that better policed the 
built environment, like the 1761 Westminster Paving Act and 1774 Building Act, 
essentially presenting a synthesis of Summerson’s modernism and Clark’s 
Marxism.430
! Fitting the eighteenth-century warehouse into the vernacular architectural 
landscape further nuances our understanding of the role of publicity in shaping 
change in building practices. On the one hand, warehouses could be very large and 
involve a high-quality of structural carpentry that made them the province of large 
scale contractors and carpenters.431 On the other hand, warehouses were 
vernacular outgrowths of the City’s mercantile community and were not at all 
features of the architectural manuals that provided builders with models. They were 
also exempt from the building regulations acts until 1774. Although potentially well 
capitalised they were, crucially, unregulated by high-style or juridical constraints. 
Setting warehouses in a vernacular tradition is important in that it cordons the form 
off from the well-funded and well publicised building works where technical 
innovation is more noticeable and often came from outside London’s architectural 
and contracting clique. For instance, the bridge-building and renovation craze that 
followed the Swiss Charles Labeyle’s pioneering use of caisson-piers to support 
Westminster Bridge saw a number of outsiders develop technologies, including 
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steel-framing.432 The public controversy over prisons saw Jeremy Bentham’s 
panopticon almost get realised, and his radial form rapidly superseded George 
Dance’s Newgate Gaol, completed in 1782 and built around quadrangles.433 Artist 
Robert Barker manipulated perspective in such a way as to make immersive 
‘panoramas’ a possibility in the 1790s and saw proto-cinematic architecture develop 
in the nineteenth century.434 It is striking that the West India Dock Company drafted 
in hydraulic engineers from Liverpool to design the basins but left the warehouse 
designs to local surveyor, John Gwilt.435 
! London warehouse-builders may not have had been privy to advances in 
engineering or new materials but they were obviously knowledgable enough for the 
merchant community. Few warehouses now survive in the City, although enough 
plans of them were drawn up by Dance in the capacity of City Surveyor to make a 
study of their form, alongside records held in private and corporate collections. This 
material forms the basis for the final section, and it is worth outlining briefly. It would 
seem that the real art of the warehouse-keeper was not so much in storing goods 
as keeping track of them and the various workers charged with packing, sampling 
and transporting them. Doors, locks, keys and various forms of “passport”, from 
porters’ licenses to tokens, were all important to their proper functioning. Attitudes 
towards the hazards posed by fire need to be seen alongside the day to day 
problem of keeping goods secure. Indeed, warehouses were calculative spaces that 
worked to modulate cultural capital and outweighed considerations of materiality or 
investment in plant, rational as they might be. 
! Again, what is important here is that a network of things was being used to 
shape how risk was perceived in this sector not treatises or popular debates. 
Neither warehouses not the fire offices were caught up in the kinds of discourses 
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likely to shift their calculative agency by defining the relationship between them as 
explicitly economic. Sporadic attempts were made to link the two industries by 
genteel improvers, but turning to the networks at hand we will see that these 
interventions were decidedly uncommon.  
              ! !         
Section 2: Richard Jupp and Fire !   
This section will illustrate how the fire insurance companies constructed and 
disseminated ideas about the hazards of fire in London and how they accrued 
knowledge about new architectural technologies. The career of the Hand in Hand 
Assurance’s surveyor, Richard Jupp, shows three sets of relationships were 
important, namely the company’s interaction with policyholders, his contacts, friends 
and patrons in the City, and his professional associates at the Architects’ Club. Each 
of these networks connected together different groups and circulated information 
about risk and fire using specific media, understandings of the market and modes of 
sociability. Describing these networks reinforces the points made earlier about the 
insurance industry existing outside of the public sphere; Jupp found eighteenth-
century insurance professionally rewarding and a gateway into other institutions but, 
struggled to find a public or formal vent for knowledge accrued in the industry until 
the end of his career. Moreover, this section draws attention to the fact that each 
network Jupp traversed was itself geographically and culturally limited, exposing 
him to relatively few new sources of information. Despite the fire offices’ capacity to 
draw data about their customers into bureaucratic centres, his office was a London-
based institution, ill-practiced in manipulating information that made Jupp 
dependent on his equally parochial colleagues when tasked with gathering up new 
information. His career shows the profound ambivalence of the insurance industry 
to architectural improvement, which they occasionally applauded but seemingly 
failed to invest in, was a result of the limited social networks it, in part, helped to 
underpin by funding them. 
Jupp and Insurance
All accounts of the development of fire, marine and life insurance have stressed the 
centrality of London in providing the initial markets, expertise and capital required to 
kick-start the industry before it spread to the provinces in the late-eighteenth 
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century.436 By 1730, six firms had established themselves in London, despite the 
fleeting emergence of some competitors around the time of the South Sea Bubble: 
Hand in Hand (est. 1696), the Union (1701), and Westminster Assurance (1719), all 
of which operated solely within London and Middlesex. These were mutual societies 
which could levy charges on policyholders in times of crisis and only underwrote 
buildings and contents. Aiming at national markets were the incorporated Sun 
Assurance (est. 1710), the Royal Exchange and its sister company London 
Assurance (1720). These were grander institutions, insuring against fire, marine 
hazards and lives, run as joint stock companies, which answered to courts of 
shareholders. At the end of the century two further companies had made an 
appearance and were competing successfully with their established rivals in 
London: the Phoenix in 1782 and the British Fire Office in 1799. Fire insurance was 
a rapidly expanding sector. Pearson estimates that at least 50,500 policyholders 
populated London’s 130,000 buildings in 1740. By 1795, the six offices issued 
155,000 policies compared to 141,000 inhabited buildings, prompting the conclusion 
‘that by the middle of the eighteenth century fire insurance reached well beyond the 
homes of the upper and middling classes.’437
! Like the Westminster Paving Commission, fire insurance offices presented 
their services as ‘public’ benefits. Most obviously they funded fire brigades, who 
were largely staffed by watermen and frequently paraded their brigades to drum up 
support. Branding was important to the companies; the brightly painted iron fire-
marks attached to policyholders’ properties, alerting company brigades to the 
protection to which the household were entitled, were brilliantly utilitarian. Fireproof 
marks like the one illustrated in Figure 4.1 bore the company’s crest and the 
policyholder’s registration number. The companies were assiduous in presenting 
these same identities in their printed policy documents too. Iconographically the 
badges were pointedly modern, using logos not armorial bearings and making a 
virtue of their numerical records. 
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Figure 4.1: Hand in Hand Fire mark in Dulwich, London. Note the wooden mount. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_insurance_mark#mediaviewer/
File:Fire_mark_Dulwich.
! The incorporated fire offices aspired towards the eminent venerability of 
more established City institutions, like the East India Company and the Bank of 
England. As Barry Supple shows, the early Royal Exchange Assurance shared its 
upper-strata of managers with the Bank and the Levant Company especially.438 
Hand in Hand could boast strong connections with the merchant and wholesale 
communities in Holborn, as well as longstanding relationships with the livery 
Companies and City’s hospitals.439 Companies also tended to maintain offices in 
high-profile locations. Indeed, Jupp designed his company’s premises on the 
approach to London Bridge in the 1790s.440 The attraction of insurance to architects 
is as startling as it is persistent. James Gibbs, Sir William Chambers and Henry 
Holland were all board members of Westminster Assurance;441 Richard Jupp 
occupied the Hand in Hand surveyorship in 1754. Jupp, Soane, Holland and 
Samuel Pepys Cockerell would all be appointed Honorary Directors to the British 
Fire Office in 1799. And Soane would also see the Sun surveyorship as worthy of 
an application, which he failed to secure.442    
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! Hand in Hand might not have had the clout of the great City companies, but 
it was no small-time operation when Jupp joined in 1754. Pearson calculates that 
the company had a market share of 26% on sums insured and 36% in terms of 
premiums in 1755, which was second only to Sun who had captured 34% of the 
sums and 27% of the premiums that year.443 Hand in Hand’s market share would 
steadily drop as a result of raids on company annuities and its unwillingness to 
expand outside the capital until 1795, when it would only command 10% of totals 
insured and 8% of premiums. Nevertheless, the company was competitive when 
Jupp arrived in 1754 and he fitted the company profile well. 
! Minute Books give a fuller understanding of Jupp’s duties and the 
Company’s structure. Jupp joined the Hand in Hand at the junior role of Assistant 
Surveyor, playing third fiddle to the Country Surveyor, Mr. Coles, and the senior 
Town Surveyor, James Steere. Jupp was unsalaried initially, instead receiving 
commission on surveys made for the company, but he could claim expenses and 
benefitted from the air of respectable authority Hand in Hand sought to project to 
prospective policy holders, petitioning the company to pay for new riding boots just 
after his appointment.444 Jupp’s family were well established in the guilds and 
building trade: his father would become the Master of the Carpenters’ Company in 
1768, as would Richard in 1779, whereon his brother William, also a carpenter-
builder, would start rebuilding their hall.445 James Steere was also a former Warden 
of the Carpenters’. His family’s livery associations provided Jupp with a reputation 
and technical education the Hand in Hand found congenial.446 Jupp would progress 
to the role of Town Surveyor and a salary of £120 per annum after the death of 
Steer in early 1760, and would quickly install his brother William as the Country 
Surveyor until his death in 1788, when the post would be taken by Thomas Poynder, 
a bricklayer-cum-building contractor with relatives in plumbing and carpentry. 
! Preferential treatment for carpenters was no coincidence, as they were 
amongst the most broadly educated members of the building trades, which 
translated easily into the role of surveyor. Carpenters were involved in the whole of 
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the building process as suppliers of scaffolding and cranes, with the structural 
carpentry common to London buildings involving a geometrical acumen beyond 
most craftsmen.447 Further, costing and measuring irregular timbers by the ‘board 
inch’, a cubic measure, had elicited serious mathematical consideration since the 
seventeenth century, including pocket-sized tables of calculations and ingenious 
instruments and compasses to measure up planks.448 These precision tools were 
embodiments of specialist knowledge and the Customs’ ‘woodfarm’ division was 
occasionally brought to a halt because of an insufficient number of Landwaiters 
skilled in surveying Baltic timbers.449 Jupp’s own building practice, latterly carried on 
with Poynder, would have provided him with relatively up-to-date knowledge of other 
materials and their costs.
! Jupp assessed buildings in order to ascertain the nature of the ‘hazard’ they 
posed to Hand In Hand, and in this he used the criteria that had become industry 
standards by the 1720s.450 Fire policies might be ‘Common’ if the building were 
brick, or ‘Hazardous’, or ‘Doubly Hazardous’, depending on the fabric of the building 
and what trades were carried on inside. For Hand in Hand, two or more wooden 
exterior walls would see a building rated hazardous, while trades which relied 
heavily on fire, ovens, kilns or inflammable materials, like oilmen or gunpowder 
manufacturers, would also be rated higher. Such an assessment would see higher 
premiums and a maximum value cap on the policy. The ritual of surveying buildings 
was too routine to be described in any detail by Jupp or any other surveyor of the 
period, although it contained some room for social niceties. For the most 
exceptional buildings, like stately homes, commercial structures and corporate 
entities, managerial sub-committees would join the surveyor during his visit, giving 
the occasion an enhanced sense of grandeur. Further committees might also be 
dispatched to visit the scenes of particularly vicious fires where they could publicly 
express their concern alongside Jupp, who was presumably assessing the 
damage.451 
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! It mattered, too, that insurance surveyors were mobile, tying together 
communities through mathematical models. Armed with boots, mathematics and 
trusted contacts, Jupp played a crucial role in creating new networks, but one that 
was extremely diffident when it came to channelling ideas to him. Part of this 
problem revolves around the extent to which he supported the abstraction of value 
from underwritten commodities. It was, after all, Jupp’s surveying of properties that 
ensured their presence in company calculations matched objective reality. Every 
fortnight, his reports would convey to the Hand in Hand board the state of the 
company’s activities; the number of new policies issued and any loses. The 
surveyors would also report the number of properties assessed on the company’s 
behalf.  
! Few attempts were made to personally involve policyholders in the running 
of the business, probably because of their geographical dispersal. Their most 
regular contact with the board was the quarterly reminders to pay their premiums 
that were delivered by a fleet of runners in London. Having paid a self-imposed tax 
to the companies, policyholders could claim their capital should calamity strike, 
notwithstanding a disaster so large it bankrupted the underwriters. The appeal of 
insurance rested on its routineness, its sedate progress and its utility-maximising 
potential, all of which promised to smooth violent tears in London’s built fabric. 
Relatively few risks were likely to send the business off course, although some 
problems did worry the industry.
! As Pearson’s research into the geography of hazard has shown, major fires 
were concentrated around wharfs and warehouses on the Thames, downstream of 
London Bridge, and were particularly prevalent in the City, Southwark, Wapping and 
Rotherhithe.452 In a startling contrast, buildings in districts like Westminster and 
Covent Garden in the north and west of London were seven times less likely to burn 
down. Chastening reports frequently graced the newspapers framing the problem in 
the South and East End in terms of the high number of wooden commercial 
buildings that characterised the area, as well as the concentrations of hazardous 
commodities like gunpowder, pitch, tar, rum and naval stores that were kept there:
! A... fire broke out at Mr. Laurence Cox’s, a breaker-up of ships at Cuckholds Point 
! [near Deptford], which in a few hours destroyed all the materials in his yard, burnt 
! down his warehouse, then spread to an adjacent yard...also [housing] a breaker up 
! of ships... the damage would not have been so great , had it not been for a quantity 
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! of charged grenades on the premises, which, burning successively, for some time 
! deterred the people from coming near enough to give any assistance.453
City warehouses were not exempt either:
! On Monday... a dreadful fire broke out at warehouses on Bulliter lane... !consuming 
! the whole range of warehouses, which were chiefly filled with Turkey goods. Some 
! houses were also destroyed [including cloth merchant] ! Sir Randolph Knipe’s. Mr. 
! Moier is said to have lost sixty bales of silk... [Started] by a lighted pipe of tobacco 
! setting fire to bales of cotton... Damage is said to be £100,000... Several persons 
! injured and thieves made off with several things of value.454
Even Wren’s London Customs House burnt down in 1715 and, again, 1814. !
! The companies knew wooden buildings were unhealthy assets, hence the 
high premiums, and they knew certain trades to be hazardous. Typically a policy 
would show the degree of the hazard awarded by the surveyor, the policyholder’s 
trade and their address. However, contextualising this data was difficult when 
addresses were given in terms of the signs (‘The Blue Boy, Gracechurch Street’, for 
instance), which could not be easily located on contemporary maps. London streets 
were not numbered until 1767, and then rarely sequentially, but locating a sign was 
near impossible without first-hand knowledge. Contemporary efforts to rationalise 
the city did not help the matter. John Rocque’s 1746 Plan of the London was large 
and detailed in terms of yards and courts, but shaded-in built blocks so as to 
obliterate individual properties. A massive fire in Bishopsgate and Cornhill in 1765 
was indicative of the problem companies had in analysing the data that Jupp and 
other surveyors accumulated. This conflagration was so dramatic that it drew out 
the entire board of the Hand in Hand to inspect the ruins and took Jupp three weeks 
to properly process the claims.455 A printed plan of the damaged area noted the 
names and trades of the occupants but could only be issued after the surveyors of 
the companies involved could reconnect the ruined properties with their archives. 
Rocque’s opaque Plan and the much more detailed plan of the utterly ruined 
buildings are illustrated in Figure 4.2. 
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 Figure 4.2: A Plan of the Fire in Bishopsgate from the Gentleman’s Magazine 
(1765) and the same district depicted on John Rocque’s Map (1746). Source: 
Motco.co.uk.
!
! In a similarly crude and reactive move, Jupp’s Hand in Hand formed a 
standing committee to consider riverside underwriting from 1761. This suspended 
all policies within 100 yards of the River for several months in 1765 after a series of 
City fires on the Thames. Again fires shook the insurance industry in 1780, causing 
Hand in Hand to suspend riverside policies and raise their premiums, alongside the 
other fire offices.456 Jupp coordinated a resurvey of Hand in Hand existing portfolio, 
noting on each policy the dimensions of the structures covered.457 The Hand in 
Hand board’s desire for more detailed geographical data was not unique. It 
coincided with the establishments of the Phoenix Fire Office in 1782 by City sugar 
bakers hoping to exploit industrial risk. They surveyed the Thames that year, noting 
individual buildings on a new map and would sponsor Richard Horwood’s 1792 plan 
of the entire capital, which made visible numbered houses.
! Jupp evidently understood the risks posed by fire and had first-hand 
experience of a wide range of buildings in the capital. Nevertheless, his surveying 
tools and knowledge of the building trade put him in a distinct position of power 
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when it came to interacting with policy holders by facilitating and formalising the 
abstraction of value. However, in doing so they stymied the means to communicate 
or record any other ideas or concepts regarding fire prevention that may have been 
of use in accumulating knowledge about fire prevention. The data he collected was 
hard to access as it was tied up in the company’s ledgers and difficult to project onto 
maps or otherwise analyse, hence Hand in Hand’s reactive policy when it came to 
the Thames. Moreover, it is worth noting that working for a London-based company 
Jupp would have visited a relatively traditional building stock made up of houses, 
stately homes, corporate halls, warehouses and the occasional sugar baker or 
brewer. He would have had little experience of the factories that national 
underwriters like the Sun were grappling with, where unique steam-powered 
machinery was making fixed capital an absolutely vital part of industrial underwriting 
and making manufacturers a distinctively new type of customer. It should come as 
no surprise then that his building practice reiterated the relatively unimaginative 
building techniques already dominant in London, as the next part describe.
Jupp in the City
Jupp’s experience in the insurance industry may well have been crucial to his 
securing the prestigious surveyorship of the East India Company in 1765. Figure 4.3 
is a rare surviving plan of Barrington Buggins’ ‘New warehouse’ in Fresh Wharf on 
the Legal Quays, dated 1764, marked by R. Jupp, and shows a warehouses divided 
into two ‘stacks’ or rooms on the left near Thames Street and three connected 
stacks nearer the Thames to the right. Buggins was a wharfinger, part owner of 
several East Indiamen, courtier to both the East India and South Sea Companies, 
and no doubt well aware of the risks fires posed to riparian London.458 Jupp’s 
subsequent appointment as Company surveyor followed his acquaintance with 
Buggins and bears all the hallmarks of City grafting. Certainly this was the office 
that made Jupp’s career, conferring on him not just a salary of £60 per annum, 
gratuities and the award of valuable contracts, but a hand in the unmistakable 
growth of the Company’s architectural presence from 1760 onwards.
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Figure 4.3: A Plan of Fresh Wharf, R. Jupp, 1764. Source: LMA, SC/GL/PR/245/
FRE-248/FYE.
! Knowledge of the dangers of fire crystallised in the wooden-framed East 
India Company warehouses. Expertise in fireproofing clearly impressed the 
Company, whose warehouses were largely situated in the hazardous wooden-
framed commercial zone of the Eastern City, which had escaped the Great Fire. Fire 
engines were maintained on site and the Company bought property to create fire-
breaks between buildings. The scale of their operation also caused Jupp to petition 
for an exemption from the 1774 Buildings Regulation Act, claiming that the 
Company could not conduct business in the smaller partitioned warehouses that it 
proscribed. This idiosyncrasy put pressure on his and successor’s skills as fire 
strategists.459 Jupp’s successor, Henry Holland, took up the baton, developing 
ceramic pots with which to insulate the Company’s otherwise wooden warehouse 
stairs. However, they had little faith in the technical precautions in place and 
coordinating labour was deemed an equally necessary measure. Senior porters 
were ‘on no account to permit a lighted candle to be taken into any part of the 
warehouse otherwise than in a lanthorn fastened with a padlock and only to be 
allowed even in that state upon absolute necessity.’460 Unlike the Hudson Bay 
Company, which regularly paid for a caldron of coals ‘for the use of the warehouse’, 
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East India facilities had no chimneystacks. To further decrease the amount of 
artificial light required, warehouses typically only opened from 6am until 3pm, a 
short and uneconomical day, inflating the labour the Company required. Accordingly, 
the most distinctive feature of the warehouse designs was Jupp’s use of courtyards, 
skylights and studiously fenestrated facades, all of which combined to open the 
warehouses to optimal natural light.
 
Figure 4.4: East India Company Warehouses at Bishopsgate and Devonshire 
Square started by Jupp. The upper floor was added by the East and West India 
Dock Company in the mid-nineteenth-century and the windows would have been 
barred. Source: Personal Photograph.
! Dwarfing the surrounding buildings, Jupp’s warehouses were seemingly 
designed without any sense of architectural principal beyond that of the rhythm of 
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his regularly spaced windows. In 1781 the complex shown in Figure 4.4 was 
awarded a backhanded complement in the Critical Review, which noted that the 
‘cheerless and unsocial’ Devonshire House was about to be eclipsed by Company 
warehousing. ‘The Public, however, have nothing to regret in losing sight of 
Devonshire House. It is spacious, and so are the East India Company’s 
warehouses; and both are equally deserving of praise.’461 However, their capacity to 
stockpile goods piqued the imaginations of later architectural commentators, who 
increasingly addressed their readers as consumers rather than concerned 
neighbours or aesthetes
! The warehouses of this Company, which are of great size and substantial 
! construction are well worthy of inspection, both from the immense value of their 
! merchandise, and from their excellent internal arrangements. Those between 
! Devonshire Square and New Street are very extensive...The great height of these 
! buildings, the multitude of windows and of cranes for hoisting up goods, combine to 
! create admiration and surprise... In the erection of these buildings several mean 
! streets were removed.462
Another in 1806 wrote,
! As a stranger turns from India-house, and casts his eye over the warehouses of the 
! Company (which are daily swallowing up the sites of many hundreds of houses) he 
! enlarges his idea of the commerce that fills them, till he imagines that he has almost 
! exaggerated its bulk.463
With their focus on the planned and instrumental qualities of the warehouses, these 
descriptions of commerce were a far cry from those of Gwynn. In scale, regularity 
and materiality, Jupp’s buildings articulated an order that lessened anxieties over 
wolfishly individualist commercial motives by taking on the appearance of gigantic 
terraced houses on the outside. Brick and glass moved commercial space out of the 
gutter, with commentators marveling at the spatial coordination revealed by the 
intake of goods from high cranes. These buildings prefigured a more perfect 
warehouse with strong links to the East India Company, Henry Cole’s glass and iron 
Crystal Palace, which extended the logic of light, repetition and exotic commodities 
184
461 [James Ralph], A Critical Review of the Public Buildings, Statues and Ornaments in and 
about London and Westminster (London, 1783), p 184. 
462 John Britton, The Original Picture of London (London, 1826), p. 146.
463 John Feltham, The Picture of London, 1806 (London, 1806), p. 52.
to grander proportions.464 That this icon of modern design burnt to the ground too, 
suggests that the reality of technological improvements in fire-safety lagged well 
behind the progressive narrative facade. 
! Jupp promoted and employed a fraternity of building contractors and 
influential architect-surveyors in the City, who further announced his expertise to his 
corporate employers. He would design the west wing of Guy’s Hospital in 1774, 
seemingly a direct inheritance from his Hand in Hand colleague James Steer, who 
had previously maintained the institution.465 The development of this project 
demonstrates the complex network of professional and personal relationships 
linking the men that built and designed London’s built environment in the eighteenth 
century. The contractors included the bricklayers Thomas Poynder and Edmund 
Wix, who would also charge the Hospital Governors for Jupp-designed vapour 
baths in 1779.466 Poynder married Wix’s daughter, Mary, inheriting his ‘eminent’ 
building business in 1787 and contacts in the Bricklayers’ Company and City. He 
would eventually be installed as a surveyor in Hand in Hand in 1788.467 Most 
lucratively, Poynder would continue building Jupp’s East India warehouses started 
by Wix, jobs that were on the scale of St Paul’s and worth thousands of pounds a 
quarter and allowed him to retire a gentleman.468 
! Similarly, the extensive East India contracts afforded Jupp the opportunity to 
sure up his relationships with other builders in London. Building Company 
warehouses at Houndsditch was George Wyatt, a carpenter-contractor who left his 
fortune to his niece, Sir John Soane’s wife. He was superseded by carpenter 
Richard Holland in 1790, also cutting a figure in the building industry by developing 
the Sloane estate with his brother, the Whig architect Henry Holland. Holland would 
succeed Jupp as East India surveyor in 1799. Moreover, Jupp’s negotiations to 
purchase deeds around the City on behalf of the East India Company were helped 
by his family’s relationship with the well-endowed guilds. In 1786, Jupp was ordered 
to ‘wait on the Carpenters Company’, his own, ‘to see what they will treat for 
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property on the West side of the entrance to Crutched Friars’.469 Leases were also 
secured from the Ironmongers’ Company, whose hall Jupp’s brother had built.470 
Jupp was also friendly with the City’s Surveyor, George Dance jnr., which hastened 
Company expansion there too. In fact, Dance’s immediate family numbered 
amongst the Company’s Directors and Captains, and the myriad of minor 
improvements he made to facilitate the flow of traffic in the City had an uncanny 
similarity with areas in which the Company were building.471 No sooner had Dance 
taken Office in 1768 then plans to redevelop the Minories were forwarded, opening 
up communication between the Company’s holdings in Crutched Friars and Tower 
Hill, where they built several warehouses in the 1770s and 1780s.472 Perhaps these 
were the benefits of building in a relatively elite client-base where gossip and 
professionalism were not far removed.473
! Jupp’s business associates were drawn from a small pool of intimately 
connected men based in London who usually aspired to gentlemanly status to the 
point that they sought to classicise warehouses. Using the patronage afforded to 
him by Hand in Hand and the other City institutions in his care, Jupp created a small 
empire of contact, which diminished the need to create a formal educational 
schema for his architectural project by limiting the turnover of talent. Again, these 
factors insulated him from building and engineering innovations elsewhere. 
Jupp, Architects and Experiments
Jupp’s practice was underpinned by valuable contacts, which provided him with the 
jobs, materials, labour and allies that made him a clearinghouse for information. 
This prestigious and wealthy group received an additional institutional dimension 
with the formation of the Architects’ Club in 1790. Founded as a dining club for 
prominent London builders who were nominally supposed to have studied in one of 
the European academies of architecture (many had not), it affected exclusivity, elite 
patronage and became a forum for shop talk. Dance, the Hollands, Sir William 
Chambers of the Royal Academy, Soane (Surveyor of the Bank and judge of the 
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West India Dock Company competition in 1799), Robert Mylne (Surveyor of St 
Paul’s) and Cockerell (Surveyor to the Foundling Hospital, Admiralty and East India 
Company from 1806) were founding members. Stana Nenadic has noted the Club’s 
implosion, explaining that despite the importance of gentlemanly co-operation in a 
low-trust economy, too many rivals were competing for too few places. After early 
squabbling over members interfering with one another’s practices, ‘the Architects’ 
Club subsided into the least contentious of its three founding purposes, to act as an 
exclusive drinking and dining club for a small group of mostly middle-aged men who 
self-styled as architects when it suited them, but were also competing experts in 
other fields of knowledge and expertise that embraced and transcended the building 
industry in all its dimensions.’474 What is remarkable from the point of view of Jupp’s 
career is the very public stance the Club took on fire-safety on which he was clearly 
an influence, if not the instigator. 
! The group’s only publication, Resolutions of the Associated Architects, with a 
Report of a Committee by them Appointed to Consider the Causes of the Frequent 
Fires, and the Best Means of Preventing the Like in the Future (London, 1793) 
appears to channel years of pent up frustration amongst the surveying community. 
The Club was keen in its early days to lay down technical building standards and 
guidelines for fees taken when surveying and auditing accounts. The Resolutions 
recalled a “house-burning” experiment made by the Club that adopted popular form 
in London, and which saw Jupp drafted in to advise on the project, presumably as 
he was one of the longest serving and best-connected insurance surveyors in the 
City. Evidently the Club hoped to lay open the debate about fire-safety and 
encourage technological advance in the building-trade. However, the text and 
experiments are shot through with uncertainties that confirm the fact that the move 
from architectural treatises and aesthetics towards experimental culture did not 
come easily to them. 
! Outwardly the Club used the Resolutions to distance itself from lesser 
builders whose ‘improper methods of construction’ were all too often the reason 
fires were so hazardous and assert their impartial credentials.475 Initially, they 
suggested that Royal Academy-qualified ‘officers’ should survey buildings in order to 
regulate their design and materials, but the idea was soon dropped during a 
meeting where Jupp was present, in favour of further legislation along the lines of 
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the 1774 Building Act.476 Echoing sentiments expressed by Hand in Hand’s directors 
in 1779, the Club argued that the insurance companies needed further support 
because
A very considerable, and perhaps the greater part of them [fires] owe there [sic] 
existence to the destructive hand of the incendiary. And on this subject, the 
committee has observed, with very serious regret, that the Insurance Offices, though 
in many instances a very valuable institution for this country, have frequently proved 
a very fatal one, and have been principally instrumental in producing this evil.477
The Club saw the calculative capacity of Londoners as getting the better of them, 
though the historical context is important in explaining this. Research for the 
Resolutions started after a fire destroyed Albion Flour Mill at Blackfriars in 1791, 
which was part-owned by a scion of the Wyatt family. The event caused rejoicing 
amongst those who sympathised with the millers it had put out of work, fanning the 
suspicion that it had been torched as an ‘anti-monopoly’ protest.478 Jupp had 
inspected the ruins for Hand in Hand and most of the insurance companies had 
received claims from Albion’s proprietors.479  
! While acting as the principal researcher for the Resolutions, Henry Holland 
actively sought out expertise from beyond the Club by making a collection of press 
notices mentioning fires and technical literature on the subject.480 Emblematic of the 
unstructured interest in fire prevention and its place in commercial life was the 
anonymous, polemical and florid pamphlet, Various Methods to Prevent Fire in 
Houses and Shipping (London, 1775) that Holland went to some lengths to attribute. 
The author’s few suggestions ranged from the practical, if not security conscious 
(keep ladders handy and remove bars from windows), to the frankly wishful (never 
read in bed with candles), except where the problematic of warehouse architecture 
was concerned. Here, he offered a concrete and topical solution, prefaced by a 
Gwynn-esque description of Thames-side topography: 
! The face of the houses, fronting a narrow dirty street, the hinder part turning out his 
! backside to the river Thames, and even that part choaked [sic] up with a few paltry 
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! sheds, called warehouses—per example Thames Street, Wapping etc... Whether 
! these faults lay in the bricklayer or the carpenter or the wealthy citizen that own’d the 
! building... or the fat of their bellies or the bulk of their heads, we leave the learned to 
! determine.481
In the stead of the bumbling builders and undiscerning merchants currently 
producing the quayside, the author offered up Robert Adams’ Adelphi as a solution. 
This complex combined elegant West End dwellings at street-level with a 
subterranean complex of wharfs and vaulted warehouses. It had also caused the 
near bankruptcy of the Adams brothers’ firm, which had forced them to run a very 
public lottery in order to recoup the costs, garnering huge amounts of publicity for 
the enterprise.
! Pamphlets like Various Methods illustrate that there was room for the 
amateur to make a mark on fire-prevention in the capital, often calling on the public 
to support his claim through ‘experiments’. There was certainly a keen audience for 
a big blaze, as is amply demonstrated by the descriptions left by newspaper 
articles, commemorative prints and maps of recent fires, all of which highlight the 
rather morbid fascination with destruction felt by eighteenth-century Londoners. 
Horace Walpole described himself ‘as constant at a fire as George Selwyn is at an 
execution’ and seemed to enjoy eight houses burning in St. James’ in 1761, where 
‘Half the people of fashion in town were in the streets all night’.482 At the other end 
of town, City sugar merchant Benjamin Boddington recorded in his journal ‘a great 
fire that destroyed many houses’ at Lothbury in 1748.483 Given that this spartan 
journal was generally reserved to document significant “partnerships”, like 
weddings, in his intimately linked business and family life, and the odd bit of chapel 
news, we can assume the fire made some impression on Boddington. This was of 
great advantage to raconteurs. Mr. Godfrey displayed to the public his father’s 
‘chymical’ method of putting out house fires using a barrel charged with gunpowder, 
which on exploding would douse the flames with a liquid solution.484 The well-
advertised experiment took place near Cavendish Square and entailed burning 
down a three-storey house, giving the display a gritty realism. 
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! Charles Stanhope, Lord Mahon, offered a pre-emptive fire-resisting 
technique in the 1770s, when he demonstrated to the Royal Society a ‘plaister’ 
insulation that could be applied to wooden under-floors and stairs and, thus, prevent 
fires from progressing through houses.485 The MP David Hartley continued in a 
similar vein, publishing a short rival treatise on the use of iron ‘fire-plates’ that could 
also be inserted between floors in 1774. The accompanying literature estimated that 
this would add an extra 4% to the average cost of building, and argued for its 
application in commercial structures and ships.486 ‘A single Fire-Plate,’ he advised 
‘might have prevented The Fire of London.’487 He too burnt a specially made house 
in a 1772 experiment in Peckham, with Parliament awarding him £2,500 to cover 
the costs. The Lord Mayor was so impressed by Hartley that he would cause 
George Dance to erect an obelisk on the spot: a stone base supported near 25 feet 
of brick. Dance’s choice of material was intended as iconic, but the inscription 
acknowledged the future obsolescence of brick, arguing for ‘the ADVANTAGES 
likely to accrue to the PUBLIC by his INVENTION of FIRE PLATES’. Here, then, 
was a monument to the City’s faith in markets to contain risk and yet another step 
away from Gwynn’s absolutism. However, located in a field in Peckham, it was a far 
from accessible reminder of the problem the City faced. 
! It would appear, however, that actual investment in either Stanhope or 
Hartley’s schemes was negligible and the Club’s main aim appears to have been to 
rekindle interest in their gentlemanly fire-prevention schemes. One of the Club’s first 
moves was to write to the Society for Promoting Arts Commerce and Manufactures 
to see if they had offered any prizes to encourage invention in the area. That same 
day they asked the fire offices to contribute to the cost of the experiment.488 That no 
mention was made of any sponsors in the Resolutions is indicative of the industry’s 
skepticism when it came to these and other experiments, though Jupp claimed the 
largest share of the final costs himself.489    
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! The Architects’ Club performed its own house-burning experiment-cum-
publicity exercise, torching houses on Henry and Richard Holland’s Sloan Estate in 
1792. With the Club seeking advice on crowd control from Hartley, it is clear that the 
event was intended as a spectacle.490 Whether an experiment on this scale could 
produce any particularly new knowledge was debatable and presumably the 
ferocious, uncontrollable heat would impede close viewing. On the day, the Club 
tested a liquid treatment that once applied to wood acted as a fire retardant, which 
was recommended as a measure to complement the work of Stanhope and 
Hartley.491 Although the Resolutions offered up the familiar apology that their tests 
were intended for the public good, Sir William Chambers considered the 
experiments as mere self-promotion, especially as he thought the technology 
involved was known to be questionable.492 Hartley’s fire plates had been used at 
Chambers’ Somerset House but had been discontinued after it was found they 
encouraged rotting in the beams to which they were attached. Holland was still 
corresponding with Stanhope in 1797 and discovered the plaster had not fared 
much better. Stanhope’s own seat at Chevening had burnt down in the same year 
and he wanted to send a roof-beam, partially burnt and partially saved by his 
plaster, to the Royal Society as proof of ‘the true principles of fire prevention’ despite 
the overwhelming damage done to his property.493 
! By torching domestic townhouses, the Club performed a careful, 
aestheticised reminder to upper-middling householders, politicians and the City that 
fire was still a great leveler, by tapping into a sense of worry mixed with optimistic 
faith in technically driven progress engendered by the previous experiments. The 
Resolutions followed this up and was distributed to worthies including George III, 
William Pitt, the Royal Society, Society for Promoting Arts, Commerce and 
Manufactures, the City’s Chartered Company’s, Liveries and great City 
merchants.494 The Club exposed to a West End audience their links to the City, and 
were evidently attempting to say that the cultures of surveying and architecture 
could work together in tandem to buttress property. Combining a house-burning 
experiment, publication and assiduous badgering of the great and the good, the 
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shrillness of the Club’s opinions may have been a worry to the insurance 
companies. Certainly the fire offices had no interest in calling into question the 
failings of the industry, though, of course, the incendiary bent on defrauding their 
offices and their inability to adequately marshal the data they harvested from policy 
holders were tacitly acknowledged. However, the assiduity with which the Clubs’ 
members attached themselves to City institutions, including the newer insurance 
companies and East India Company, suggests the experiments were not simply 
empty posturing, but formed a useful addition to their curriculum vitaes. 
! The energy of the Club, or Holland at least, devoted to creating a bridge 
between the City and Westminster may well have been short-lived and be related to 
the jobs market. However, it serves to put Jupp’s previous advocacy of fire safety 
issues in relief. Despite the ripples that occasionally disturbed the fire-offices, he 
seems to have made little contribution to the technologies or debates in question. 
The Resolutions may not have offered much more than a cheerful optimism in 
gentlemanly amateurs coming to the rescue and well-guided legislation, but it did 
suggest that there was a solution to the problems posed by fire. The Club also 
entertained the idea of courting relatively public forums for debate like the Royal 
Society and Society for Promoting Arts and Manufactures as well as the Royal 
Academy. Jupp and the fire-offices were by-standers for the most part, evidently 
happy to review innovations when they emerged but hardly zealous in repositioning 
the industry’s public profile. Business for the fire offices was steady, especially those 
mutuals like Hand in Hand, unflustered by industrialisation in the regions, where 
coal power was exerting pressure on underwriters to act more dynamically. One 
must conclude that Jupp was in a cosy office and felt little pressure to change, 
though the Phoenix’s backing by sugar bakers, the Albion Mills episode, and the 
anxiety around warehouses and docks suggests that this was not completely the 
case. However, the failure of the Club to ignite any real interest in the technologies 
they tested also suggests that the supposed mercantile market for improved 
architecture was optimistically constructed by inventors like Hartley. We turn that 
market next. 
     !
Section 3: Control in Warehouses
As we have seen, flammable buildings around the Thames presented a special 
problem for underwriters, and were of special interest to the City merchants who sat 
on the boards of the insurance companies. Yet despite bearing witness to their own 
and other businesses suffering losses through fire in the City, and the Corporation 
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erecting monuments to men like Hartley, little actual investment in fire-proof 
technologies is evident. Warehousing presents the ideal forum to explain the City’s 
blustering but not terribly technical attitude toward fire-safety by giving us a window 
as to what merchants demanded from commercial space. Few full accounts of 
warehouses survive, most being jettisoned when the commercial operations of a 
firm ceased. Moreover, the seasonal nature of overseas commerce meant that 
employment in warehouses was often casual and unrecorded. Margaret 
Makepeace’s superb elaboration of the surviving East India Company records 
suggests that Company warehouse-keepers were employed on an ad hoc basis at 
the beginning of the century, before the award of places were engrossed by the 
Directors in the 1780s.495 Consequently, her study uses evidence from the 
Company’s centralised records after 1800, not least nineteenth century pensions, 
which are uncommon. The sheer scale of the East India warehouses means they 
are not representative of the constellation of smaller and medium sized business 
that populated the City, which typically employed a few labourers rather than a few 
thousand. Whereas it was paperwork that facilitated the expansion of Company 
warehouses, smaller concerns had to rely on their keepers’ personal influence and 
memory to police them, circumstances that further undermine the available archival 
base. However, building plans add much to the contention that the basic problem in 
running a warehouse remained the same irrespective of size: controlling access in 
order to increase the calculative agency of warehouse owners or operators. 
! Examining first the geography and architecture of warehouses, then their 
personnel and modes of remuneration this section argues that warehouses were 
machines for creating identity. Various circuits of credit and interpersonal 
connections made warehouses operable by concentrating power on men who 
commanded written or tacit knowledge about the goods entering the building, their 
employees and their ability to manage both through modulations of information and 
money. Mechanisms based on the accumulation of trust, knowledge and experience 
by a permanent staff, and the layouts of the buildings themselves, were used to 
protect warehoused goods in London. Guarding primarily against the much-
maligned itinerant workers in the transport sector, these concerns also deprived 
fireproofing of investment. Hartley and the Architects’ Club evidently overestimated 
the mercantile market for improved architecture because risk was made visible in 
warehouses by badges, tokens and other signifiers or discipline which added to 
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these buildings ability to act as calculative space where commercial data was 
analysed and acted upon in their own right.  
Warehousing: Geography and Architecture!
London’s wharfs and warehouses existed in a legal landscape which managed to 
resist architectural legislation until the 1774 Building Act. A composite of intersecting 
Customs and customary laws governed their form in the eighteenth century. As 
earlier chapters have described, statutes of 1668 and 1671 defined the Legal Quays 
and sufferance wharfs on the Thames.496 The statutes specified the water-frontage 
of each of the nineteen quays, the Customs House, as well as the common 
passages, water-stairs and sewers that connected Thames Street to the River. 
Commodities were to be loaded and unloaded onto ships or lighters from the 
Quayside apron by means of cranes that were numbered in the Acts. Though not 
prescribed by the Acts, each Quay had some warehouse space for storing goods. 
Leaseholders were expected to keep their Quays in good physical order and the 
City was largely responsible for managing the various porters operating in the area. 
Having defined the sites of taxation, it was then up to the Customs Commission to 
monitor and arbitrate on fiscal activities in the area. Various by-laws, precedents 
and standing orders are noted in the Customs’ minutes, mostly aimed at their 
officers.497 
! Colonial commodities destined for re-export needed to be landed in London 
before being sent abroad, creating an important legal distinction between bonded 
and free warehousing. Bonded warehouses were privately managed and built, like 
free ones, but were sanctioned by the Customs Commission only after having 
received a report from their Surveyor of Buildings. In these buildings importing-
merchants could house goods on which a fraction of the duties had been paid if 
they could secure a bond for the remainder on another merchant’s credit. Canceling 
the bond mitigated the need to pay the complete Customs charge and claim it all 
back when the goods were re-exported. This arrangement had a great influence on 
the geography and sociability of mercantile life in London. The Commission in 
London saw the system as a convenient way of rationalising their duties, as bonded 
warehouses were not allowed to be more than half a mile distant from the Quays. 
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Confining goods to commodity-specific warehouses was also a way of reaffirming 
and keeping distinct merchant groups, reflecting the discriminatory and patchwork 
fiscal regimes built into British trade. What gave the bonding system coherence 
from a legislative point of view was its continuity with the Navigation Acts, which 
were also administered by the Customs from 1696.498 Aimed at channelling colonial 
trade through Britain in British vessels, the Navigation Acts cemented together the 
Empire through commercial exchange. Taxation distinguished colonial goods from 
those that were properly British, with bonded warehouses representing fiscal 
borders. 
! Consequently, the spate of Bonding Acts that ratified the system towards the 
end of Queen Anne’s wars specified that goods be stored in a fiscal limbo, known as 
being under the ‘joint locks’ of the monarch and the merchant.499 Bonded 
warehouse-keepers were required to keep logs of the dates, amounts and 
destinations of any goods they stored, with the books kept open to the Customs 
officers. Further, they were to ‘affix one lock to every such warehouse, the key of 
which shall remain in the custody of proprietors’.500 The later Tobacco Act stated 
that whilst ‘the merchant or his servants shall have free access [to the goods] at all 
seasonable times; and the customs house officers are hereby required to attend, 
without fee or reward.’ As a result, opening warehouse doors was an act charged 
with bureaucratic and fiscal implications for their key-holding proprietors, merchants 
and Customs officers. Revisions in tobacco taxes under George I threw into doubt 
whether a 1711 Act was still in force, provoking a petition by London merchants to 
the Treasury asking that the provisions be re-reinstated in 1730, thereby suggesting 
the system was a valued part of the commercial landscape.501 
! One of the major challenges to the system was what actually happened 
inside the warehouses and, in particular, the kinds of work that might be done on 
commodities. The bonding legislation stated that pepper could be ‘sifted or garbled’, 
tobacco plants could have their stems removed and tea could be sampled, with 
most other goods needing to be broken up into lots before sale. As one petition on 
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the subject stated, ‘many of the warehouses [were] well calculated for the purpose 
of making convenient chambers for stripping tobacco’, the inference being that 
warehouses were fitted with specific goods in mind.502 Far from inert, a stream of 
labourers entered warehouses, putting huge pressure on their proprietors, as they 
aimed to keep goods secure and monitor the myriad of subspaces into which 
warehouses were broken. Conversely, it is worth noting, too, that commodity 
specialisation must have limited the people entering warehouses, meaning 
warehouse-keepers could rely on interpersonal relations within smaller trading 
communities rather than faceless masses of merchants or labourers. Smuggling 
goods out of warehouses to play on the price differentials caused by taxation was 
always problematic and necessitated the employment of watchmen and ‘lockers’ in 
the pay of the warehouse-keepers and the Customs. 
! Even so, processing work of this kind was messy and the bi-products like 
tobacco stalks or damaged tea had a market, which led to all manner of 
complications for the Customs as the acts stipulated that warehouses were to be 
kept clear. The East India Company was asked to burn any unsellable tea.503 More 
impressive was the burning ground at Rotherithe, instituted to dispose of damaged 
or stripped tobacco.504 The so-called ‘King’s Pipe’ was London’s best-policed 
ashtray, responsible for all the trade’s bi-products, and which expanded to include a 
wharf, warehouses and kilns between 1720 and 1770. Covered boats transported 
the tobacco there; the scale of the operation and the heightened security it required 
saw the contracts being farmed out to specialist lightermen. Despite four watchmen 
being employed to guard the facility, centralising tobacco waste could only defer the 
problems it caused, and in 1752 further rules to prevent embezzlement were issued. 
1762 saw the Customs reissue the rules for guards and the ground alongside the 
‘King’s Pipe’ fenced in, adding another layer of protection. As the burning ground 
nicely illustrates, the bonding system caused endemic security problems and ever 
more complex administrative subcontracts paid for by the public. 
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Figure 4.5: Numbers of warehouses and wharfs liable for the Four Shilling in the 
Pound Tax, 1694. Source (Map): http://www.londonbucketlist.com/fire-of-london.html
! The relationship between bonded warehouses and the Customs meant they 
were restricted to the eastern City. Merchants who had fully paid their taxes could 
remove goods from them to free warehouses, although transport costs meant they 
grouped in that region as well, or by the Thames. Figure 4.5 shows the number of 
warehouses listed liable in the City and Tower Wards for the 1694 Four Shilling in 
the Pound Tax on real property and personal estate. Probably many more 
warehouses fell below the threshold of the tax or went unlisted; however, the tax 
assessments give a rough sense of the geography of businesses. The highest 
concentrations, as we might expect, were in the Thames-side wards, especially 
those near the Legal Quays in the mercantile eastern City, and the extramural 
parishes of Bishopsgate Without, Whitechapel, St Katherine’s and Stepney (12, not 
displayed) to the east. Petitions against the Docks in 1795 came from the same 
districts, as well as those on the south bank of the Thames, suggesting that this 
distribution did not change significantly during the eighteenth century. That is, these 
businesses remained in the flammable districts that had escaped the Great Fire and 
retained a high proportion of wooden buildings. 
! Many merchants and tradesmen in the City had free-warehouses attached to 
their properties. West India merchant Gedney Clarke hoped to sell a dwelling on 
Philpot Lane in 1765, described as being attached to ‘a large and commodious 
warehouse, in which is fixed a wheel crane, and convenient compting-houses 
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adjoining; also a large stack of warehouses, five stories high and adjoining the 
above premises, in which are fixed a jib and capstern compleat.’505 34 Great Tower 
Court, built in the 1680s and inhabited by a string of grand merchants in the next 
century, likewise had warehousing attached.506 Joshua Johnson arrived in the 
capital in 1771; hoping to save money he kept cargoes in his room until finding 
himself overrun with packages and bales. He moved to Great Tower Court too, 
writing to his American partners, ‘I found that in the manner I lived would not 
answer. It looked so...mean...I therefore resolved to take a counting house which 
has made me of the consequence a merchant [of] merits... It has stripped me of the 
appearance of a transient person.’507 Failing to secure space at home could be 
detrimental to mercantile credit-worthiness as well as inconvenient, which opened 
up the market for independent warehouse operators.!
! Johson’s anxiety over ‘having the appearance of a transient person’ pivoted 
on the ability of property to signify economic muscle and anchor personal identity. 
Unlike land, movable property and moneyed wealth did not tie its owners to a 
community and could be stolen. Given that trade relied on the movement of goods 
this was highly problematic for the vast majority of the commercial community, 
forcing many to establish guilds to compensate for their incriminating poverty. As the 
lowly Billingsgate’s Fellowship of Porters succinctly acknowledged, their £40 ‘bonds 
are of great use to the society, as they are a security to all persons who employ the 
Fellowship Porters that they shall not be defrauded of their Commodities, security 
being given for the purpose’.508 Ticket porters wore badges with their names 
attached as they sought employment ‘in merchants’ cellars, by warehousemen, and 
shopkeepers of large dealings to carry goods to their customers’ and were also said 
to ‘ply amongst the bankers, and are entrusted with large sums of money.’509 
Licenses bought a cachet of trust which those attached to under-capitalised or 
itinerant trades found desirable in moving goods around London because they 
openly proclaimed roots in a community capable of disciplining them. 
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! From the Port of London Compensation Scheme, established to compensate 
businesses suffering because of the new docks between 1802 and 1824, we know 
that workers involved in transportation were numerous but not wealthy.510 The 
scheme paid £677,382 to around 800 businesses, resulting in a mean claim of 
£846. However, the median claim was just £150. The majority of claimants were in 
the transport sector claiming well under the average, whereas wharfingers and 
warehousemen representing less than 10% of claimants were routinely awarded 
considerably above the average. For instance, wharfinger Thomas Coles received 
£30,250 for his wharf on the Legal Quays, about as much as the payments made to 
150 City-administered Ticket Porters (£65-100) and to 150 Carting license owners 
(£100-200) combined. Yearly rents for the Quays were typically between £700 and 
£1,500 in the mid-century and the sale of Fresh Wharf brought Sir William Lee 
20,000 guineas in 1776, although not only because of its monopoly status.511 The 
indebted Lee noted that wharfs were costly because of ‘the very heavy charge of 
repairing the wharffings’, referring to the piles that needed to be driven into the 
Thames. Wharfs were built to last and another wharf owner spent £6,000 on repairs 
to his warehouses, detailing heavy-duty structural carpentry such as 12” by 13” 
girders of ‘best Riga timber’.512 To be sure there was ground between these poles: 
two dozen warehouse-keepers and owners received £800-6,200 each in 
compensation depending on the size of their premises. Most lightermen were 
awarded around £300, although several masters received thousands of pounds 
indicating a range of business structures in that sector. These records do not speak 
of absolute populations tied to the Quays, only those that could prove a claim, and it 
is likely that many more unlicensed carters and porters were too poor to buy into the 
guilds and fellowships that regulated transport around the Quays.513 
! Trade relied on the circulation of goods, and warehouses were envisaged as 
defensible islands amidst more or less suspect modes of distribution. Warehouse 
operators at the upper end of the trade were comparatively well-capitalised 
members of the commercial community and it was their task to oversee the comings 
and goings of those collecting goods or working on them. The most obvious means 
of securing property was to locate the door to warehouses where they could be 
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easily monitored. Plans in the City Surveyor’s office show this typically took a form 
reminiscent of seventeenth-century coaching inns, whereby carts could enter into 
courtyards to receive goods; these entrances were flanked by domestic, retail or 
administrative spaces.514 Insurance records further make plain that, on the whole, 
warerooms or workshops were located behind street-frontages.515 Open-plan rooms 
were rare compared to nests of stacks and only one surviving plan shows a 
warehouse without provision for off-street deliveries.516 Security was achieved by 
monopolising City courtyards and choking their entrances, with most buildings being 
similar in plan to the one illustrated in figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: A late-eighteenth-century survey, not dated, from the City Surveyor’s 
Office illustrating the gate-yard-warehouse plan commonly used in the City on the 
left and the street elevation on the right. Source: LMA, COL/CCS/PL/02/348.
! Relatively little seems to have changed in the spatial organisation of those 
warehouses that we are sure were purely mercantile. A ground plan and elevation of 
Hudson Bay Company House shows that it was entered from the street through a 
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double height door bisecting the façade, its classical facade belying a ramshackle 
collection of warehouses behind.517 The East India Company did enough business 
to require a string of warehouses across the eastern City, outside the Company 
House on Leadenhall Street.518 The ‘tea boom’ of the 1770s, alongside the 
provisions of the Commutation Act, which required they keep a year’s supply of tea 
in reserve, saw major Company investments in these facilities. Jupp, who 
supervised these developments, maintained the traditional focus on an internal 
courtyard.519 
! If warehouses effected bottlenecks to control the flow of traffic, wharfs 
funneled goods from the Thames to checkpoints inland. The Legal Quay-sides were 
a jumble of crane houses and projected roofs forbidden by the governing Statutes, 
but which were considered by the Customs as being necessary shelter for the 
officers and essential to the ‘dispatch’ of business.520 Great pains were taken to stop 
undesirables approaching the Quayside apron from the public water-stairs, thereby 
allowing goods to stand on the quayside.521 Plans suggest the buildings comprised 
long thin warehouse complexes reaching from the waterside towards Thames Street 
and punctuated lengthways by internal cart-ways. The Steelyard sufferance wharf, 
upstream of London Bridge, was expanded in the later part of the century, as was 
Dice Quay near the Customs House, muscling out tenements and inns in favour of 
warehousing.522 The authority derived from controlling street access to the wharfs 
had a symbolic function not lost on wharfingers’ cartel leader Barrington Buggins 
jnr., who addressed his correspondence to merchants regarding prices and the 
handling of their goods from Dice Quay Gate.523 Focus on gates was not accidental 
in that they acted as spaces to accumulate information about goods and labour, 
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through licenses, letters or privately distributed markers of trust, like the tokens 
illustrated in figure 4.7 that were issued at Three Cranes Wharf and allowed their 
holders to pass freely thought the complex.
Figure 4.7: Tokens issued by Thomas Ballard at Three Crane Wharfs, 1723. Source: 
British Museum, object no. MG. 1248.
! Piecemeal expansion of East India Company warehouses at Seething Lane 
and Houndsditch are illustrative of the trade-off between transport and security that 
chiefly influenced the design of City warehouses. The Company had leased its 
Seething Lane warehousing from 1722 and acquired an additional freehold at 
Fenchurch Street in 1733, building a warehouse fronting a yard there in 1736.524 
This site underwent major expansion between 1780 and 1786 when the 
neighbouring French Ordinary Court and Navy Office were bought. The sites were 
consolidated in the 1790s, with further purchases of property adjacent or nearby.525 
Consequently the Company formed a large holding comprising the Navy Office-
Seething Lane site and a further complex opposite with gates onto Fenchurch 
Street, Old Jewry Street and Crutched Friars. The Company effectively colonised 
this block, beginning at the peripheries and moving inwards by increments. 
Horwood’s 1792 Map, illustrated in Figure 4.8, shows an island of non-Company 
properties, including St Catherine Coleman Street’s workhouse stranded amidst the 
warehousing, accessible only by Northumberland Alley, the southern end of which 
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was now no more than a ground-level tunnel through the complex.526 An equivalent 
process can be seen in their five-acre Bishopsgate warehouses, which maintained 
the footprint of jutting, irregular City courtyards, though writ incredibly large. On this 
site seven freeholds had been bought ‘to shut up the alley and open a new street... 
to perfect the plan of their warehouse’ and this security measure is illustrated in 
Figure 4.9, where empty awaiting building has been carefully enclosed by a wall.527 
Jupp’s warehouses were unique in being large enough to warrant multiple gates 
and it was around these features that he embellished the buildings with heavy 
rustication, giving each an oppressive quality. Nevertheless, even at the 
impressively bleak Bishopsgate complex the principal entrance was flanked by 
domestic buildings erected for the chief warehouse-keeper and his assistants. 
Figure 4.8: East India Warehouses at Seething Lane, Crutched Friars and the Old 
Navy Office shaded in on Richard Horwood’s Map (London, 1792). The buildings 
stranded in the middle of the complex included a workhouse. Source: Motco.co.uk
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Figure 4.9: East India Warehouses at Bishopsgate and Cutlers Garden on Richard 
Horwood’s Map (London, 1792) showing the ground purchased for future 
expansion. Source: Motco.co.uk
! On entering into any warehouse in the City, not just Jupp’s works for the 
East India Company, further distinctive architectural features would become clear, 
which were not always apparent from street elevations. Typically warehouses were 
tall, with ‘stacks’ being built 3 or 4 stories high and cellars to mitigate expensive City  
ground rents. These ‘stacks’ also enabled each cargo to be dealt with on an 
individual basis, as per the bonding acts. Inside the courts, plans show multiple 
entrances into the surrounding storage areas, again signifying stacks, sometimes 
with doors on each story surmounted by hinged cranes. ‘Engines’ (tread-wheels) for 
the cranes appear to have been located inside the buildings on the top floor. 
Especially in wharfs, one also finds internal overhanging ‘pesthouses’ or covered 
passages, which would have allowed goods to be dropped into waiting carts without 
the carman needing to enter the warehouse proper.528!
! The materiality of the goods also influenced the spatial organisation of 
warehousing. Bonded warehouses and those owned by merchants exclusively 
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trading in few commodities appear to have been ‘adapted’ for the reception of 
certain goods.529 Quite what this meant in terms of layout or fittings is unclear, 
though the customs were unwilling to sanction those they felt improper: warehouse-
keeper Andrew Cornish petitioned the Treasury in 1779 claiming he had set out 
£3,000 on a stack designed for coffee ‘with floors of such a height as adapted to this 
business and improper for sugar or many other commodities’ but the Customs 
vetoed his application.530 The East India warehouses at Bishopsgate had been 
‘appointed for the reception of indigo, the quality of which is best ascertained by a 
particular light’ and fitted with skylights.531 
! Since the Restoration the Chartered Companies had had a tendency to 
broker deals with specific wharfingers on the Legal Quays probably also seeing 
facilities customised for certain goods.532 Trucks on rails were used to move 
hogsheads of sugar through the long warehouses on Coxes Quay.533 We know from 
a 1796 Customs’ survey of the sufferance wharfs that they were also fitted to 
receive only some commodities but rarely all.534 Scott’s Wharf on Bankside, for 
instance, was used for mahogany and dyers’ woods, and had ‘a very powerful crane 
for landing this article, which is extremely ponderous’. There is not enough evidence 
from the early part of the century to show whether the tendency to adapt 
warehousing was increasing as trade in specific commodities or regions became 
specialised, as Jacob Price has argued for eighteenth-century merchants. 
Nevertheless, the bonding regulations set down by the Customs and the market 
function makes finding an “all-purpose” warehouse difficult by the end of the 
century.
! By way of concluding this subsection it is worth noting that many of the 
spatial configurations outlined above were repeated in the West India and 
subsequent Docks, albeit on a grander scale. Gwilt’s warehouses, though larger 
and far more regular in footprint than stacks, were wooden-framed multi-story 
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buildings with brick exteriors. The initial warehouse design competition for the West 
India Docks, judged by Soane, saw ingenious crane and loading-bay combinations 
proposed to facilitate moving goods the warehouses and on to carts, though Gwilt 
simply used the warehouses to divided quayside operations from the carters who 
approached from the rear.535 They were enclosed by a perimeter wall that forced 
labourers and coopers through a gate to the north-west and flanked by the 
administrative offices. The founding charter compelled all West Indian traffic to use 
the Docks, ensuring the principles of commodity specialisation grown up around the 
bonding system was reproduced. Perhaps the most interesting thing about them 
was that the Docks extended the propensity to differentiate materials to shipping by 
cutting separate basins for imports and exports, and establishing a superintendent 
of shipping to monitor this traffic too. The security of goods from people and 
integration with transport networks were fundamental to these complexes rather 
than any desire to render the goods or ships safer from through the use of new 
materials. Indeed, despite the superlative nature of the Dock complexes, the 
insurance companies refused to insure goods or ships in the West India Docks in 
such large concentrations, causing the Company’s directorate, largely merchants 
with shipping-interests, to form the Imperial Assurance in 1802. 
Figure 4.10: A plan of West India Dock, c 1810. The Broken line represents a 
perimeter Wall. Source: British-HistoryOnline.ac. uk!  
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Warehouse Personnel and Management !  
Surviving evidence regarding the remuneration of warehouse employees suggests 
that employers cultivated the loyalty of their warehouse-keepers and expected their 
authority to trickle down to the more menial labourers. Fine gradations in the 
education and social opportunities of warehouse employees worked in tandem with 
the architecture and material culture of the buildings to structure the flow of 
information and resources through warehouses, as well as further limit the access 
to goods. Understanding how warehouses worked and were managed is, therefore, 
vital in understanding the social structure of the market for commercial space in 
London. Moreover, the emphasis on retaining staff supports the notion that 
investment in safer buildings could be off-set to no small degree by investment in 
the people that worked in them, as age and familiarity were also clearly valued and 
part of the calculative framework of warehouse keepers. Again this further suggests 
why the ‘problem’ of warehouse security was seen less as a technological or 
architectural one by merchants than a human one.    
! Prior to the Docks, the most numerous and largest warehouses in the City 
were East India Company’s, who had developed a sophisticated hierarchy of 
‘servants’ to control them. The Company employed a central audit department of 
inspectors, packers and surveyors of goods that comprised 60 men.536 A pair of 
surveys from 1779 and 1785 illuminates how this was structured at warehouse 
level. At the top of each warehouse were the warehouse-keepers, assistants and 
two to four clerks, who shouldered the chief bureaucratic burden, defined in 1785 as 
‘To receive and take account of all the company cargoes - compare them with the 
invoices and manifests, adjust them with the revenue officers - prepare them for 
sale - cast the account thereof, and deliver them to the respective buyers on 
demand, when paid for – state account for the investment homewards and pay the 
labourers weekly, besides a vast variety of other business.’537  Below them were a 
group known as Elder Porters who were entirely unrelated City-licensed porters and 
also salaried by the Company. These were responsible for ensuring that 
warehouses were opened to ‘punctual’ labourers, relaying daily instructions from the 
keepers, recording deliveries, lotting goods, drawing samples, admitting Customs 
officers and being present where packages were opened.538 
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! All these positions were salaried, but also received a yearly gratuity and 
substantial fees from dealers who removed goods from the buildings after the 
Company sales. An 1801 report revealed that warehouse-keepers could enjoy a 
significant income from these incidental payments. For instance, a tea warehouse-
keeper received a salary of £100, not changed since the early-eighteenth century, 
but had earned £2,793 that year through fees, £900 more than the Company 
Secretary.539 Unsurprisingly, such lucrative positions were not lightly abandoned. 
Salary records show that in 1763 the Company had employed 20 warehouse-
keepers and clerks for a mean of 18.8 years. Robert Day and James Finlay, 
‘Husbands’ or overseers of the Company’s wharf on the Legal Quays, had 35 and 
33 years’ experience respectively. By 1783 the expansion of Company warehousing 
had seen an introduction of newer blood, although the 32 keepers and clerks active 
then still had 10.4 years of experience on average, with one Peter Corbett having 
notched up 33 years’ service. In the midst of the Docks campaign in 1800, the 
average years of experience was 13.5 years, with the same Peter Corbett in 
Company service for the phenomenal tenure of 50 years. 
! Waged manual workers were less well documented by the Company. In 
1779 there were approximately 900 unnamed labourers across the five surveyed 
sites, about one in 20 of whom were ‘commodores’ or foremen. Ancillary to them, 
each warehouse maintained 10-20 watchmen and approximately 20 men to drive 
the cranes. The daily wage was 2 s. or 2 s. 6 d., depending on seniority. Table 4.1 
illustrates the hierarchies of the Company’s typical Tea and Drug warehouse. By the 
end of the century, the Committee of Warehouse appointed day labourers to work in 
Company warehouses. It awarded tickets that allowed staff to return to positions 
after being laid off in slack periods.
!  The Hudson Bay warehouse records run from 1736/7 until 1790 and 
between 1794 and 1805. These show that less formal methods could achieve 
continuities similar to the East India Company, albeit on an intimate and probably 
more typical scale.540 Like the East India Company, their trade was seasonal 
meaning that permanent porters were unnecessary and every summer they whittled 
down their staff to a longest serving employee. In the busy autumn and winter 
before the Company ships put out for Canada, the same eight or nine names 
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returned year after year, expecting not just warehouse work at 2s. 6d. or 2s. 8d. per 
diem, but also a guinea gratuity after the Company sale and the opportunity to earn 
overtime as night-watchmen. John Colson left the Company after the 1766-7 
season having laboured in the warehouses for at least 30 years, and tenures of a 
decade or more were common amongst his workmates. 
Table 4.1, Staff at the East India Company’s tea and drug warehouse, 1779
Position Number Salary/daily 
wage
Perquisites
Simon Holbroke, Warehouse-keeper £100 Yes
John Stiles Mordaunt, Assistant warehouse-
keeper
£60 Yes
John Skuse, Clerk £70 Yes
Joseph Wallis, Clerk* £70 Yes
William Coward, Clerk* £70 Yes
Ewere Mordaunt, Clerk* £70 Yes
Elder porters 2 £70 Yes
Elder porters 2 £40 Yes
Elder porters 2 £20 Yes
Assistant elder porter 1 £50
Labourer (‘Commodore’) 26 2s. 6d. No
Labourer 429 2s. No
Watchmen 20 1 s./1 s. 6d. No
‘Men for exercising the engines’ 20 2s. 6d. No
Source: IOR, H 63 except * from Salaries Paid to EIC Employees, London Lives.
!
! Warehouse-keepers had similarly long tenures in the Hudson Bay 
establishment. Charles Hay drew up the accounts from 1744, before being replaced 
by William Redknap in 1763, who subsequently worked until 1780. According to 
their Accounts, they had pursing duties, bought candles and coals, negotiated with 
customs officers and advertised Company sales at the Royal Exchange. Summer 
saw the empty warehouses opened to artisans for repair. Again, a permanent 
administrative staff was supplemented with manual warehouse workers. Nothing in 
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the records suggest material perquisites formed part of warehouse remuneration, 
although they confirm that Edith Burley’s notion of the paternalistic assumptions of 
the Hudson Directorate were played out in the warehouses: ‘It always expected its 
employees, regardless of occupation and status, to consider themselves its ‘Faithful 
Servants’ whose fidelity and diligence it would reward with the wages and benefits 
appropriate to their stations.’541
! Similar patterns seem to have emerged on the Legal Quays. The 
wharfingers’ cartel had formed in 1696 to manage the Quays by attempting to 
exclude independent lightermen from delivering goods there and influencing the 
appointment of licensed porters (‘gangsmen’) by the City to their wharfs.542 
Permanent gangsmen worked on each Quay, supplemented by casual labourers in 
the warehouses, who, Peter D’Sena observes, feature far more often in criminal 
proceedings than those with licenses.543 Evidently the regularity of the gangsmen’s 
work, their securities and, consequently, their payment in cash fees as opposed to 
material perquisites garnered a trustworthiness that itinerant labourers could not 
match. 
! Day to day activities on the Quays were overseen by intermediate managers 
in the pay of the wharfingers, six of whom received payments from the Docks 
Compensation Committee, ranging from £100-300. The depositions of these men to 
the Committee illustrate that graduations of culpability and training were important in 
securing their positions. William Boak had ‘served an apprentice as a lighterman 
and is a free Waterman. In 1785 he enrolled in the employ of Mssrs. Thom and 
Ogle, the occupiers of Ralph, Youngs and Wiggins Quays as the manager of their 
lighterage business [at six guineas a month]... That in 1791 he also became 
manager of [Wiggins Quay]’ at twenty guineas salary plus lunches, night-watch 
payments and fees, worth £150 per annum.544 Although the wharfingers were not 
incorporated like a City guild, David Hudson, clerk and manager of Brewers and 
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Chesters Quays claimed he had ‘served an apprenticeship of the to the Company of 
Wharfingers who occupy the whole Legal Quays’ in 1777, thirty years previous.545 
 ! Surviving warehouse books for the Howland Dock at Rotherithe further 
illuminate what was required of wharf managers. The bound account books show a 
sophisticated bureaucratic record with columns for the location of any goods in the 
warehouse, the tenant, the dates goods were received and cleared, costs owing, 
who made payments and a cross reference to the ledger and cash books.546 
Double-entry book-keeping was a revered skill, so we can infer this was a post for 
the relatively well educated. Warehousing was secondary to refitting ships and 
‘boyling’ South Sea Company whale blubber at Howland, only taking on 68 lets and 
29 tenants in nine years. However, they too employed a named staff on day rates of 
1s. 8d., with occasional payments made to less established hands, as in ‘12 Dec. 
1752, Paid two men shipping oyl, 3s 4d.’547 One would expect the Legal Quays to 
have conducted business at a far more intense rate given their rents, and overseen 
a larger contingent of regular and irregular labourers. Nevertheless, the key point to 
be made here is traditional accounting technologies were required only when 
money changed hands between their managers and the owners of goods. For 
warehouse-keepers, balancing the books also required that goods be kept safe 
from warehouse labourers but the signs and tokens they carried were adequate 
because their buildings operated as a calculative space in their own right. 
!  A picture emerges across the warehousing spectrum of a relatively long 
serving, trusted and well-paid nucleus of administrative staff coordinating known 
manual labourers within warehouses, while excluding transient or occasional 
workers where possible. As warehouses tended to be fairly small business that 
specialised in a few commodities, this could be achieved on an informal basis, with 
labourers returning to certain sites year after year. In reducing those legitimately 
interested in warehouses to those known to the trade, or knowledgeable of certain 
products, the front door became easier to police, all without having to resort to the 
bureaucratic practices used by the East India Company. Clerical and literate 
managers were paid in cash, as were the majority of the preferred, semi-permanent 
staff. Payments in goods were reserved for ill-trusted and easily criminalised 
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transient labour. Warehouses were filters for types of commodities, skills, and for 
traffic, hence their relationship to roads and the Thames. They were ‘machines’ that 
concentrated power into the hands of knowledgeable, long-serving and creditable 
staff who diffused it through warehouses using quotidian technologies such as keys, 
book-keeping and fees. In theory, warehouse fires should not have been a problem 
for London’s merchants so long as they trusted their warehouse-keepers 
Conclusions
Merchants like William Vaughan stood at the junction of two networks: insurance 
and warehousing. Their equivocal stance on the problem posed by Pearson’s 
research, chiefly that the risks facing commercial spaces like warehouses were 
understood but not bested, has been explored in this chapter by comparing the 
mediators underpinning each network. !
! The career of Richard Jupp clearly illustrates that surveyors had been 
getting their hands dirty in the City for some time but were restricted from publicly 
formalising their knowledge about its quirks. He seemingly founded his credentials 
on his reliability, family connections and business contacts, both in acquiring his 
post at Hand in Hand and his later surveyorships. His work for the Hand in Hand 
clearly gave him access to a wide range of buildings and a good understanding of 
the risks caused by fire but little indicates he tried to do anything with that 
knowledge until he collaborated with Holland. In general, Jupp’s work was carried 
on through highly socialised transactions, embodied in the personal connections he 
formed with other contractors and surveyors, and underpinned by highly lucrative 
contracts. These jobs had little to add to the stock off knowledge about fire safety, 
though presumably his clients were assured that he knew everything regarding the 
topic that was worth knowing. His East India warehouses were impressively large 
and boasted facades that alerted contemporaries to their technocratic virtuosity, but 
revealed relatively few innovations in terms of fire safety. By the early-nineteenth 
century commentators saw them as indexes of British overseas trade, overcoming 
the odium previously heaped on commercial architecture, and traders more 
generally, by classicists like Gwynn. The discourse surrounding commercial 
architecture increasingly interpreted consumer desire as driving architectural 
change in warehousing and innovative improvements. However, surveyors did not, 
like architects, stand in a tradition of public debate, treatises or even the eccentric 
experiments performed by the Architects’ Club. Nor did demand for a more 
technically proficient warehousing architecture reach such a pitch as to see Jupp 
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exert much effort in outlining questions to be asked of the insurance industry and 
fire-proofing technology, a task that Holland appears to have relished.    
! Policing warehouses also created strings of personal contacts and 
associations. Whereas policyholders principally communicated their satisfaction 
with the insurance companies by keeping up their quarterly subscriptions, expecting 
a response only when disaster struck, merchants conducted an intense seasonal 
dialogue with warehouse-keepers using commodities. The condition of goods 
delivered from warehouses to merchants was a material index of whether the trust 
placed in an individual warehouse-keeper was well deserved. Concerns over fire 
safety melded with fears about theft, smuggling and itinerancy that were intrinsic to 
long-distance trade and more easily rectified by systems of identification and 
registration than new technologies. Careless people caused fires, not buildings, 
resulting in a tradition of graduated investment in human rather than fixed capital 
that doubtless stymied demand for new architectural products in the warehousing 
sector. As the next chapter describes, the Legal Quays were a site that periodically 
vexed London’s merchants precisely because stolen, damaged, delayed or lost 
goods called into question the reliability of wharfingers and porters.
! The paradox signalled by growing numbers of policyholders and relatively 
unambitious investment in material infrastructure raises questions about narratives 
of improvement and modernisation. This chapter has forwarded a two-pronged 
explanation of this supposed problem based on close observation of two systems of 
objects, the first surrounding Jupp the insurance surveyor, and the second 
surrounding combustible warehousing. Both the insurance industry and Jupp were 
presences that were felt by merchants in the City and there can be little doubt 
warehouses were recognised as problematic by them. Nevertheless, the 
construction of risk around abstract values on policy document could not displace 
their traditional understanding of warehouses as beset by problems of theft or poor 
stewardship, and the two models appear to have co-existed. The demand for 
improved warehousing never really crystallised, though it might be added Jupp and 
the insurance companies did relatively little to define their product in those terms. 
While Pearson is right to chastise Beck for assuming technocratic agencies like the 
insurance companies immediately heralded a risk society, he equally implies that 
insurance, by creating a financially-driven and numerical language to frame risk, 
should have noticeably shifted the calculative agency of the City as a result. Yet 
close examination of the warehouse sector suggests the fire offices had no 
monopoly on spreading or visualising ideas about hazard, despite the fact their 
213
charges were regular reminders to policyholders that certain buildings were 
dangerous. Warehouse-keepers used badges, tickets and tokens to ensure the 
labour entering them could be trusted. The basis of this trust was either personal 
association and a good disciplinary record or affinity with one or other of the guilds. 
Indeed, issuing badges, taking securities and regulating their members through 
bureaucratic conventions, the guilds were not so very different from the insurance 
companies. Warehouse architecture served to concentrate the information these 
mobile markers of capability onto specific spaces, staffed by well trained 
employees. They were, in most respects, very good centres of calculation that did 
not need improving. 
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Chapter 4: Designing the Docks
Vaughan required a degree of political literacy to convince various groups of the 
need for docks in London and this chapter examines that in terms of the lobbying 
surrounding the numerous failed attempts by merchants to reorganise the Quays in 
London. Although Vaughan had envisaged the Docks as tools to combat 
mercantilism on the Quays, the reality was rather different. Far from freeing labour, 
the Docks and those associated with them, like Jeremy Bentham and Patrick 
Colquhoun, figure in Peter Linebaugh’s influential thesis as maliciously shackling 
working Londoners to oppressive working conditions.548 Moreover, Vaughan’s 
planned Docks suffered a fractious takeover by the West India Merchants 
Committee, became aped by the East India Company and were constituted as 
monopolies. The Docks did things that were quite unexpected when they entered 
the political sphere and when they were built. As such, this chapter probes the 
contingency of political and commercial knowledge, suggesting that the Quays and 
later Docks were formative sites in the production of political economy for the 
merchant community.
! Vaughan’s achievements in the 1790s had been prefigured by similar 
campaigns dotted across the century. Each type of merchant campaign is treated 
separately in this chapter in order to draw attention to how the specific forms of 
writing about the Quays socialised interested actors differently and produced 
outcomes for the sites that were not evolutionary. A section is devoted to each of the 
following: the loose coalitions of merchants discontent with the Legal Quays 
between 1710 and 1766; the West India Committee’s more sustained and 
concentrated attempts to police the Quays from 1740 to 1790; the plans of Vaughan 
and his rivals during the 1796 Parliamentary campaign; and, finally, the successfully  
chartered Dock companies, who approached the Thames with architects and 
shareholders in tow. As a whole, the chapter argues that the new Docks must be 
seen as a step away from markets bounded by ties of kinship, friendships or 
interpersonal trust, and towards a world policed by institutions. As we will see, this 
course had been precipitated by the increasing presence of the West India 
Committee on the Quays. War also seriously disrupted the personal networks that 
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held together shipping and other Quayside workers, forcing the Committee to 
combine in order to treat with uncompromising agencies, like the Admiralty, and to 
resist taxation. These coalitions generated the multifaceted knowledge that formed 
part of the reason why a group of merchants with no experience of building or 
managing docks felt themselves capable of doing so, and convinced the Treasury 
and other investors to support the enterprise. Moreover, the increased volume of 
writing about the Quays and the prevailing anxieties surrounding how that writing 
did or did not touch upon the market brought into play an extraordinary number of 
other commercial ‘things’ that meant elite knowledge of commerce palpably 
changed. This has major implications for how we understand mercantilist politics, as 
we shall see. 
Section 1: Historiographies of Power
The Legal Quays were the focus of Customs operations in London. According to 
statute, high-duty imports had to be processed by Customs on the 600 yards of 
docks that ran along the north bank of the Thames between London Bridge and the 
Tower. London Bridge proved an effective barrier to large vessels going west, and 
its supporting piers had disrupted the flow of the water causing silt deposits to form 
around the Quays immediately down river. Consequently, overseas vessels of large 
draught moored in the Eastern reaches of the Thames, unloading goods onto 
smaller lighters, which would journey into the City’s Quays. The tidal nature of the 
Thames meant the breadth and depth of the River shrunk daily, causing congestion; 
conditions that were exacerbated by adverse winds, frost and ice, the seasonality of 
trade and the gluts caused by convoys. 
The number of bodies that had claim to the Quays further complicated the 
channelling of goods into the City. Prior to the Docks campaigns, guild-appointed 
Tackle and Ticket Porters unloading vessels on the Quays had developed into 
‘gangsmen’, or contractors of porterage, attached to particular wharfs.549 Individual 
wharfs were privately owned, in some cases by the guilds, but were leased to the 
wharfingers. These managed the movement of goods from vessels onto the quays 
and into warehouses attached to the wharfs or elsewhere. Henry Roseveare has 
noted that in addition to their legal privileges, the wharfingers established a 
secondary cartel known to the merchants as the ‘combination’ at the end of the 
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seventeenth century.550 Explicitly modelled on a joint stock company, the 
combination’s explicit function was to suspend the extension of long credit to 
merchants warehousing goods and to exert control over the employment of lighters 
and porters. Despite a Chancery suit against the cartel by one of their number in the 
1710s, they remained collectively active throughout the eighteenth century without 
reprimand. In fact, the wharfingers were able to sustain their monopoly in spite of 
merchants lobbying the Treasury in 1711, 1713, 1746 and 1762 to increase the size 
of the Quays. Reviewing the situation, Roseveare argues that reforms were 
repeatedly stymied by the wharfingers’ cosy relationship with the Customs 
Commissioners, as well as the exertions made by wharf owners inside Parliament 
on the behalf of their tenants.551 In addition, Roseveare cites the dock promoter 
William Vaughan’s assessment of the wharfingers’ obstructive stance, stating that 
the ‘landed interest &c. overcame the interests of commerce’.552 
! The merchant campaign in the City, led by Vaughan and the West India 
Committee from 1793, eventually led to the establishment of the Docks.553 Initially 
the merchants had stressed the inability of the old Legal Quays to house incoming 
cargos under the aegis of the wharfingers. This, in turn, caused delays in unloading 
ships and rampant criminality as goods were left idling on the quayside. Presented 
to a series of Parliamentary Commissions, these reasons have formed the 
backbone of utilitarian explanations of changes in London’s infrastructure, which 
were described as a rationalisation of the ‘confusion and laxity shown in the 
administration of the Port...which brought losses not only to merchants but the 
public revenue’.554 
! In calling for the removal of the Quays from the City Vaughan caused great 
offence to the Corporation of London, who licensed and protected the great 
numbers of incorporated porters, lightermen and car-men they attracted as well as 
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deriving benefits for warehousing, processing and mercantile communities located 
there. By 1798, two dock projects were being considered by the Treasury: the West 
India Dock Company backed by the West India Committee and Corporation of 
London, and the London Dock Company led by Vaughan and a broad coalition of 
City merchants. Both were sanctioned, with the former being granted a monopoly 
on West India goods in 1799, and the latter a monopoly on wine, rice, brandy and 
tobacco in 1800. City money poured into both schemes in the late-1790s as shares 
for both were snapped up quickly.555 The West India Docks on the Isle of Dogs 
opened in 1802, whereas the London Docks, built in congested Wapping and 
costing more, opened in 1805. These early efforts were followed by the East India, 
Surrey and St Katherine’s Dock Companies. Architecturally, the campaign for the 
Docks was an unlikely success story. Within a decade, the port of London had gone 
from being a ramshackle collection of buildings governed by an accretion of 
authorities, to being merchant-run facilities of the most up-to-date kind. 
! The relationship between Vaughan’s free-trading idea and the newly built 
Docks complicates the narrative. Advocates of the fiscal-military-state thesis, like 
William Ashworth, have explained the Docks in terms of economic rationalisation, 
chiefly the fiscal retrenchment of the Pitt era and the longer history of the national 
debt.556 Such an institutional basis allows Ashworth to see the Docks as revenue-
maximising tools for the Treasury. Similarly, the disciplinary culture forced on the 
Royal Dock Yards’ shipwrights by Samuel Bentham in Greenwich facilitated the 
streamlining of government expenditure during the Napoleonic wars. Ergonomic 
plant and standardised designs began replacing the shipwrights’ craft, while 
simultaneously reducing their scope to produce ‘chips’, the valuable perquisites of 
wood wasted in the ship-building process. Political economy, framed thus, found its 
expression in moves towards mechanisation, greater divisions of labour and the 
replacement of fees and perquisites with wages.  
! Peter Linebaugh’s Marxist interpretation of the Royal Docks suggest they 
were a point of contact between labour and expertise characterised by antagonism. 
His study of the Docks draws direct links between Samuel Bentham’s reforms at the 
Royal Dock Yards, Vaughan’s interest in political economy and the West India 
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Committee’s sponsorship of Jeremy Bentham and Patrick Colquhoun to police the 
Thames stevedores.557 For Linebaugh, these ‘planners and theorists of class 
struggle’ found mechanisms to force wages onto the porters and stevedores 
unloading ships (‘Lumpers’) in place of the payments in perquisites they had 
previously received; it was a trajectory that was no different from that experienced 
by the shipwrights in Greenwich. In his estimation, economic streamlining was a 
conspiracy of ‘The international drug and slave cartel, or “West India Interest”’ who 
‘became the dominant partner in the Bank of England and a powerful influence on 
Parliament’ to form London’s working class in the image of the dominant form of 
capitalism.558 Violent protest resulted. 
! Readers of Perry Gauci’s recreation of the political world of merchants might 
wince at Linebaugh’s easy coupling of the West India Interest with government. As 
Gauci argues, merchants were persistent and sophisticated Parliamentary lobbyists 
but their tactics were not guaranteed success, even in London.559 This argument is 
borne out by David Ryden’s detailed analysis of the West India Committee’s 
response to the shifting political economy of the Atlantic between 1783 and 1807. 
These few years saw the United States abandon the navigation acts and unleashed 
competitively priced American vessels on to the Anglo-Caribbean trade, which was 
further rocked by the Haitian Revolution and the abolition of slavery.560 
Complementing an older historiography of colonial lobbies, Ryden and Gauci 
reiterate that merchants put an extraordinary amount of thought into communicating 
with government, including pamphleteering, mobilising the chartered companies or 
guilds, buying boroughs, bribery and a great deal of social networking. The form 
these interactions took mattered, and the West India Committee’s propensity to 
entertain ‘friends’ with turtles shows how easily economic regulation bled into 
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convivial relationships between merchants and politicians, between merchants 
themselves and between merchants and their servants.561!
! Gathering information unavailable to government was essential to lobbying 
and provides a way to start rethinking how class impacts on the narratives 
surrounding the Docks. That the Dock campaign produced much of the evidence we 
have for the economics of the river, in the shape of the two parliamentary inquiries 
into the port of London and several pamphlets, is something this chapter hopes to 
address directly. Linebaugh’s framework has won plaudits from East End social 
historian John Marriott, although other historians have been much more critical.562 
The tone adopted by Anthony Henderson and Sarah Palmer is far less censorious 
than Linebaugh. They claim that, although the Docks did reduce the independence 
of their many employees, so little is known about the hordes of coopers, lumpers 
and lightermen working on the early modern Thames that the extent of their 
oppression is hard to judge.563 In a more direct critique, David Armitage has 
accused Linebaugh of reading ‘elite’ evidence against the grain to suit his 
theoretical preoccupations.564 He asks whether the Parliamentary Commissions into 
the port can simultaneously be read as examples of mercantilist conspiracy and an 
objective description of social relations. The repeated campaigns surrounding the 
Quays and wharfingers provide a number of illuminating case studies into how elite 
knowledge was constructed, not because the face-off was between unchanging 
commercial and landed interests, as Roseveare suggests, but because they did 
encompass new strategies and rhetorics. Moreover, that Pitt the Younger 
sanctioned the Docks in contrast to his predecessors at the Treasury suggests that 
certain languages were becoming more widely recognised and understood. My 
feeling is that a focus on the administration of property can illuminate the subtle 
transformations underpinning the emergence of the Quays as a political problem.     
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! Linebaugh is not alone in assuming that elite factions represent an 
unchanging succession of more or less predatory coalitions. Douglass North, John 
Wallis and Barry Weingast’s recent situation of mercantilism relative to modern 
capitalism is similar and worth reflecting on in order show how this limits how we 
interpret innovation. For North et al., there exist two types of society that both tackle 
the problem of social order, but use different logics: ‘natural society’ and ‘open 
access society’, a condition that emerged after about 1850 in a small number of 
countries.565 In a natural state, which encompasses most historical and current 
cultures, social order is achieved by political coalitions of the propertied that 
distribute military power through society, while uniting to eradicate violence: ‘The 
political system of a natural state manipulates the economic system to produce 
rents that then secure social order.’566 At various stages, North et al. point to the 
chartered companies as exemplifying this in Britain. In an open-access society, by 
contrast, military power is consolidated and subordinated to political control. Political 
systems are also constrained by other social institutions, and for a political faction or 
party to remain in power, it must ‘maintain the support of economic and social 
interests, broadly defined.’567 The crucial transition from one society to another 
occurs when elite groups begin to share their privileges equally amongst 
themselves, which allows those advantages to be progressively accessible by non-
elite groups. For this to happen, three basic conditions need to be met: ‘1) Rule of 
Law for elites 2) Perpetually lived forms of public and private elite organisations [i.e. 
institutions that exist beyond the life of single members] 3) Consolidated political 
control of the military.’568 North et al. clearly state that Britain did not leave the 
natural state until the 1832 Reform Act was passed and the 1824 Bubble Act was 
repealed, the latter having blocked the creation of joint-stocks since 1721.569 
! Investigating the campaigns for the Quays does shed light on the ‘intra-elite’ 
agreements that weighed heavily in the favour of the chartered companies and the 
propertied. Both were disinclined to stop using legal and social barriers to maintain 
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inequalities in wealth. The campaigns also speak to the basic conditions for open-
access society, with the increasing visibility of longer lasting coalitions that enforced 
more wide-ranging contracts.570 However, while Vaughan certainly did make strides 
towards breaking the monopolies on the Quays, arguing that the new shareholder-
owned Docks were freely accessible seems to overstate his achievements. Julian 
Hoppit’s recapitulation of the events that followed the South Sea Bubble, The ’45 
and the abolition of slavery is a salutary reminder that Parliamentary elites were not 
as squeamish about forcibly redistributing of property rights as North et al. 
presume.571  While North et al. might contest that they are explicitly attempting to 
explain the great divide between rich and poor nations, their opposition of an open 
society (read: liberal capitalism) with every other type of political settlement offers 
an impoverished choice of binary interpretive frameworks even on a local level. 
Firstly, it ignores the more or less institutionalised inequalities of race, class and 
gender that have persisted within open societies, as well as so-called natural ones. 
Secondly, and most crucially, the notion of sharp-elbowed elites suddenly becoming 
‘fair’ implies that elevated circles were not entirely isolated from a broader culture 
that might influence or direct their decisions in some manner, just as the 
Landwaiters forced Musgrave into action.  
! North et al. share with Bruno Latour an interest in Hobbes and credit a 
‘myriad of tiny changes’ as being meaningful because both seek to understand 
creeping institutionalisation. However, Latour’s relativism fundamentally questions 
the great-divide thesis the North et al. hope to explain using a formulaic three step 
programme based on supposedly universal social categories, not least property.572  
For Latour, groups held together merely by ‘social skills’ are usually those whose 
power has ‘great trouble spreading in time and space, that has no inertia and is 
ceaselessly to be renegotiated’.573 Indeed, ‘It’s precisely because it’s so difficult to 
maintain asymmetries, to durably entrench power relations, to enforce inequalities’ 
that larger institutions devote so much work to ‘shifting the weak, fast decaying ties 
to other types of links.’574 Bureaucracies and institutions held together by ‘things’ 
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provide the durability that allows power to go global. Thus, technologies ‘allow, 
afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible [and] forbid’ 
other associations.575 Arguing against the determinism inherent in social theory, 
Latour points to the countless combinations of things that make up reality, claiming 
these ‘primitive’ theories are not ‘sufficient to describe the many entanglements of 
humans and non-humans.’576 Most egregiously, sociologists presume that social 
forces are in play a priori: ‘By putting aside the practical means, that is, the 
mediators through which inertia, durability, asymmetry, extension, and domination is 
produced and by conflating all those different means by which the powerless power 
of social inertia acts, sociologists, when they are not careful in their use of social 
explanations, are the ones who hide the real cause of social inequalities.’577 
! Miles Ogborn has traced ‘a geography of writing’ to explore the making of 
empire in India and its attendant colonial knowledge. This represents a parallel 
problem in that elite knowledge came to be accumulated in East India House 
whereas Indians became increasingly dispossessed of political and economic 
authority. For Ogborn colonial transactions of all kinds were freighted by inequalities 
of power but not, and this is crucial, over-determined by them:
! The geography of the written word offers ways of understanding the relationships 
! between space, knowledge and power in the practices of European trade and 
! empire that show those practices in the process of their construction and operation. 
! This can demonstrate the relationships between power and knowledge in the 
! making, rather than simply assuming what they might be. A focus on the material 
! practices of making, disseminating and using documents in both script and print can 
! decipher the many entanglements of both a will to power and the many forms of 
! agency that need to be negotiated for trade and empire to be pursued and 
! realized.578   
Ogborn illustrates that mercantilist writing was a conduit for ideas about social 
groups that not only had intellectual dimensions but, at the point of production, 
social ones as well. The Quays might also be seen as a place continually remade 
by the writing of privileged actors like the merchants, chartered companies or 
Customs Commissioners. Simon Schaffer, pursuing a similar argument, suggests 
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that co-produced knowledge of the Quays might involve a cast of less well known 
stevedores and coopers, with potentially radical implications for how labour was 
conceptualised.579 However, his work on the Royal Dock Yards figures expropriation 
of shipwrights’ labour and skills as the basis for the technical and administrative 
principles that characterised the work of industrialists like Charles Babbage and 
John Atwood that were put into practice elsewhere. The circulation, form and 
relationship of writing to other institutions or objects could challenge privileged 
Londoners and the social and cultural constitution of a mercantilist elite as much as 
support them.  
! Writing about the Quays encompassed many genres, including government 
documentation, private agreements between lobbies, pamphlet literature and 
Parliamentary Inquiries and commercial data generated by the Dock companies. 
These genres of writing each responded to special problems regarding broader 
networks engaged in commerce at a local level, usually centred on the Quays, and 
were designed to enroll other groups interested in those spaces. Not only did the 
Quays structure elite sociability by forcing them together into new combinations, 
these genres of writing act cumulatively furnish those circulating and processing 
that writing with a number of rhetorics that we might think of as political economies. 
What this chapter shows is that by the end of the century the Quays were being 
figured in ever more wide-ranging commercial institutions that presaged a far more 
bureaucratic attitude towards intra-elite compliance, especially in the writing of 
contracts. Writing had the effect of shifting opinions over the Docks continually, 
setting privileged and plebeian groups into new but generally larger combinations. 
Before even a brick of West India Dock had been laid, a crisscrossing, poly-centric 
but increasingly well integrated web of communications had reformulated elite 
opinions about them. What is suggested in the closing section then, is that the 
Docks were a product that not only shaped the lives of working class Londoners but 
elite ones too, in that they created commercial and political knowledge that gave 
various interest groups more not less common ground. 
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Section 2: Campaigns for the Quays, 1700-1766
Between 1711 and 1766 London’s merchants repeatedly tried and failed to extend 
the Legal Quays to the sites marked in Figure 5.1. Examining these campaigns 
through the Treasury and Customs papers that recorded the merchants’ scraps with 
the whargingers combination show a surprising number of solutions to the problems 
facing the port were proffered by the contestants. Not only was experimentation in 
evidence in the ideas put forth, but also it was present in the means used to bargain 
with the Treasury and the forms of the merchant campaigns, which varied 
considerably. Contrasting the merchants with the Customs is instructive, as the 
latter diligently recorded these wrangles and referred back to previous ones when 
making decisions. Moreover, the campaigns rarely stemmed from the chartered 
companies, who seemed to find the port fairly accommodating and could bargain 
with the Customs and wharfingers independently. Fundamentally, the petitions 
suggest that merchant campaigns separated by many years and with no discernible 
continuity in terms of membership were highly unstable, and were structured more 
by extraneous factors, like war, than any sustained or evolving ideology. Writing 
about the Quays was, in these instances, squeezed out of the merchants in 
response to outlandish commercial conditions in the port that had halted the usual 
flow of commerce.       
Figure 5.1: Sites in the Early Campaigns to extend the Legal Quays 
 
Source: ‘Report From The Committee Appointed To enquire into the best Mode of 
providing sufficient Accommodation for the increased Trade and Shipping of the 
Port of London’ (1796)
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! The ‘merchants of London’ first petitioned about the Quays in July 1711, 
when they argued ‘that the wharfes and keys first appointed for the port of London 
were at that time very sufficient, but by the increase of trade are now become so 
strait that the merchants suffer great inconveniences thereby; and that the wharfes 
belonging to the Bridge house in Southwark over against the Custom House, if 
appointed free or lawful wharfes, and subject to the Customs Commissioners, would 
be a great accommodation to the trade of the City of London.’580 The timing of their 
argument was significant, coming towards the end of the War of Spanish 
Succession. In common with any conflict, we would expect this to be a period when 
overseas trade was close to stagnant. However, Admiralty coordinated convoys 
protected what imperial commerce remained by escorting fleets through contested 
water, grouping them, before sailing at predetermined places and times. This 
resulted in annual crops, say tobacco, normally shipped over the course of several 
months arriving in London in a week, glutting the quayside, causing a run on specie 
in order to pay taxes and creating a headache for dealers hoping to sell early when 
demand was highest. All the subsequent petitions examined in this chapter occurred 
during wartime, with adherence to the convoy system partly explaining this 
complaint. 
! The suggested extension at London Bridge is also notable. The 1711 
merchants urged that existing wharfs be reappointed, moving from sufferance to 
‘lawful’, or Legal Quay, status. No mention was made of a change in the wharf’s 
ownership, and a 1763 Customs report noted that the owner had been a Southwark 
brewer and MP, Charles Cox.581 Whether Cox linked the campaign with 
Parliamentary interest cannot be proven, although it is this kind of detail that 
illustrates how important administrative acumen was to the Customs. The chosen 
site was, in fact, strategic, emphasising jurisdictional continuity by referring to the 
City-administered Bridge House Estates and their proximity to the Customs House. 
The hope appears to have been that Customs officers would have few problems 
getting to the new Quay and that the City could retain their right to appoint porters 
and fix the fees charged by wharfingers. 
! Although the 1711 petition disappeared from view, in 1713 the merchants put 
pressure on the Treasury over the same issues of increased trade and insufficient 
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space on the Quays. It referred the matter to the Customs, jointly forming the 
‘Commission for appointing the quays and wharfs &c. in the port of London’, which 
examined a ‘Proposal for enlarging the Tower Ditch in order to receive ships of 
burthen and to erect warehouses &c.’582 Serious consideration went into this more 
ambitious venture, which was even passed to the Attorney General, before, again, 
falling out of contention for unknown reasons in 1714. The proposal would have 
been a major undertaking and making use of the still-flooded Tower moat to extend 
the Quays contiguously around Tower Hill would have doubled their extent. 
However, with the Mint located in the Tower and the Admiralty victualing yard in East 
Smithfield, the plan had drawbacks, not least taking some Quays outside the 
jurisdiction of the City. Whether these local considerations or the cessation of 
hostilities with France diminished the pressure convoys put on the Quays cannot be 
ascertained from extant records. What we do know was that the idea was dropped.   
! The next dispute came a generation later, during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, in 
February 1746. Again, the length of the Quays was deemed problematic, but the 
petition was more complex. An initial notice to the Treasury by a group of three 
merchants, John Forward, William Whitaker and John Philpot, complained of ‘the 
narrow bounds of the [Legal] quays and wharfs’.  Shipping congestion had been 
compounded by the wharfingers’ ‘combination’, which had held the merchants to 
ransom by controlling the dispatch of lighters to unload ships in the pool, for which it 
had ‘no charter’. Forward, Whitaker and Philpot proposed an extension of the 
Quays, claiming to have purchased land around Iron Gate on Tower Wharf on which 
they were prepared to build a new wharf. They argued that the site was ‘very 
convenient for the shipping business’, and that the ‘additional wharf will be of great 
service and dispatch’.583 
! The petition essentially outlined a commercial indulgence, and was 
seconded by a much larger petition of London merchants, comprising 150 
signatories, who condemned the ‘narrow quays’ and the wharfingers’ ‘advanced 
rates’, describing Forward, Philpot and Whitaker as ‘persons of great credit and 
fortune’. Substantiating their claims, they presented the Customs with wharfingers’ 
bills showing price hikes for the tobacco, Russia, sugar and Hamburg trades.584 
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These sectors were broadly reflective of the signatories’ trading activities, which 
were biased towards Europe, the Levant and North America. Few principally traded 
with the West Indies, fewer than ten can be linked with either the South Sea or East 
India companies and although several became MPs, none were in Westminster at 
the time of signing the petition.585 
! In response, the Customs Commission quashed any idea of increasing the 
Legal Quays, stating that merchants delayed in landing goods would be granted 
sufferance on individual petitions.586 Notably, the wharfingers had counter-
petitioned, arguing that convoys were a problem, but that any extension would see 
the new facilities managed by individuals who had not proven themselves as 
capable. They reinforced the notion that the Commission’s power would be eroded 
by casting doubts on the social makeup of the proposed new site, claiming the area 
was, ‘inhabited by alehouse keepers, watermen, coal heavers, porters, lumpers that 
deliver ships, and very poor people who will have the opportunity of smuggling and 
carrying off their stocks (as they call them)... into the hundred alleys, passages, 
yards, courts turnings and private places’.587 With regards to the wharfingers’ rack 
renting, the Commissioners were more sympathetic to the merchants, referring the 
case to the Corporation of London, following a 1674 precedent, when the Mayor 
fixed the wharfage and lighterage rates at the Quays.588
! Following a ‘public’ meeting in late 1762, London merchants again petitioned 
the Treasury; the latter referred the claims to the Customs Commission.589 Again the 
merchants labelled the Legal Quays insufficiently spacious, but side stepped open 
confrontation with the wharfingers by refusing to propose a solution. Initially, the 
Customs rejected the criticism, stating that delays were the result of convoys, and 
with peace would come a more navigable port. The merchants countered, echoing 
the arguments used previously by the wharfingers by stressing reasons of state: 
‘Want of room on the Quays prevents dispatch; delay enhances sea damage, is a 
temptation to fraud and theft and in all these cases the crown suffers’. The Customs 
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then formed a committee with 28 merchant delegates under the auspices of the 
Treasury to consider the Quays.590 
! The merchant delegates were successful City men, largely tied to the 
Atlantic economy, as opposed to the chartered companies. At least three can be 
connected to the Newcastle Ministry, one, George Prescott, was an MP, and Robert 
Dingley was a goldsmith linked to the Russia trade and founder of Magdalen 
Hospital in 1758, which gave him some celebrity.591 As discussed in chapter two, the 
Customs Commission and Treasury were then entering a period where experience 
was at a premium and quickly adopted a more conciliatory approach than in 1746 to 
these well-connected City plutocrats. Landsurveyor Richard Frewin, the father of 
Musgrave’s accomplice, reported on the suitability of two of the merchants’ 
suggestions.592 The first recommended that Speck’s Wharf in Southwark be re-
designated to Legal Quay status, though the property was quickly deemed too 
small, distant and insecure. The second idea revisited opening up the Tower Ditch 
and Wharf. The Customs surveyors were uneasy about this, except for ‘bulky goods 
such as in a heavy glut of business must retard dispatch’, specifically American and 
Caribbean produce: sugar, tobacco, rice and hemp. They also noted that the area 
around St Katherine’s was populated by smugglers and their captains, drawing 
attention to the 1746 minute advising the same. Despite their caveats, they 
accepted that this area was suitable and coolly endorsed the proposal.593 
! Although the Commission seemed to run out of steam with the fall of the 
Bute Administration in 1763, evidence presented to the 1796 Commission on the 
port of London suggests the plans were in fact in consideration until 1766.594 Again, 
this administrative gap suggests that political instability at Whitehall noted in relation 
to the Customs was confusing the lobbying process as well as its documentary 
protocols. Jettisoning both the Tower and Southwark schemes in 1765, the revived 
Commission ordered that sufferance wharfs in Irongate and St. Katherine’s be 
converted to Legal Quays on the proviso that they refitted, expanded and secured 
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their premises against the neighbourhood using a twelve-foot wall and gate. 
Advertisements were planned for the London Gazette to announce the change, 
though none have actually been discovered, but out of the blue the Exchequer 
deemed the Commission illegal and quashed its orders in January 1766. While the 
extension to the Quays was relatively small, the merchants were on the verge of 
marking a significant precedent in 1765. However, the general atmosphere of 
indecision speaks of the political turbulence of these years, marked by continual 
change at the Treasury, rather than any attempt to favour the landed elite as 
Roseveare suggested.595      
! While the convoy-glutted Thames led merchants to form associations to 
tackle the Quays, the fluidity of their proposals, campaign strategies and personnel 
do not suggest a well-defined merchant ideology or sense of interest. Moving trade 
away from the Legal Quays had ramifications because the Customs and 
Corporation of London regulated them, and breaking the wharfingers’ monopoly was 
bound to raise questions as to their entitlement to protection as property holders. 
The merchant propositions clearly recognised this and put forth schemes that were 
intended to suggest geographical continuity and, thereby, present the new facilities 
as extensions of the existing administrative system. The arguments have a 
hydraulic quality in that they suggest inflating the regulatory frame work in response 
to the pressure caused by shipping as opposed to disbanding it. The traces left by 
each campaign appear in the usually well-archived official documents of the 
Customs, which gave them considerable advantages in resisting these campaigns 
because they had access to more historical data that allowed them to be seen as 
cyclical. However, the Customs’ archive was not impregnable for the merchants and 
the next section considers how their bureaucratic strategies were adopted by the 
West India Committee. 
Section 3: The West India Interest, 1740-1790
Turning to the West India Committee minutes it is clear that unincorporated 
merchants were far from acquiescent when it came to getting their way on the Legal 
Quays. The chartered companies had advantages over the largely free trading 
merchants who brought the early-eighteenth century petitions. Both the East India 
and Hudson Bay Companies paid rents to individual wharfingers to keep a 
waterside staff stationed at the Quays to help them ‘dispatch’ their goods. The 
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South Sea Company had a special relationship with the proprietors of Greenland 
Dock in Bermondsey. The chartered companies also fostered corporate 
relationships with the Customs, and though this frequently meant reminding the 
East India Company of their debts, it gave them unique formal channels through 
which they could broker deals with the revenue. The Customs’ obvious concerns 
over revenue collection meant that quashing the 1762-6 Commission did not render 
the port utterly inelastic. As chapter three described, bonded warehousing provided 
a flexible means of recreating fiscal borders inland, and the Customs Commission 
were happy to appoint them when demand arose and where the facilities were 
deemed secure. The East India Company’s premises were the largest overseen by 
the Customs, but specialist ‘lockers’ were appointed by the Customs in 1770 to 
manage the sugar warehouses, and the Navy’s Victualing Yard in Tower Dock was 
converted into a tobacco warehouse in 1787.596 Confining commodities to specific 
buildings had the effect of preventing different merchant communities from 
combining to complain about the Quays, but it also offered them a channel to the 
Customs and fiscal efficiency became a reason to berate them over Quayside 
facilities. 
! The evolving fiscal infrastructure of the port provides a background for the 
West India Committee’s adoption of bureaucratic tactics resembling the chartered 
companies in both their parliamentary politics and their work in London, which is the 
focus here. Two related procedures stand out in the Committee’s minutes. First, 
their use of private police constables in London was well in advance of their 
sponsorship by Colquhoun in the 1790s, although it was not unlike the Corporation 
of London’s patchy and experimental use of salaried officers between 1740 and 
1800.597 Second, the Committee’s belief that regulation could be achieved through 
administration and it persistently drove to formalise contracts and disseminate 
information. When the Committee usurped contracts that merchant houses had 
previously arranged themselves, this tended to mean fostering contacts with other 
large bureaucracies, including the Customs, the guilds, the wharfingers, Admiralty 
and Lloyds. West Indian commerce had always been global, but increasingly the 
Committee were combining the networks that ran between the metropolis and 
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Caribbean to create more impersonal connections. The writing they developed was 
about tracking flows of goods from centres of power in London.      
! The West India Committee Minutes evidence uneasy collaboration between 
these groups. Emerging from the coffeehouses to provide support for Colonial 
Agents from the West Indies, the Planters Club had been active since at least the 
1740s, when the merchant Henry Lascelles wrote to a correspondent that a 
threatened increase in sugar duties had seen 
The Agents and some other deputed and did wait on Mr Pelham with an abstract of 
the case [against the proposal]... besides sending the case to every Member of both 
Houses, we go about to visit the Members at the their several places of abode, and 
divide ourselves (Agents, Planters and Merchants) into little Committees to attend 
them in different quarters of this great Town.598
By 1760, the West India Merchants had formed themselves into a permanent 
‘Committee’, leaving minutes from 1769 and, after some short-lived collaborations, 
they combined formally with the Planters into a joint body in 1784.599 
London’s West India merchants were a tight-knit group, conspicuous in the 
capital as absentees, proverbially wealthy and prone to lavish feasting. Their 
commercial and political ‘business’ was often conducted with cousins and in-laws, 
and such were the coercive powers of the Committee that Benjamin Vaughan guiltily  
admitted to Shelburne that he often felt compelled to ‘monopolise’ in spite of his 
liberal convictions.600 Political lobbying occupied the joint Planters and Merchant 
Committee, who met during Parliamentary sessions. The Merchants Committee 
comprised a core of four to ten committed members, including the Vaughans, who 
met monthly to discuss business that has been perceived as too quotidian to 
interest previous historians, especially the matter of the Quays. 
! Organised around the consignment system, Caribbean planters shipped 
sugar, rum and molasses to London on their own account, whereon London 
merchants would market the products and arrange return cargoes of plantation 
supplies, agricultural implements, and luxury goods for their correspondents. As a 
highly taxed dry-good that was salable in small lots, sugar was a magnet for thieves 
on the Thames, and the problem of criminality on the Quays was a perennial issue 
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for the Committee. Mistakes also happened, and the firm Lascelles & Dalling 
thought it worthwhile to remind a Barbadian consignee of the virtues of well-
designed hogsheads.601 The loss of sugar in London was alarming enough to cause 
Samuel Martin of Antigua to write a long and sardonic letter squarely blaming his 
London factors: 
! [The current account] may be right for all I know to the contrary for you have put 
! down no weights for the duty and freight which I think a way of accounting that 
! would not please you from a merchant here. If I want to investigate backwards the 
! weight, as witches say their prayers, I should be at a loss for the petty charges 
! which are lumped in the article of duty... for though I esteem you [as] gentlemen of 
! integrity, yet you may possibly commit arithmetical errors as no man is infallible, not 
! even the Pope, and tho’ I am no catholick you seem to expect I should take your 
! acct[ount] as his decrees, without examination.
Accounting signified mercantile probity for Martin:
! By Acc[oun]ts from my other correspondence I find less sugar sold by some 
! hundredweight for which duty and freights is, which deficiency of weight must be 
! pilferage by coopers and others even after the sugar is put into  warehouse. I 
! presume it is the same case with you; and I observe the better the sugar the more 
! loss of weights by pilferage. Are not these points worthy of the Merchants enquiring 
! when the coopers are known to sell many hogsheads of sugar every year tho’ they 
! import none?602 
‘Pilferage amongst your coopers’ continued to bedevil Martin and he challenged the 
London firms directly when he asked, ‘Can our friends in London then blame the 
planters for shipping directly as much as they can to the outports, of which will 
certainly in time need no supply of London[?] How this will affect the Interest of the 
Merchants there is easy to determine unless they join in one general combination to 
put an end to such evil practices[?]’603 He reasoned, ‘the Liverpool Market is much 
preferable to that of London, especially in regard to petty charges & the sale 
weights (which you will see on acc[ounts] of sales)... for there is no pilferage at 
Liverpool... For those reasons I intend to ship half my crop to Liverpool.’604 Similarly, 
Simon Taylor opined Bristol was a tolerably good market for sugar and ‘in general 
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much better than London, as there is not near so much pilferage and plunderage 
there’.605 The West India Merchants’ credit and future prosperity in London rested 
on securing the sugar on their books and better control over the port and 
warehouses was the explicit call from the Caribbean. The Committee’s use of 
writing was, for the most, part aimed at narrowing the gap between the commerce 
represented in their accounts and books and objective properties of the 
commodities they were faced with. 
As part of the security measures the merchants sought to institute a number 
of different controls in the Quays. Lascelles wrote of a voluntary penny-per-barrel 
levy on sugars imported into London in order to provide a merchant-fund to ensure 
lumpers caught stealing were prosecuted as early as 1744/5.606 Coopers drawing 
samples from barrels were also thought to be pilfering sugar and he hoped that 
‘trusty persons could be stationed at the doors of the warehouses to the waterside 
to watch their [the coopers’] going and coming, but this has not yet been found 
practical.’607 The Committee employed a special Constable to patrol the quayside 
from 1745. In 1779 the Committee issued ‘new rules’ for the prevention of 
‘plunderage’ aimed at lumpers and coopers on quays and warehouses. These new 
rules combined with a petition to the Mayor asking that public houses on Thames 
Street be banned on the grounds they ‘encouraged pilferers’. Taverns had long 
been held suspect by the Customs as hubs for information and fenced goods, and 
victuallers advanced the securities of Gangsmen in disproportionately high numbers 
in the 1770s, suggesting ongoing links between the Quays and the unregulated 
street.608 At the same time the Committee approached the ‘Commandent’ of the 
Tower to crack down on the disorderly quayside antics of his soldiers.609 Despite the 
gap in the West India Committee minutes from 1783 to 1792, we know the 
Committee petitioned the City for the powers to appoint ten officers on the Quays 
when the Corporation were taking increasing interest in extra-parochial patrols.610 
Magistrate John Staples claimed to have assisted the magistrates of Shadwell in 
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patrolling the Thames ‘to apprehend offenders’ with Trinity House, The East India 
Company, The Russia Company, The Committee of West India Merchants and 
North America Merchants footing the bill from 1786: ‘I left the Shadwell Office the 
beginning of 1789. There was not a gang of river pirates left.’611 This boastful letter 
illustrates that prior to their sponsorship of Patrick Colquhoun, the West India 
Committee had joined with other merchant bodies to fight crime on the Thames, one 
of many increases in the scale of their operation.  
! Expediting these cases meant pilferage on the Quays and in the adjacent 
warehouses was a hardy perennial of the Committee by the time William Vaughan 
joined the West India Committee. At only his second meeting in 1774, the 
‘plunderage of sugar on lighters’ was taken into consideration and the meeting 
concluded the difficulty arose ‘from the confused state of the lawful quays’.612 A 
month later the Customs were sent a letter outlining the Merchants’ opinion that the 
‘insufficient size’ of the Quays led to delay, delay to plunder, and a loss to the 
‘proprietor and the Revenue’.613 Despite the petition falling on deaf ears, other more 
mercenary groups resident on the Quays provided the Committee with further 
leverage there. As appendix 3 shows, West India Constables brought just four 
cases to the Old Bailey between 1740 and 1800, suggesting they were more 
effective as deterrents than detectives. By contrast, the gangsmen brought 44 cases 
of ‘pilferage’, 30 of which concerned the theft of sugar and presumably a 
consequence of the reward scheme founded in Lascelles’ time. Moreover, the 
Merchants had used their weight to broker alliances with well-placed collectives 
around the City, not just the gangsmen, but the Carmen’s Company and, quite 
illegally, the Landwaiters of the Customs.614 Each alliance allowed grievances to be 
redressed and new Quayside protocols to be laid down regarding the transit of 
sugar, usually adjusting upwards the tariff of fees the West India Merchants paid to 
these groups. 
The most important, persistent and problematic negotiations the merchants 
attempted were with the wharfingers, who, as warehouse-keepers and lighterage 
contractors, were obvious targets for the Committee. Thankfully the wharfingers 
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were a small group, with between 4 and 8 managing the whole waterfront in the 
mid-century. Details were hammered out in person, and both collectives were happy  
to be represented by committees. The wharfingers’ leader-cum-secretary in 1773 
was Barrington Buggin, who owned at least nine wharfs and was succeeded by his 
son, also called Barrington, in 1780. By 1790, Edward Ogle appears to have 
emerged as pre-eminent. 
Like the Committee, the wharfingers kept formal minutes, sadly now lost, 
styling themselves as the ‘Company of Wharfingers’. Written notification was a 
standard part of the brokerage process and the decisions that specified their 
respective duties were disseminated via written and dated agreements by both 
groups.615 Although failing to honour contracts was deeply problematic, 
collaboration between the two groups seems to have been the normal state of 
affairs. In 1773, the wharfingers attended the Merchants’ monthly meeting to 
discuss quayside security and both agreed that it was the ‘King’s surveyors and 
watchmen who were remiss in their duty’, resulting in a merchant petition to the 
Customs Commissioners asking them to improve their efforts.616 Likewise, in 1774, 
the wharfingers attended a West India Merchants’ meeting to discuss a 1d rise in 
landing fees; although this action resulted in ‘debate’, the merchants ratified the 
increase a month later.617 
Tracking the flow of goods was not simply a question of watching them but 
involved carefully specified duties that made policing and writing contracts an 
essential part of the west India Committee’s work. The wharfingers’ less co-
operative aspect was on show during a major dispute in 1780 that highlights this 
nicely. In February 1780, the wharfingers notified the Merchants by letter that they 
would be increasing the lighterage on hogsheads of sugar by 6d.618 The rise was 
exceptionable and a second letter from the wharfingers demanded an answer from 
the Committee, who had yet to reach a decision. The merchants
Resolved that the merchants consider the price of wharfage and warehouse rent as 
connected with that of lighterage and that under the monopoly enjoyed by the 
Wharfingers of the free [Legal] quays in the City of London a price is paid by the 
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merchants fully adequate to the whole service... therefore the merchants do not think 
it proper to take lighterage separately into consideration.619 
Agreeing to consider wharfage in toto the Merchants copied the minute to the 
wharfingers. Several months of carefully noted correspondence and meetings 
followed during which the parties could not agree terms. Finally, a meeting was 
arranged by the two camps in the plush London Tavern at which the charges of 9d 
per hogshead of sugar warehoused at the Legal Quays and 12d per hogshead sent 
elsewhere were proposed by the wharfingers. The West India Merchants stated 
they would tolerate 6d and 9d respectively, ‘Which being sent to the Wharfingers for 
their consideration in another room they sent out a verbal message that their 
proposal was an ultimatum – they afterward came in, and the merchant proposal 
being explained to them, they returned no answer but withdrew.’620 The 
wharfingers’ refusal to commit to anything in writing evidently concerned the 
Merchants. 
When the West Indies convoy arrived on 9 August the Merchants arranged 
an emergency meeting at which they composed a letter to the Customs 
Commissioners complaining that the Wharfingers ‘had established by ancient 
custom’ a ‘monopoly prejudicial to the commerce’ of the Port.621 They explained the 
Wharfinger’s ‘being few in number had lately united in Arbitrary demands of an 
additional price for their lighterage which is without just foundation’ and that their 
refusal to pay meant the fleet was now moored in the Thames without any lighters 
to unload them. The merchants hoped the Commission would allow them to land 
goods on the sufferance wharfs, appealing to the discretionary powers granted to 
the Commissioners by Parliament in 1670 in order to resolve commercial disputes. 
On 12 August, the Merchants were notified of a counter-petition by the wharfingers 
to the Custom Commissioners, stressing their attempts to ‘accommodate’ the 
Merchants with ‘every assistance and dispatch’, but explaining that the rising prices 
were a consequence of sugar being such a risky and valuable commodity to convey  
down the Thames.622 In a gesture perversely steeped in contrition, the Wharfingers 
offered to unload the fleet without charging lighterage on the understanding the 
prices would be swallowed whole next year. The Customs came down on the side of 
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the West India Merchants, granting them sufferance allowances for which thanks 
were returned ‘for removing one of the principal causes of that shameful scene of 
pilferage’.623
! Regulating the flow of goods by proxy also made the Committee aware of 
problems caused by the space of the Quayside. Following the wharfingers’s failure, 
the Merchants Committee attempted to use the Customs as leverage on the Quays. 
In April 1783, the Customs received a long ‘representation’ from the West India 
Committee complaining mostly of high taxes, problems in shipping and the 
misadministration of seizures. It also stated that ‘every delay arising from the Forms 
[bureaucracy] of the Customs House and the limitations of the space in which 
business is required to be done encreases the opportunities not only of defrauding 
the revenue by smuggling but robbing the importer, by pilfering commodity on which 
the duty is payable.’624 They further recommended cutting back the number of 
Customs holidays, consolidating the drawbacks and duties, and suggested that the 
Customs should 
! extend the Publick Quays of London and no longer require the commerce of the 
! Metropolis to be carried on in less space than is allowed in the principal Out Ports, 
! and in so crowded a way, as wholly precludes an effectual care of the commodities, 
! and encourages Villainy of all denominations among the labouring People employed 
! about them. And on all these Topicks the Committee observe that the interests of the 
! Government, and of the Planter and Fair Trader, fully coincide, and no regulation 
! can serve one without protecting the others.625
The Commission turned to the Landsurveyors for advice, and Musgrave’s protégé, 
Frewin, reported that through a judicious use of sufferance laws the ‘great publick 
expense’ of extending the Quays could be avoided. Rebutting claims that they were 
to blame for thefts, he added that pilfering on the Quays was largely due to want of 
‘spirited execution’ by merchants in protecting their goods after they have been 
passed by officers: a ‘larger space of transaction can scarcely afford less 
opportunity of theft’.626 
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! Ships on the Thames were another battleground where ‘the lumpers and 
other dishonest people on board plunder as they have opportunity’.627 Here, again, 
the trend seems to have been for the Committee to usurp contracts brokered by 
individual countinghouses and for the Committee to represent the merchants to 
other large bodies. Early modern ship-owners commonly had fractional interests in 
several vessels with merchants being the most prominent shareholders, alongside 
those concerned with maritime victualling, port facilities or ship-building.628 This 
arrangement put merchant-owners in a contradictory position: as traders they 
wanted to ship their goods at the lowest freight-rates but as ship-owners they 
wanted to secure the highest freights. Competition in the freight market was high, 
further dissuading heavy investment in single vessels. Should these fail to find 
adequate cargo for only a few voyages, they would represent a substantial loss and 
reinforce the reliance on thinly spread shares. Merchant-owners might not always 
ship goods in their own hulls, but major Caribbean merchant dynasties, like the 
Vaughans, Lascelles and Longs, acquired access to wide networks of information 
through portfolios of shares in ships. 
! Ships’ captains were powerful figures in reiterating commercial networks. A 
200-tonne vessel cost around £5,000 to build in the mid-eighteenth century and 
their cargos easily exceeded £10,000.629 Caribbean consignees tended to send 
sugar to London on several vessels as a crude form of insurance. Securing return 
cargos required captains to build up networks of friends: ‘The social relationships 
and obligations developed between merchants of different ports helped keep 
vessels on the same route for many years.’630 Samuel Martin was sure his influence 
had some bearing on the success of a voyage; he wrote to one factor in London, ‘I 
solicited and consulted all your friends and mine to assist [Captain Bowes] get 
lading’.631 According to Martin, Bowes lacked sufficient ‘prudence’, and had returned 
to London without freight. Damages in transit were also a reflection on a captain’s 
skill in navigating and loading a ship. In 1797 William Vaughan reckoned losses at 
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sea accounted for 10% of the 141 hogsheads of sugar he received from his 
Jamaican estates, even though they had been shipped to London in six vessels.632 
More sizeable, higher quality or personally valuable cargoes were sent with 
captains deemed to be particularly trustworthy. Martin frequently specified that 
goods sent from London go with named captains and patronised the same on the 
return. Samuel Vaughan was sure to have checked the captain carrying his son to 
Philadelphia was ‘of established good character’.633
! Captains also played a crucial role in disciplining their crew. Benjamin 
Vaughan supposed sailors were a liability, 
! You know what sailors are, at least with us where they have no concern with trade 
! and only with the ship. They are bold, they are generous, they are extravagant, 
! when on show they are mad after women, they are active, they have hard labour, 
! they descend to all work, they are honest amongst themselves, they have intervals 
! of labour and long ones of unemployment, they must live hard and watch [sic: 
! want?] much.634 
Vaughan rather hopefully advocated that providing entertainment ‘as is consistent 
with innocence and duty’, like hymns, rather than ‘improper’ drinking, singing and 
dancing. War severely curtailed a Captain’s ability to discipline his crew through 
wages, fear or loyalty, as sailors were frequently pressed into Naval service. ‘Hot’ 
presses on the Thames caused sailors to vanish and forced ships unloading on the 
Thames to resort to ‘lumpers’ with even less invested in the success of a vessel.635
! Captains were also held accountable for thefts, a mechanism that helped to 
ensure the safe delivery of goods. Henry Lascelles explained losses incurred by a 
Barbadian planter, writing that ‘it is observable that these ships, whose captains 
attend on board at the time of unloading have seldom much to pay for the 
plunderage’ of the crew and coopers.636 Forty years later, Simon Taylor reckoned 
that Captain Renwick would be a good choice to command a newly commissioned 
ship, claiming ‘he knows which end of the vessels suits us... and which [goods] can 
go under the crane at the wharf in London, and by this means avoid all the thefts in 
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the River’.637 Robert Plumsted told a consignee that ‘One hogshead [of] sugar is lost 
and about twenty pound to pay for plunderage beside - who is to blame for this[?] 
Capt. Bready must explain when you see him.’638 
! Nothing signalled a captain’s confidence in his abilities to negotiate 
commercial opportunities, navigate his route and discipline his crew so surely as 
taking a share in the vessel he commanded.639 In 1774 Martin attempted to sell a 
share in a boat commanded by Robert Martin (no relation). He wrote to Robert that 
he had pressed his ‘friend and neighbour’, Mr Willcocks, to buy but the asking price 
set by the share’s owner, Mr Johnson, was too high.640 Samuel advised Captain 
Robert that it was 
! a great deal more that be gave by Martin Byan for his share, which is certainly an 
! imposition upon all your friends who become owners... Unless Johnson will abate 
! the price all your friends think it will be for your advantage to quit command of her 
! and except [sic] a new ship which they shall buy or build for you. In that case I shall 
! quit my share in her and hope that you will not let me be the loser by it.641 
Samuel signed off with the uncharacteristically obsequious ‘I am with true esteem 
your faithful friend’, underlining the coincidence of fealty, money and personal 
influence that typified this type of transaction. Martin’s emphasis on his ‘friendship’ 
with Captain Robert must be seen as a further attempt to localise captains within 
bonds of trust, none too subtly dovetailing obligations of friendship with mutual 
interest.  
! Gifts could also be deployed to sure-up weak ties. Simon Taylor, a plantation 
manager and lawyer in Jamaica, wrote to his factor in London that he was going to 
‘make an agreement with all the Captains that get sugar from me to carry home 
turtles as they are always agreeable presents to make your friends’.642 Such non-
monetary forms might engender reciprocities that eased more informal and intimate 
relationships, precisely because they pertained to connotations of honour and 
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hospitality that were distinct from the contractual market.643 Rebecca Vaughan, 
William and Benjamin’s sister, wrote to her nephew 
! I think you would have been much delighted to have accompanied your !cousins the 
! other day on their visit to Captain Wilson. They were employed !all day in looking 
! over the curiosities brought from Pellew, China & the East Indies. He has given your 
! cousins two roots which resemble the head of a ram... he has also given them some 
! very curious shells from thence & a tea cup & saucer of very handsome transparent 
! China [and] Jonathan a very nice bamboo cane. We met him at Uncle William 
! [Manning’s countinghouse] the other day...644 
Wilson certainly succeeded in playing the role of family friend to the wearyingly 
didactic Vaughans. 
! Befriending captains was one mechanism merchants and planters used to 
keep their valuable cargos safe. Tying captains to shared cultural or personal values 
lessened anxiety for consignees of goods. Here, regarding a captain as a steward 
with a sense of duty grounded in piety, affection for one’s self and kin, or some other 
noble motive functioned as a palliative. Quasi-economic alliances between 
merchants and captains were, of course, precisely the kind of relationships Adam 
Smith questioned, though it is worth noting that they occurred in markets ostensibly 
outside of monopoly interference and close to the Vaughans. However, his 
propensity to govern through the Committee was one of the reasons that such 
friendships became less economically important. Like with the wharfingers on the 
Legal Quays, steady bureaucratic procedures rendered personal calibrations of 
trust between captain and merchants increasingly redundant, replacing their gifting 
and friendship with contracts that could define duties and could be circulated and 
compared. Increasingly elite merchants like Vaughan became attached to 
impersonal institutions like the Committee, insurance companies and Admiralty who 
could safeguard and monitor goods, as opposed to friends.    
! The West India Committee took every opportunity to regulate these 
processes in London more formally. For instance, official arrangements for the 
employment and regulation of lumpers were distributed to captains in 1789, making 
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plain the conditions on which both would be judged.645 Freight rates were fixed in 
1776, the war forcing ‘[ship]owners in the West India trade’ into ‘arming their ships, 
and of putting on board additional numbers of men at advanced wages, with high 
prices of all articles of outfit, and greatly increased Premiums of insurance’.646 Once 
confirmed, freight rates were printed and distributed at the Jamaica Tavern and 
Lloyd’s, the hubs of Caribbean shipping intelligence.647 
! This chimes with Simon Ville’s argument that ships’ captains were becoming 
increasingly deskilled by cartographic, oceanographic and dock technologies, 
opening the door for specialist shipowners like Henley & Sons to emerge at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century.648 The embodied or local skills used by 
captains were supplanted by mobile and reproducible information, meaning London-
owners could simply send boats to wherever they were likely to pick up the best 
freights. The West India Committee’s evolving relationships with the Admiralty and 
insurance industry is illuminating in suggesting why the City continued be a crucial 
site in this network. British Naval involvement in the Caribbean and maritime 
insurance both have histories that stretch back to the mid seventeenth century. 
However, a shift is identifiable between the 1740s and the Napoleonic era, when 
these agents appear to act in concert with merchant-owners to co-ordinate shipping 
in a far more authoritarian manner and, in the process, redefined captaincy. 
! War had a huge impact on the safety of merchant shipping as European 
powers licensed privateers to disrupt the enemy, causing premiums for shipping 
insurance to rise drastically. Henry Lascelles’ letterbooks describe premiums going 
from 3 guineas percent on Caribbean routes to 30 guineas in the early years of the 
War of Jenkins’ Ear when it was felt that French privateers held the advantage in the 
Channel. By 1744, Lascelles was actively soliciting the Admiralty to arrange 
convoys ‘as there were in Queen Ann’s war’.649 Convoys through the Channel 
slashed the rates to 5 guineas percent but necessitated setting departure times to 
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coincide with the Navy’s and, thereby, synchronised West India shipping to an 
unprecedented degree.650 
! The cycle of militarisation, spikes in premiums and merchant petitions to the 
Admiralty repeated itself at the outset of the Seven Years War, though much quicker 
as neither the merchants nor admiralty were caught dawdling. By the time of the 
American Revolution the arrangements previously made by individual merchants 
with the Admiralty had been taken on by the West India Merchants Committee, who 
formed a sub-committee to treat with Admiralty over convoys in August 1776 and 
explicitly acknowledged that convoys kept premiums low.651 Keen to keep on good 
terms with the Navy, the Committee arranged a celebratory meal when Admiral 
Keppel returned with the West Indies convoy in 1779, indicating that new 
friendships were blossoming.652 The Committee were also active in admonishing 
officers who deserted convoys. Captain Douglas’ HMS Squirral [sic] lost the 1776-7 
convoy before reaching British waters, causing the London Merchants and their 
counterparts in Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow to arrange interviews with their 
Captains.653 The Committee presented their evidence to the Admiralty, and they 
also threatened to cover the costs incurred by any further West Indian captains 
giving their testimony at the Court Martial, if necessary. Captains were being 
mobilised en masse in response to Naval captains’ mistakes, the one establishment 
watching the other whilst in convoy. 
! The Admiralty found dealing with Lloyd’s underwriters convenient too. 
Instruments like Lloyd’s Register were an invaluable source of information on the 
captains and condition of ships sailing from London. It was available to underwriters 
from at least 1764 and represented a sophisticated bureaucracy that buttressed the 
private-underwriters’ knowledge.654 The Admiralty traded shipping information with 
the Lloyd’s Masters from 1794, and individual officers frequently shared news about 
naval actions with the underwriters. The 1798 Convoy Act, making it illegal to 
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conduct overseas voyages without an Admiralty convoy, was drafted with the 
underwriters’ approbation and was subsequently administered via Lloyd’s. 
Underwriters had themselves been prepared to discipline Captains and in 1794 
resolved to ‘bring to immediate justice, any captains of a merchant vessel who have 
been or may hereafter be represented to them as having wilfully quitted their 
convoy’.655 
! The trend was for bureaucracies to draw together, appropriate previously 
personal trusts into ledgers and monitor agents from centres of calculation rather 
than in person. The West India Committee were a crucial node in this movement, 
joining the Quays with other centres of calculation. “Commerce” and the means 
through which it was administered, represented and globally distributed was 
shifting. The move away from contracts policed by individual firms, presumably in 
person, and towards collectively brokered and reproducible documentation forms a 
crucial backdrop to understand Vaughan’s strategy regarding the Docks in the 
1790s, which we turn to next. 
Section 4: The Political Economy of Designers, 1793-1800!     
1793 witnessed a similar dispute over wharfingers’ fees to that of 1780. This 
precipitated the campaign that finally led to the establishment of the Docks, 
although it grew into a much larger proposition under the aegis of William Vaughan. 
Following the pattern that had almost proved successful three decades earlier, 
Vaughan’s campaign started by garnering support from the merchant community at 
public meetings, before forming a general committee to represent their cause. He 
also took the unprecedented step of publishing a number of pamphlets detailing the 
confines of the Legal Quays. Initially he did not presuppose wet docks were the only  
solution to the problem, but rather preferred that the Customs buy the existing Legal 
Quays and run them in the national interest.656 Vaughan and his nascent Dock 
Company examined several schemes in 1794-5, before taking the issue to 
Parliament and causing an Inquiry into the present and future port. The lengthy 
Report the Committee delivered to Parliament in May 1796 is a key document in the 
history of the Thames, recording the opinions of spokesmen from the Corporation of 
London, guilds, Customs, insurance, Trinity House and merchants interested in the 
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Quays. It was also shaped the outcome of the Dock campaign by creating a highly 
contentious node in a series of political networks.
! The Report took the standard form for Parliamentary Inquiries of the period, 
comprising a digest written by the Commissioners that referred back to extensive 
appendices of testimony and supporting information. The Thames economy that 
had grown up since the Fire was such that alterations to one tradition would cause 
turbulence across occupational groups that were caught up in an intractable mesh 
of overlapping regulations, transport technologies, business networks and 
architectural traditions. Consequently, various configurations of infrastructure and 
administrative regulations were bandied around between 1794 and the second 
Parliamentary Inquiry of 1798. Representational forms borrowed from architecture 
and cartography were used to support the ideas proffered to the Parliamentary 
Inquiry and should be seen as ‘instructions for the construction of sensory content’ 
that was not experienced but had to be built in the heads of the Commissioners, 
though they were quickly reproduced for public perusal too.657 Despite adopting a 
common representational strategy that did speak to the propertied classes, as a list 
of proposals and compilation of information, it is very difficult to see in the 1796 
Report a coherent expression of the goals of a dominant faction that Linebaugh 
suggests. He cites them frequently to explain how ‘in reaction to plunderage from 
moored ships, a combination of merchants, engineers and magistrates produced a 
two pronged counter attack: a river police was created and the enclosure movement 
was extended in the creation of London wet docks.’658 Rather, looking at the 
competing technologies outlined in the Reports, this section argues various and 
often conflicting political economies were at play, shaped in no small part by their 
proponents’ immediate interest. This was a polemical and speculative form of 
writing, quite unlike the two outlined previously, in the freedom it gave the delegates 
to the Inquiry to think beyond existing commercial frameworks and criticise them. 
Furthermore, the cacophony of ideas was profoundly unsettling and the Reports 
document a stalemate not a solution. In conclusion it is suggested that the Reports’ 
most concrete outcome was to realign the competing parties by forcing the West 
India Merchants into buying out the opposition through a compensation scheme.
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! Edward Ogle’s submission, illustrated in Figure 5.2, suggested increasing 
the quayside apron and extending the Quays to the Southwark side of the river.659 
He thought dredging the river, greater emphasis on policing Thames traffic, 
provision of moorings and allotment of goods to wharfs by country of origin would 
ease congestion and order the port. Only a minimal extension of the Quays was 
proposed, with Ogle leaving their management firmly in the hands of the Customs 
and wharfingers. This programme of works affected few City interests and required 
relatively little investment in new warehousing or infrastructure to consolidate and 
slightly extend the existing Quays. As secretary of the wharfingers’ combination and 
central to galvanising opposition to any alterations, this conservatism was 
unsurprising.  
Figure. 5.2: Mr Ogle’s Plan. Source: ‘Report From The Committee Appointed To 
enquire into the best Mode of providing sufficient Accommodation for the increased 
Trade and Shipping of the Port of London’ (1796).
! The City produced two plans initially in response to the outcry amongst the 
Liveries and those Thames-side traders likely to be dispossessed by the docks. The 
first suggested a major extension of the warehouses around the Thames, with the 
second involving a new harbour at the Isle of Dogs. By 1796, these had fused into 
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one plan. Figure 5.3 shows the first component to have been a modernising 
enterprise of Wren-like proportions, where the space between the Thames and 
Thames Street would be demolished and replaced with vast classical warehouses 
built around two lighter-docks. A dock for 400 sea-going vessels at the Isle of Dogs 
would act as a harbour, with no provision for warehousing. This scheme proposed to 
keep overseas trade in the City, thereby protecting the porters and lightermen 
attached to the Liveries, although it also required the wharfingers to be 
dispossessed and the Quays turned over to the Customs and Corporation. 
! George Dance refined the plan still further, suggesting the demolition of 
London Bridge and its replacement with two drawbridges that would have allowed 
overseas shipping right into Westminster. Dance, more than any other contributor, 
saw London in terms of traffic flows and monuments, and was clearly trying to find 
an architectural language for commercial grandure in the City.660 The Corporation 
was equally keen to hold onto its monopoly and willing to invest if necessary, as 
table 5.1 showing the comparative costs of the schemes, illustrates.
Table 5.1: The comparative cost of the first round of Dock schemes
Estimated Cost (£)
Ogle’s Plan for deepening the River, and improving and 
extending the Legal Quays
565,000
Vaughan’s Plan for Docks and a canal 993,132
The City plan for docks, a canal and extending the 
Legal Quays
1,109,352
Wyatt’s plan for docks with floating platforms 880,000
Wilkinson and Revely’s plan for a channel and docks none provided
Source: ‘Report From The Committee Appointed To enquire into the best Mode of 
providing sufficient Accommodation for the increased Trade and Shipping of the 
Port of London’, p. 18.!
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Figure 5.3: The City’s plans for warehouses and lighter docks at the Legal Quays. 
Source: ‘Report From The Committee Appointed To enquire into the best Mode of 
providing sufficient Accommodation for the increased Trade and Shipping of the 
Port of London’ (1796).
! The architect, building merchant and miller, Samuel Wyatt forwarded several 
plans, advocating the removal of the legal-sufferance distinction. He reasoned that 
being left ‘at liberty’ would cause proprietors to improve wharf facilities while 
simultaneously encouraging their extension along the Thames both east and into 
Westminster.661 Wyatt finessed his argument, envisaging a holding dock at the Isle 
of Dogs containing floating platforms equipped with scales, shown in figure 5.4, 
which could be moored next to ships, and allow the Customs officers to weigh and 
rate goods as they were passed onto City-bound lighters, bringing the quayside to 
the goods rather the vice versa.662 The Customs objected that the supervision of its 
officers would be impossible if the market were simply left to provide 
accommodation and the Customs forced to follow. The previous year Wyatt had 
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petitioned the Excise to convert his burnt-out Albion flour mill into a bonded coffee 
warehouse, so his was a far from disinterested voice.663 Nevertheless, he 
recognised that Customs regulation was an essentially mobile practice and need 
not be stationed in the City, thereby deregulating the riverside warehousing and 
transport markets.  
Figure 5.4: Samuel Wyatt’s floating Legal Quays. Source: ‘Report From The 
Committee Appointed To enquire into the best Mode of providing sufficient 
Accommodation for the increased Trade and Shipping of the Port of London’ (1796).
! John Wilkinson, a fabulously wealthy and eccentric Shropshire iron-founder, 
and the brother-in-law of Joseph Priestley, suggested turning London into an 
industrial powerhouse.664 As figure 5.5 shows, he planned to cut a channel through 
the Isle of Dogs and dam the river to form a harbour at Greenwich, arguing that the 
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improved flow of the Thames would be an excellent source of power for mills on the 
Thames, probably calling to mind his own lead-works at Rotherhithe. Ecologically 
brutal, the plan was put to the 1796 Committee by John Revely who argued that it 
would diminish mercantile dependence on lighters, which he saw as one of the 
many hidden costs of the port that depressed trade. He explicitly argued against the 
use of monopolies to protect occupations.665 As these plans were comparatively 
sensitive to the existing riverside architecture, merely changing the course of traffic, 
much like a road by-pass, Revely thought free trade would bring about gradual 
shifts to the socio-economic constituencies using the Thames.
Figure 5.5: John Wilkson and John Revely’s ‘Channel’. Source: ‘Report From The 
Committee Appointed To enquire into the best Mode of providing sufficient 
Accommodation for the increased Trade and Shipping of the Port of London’ (1796).
! Tropes outlined in the first two sections, such as tracking goods and the 
geographical limits of commercial regulation were in play in all the proposals put to 
the 1796 Inquiry. However, what we also see in these designs, and this goes back 
to the points made in the introduction to this dissertation, is the interweaving of 
political economies with technologies. More pointedly, different social networks or 
interests were generating markedly different solutions to the same problem. 
Mercantilist elites were not so much excluding newcomers as responding to 
concepts generated elsewhere and that were clearly circulating more broadly than 
the merchants who had usually complained to government about the Quays. 
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William Vaughan was no exception to this, however, his first hand knowledge of 
commerce was clearly an advantage when it came to establishing his ideas.    
! Vaughan adopted the role of spokesman for the merchants early on, 
advancing a scheme that sat neatly between the inventive Wyatt and Wilkinson, on 
the one hand, and the traditional Ogle and Dance, on the other. His plans, illustrated 
in figure 5.6, linked wet docks with warehousing at Wapping to the Thames via a 
canal at Blackwall that circumvented the Isle of Dogs. Relatively near to the City, it 
would not disrupt the merchant community located around the Customs House, nor 
create too much extra expense in moving goods into more centrally located 
warehouses. The surveyor assured Vaughan that the land was sparsely populated 
by ‘small indifferent’ housing on short leases, so the dock could effect a crafty piece 
of social engineering in an area long known for its dubious inhabitants. In fact, the 
Customs saw this as a distinct advantage too.666 Rather than directly challenge the 
wharfingers by compelling shipping to use the alternative docks, it was supposed 
that secure, purpose-built warehouses and the increase in shipping productivity 
would attract enough high-value overseas custom to be viable, while exposing the 
wharfingers to market forces. Adopting ‘the principles of free Trade’ would allow 
‘commerce to extend its accommodation in proportion to its regular wants’ rather 
than ‘derange’ the port with ‘a great and sudden revolution’.667  
Figure 5.6: William Vaughan’s plan Source: Source: ‘Report From The Committee 
Appointed To enquire into the best Mode of providing sufficient Accommodation for 
the increased Trade and Shipping of the Port of London’ (1796).
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! The adjudicating Commission of 1796 knew they were distinguishing 
between ‘the cavils and objections of rival schemers’, which revealed little 
consensus as to how best to remedy the problems of the port and no great certainty  
that enclosed docks with warehousing were necessarily desirable.668 Well stated 
arguments were not enough to force the issue and much politicking went on behind 
the scenes that must be further taken into account. We know Vaughan mounted a 
campaign to lay the groundwork for his ideas, a campaign that was peculiarly 
rigorous in folding together architectural and commercial networks. His pamphlets 
were heavy with shipping statistics culled from Customs House showing the decline 
of London trade relative to the outports.669 This publicly confirmed what consignees 
to London like Samuel Martin had hinted at for some time, namely that the port was 
badly run and uncompetitive. Moreover, his contacts in Customs House were clearly  
well placed. Writing to the engineer of Liverpool and Hull’s docks, John Rennie, 
Vaughan noted that he had given some ‘general objects and outlines’ to the 
Customs Commissioners responsible for assessing the initial plans.670 
Subsequently, the Customs stated ‘the self-evident truth that the augmentation of 
trade...must increase public revenue’ underscoring that the Corporation’s and other 
interests were secondary to ‘the merchant in the Port of London for the despatch of 
his business and the security of his property’.671 Undertaking considerable research 
into the composition of shipping entering London, the goods carried upon different 
vessels and their likely draught, Vaughan became something of an expert on 
maritime architecture. Indeed, at the outset of the campaign he supervised a survey  
of the Thames, noting the navigable dimensions at high and low tides. Vaughan 
cemented his position by staying in touch with engineers like Rennie, who gave 
evidence to the Commission too, and collecting information from merchants in rival 
ports like Liverpool and from their designers in London. Materialism, statistics and 
economic projections were crucial in giving his case bite and establishing himself 
within a network of expertise. 
! In terms of resources, Vaughan’s only real rival was the Corporation of 
London. As Conservators of the Thames and nominal custodians of the licensed 
transport workers attached to the Quays it considered itself as rightfully having a 
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voice in any changes made to location of the Quays. As well as being able to call on 
the legal machinery intrinsic to local government, they had George Dance 
campaigning for them in the elevated circles he moved in.672 The Corporation was 
also keen to establish its case with the politicians, sending representatives to Pitt 
the Younger, who thought its claims were just.673 
! Parliament concluded that the Legal Quays necessarily needed relief and a 
second round of plans be submitted.674 Here Vaughan’s success was confirmed, 
though probably not as he intended, as his ideas were pirated by West India 
Merchants linked to the Corporation who were determined to avoid the stalemate 
the 1796 Report detailed. Indeed, the most immediate effect of the Report was to 
ensure that the fractious and ambiguous process was not repeated. During a lull in 
the ongoing rearguard against Wilberforce’s Abolitionists, the West India Committee 
sent Robert Sewell, a planter and Jamaica’s attorney-general and London agent, to 
present Vaughan’s London Dock Company to the Commons in February 1797.675 
However, by April 1797 the West India Planters and Merchants Committee had 
become apprehensive of further struggles with the Corporation. The West India 
Committee reneged on Vaughan and threw its support behind a competing proposal 
piloted by Robert Sewell, the planters Robert Milligan and William Chisholm and the 
engineer Ralph Walker.676 November saw the West India Committee call a public 
meeting to state that
Your Committee, having obtained Communication at different times with the several 
parties promoting and opposing the said bill, and perceiving that each of the 
interested views in some degree [are] irreconcilable with the views of the other, in 
order therefore to conciliate ... these jarring interests or at all events, to contract the 
sphere and often violence of the subsisting opposition, your committee formed the 
resolution of offering some other plan.677
The chief difference between what would become the West India Company Docks 
and Vaughan’s London Docks was the former’s narrow sectional basis, which was 
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aimed at circumventing the City’s opposition. Their proposal involved building a 
dock at the Isle of Dogs with a canal that would allow Thames traffic to by-pass this 
great loop in the River. The Corporation of London would manage the canal, using 
the profits to compensate any trade lost by Londoners as a result, meaning £50,000 
of the proposed half-million pounds foundational capital was promised to 
Corporation investors. As chapter three described, this compensation scheme was 
successful in buying out the claims of licensees and well capitalised warehousemen 
attached to the Quays, as well as lining the pockets of the Treasury staff who 
administered the fund and charged 2.5% commission on all transaction. 
! The West India Committee did ‘not think it necessary to provide for taking 
out of the river the Whole Trade of the Port... but Part Only’, thereby deflecting 
much of the previous criticism aimed at Vaughan and causing several prominent 
West India merchants to withdraw their investments from the London Docks.678 
Sewell and his West India associates successfully piggybacked the London Dock 
Company’s political gains while at the same time cosseting the Corporation. Two 
dock companies were chartered in 1799 and 1800. One of these was dominated by 
the West India Merchants and the City. The other, led by Vaughan, Beeston Long 
and the Russia Company’s Edward Forster, was composed of a broader cross 
section of City interests, boasting the patronage of those associated with the 
chartered insurance and trading companies. Only 55 investors defected wholesale 
to the West India from the London Dock scheme, though these included West 
Indian merchants like George Hibbert, Robert Milligan and others who would lead 
the West India Dock Company as Directors and Chairmen in its early years.679 Data 
from Nick Draper’s analysis of early dock investors illustrated in Table 5.2 shows 
that West India Merchants backed the breakaway plan, investing more money in it, 
and forming a comparatively large proportion of total investors in the West India 
Docks.680 The high average subscription by West Indians in the West India Docks 
further cemented their hold over the Company where rights to vote for directors 
were limited to those with shares worth £2,000 or more. Consequently, only the 
directorial posts set aside for the Corporation were occupied by non-West India 
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Planters and Merchants, though Alderman Hibbert contrived to have himself elected 
into a Corporation seat.681 
Table 5.2: West Indian Merchant investment in the rival Dock schemes
Capital 
Required
Number of 
Investors
Mean 
Subscriptio
n
Number of 
West 
Indian 
Investors
Total West 
Indian 
Capital
Mean West 
Indian 
Subscriptio
n
West India 
Dock Company
£500,000 388 £1,288 70 £145,000 £2,101
London Dock 
Company
£800,000 588 £1,360 53 £66,000 £1,245
Source: Nick Draper, personal communication.
! The alacrity with which the West India Committee dominated the West India 
Docks highlights the peculiarities of the sugar market. From 1793, the Dock 
campaign was carried on by merchants exponentially increasing the traffic of sugar 
on the Thames, campaigning to adjust taxes in favour of re-exports and twice 
having to treat with Customs to allow them sufferance because massive cargos 
simply could not be landed. Strict enforcement of the Navigation Acts meant that 
provisions and shipping previously provided by colonists in the north Atlantic were 
no longer accessible and were inflating prices in the metropolis.682 Moreover, the St 
Domingue Revolution of 1791 prompted the Planters and Merchants meeting to 
discuss the ‘the terrible consequences of the revolt spreading to Jamaica’ in 
November 1791.683 British Planters hurried to exploit the European demand for 
sugar, culminating in 47,000 slaves being disembarked in the British islands in 
1793, accounting for over 80% of all slaves taken to the region. Despite the 
disastrous British invasion of Haiti in 1794, the occupation of Dutch Guiana and 
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Trinidad saw plantation acreage rise.684 As early as February 1792, the Planters and 
Merchants Committee had divulged to Pitt that the islands were expected to 
produce 36,000 more hogsheads of sugar than usual.685 Projections of this kind 
were unprecedented but foreshadowed the entire Docks project as sugar prices 
jumped by 50% and the re-export market, illustrated in Table 5.3, ballooned. To put 
the volumes in contexts, London’s sugar imports in the 1790s were twice, if not 
three times, as great as the sugar and tobacco that had brought the Atlantic 
merchants together in 1746. By 1799, overproduction had glutted European 
markets, leaving the Thames utterly clogged and the Committee in negotiations with 
Pitt to find a vent. Again, far from being reactive, elites were hungry for knowledge 
being produced elsewhere.
Table 5.3: British imports and re-exports of sugar, 1790-1801
Yearly average imports of 
sugar (million cwt.)
Re-exports of sugar 
(million cwt.)
1790-2 1.8 1790 0.2
1793/6 2.2 1795 0.9
1798/1801 3.3 1800 1.6
1802 4.3 1802 2.0
Source: Francois Crouzet, ‘America and the Crisis of the British Imperial Economy, 
1803-1807’, McCusker & Morgan eds., The Early Modern Atlantic Economy, p. 280.
! Engrossing European sugar supply not only generated massive personal 
wealth for the London merchants but created vast revenues for the government, 
which Hibbert thought deserved recognition. As a fabulously wealthy Jamaican 
planter-merchant, vocal anti-abolitionist, botanist and West India Committee-man, 
Hibbert was placed to convey this message to those with an interest in the 
Caribbean. His ad hominem politics seem to typify the kind of mercantilist backbiting 
Benjamin Vaughan despaired of and are prevalent in an observation made to Simon 
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Taylor regarding Treasury Secretary Vansittart’s supposed preoccupation with the 
East Indies:
Vansittart seems to turn his eyes eastwards where some of his family made 
fortunes and I am convinced in this corrupt age, the great patronage which our 
extensive possessions in India give, affording provision for younger sons and 
Bastards of Noblemen and Members of the House of Commons greatly 
influences in high departments as to the interests of Empire & occasion those 
deviations from justice and sound policy which we West Indians (having no 
such sinecure markets open) have had so frequently to lament.686
Rather than beat the monopolies, as Vaughan hoped to do, Hibbert appeared far 
more interested in winning ‘sinecure markets’ for his own.
! This section has elaborated the diversity of ‘elite’ opinion surrounding the 
Docks campaign and the difficulty involved in ascribing to Londoners a dominant or 
even coherent ideology before the Docks were built beyond suggesting the 
wharfingers’ cartel should be broken up. As with the previous merchant campaigns, 
the number of responses the Dock campaign attracted illustrates that the wealthy 
bourgeoisie interested in the port had very different ideas about how the market 
should function. Whether commerce was to be regulated by a fleet of Customs 
officers on floating Quays, Corporation run warehouses or merchant-administered 
Docks each had profound political economic resonances. The West India 
Committee’s appropriation of the political gains made by Vaughan’s Company, and 
some of his shareholders, also speaks of fractures in their ideologies. 
Fundamentally, their takeover suggests that Vaughan’s economic and technical 
ideas were fluid, at least in the paperbound and unusually public ‘research and 
development’ phase the Docks underwent. If the Docks were not intrinsically 
instruments capable of levelling the mercantilist playing field, when did they take 
hold and become irreversible parts of the commercial landscape?            
Section 5: When the Docks Became Objects
The engineering and architectural history of the West India Docks on the Isle of 
Dogs has been brilliantly recounted by the Survey of London and does not need 
repeating, other than to say that they were opened for business only three years 
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after receiving Parliamentary assent, in 1802.687 This section examines the vexed 
relationship between buildings and power using these well-documented and much 
contested structures in order to problematise the point at which a building becomes 
an instrument of social differentiation and control. As we have seen, previous 
scholarship on the Docks has been dominated by questions of working-class labour, 
discipline and criminality, and how the capacity of the new spaces to reproduce or 
enforce qualities associated with “bourgeois” political economy. Paying greater 
attention to the day-to-day management of the Docks, this section attempts a 
corrective to such top-down analyses by imbuing them with some agency in shaping 
commercial knowledge and the calculative agency of their mercantilist managers. 
Indeed, their architecture is not as important as their place in various administrative 
networks that not only concentrated disciplinary power on stevedores and lumpers 
but bundled together concerns over shipping, fiscal infrastructure and the flow of 
goods. They were also outside of the City in two senses, geographically and in 
terms of the networks of regulation that had grown up around the Legal Quays. As 
such, they created two forms of document which reflected back on the City that this 
section focuses on: the administrative paper-trail that recorded commercial 
information and the shares used to identify their owners. These closely related 
documents made the Dock managers powerful mediators in their own right, who 
discovered that the new spaces had dynamics that undermined the merchants’ 
assumptions about their ability to regiment labour. Further, the existence of shares 
meant that control over the quayside became a relatively easily accessible 
commodity, which, although designed to break the wharfingers’ monopoly, also had 
the potential to dilute the coherence of mercantilist institutions, like the West India 
Committee, which were based on occupational solidarity, geopolitical interests, 
dining and kinship. Consequently, it is argued that like the other combinations of 
paper-work and spaces investigated in the chapter, the Docks also produced a 
distinctive knowledge that shifted mercantilist sensibilities.             
! The other characters involved in the Docks alongside Vaughan are well 
known to historians of crime and the law. Leon Radzinowicz gave Colquhoun and 
Bentham leading roles in his narrative of Enlightenment principles overcoming 
medieval legal prejudice.688 Linebaugh turned that liberal narrative on its head, 
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claiming legal rationalisation to be the result of bourgeois socio-economic forces 
reforming property relations to suit their own ends. He also spotted that Vaughan, 
Colquhoun and Bentham were friendly, ergo the Docks and the Thames Police 
should be seen as a draconian effort by an elite mercantile group to force ‘lumpers’ 
onto wages. Explicitly writing to counter Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1977), 
Linebaugh claims that lives and livelihoods were materially shaped by the 
disciplinary measures enacted on the Thames.689 Adherence to the fiscal-military-
state thesis led Ashworth to adopt a middle ground between Linebaugh and 
Foucault, with his suggestion that utilitarian principles were embedded in the 
practices of the Excise, and it is their unfolding across different social and economic 
domains, he argues, that explains the Docks. He concludes they were architectural 
expressions of Walpole’s political oeconomy, ‘enclosed’ spaces where minimal 
taxation or pilfering occurred, where labour was productive, and an instrument of 
‘modern’ industrial capitalism.690   
! Manifestations of either Enlightened discourses, Treasury protocol or 
bourgeois political economy are rather hard to pinpoint in the Docks’ design 
process. In 1799 William Vaughan’s sister-in-law received a letter expressing one 
middling Londoner’s incredulity at the schemes then in Parliament: ‘There is talk of 
surprising alterations being projected for the City of London, such as heightening 
the three arches of London Bridge to a degree capable of admitting ships to sail 
under; & also of making a passage under the Thames (which I believe is called a 
Tunnel) for the purpose of a near communication between the counties of Kent & 
Essex. I can hardly promise myself the satisfaction of seeing these wonders 
realiz’d’.691 Sir John Soane remarked to the West India Dock Directors that, 
although ‘Practicality, Security, Economy and Dispatch’ had been the watchwords of 
their design-brief, the tendered warehouse designs were ‘uncommonly diffuse’ and 
seemed ‘more intended to dazzle and surprise than convey useful information’.692 
Helpfully, the West India Committee’s former antagonist, Edward Ogle, was acting 
as an intermediary in a dispute between them and the gangsmen on the Quays and 
would soon be found advising the West India Docks Directors on how best to 
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manage the premises and workforce in July 1800.693 Ogle’s conversion to the West 
Indian cause is probably explained by the fact he was now a West India Docks 
shareholder. Nevertheless, the warehouses were in hand soon after. 
Yet a year after the Docks first opened to vessels, new regulations ordered 
mariners out of premises immediately after landing, leaving all unloading to 
warehouse employees. Doubtless this further contributed to the erosion of captains’ 
agency in cementing shipping networks, outlined in the second section. Moreover, 
in 1803 the Warehousing Act removed the Customs drawbacks on re-exported 
goods marking a step towards international free trade. It caused the goods inside 
the Dock to significantly alter in their political economic character, becoming far 
more precious when smuggled into Britain than back out. The warehouses began 
looking in the wrong direction from the revenue’s point of view as the all-important 
Dock wall that could prevent goods being spirited away was not complete until 
1806. Perhaps it is this that caused the West India Docks to follow the precedent of 
the East India Company by arranging into regiments to guard the premises during 
the Napoleonic Wars.694 
Insofar as the completed Docks were buildings with a few easily monitored 
entrances, they were anticipated by the commercial vernacular described in chapter 
three, and this form was copied by the other dock companies. In the early days of 
the Docks the aim was to give the labourers as much work as possible by 
employing them as watchmen or labourers on building projects associated with the 
Docks. When the Company could not sustain full employment the increasingly 
sophisticated web of information was mobilised to the stevedores’ advantage: the 
Dock company would warn them of slack days in advance so that they might find 
occasional work elsewhere.695 However, as Gareth Steadman Jones has described, 
this system disintegrated when steam rendered shipping less seasonal and the 
Spitalfields silk industry collapsed in the late 1830s, causing the Dock companies to 
exploit the glut of cheap labour in the East End.696 Consequently dockyard contracts 
became more casual, eventually devolving into hourly contracts that left the 
stevedores underemployed and forced to wait outside the Dock gates. 
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Architecturally the Docks had not changed so much as the sequencing of goods 
and information that was well beyond the control of the London merchants.  
!  Like Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, Ashworth’s and Linebaugh’s 
explanations of the Docks assume that spaces are determined a priori, with 
architecture dictated by preconceived plans that simply need to be built. What is 
clear from this very brief catalogue of events in the early years of the West India 
Docks is that ‘things’ as simple as walls can lag behind ideas, that proclamations 
like the Warehousing Act drastically alter a building’s character, and that buildings 
can inadvertently alter social relationships, as with the captains. The utilitarianism 
described by Ashworth and Linebaugh appears short-lived from this perspective. 
This is merely to restate Latour’s contention that things act variously on people and, 
in spite of this, become illustrations of theoretical agendas rather than agents 
explored in their own right. Indeed, all of these instances might be seen as 
moments where the Docks acted on the imaginative and calculative capacities of 
elite Londoners by channelling relatively new information at them. What has 
received far less commentary is the fact that the Docks had accelerated a 
decoupling of commerce from the Legal Quays, where increasingly the East End 
dealt with the goods and the City handled the money. This relied on two types of 
document, accounts and shares, that were well known to the City community in 
facilitating commerce but drew the West India Committee and Docks into new 
relationships. 
! Merchants had, of course, devoted their entire careers to disciplining 
faraway people, enticing consignees on remote islands to send goods, honour 
debts and remain loyal to their firms. Mercantile families were kept together by 
industry, as Sarah Vaughan reminded her thirteen-year-old son,
! ...you will not surely let anyone of your age excel you in anything that is useful or 
! good. The Grandfather of this child dyed whilst his children were young, the eldest 
! son Samuel Dixon was taken by your Grand papa into the Counting house (when he 
! was young) where he behaved so well as to acquire my father’s esteem, he 
! supported his mother and a number of brothers and sisters by his industry, and his 
! good behaviour induced my father to take another brother, James... [into] his house, 
! & and to give them every insistence and encouragement in his power; Samuel is 
! now a rich man & has now had the pleasure of placing several of his brothers in 
! situations to provide for themselves, and of marrying his sisters advantageously. You 
! may see from this how much use a good young man may be, & I hope should you 
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! have the misfortune to lose your parents you would endeavour to qualify yourself to 
! serve your brothers and sisters, & and be a worthy and respectable man.697
Family certainly played its role; genetic capital was a perfect conduit for wealth, and 
kin frequently served to anchor long-distance trade by acting as agents in far flung 
colonies. However, as scholars of commercial writing have shown, maintaining the 
‘credit’ of a countinghouse overseas relied on letters specially adapted and policed 
to make reputations visible at a distance.698 Mercantile letters and the accounts 
Samuel Martin upbraided his factors over were terse, clearly written and designed 
to convey information concisely. Correspondence did not describe the market as 
much as embodied it, making the regularity, punctuality, diligence and performance 
of correspondents visible and objective. These commercial virtues were co-
produced in two senses: through a reciprocal correspondence between business 
associates and the supporting cast who transported the letter. Consequently, the 
West India Committee was frequently to be found badgering the Admiralty and post 
office about the frequency of Caribbean packet boats.699 Even at this level we see 
the Committee suturing itself to the centres of imperial power in a manner different 
to the East India Company, who tightly controlled their fleets, but not fundamentally 
dissimilar.  
! Writing was central to the work of the West India Committee too, though it 
took a more corporate form than in countinghouses. The printed material they 
distributed in the 1790s replicated the form of the minutes kept in the journal, often 
starting with a declarative ‘Resolved, that [etc.]’. The Committee sutured themselves 
onto other powerful bureaucracies where possible, using written agreements to co-
ordinate their membership and shape others. Compliance was not always 
guaranteed by contracts, as the prosecution of captains or the confrontation with the 
wharfingers show, but recourse to extraneous bodies like the Customs was a last 
resort. Indeed, contracts could at least highlight breaches of trust, acting as third 
parties, but it is in an information gap that the Committee’s problems with Quayside 
discipline needs to be located. 
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Lumpers and coopers operated outside the guilds or any trade association. 
They could not be corralled easily by the Committee or tied down to formal 
agreements, forcing the Merchants to monitor them physically. This was labour-
intensive and several very expensive policing initiatives appear in the Committee’s 
minutes in the 1790s. Further, the Merchants had also started to offer rewards for 
those who secured the conviction of plunderers and receivers, based on a scheme 
proposed by ‘Naylor & Sollory’ and supported by the Watermen and Customs.700 
Rewards were suspended in January 1797, as the legal costs of prosecutions were 
proving discouragingly expensive. In May, it was noted that their yearly bill for the 
‘prosecution of plunders’ amounted to £1,136 13s, half of which constituted 
‘disbursements’, legal fees and rewards.701 This was about five times the cost laid 
out in the 1770s.
! Colquhoun approached the West India Merchants with a scheme to regulate 
the lumpers during this crisis, just a few months after the West India Dock 
Company’s first public meeting. Colquhuon’s Treatise on Policing (1796) had 
advertised his interest in riparian crime, citing the complaints made by the West 
Indians during the 1795-6 Parliamentary Inquiry into the Docks.702 Colquhoun 
advocated licensing as a means of regulating the metropolitan carrying trades, 
dealers in small goods, pawnbrokers and publicans, who were all parties thought to 
handle stolen goods. This would ‘establish such a system of regulation, inspection 
and superintendence as will insure the public the benefit of good laws administered 
with activity, purity and discretion’, as opposed to a miscellany of competing statutes 
policed through ad hoc informants.703 Colquhoun hoped to extend this bureaucracy 
to the lumpers and coopers and, by June 1798, the West India Merchants were 
preparing to purchase Colquhoun’s ‘Establishment’ an office in Wapping that 
included a lock-house, Magistrates’ private rooms, a cashiers’ apartments, 
warehouses and housekeepers’ rooms, uniting the countinghouse with 
courtroom.704 
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A series of meetings, reports and recommendations chart the evolution of 
the Marine Police. The Merchants’ minutes dwelt primarily on the regulation of 
Lumpers. They were to be weekly split into gangs of ten, supervised by a foreman 
and monitored by two Police Constables, who would also attend the lighters 
transporting sugar to the Legal Quays.705 To prevent sugar disappearing from holds, 
lumpers were to be confined to the vessel they were appointed to unload each day; 
clothing capable of concealing sugar was forbidden; on quitting a ship they were to 
be searched by the constables and their wages were to be fixed at 3s 6d per day for 
lumpers and 5s for constables and foremen. The regulations repeated and refined 
those delivered to captains in 1789-90 by the Committee, the chief difference being 
that Colquhoun’s office administered a system of registration that ensured that 
dismissed lumpers would not find themselves in the service of other vessels: 
diligence had to be performed.706   
! The speed with which Colquhoun and the Merchants joined forces indicates 
the compatibility of their techniques. The novelty of the enterprise lay in the 
establishment of a centralised bureaucracy rather than the preventative policing 
strategy, which the Committee had long since been developing. By July, Colquhoun 
was acting as Magistrate, overseeing four clerks, a solicitor and 236 constables on 
lighters, with an additional ‘superintendent lumper’ and clerk administering the 
activities of 65 master lumpers and 1,000 registered lumpers.707 The system 
succeeded by fastening mobile labour to a fixed hub, using verifiable documentation 
and prefiguring how the Docks were envisaged. It evidently functioned fairly 
smoothly and once it got Parliamentary backing in 1802 the West India Committee 
awarded Colquhoun £500 worth of plate and ignored the scheme.
! The process of planting a bureaucratic colony in the East End before 
retreating was repeated with the Docks. This is not, however, to suggest the 
scheme had no impact on the City, as the administrative architecture that 
surrounded it was far more sustained. The Principal Storekeeper, Philip Simpson, 
played Colquhoun’s role at the Docks. His duties were officially defined as: to 
inspect all staff, receive reports, ensure the attendance of ships’ captains, keep 
keys to the ships’ hatches, shut the outer gates, keep a general cargo book with 
warehouse ‘debits and credits’ and expedite deliveries, for which ‘punctual and 
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constant attendance will be indispensibly necessary’.708 He stood at the apex of a 
pyramid of clerks, ‘Captains of Warehouses’, accountants and collectors of dues 
who recorded information about the goods and people which came through their 
warehouses. It was envisaged that these 20 salaried administrators would co-
ordinate around 240 day-labourers and 40 coopers.709 
All personnel were expected to solemnly ‘devote their time and attention to 
the faithful discharge of their duty’, but the work involved was not significantly 
different to that that had taken place on the Quays.710 What was new was the 
regularity with which paperwork could flow from the City to the Docks and back. A 
manuscript ‘sketch for the arrangement for business at the W.I. docks, 10th Aug., 
1802’ recorded the standardised dockets that were going to be used to represent 
the goods to both the Company Directors and Merchants in the City; these had the 
look of Customs bills.711 Additional certificates were devised to assess the progress 
of unloading vessels, for coopers’ reports on sea-born damages and for ordering 
samples of sugar. The West India Dock governors typically met at Hibbert’s 
countinghouse before they graduated to West India Dock House at 108 Fenchurch 
Street in 1801. The notion that City merchants would actually have to visit the Docks 
in person was anathema to them and slide-lid boxes to contain the samples were 
suggested. These would be conveyed to Fenchurch Street in covered wagons to a 
fixed timetable, where individual merchants could collect them. Warehouse books 
used to locate goods contained chess-like grid-references, “stack E, floor 2”, 
showing uniform spaces could produce more easily comparable data. Every effort 
seems to have been made to make the data generated by the Docks more regular, 
accurate and smaller; that is, better to manipulate within the calculative space of the 
countinghouse. Having enhanced the calculative agency of the City merchants, the 
Dock’s middle managers were in a position to challenge their assumptions by 
channelling the information generated by these fundamentally new environments 
back at the merchants, as hiring policy was tinkered with and drifted towards casual 
contracts and through-put incentives.712 Commercial data itself became an 
increasingly powerful and determining force in the Docks.
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Moreover, whilst the dream of malleable labour and defensible warehouses 
might seem the culmination of the West India Committee’s aspirations in London, it 
is important to remember the Docks’ constitution far from guaranteed this long-term. 
Both Hibbert and the London Docks’ Beeston Long were proud enough of their 
premises to have them form a backdrop to portraits they commissioned in the 
1810s, and they functioned similarly in William Vaughan’s autobiography-cum-
collected works, published in 1839. Squabbling between the merchants and the 
Corporation continued when the West India Docks’ charter was renewed in 1824-5. 
Yet the power of this foundational group of merchants may have been underpinned 
by a proprietary sense of ownership but there was nothing to prevent shares being 
purchased or inherited by rentier communities. The amalgamation of the East and 
West India Docks in 1837 might be seen as a moment when the Docks forced a 
new rationale on the active shareholders, geared toward consolidating the 
burgeoning Docklands rather than the old lobbies.713 The point is that although the 
wet dock form was new, it was not miraculously so. Further, it must be reckoned in 
terms of a relatively unprecedented recalibration of quayside information networks 
and patterns of ownership. Perhaps less dramatic or visible than the Docks’ impact 
on the East End, these new conjunctions of paperwork and profit took on a life of 
their own that eventually reframed the mercantile interest too, precisely because the 
buildings brought together fundamentally new geographical, technological and 
economic networks.    
!   
Conclusions
Histories of the Docks have tended to treat the sites as isolated units, which 
concentrated bourgeois values on labour. The argument presented here is that they 
can also be seen as exacerbating already extant divisions sustained by 
administrative processes. The Docks made the conditions under which Quayside 
services were performed more stable. The wharfingers and latterly the merchants 
who most successfully governed the Quays were generally the most adept at 
maintaining contracts and rendering breaches in them identifiable. Not only did this 
cause services to become standardised but forced other collectives to comply and 
expand. For instance, the West India Committee drew individual firms into a single 
unit to discipline their own trade in order to gain political and bureaucratic traction. 
Lloyd’s similarly saw individual underwriters join together to share information 
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between themselves and with others pursuing the same ends. The politics of overtly  
market-orientated institutions like the West India Committee or insurance offices 
and the Corporation or Admiralty were, of course, different, but the scribal and 
increasingly bureaucratic manner in which they conducted themselves was similar. 
Tax, war and the movement of goods frequently drew them together. The attempt to 
force Quayside labourers into the Docks and away from non-monetary 
remuneration under Colquhoun’s Police must be seen against the backdrop of the 
growing apparatus of compliance in the City.
! Evidently the weight put on information, prices, rules and regulation grew. If 
the mobility, scale and uses of information have relevance in light of the arguments 
made by North et al., it is to say that elites were privy to what seems to have been 
growing, global and increasingly sophisticated networks, churning out data that was 
institutionalised and impersonal. Further, the Docks show that elites had major 
problems bargaining with one another because of the broader networks their 
property inveigled them in not despite of it. The lumpers, gangsmen, lightermen, 
mariners, slaves and coopers who made legally secure property profitable were 
highly visible in sparking disagreements between propertied Londoners. Wars, and 
the radical redistribution of property that accompanied them, doubtless forced the 
issue. Local circumstances had global repercussions and illustrate the contingency 
of elite power.   
! As Ogborn and others have suggested, the form of commercial information 
is just as important as the content in connecting groups as well as distinguishing 
them. Knowledge about the port and overseas commerce was painstakingly 
accumulated through multiple channels, compared, weighed up and acted upon 
variously. The difference between the increasingly global connections, formed by 
those bureaucracies passing around information and writing contracts, and the local 
ones, formed by those facilitating the movement of sugar, was relative not absolute. 
Envisaging the Docks as giant filing cabinets is useful because it shows the work 
there was not of a different type to that undertaken in the City but on a different 
scale. Both goods and commercial information like freight charges were circulated 
in material forms. However, commercial information was reproducible given a pen 
and paper; it was also comparable, interpretable and easier to make calculations 
with. So, while the channels by which various City bureaucracies communicated 
were becoming more stable and formal, they were still far more flexible and 
responsive than the mute goods coopers and lumpers were faced with in the Docks. 
Indeed, the removal of their work from traditional sources of news, like the taverns 
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on Thames Street, and their reduced opportunity to fence pilfered goods can only 
have heightened the step change their work underwent in terms of calculative 
agency. By contrast, the Docks presented another form of investment for 
shareholders. Bourgeois Londoners were not exempt from the impact of the Docks 
because of their class but because they constructed their identities around far more 
liquid and fungible forms.   
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Conclusion to the Dissertation
This dissertation has examined the various ways in which historians have thought 
about Adam Smith and the economy he criticised. My suggestion has been that his 
ideas were put into practice by the Bowood Set. The Bowood Set not only read the 
Wealth of Nations but tried to use it to interpret the world around them and to apply 
its ideas to practical situations. By tracing the attempts of the Vaughans, Musgrave, 
Shelburne and Bentham to shift the ‘calculative agency’ of Londoners, the 
dissertation has drawn attention to many more unknown and unknowing 
accomplices of their set, both people and things. In some cases these other agents 
have been well described by previous historians, as in the case of commercial 
correspondence or polite consumers in the West End. Others have proved more 
surprising, such as the aging bodies of Customs officers and collaboration between 
Lloyds and naval officers in their attempt to “insitutionalise” the high seas. Still 
others have been frankly astonishing, not least the fact that the fire offices were so 
close-minded that they motivated a group of architects to ponder the best methods 
of fire-prevention.!
! Focusing on local circumstances does not mean disengaging with the 
question of modernisation; rather it means being more critical of master-narratives, 
such as the idea of Smithian markets. To be sure the networks investigated here all 
had aspects which faced markets in the sense Smith understood them, but their 
rationality was partly determined by the things that constituted them. Far from 
suggesting Smith’s markets were operative and always had been, the research 
shows that Vaughan and his associates could materially throw markets off course 
and set them on new paths in some cases. The Docks are symptomatic of this 
process in that they seemed to diminish the lumpers’ agency as petty thieves, 
undermine the West India Committee and add to the share-options monied 
Londoners had open to them. Death by shareholders was not what Vaughan 
envisaged when he waged war on the wharfingers and chartered companies, and 
this outcome goes to show how tricky instituting markets or shifting calculative 
agencies proved to be.        
! Chapter one explored this contention in more detail, by thinking through the 
proposition that the Enlightenment was intimately linked to consumption patterns. 
Although generally supportive of the idea that economic discourse could alter the 
attitudes of British men and women to the market, it suggested that distinctions had 
to be made between the act of consuming and the Enlightenment as a source of 
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written economic information about the effects of consumption. Narratives about the 
market might make certain commodities or certain modes of consumption attractive, 
but they were not the equivalent of consumption informed only by the material 
culture at hand. Rather, this chapter collapsed commercial information into one 
category in order to find evidence of rapid changes in the iron and silk industries in 
London using insurance records. Instead of change, the opposite was found to be 
true, with few alterations in consumption patterns evident over time but several 
different types of consumer, evolving in and through space. The revelation seemed 
to be not that some consumers were more ‘enlightened’ than others but that any 
potential Enlightenment was likely to be dependent on the places, buildings, stock 
and information at hand, and which existed in many configurations. A number of 
economic geographies that seemed fairly fixed emerged around different 
technologies such as the shop, the warehouse and the Thames. Each was activated 
by different stimuli, arrangements of spaces, forms of communication and 
temporalities that had qualities similar to the ‘machines’ described by Alex Preda,714 
and proto-network theorists Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. That is, assemblages 
‘easily matched with the type of society - not that machines are determining, but 
because they express those social forms capable of generating and using 
them.’715The conclusion I drew from this was not that linking the Enlightenment with 
everyday economic phenomena is unwarranted but that more careful case studies 
of the interaction between ideas or information and material culture are necessary.
! Chapter two sought to follow up on this proposition by positioning the 
merchant community in the City within the networks of information distinctive to 
overseas trade, starting with the Customs. Given the war waged by Musgrave on 
corruption, and his relationship with Shelburne, three questions seem pertinent 
here. First, how did Musgrave come to recognise that his staff were becoming more 
dysfunctional when few publicly discussed definitions of corrupt behaviour seemed 
to have had any purchase within the service? Moreover, following Mark Philp, this 
chapter considered how to restore the agency of officers and suggested that their 
“corrupt” use of office was itself fluid, not an immoral constant, but a function of 
shifting circumstances.716 Second, in what sense did the officers act as mediators 
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between the Treasury and City merchants? Thirdly, how did Musgrave turn the 
service inside-out and begin, but by no means entirely succeed, in persuading the 
Treasury to accept an essentially Smithian definition of corruption that deeply 
implicated them? Focusing on the problems surrounding age and pensions that 
coincided with Musgrave’s reforms, a prosopography of the Landwaiters on 
London’s Legal Quays showed that they were indeed increasingly unable to do their 
jobs. This situation offended London’s merchant, who were used to bribable but 
essentially reliable officers, causing them to begin petitioning the Customs for more 
regular management strategies. It also implied that at least some classes of officer 
could undermine faith in the Treasury because the Landwaiters represented the 
state on a practical level. Further, these officers provided the intellectual resources 
for Musgrave to imagine an alternative situation and to turn the tables on the 
Treasury, ushering in more stringent management techniques. His new measures 
succeeded and took on a recognisably modern form, not because they were 
intrinsically rational but because they were underpinned by Musgrave’s monumental 
administrative capabilities.717 An alternative political economy was established using 
things, in this case paperwork and wages, both responding to the instability on 
which corruption was based and both being redefined in the process. Contrary to 
the fiscal-military thesis, the Treasury was not the font of rational management 
strategies, but often something of hinderance in the case of the Customs.718
! Money and bureaucracy were a winning formula for Musgrave, but Chapter 
three aimed to show that this was not an intrinsically effective combination, by 
drawing attention to the failures of the fire insurance industry. Despite being lauded 
by Smith as a perfectly routine utility, insurance proved to be ineffective when it 
came to channelling investment into the built environment by alerting City 
merchants to the dangers of warehouse fires. As Robin Pearson has asked of the 
industry in this period, why were rational policyholders failing to be rational?719 
Reiterating points made in chapter one, it was important to emphasise that neither 
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the insurance nor the warehousing industry had a tradition of courting the kind of 
public debate that might problematise their business practices. Thus, relatively few 
extraneous ideas were added to either industry that might have shifted their 
calculative frameworks publicly and both relied on vernacular advice when 
architectural expertise was called for. As the case study of Richard Jupp showed, 
knowledge gained from the insurance industry was hard to generalise beyond the 
rather blunt idea of hazard. Surveying in the City was a great money spinner for him 
and his cronies but did not put him in contact with any particularly new building 
forms, with the exception, perhaps, of Albion Mill. If anything, Jupp sustained 
unimaginative building practices, though towards the end of his career he did 
contribute to the Architects’ Club and its attempt to raise awareness of inflammable 
architecture.  The insurance industry was not set-up to “supply” an improved 
architecture, nor was there much “demand” to do so. The insurance industry 
appears modern in its mathematical tendencies but it was, at root, simply a way of 
administering money. 
! Warehouses modulated the flow of goods and people through the City using 
a combination of architectural distinctions, remunerative strategies and identificatory  
procedures. These endowed the dangers to warehouses with a human quality not 
easily reconciled with the numerical forms generated by the insurance industry, 
though this quality was perfectly rational insofar as humanising risk was a means to 
prevent thefts. Ironically, the building considered as being bereft of cultural 
importance played an important role in tethering and limiting the commercial 
community in the City, giving it a face, and linking it to the Corporation who licensed 
the porters. Warehouses represent a fine example of how close attention to 
mundane things shifts how we understand economic networks and the regulatory 
regimes distributed throughout the City.    
! The final chapter explored the politics of Vaughan’s Dock campaign in the 
context of mercantilist traditions in the capital. Intimately linked to the warehousing 
sector, the Docks were a focal point for labour, goods, shipping, taxation and news. 
They were active agents in the politicisation of merchant life and, as such, a factor 
in the shifting mental and social make-up of mercantilist London. Groups like the 
West India Committee were not only institutions that aimed to maintain or enhance 
the commercial privileges of their members, but great conduits for knowledge about 
the empire, which influenced their objectives, and how and to whom they were 
represented. The Quays played a major part in conditioning and constituting that 
knowledge, and by channelling the flow of goods were a major influence on the 
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political economy of the City. Following Miles Ogborn’s methodology in Indian Ink,  
the chapter argued that mapping the circulation and production of writing about the 
port shows Quay-side work was evolving and increasingly integrating larger 
sections of the commercial community.720 Bureaucracies allied with other 
bureaucracies, serving to create a network of contracts that altered how the Quays 
were managed, replacing informal agreements with documents that could highlight 
infractions and define responsibilities more surely. Wars played a major role in 
drawing the merchant community into the process of government by causing 
commercial and military data to elide when tax hikes and convoys necessitated a 
greater coordination of resources. By the time of Vaughan’s Dock campaign many 
solutions to the problem of the port were tabled, resulting in a series of negotiations. 
These redrew the battle lines by seeing the consolidation of the Corporation of 
London and West India interest, a reconciliation that placated the transport and 
warehouse sector. Patrick Colquhoun added another branch to the bureaucratic 
web by enrolling the Thames’ stevedores. Far more data about the Thames and 
shipping were being passed around between important centres of power in London 
prior to the building of the Docks, which not only changed the character of labour 
but also changed elite sociabilities. Once built, the Docks consolidated these data 
and redistributed them again, first by reverting back to recruiting labour on short-
term contracts and second by channelling  information to shareholders.  Both 
processes contributed to the disintegration of the West India Interest. As with 
warehouses, these forms of writing anchored commercial sensibilities, the 
difference being that these ‘things’ were far more mobile and prone to become 
entangled with other forms of writing.  
! It is a moot point whether the Bowood Set made Londoners any more 
Smithian in their thinking. There is, however, plenty of evidence to suggest that they 
shifted the commercial community which became more bureaucratic and utilitarian 
in many respects, as centres of calculation joined together to administer money and 
things, as opposed to people. No doubt this also made greater levels of social 
stratification apparent, and the elites that sponsored and implemented these shifts 
had a happy knack of remaining part of a charmed circle held together by gift 
exchange and political capital, alongside merit. Musgrave’s appointment to the 
British Museum and the West India Committee’s award of plate to Colquhoun 
indicate that carefully graduated material and social rewards still made up the 
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economy. Certainly this chimes with the Gentlemanly Capitalism thesis put forward 
by Cain and Hopkins, though I think the rather more rigidly defined institutions they 
oversaw meant these were quite different gentlemen to those that had preceded 
them.721 Musgrave’s protégé Richard Frewin, died in 1820 a Commissioner of the 
Customs and life-long servant of government. Frewin was of very different stock and 
temperament to Thomas Pelham, the absentee Surveyor-General of the Customs 
between 1773 and 1805 who was appointed because his cousin, the Duke of 
Newcastle, found him a liability in the Commons. 
! Smith’s ideal was not realised, but it was hardly likely to be. The Wealth of 
Nations described a complex economy that had been thwarted by mercantilist 
intervention both at the level of legislation and at the level of day-to-day sociabilities 
around the market. Smith posited a counterfactual and well-functioning economy, 
built on an amalgamation of study, intuition, rhetorical convenience, political calculus 
and identification with gentlemanly social groups.722 To be sure scholars of the 
Cambridge School have been more specific in identifying sources he invoked, 
carefully interpreting his text through careful examination of his library and the 
prevalent ‘languages’ through which concepts were conventionalised in the 
eighteenth century.723 Understanding his ideas as the product of other texts, and as 
intelligible because of them, has been productive, but it rather downplays the social 
forces at play in the constitution of his work as an author and by his readers. It is 
certainly the case that recovering a richer context for Smith is not helped by the 
dearth of biographical material he left behind. Nevertheless, outside his contribution 
to economic discourse, the uses of his ideas have been dealt with relatively crudely, 
insofar as the assumption has been that his printed texts became concrete 
weapons in the hands of the rich. Peter Linebaugh sees Smith’s political economy 
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as the ideology of the bourgeoisie, “reified” by projects like the Docks.724 Foucault 
similarly saw men like Bentham “instrumentalising” the economics of the 
enlightenment through projects like the panopticon, that not only reshaped 
productive forces but created docile individuals incapable of resisting the logic of 
capitalism.725 William Ashworth and John Marriott take a similar view of Samuel 
Bentham and Patrick Colquhoun.726!
! Throughout, this dissertation has tried to keep intact the heady mix of 
possibilities opened up by  ideas, ‘languages’ or ‘discourses’. But it also suggests 
that great attention to the practice of instrumentalisation shows transformations from 
texts to objects to have been no easy process, where misinterpretation, apathy and 
palm-greasing all played a part. Smith’s ideas were things as much as anything: a 
book which could travel to Kingston, Jamaica, as did Vaughan’s copy of the Wealth 
of Nations, or be put on a numbered shelf in St James’, as did Musgrave’s copies; 
words on a page that could be recited or plagiarised, like Benjamin Vaughan did in 
Old and New Principles of Commerce; or sheaves of paper that could be annotated 
and, very likely in East London, burnt. As Bruno Latour has suggested, attending to 
the ‘things’ that constructed social power and economic choices means conceding 
that many of them had to be in place already for the technologies involved to take 
hold.727 If the Enlightenment did shift the calculative frameworks of Britons it was far 
from revolutionary: it progressed piecemeal and unevenly through existing networks 
not instead of them. For instance, merchants were willing to fund docks because 
they had long experience of the port and business strategies based on mobile 
information that meant the goods they traded did not necessarily need to be near at 
hand. Unlike Westminster shopkeepers, only a small nudge was needed to 
galvanise the merchants, although the consequences may have been great for 
many Londoners attached to the warehousing and transport trades. Economic 
enlightenment in London grew out of complex relations between people and things 
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that were by no means universally applicable, and required no end of political and 
conceptual compromises to embed as a result.
! Latour states that actors supply ‘their own metaphysics’, and he provides a 
methodology that creates an interdisciplinary platform by emphasising complexity.728 
Studying the interactions of ideas like Smith’s on economic practitioners like the 
Vaughans is an interdisciplinary endeavour that should mean more than saying that 
culture is important to the economy, or that the market structures ideas. Rather than 
privileging one discipline over the other, it means giving ideas and markets the 
same weight and trying to discover methods capable revealing both things at the 
same time. Economic and social history have greatly helped us to explain long-term 
trends, pointing towards important divides between the ‘west and the rest’ or men 
and women. Cultural history is very good at nuancing particular situations, 
transactions, representations or bodies. The position developed in this dissertation 
has been to suggest that culture needs to be counted more often and economic 
activity stripped of its supposed rationality. Measures like GDP are useful because 
they make patterns numerical and therefore manipulable or comparable in a 
different way to texts or pictures, and they function no differently from prices in that 
regard. With digital databases and programmes like Excel making data more 
malleable than ever, any aspect of a source can be counted to good effect, as Phil 
Withington’s study of the distribution of words and phrases in early modern Britain, 
rather than texts and discourses, has shown.729 Probing how the qualitative and the 
quantitative interact and, moreover, combine to throw seemingly fixed institutions 
wildly off course is important in getting to grips with problems like Musgrave’s work 
in the Customs. Further, making cultural phenomenon like corruption graphically 
representable or warehouse plans signifiers of the technological intransigence of 
the City merchants is as much illustrative of an argument as a strategy developed to 
locate common ground between economic and cultural history. New historical 
narratives may not be immediately forthcoming but it is certainly productive of new 
questions, especially regarding the exploration of historical methods themselves. 
! Latour’s paradigm offers great insights and freedoms for jumping between 
historical subdisciplines, but there is room to point out its limitations from this point 
of view too. As Latour suggests, ‘tracing the networks’ and allowing the archive to 
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lead the enquiry effectively bypasses historiographical considerations and does not 
guarantee answering one initial research questions or reaching interesting 
conclusions. Ever the optimist, Latour would suggest power resides at the end of 
the network building process, or when all the archives and contemporary narratives 
have been sewn together. What began, in my case, as a dissertation about the rise 
of utilitarian architecture became a discussion of the ability of City merchants to 
react to new information whilst maintaining their political and fiscal status. This is 
hardly a new tale, although I think Callon’s notion of calculative agency provides 
plenty of insights as why that was achieved at the expense of the broader 
commercial community actively involved in moving goods around.730 Historical 
research is a reiterative process, where questions are generated by spending time 
in the archive, secondary reading, seminars and contemplation. Yet, if the aim is to 
let archives coproduce knowledge that reflects on disciplinary preoccupations, 
rather than simply apply theories like Callon’s, then Latour’s methodology is not 
necessarily well suited to historical research as it is currently structured, where three 
generous years of PhD funding or the REF cycle still necessarily limit the amount of 
resources available to locate those game-changing archival nuggets. 
! Apart from a feeling that network theory should be treated with caution, 
several elements of the research presented here seem compelling enough to 
warrant more positive attention. The institutions examined in this dissertation 
evolved in conversation with one another but each in different directions. For 
instance, whilst the Customs began to insulate officers from their local merchant 
community, the West India Committee took on an increasingly mediatory role 
between the upper echelons of many firms, utility companies like the Docks or 
insurance, and government departments. To what extent was this re-allocation of 
resources repeated elsewhere, both in terms of other lobbies in London and around 
the country? Further, was this a question of new relations between central 
government and commercial groups or was the pattern followed in local government 
too? The Corporation of London was a complex and important influence on the City 
and on the Quays, which has not received its full due in this dissertation, but would 
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form a fertile ground for this kind of enquiry into the effects of gentlemanly 
capitalism on local government. 
! Insofar as this is a dissertation about things as well as the sociability and 
regulation of the market, several design-related questions present themselves. 
Bureaucracy has been a key trope in this dissertation and despite mapping out 
several institutions that based their practices on highly regimented procedures and, 
in the case of the Customs, radically altered them, a more thoroughgoing 
investigation of “stationery” seems a necessary corollary. If paperwork did structure 
state-merchant relations, as this dissertation suggests was increasingly the case, 
how were printed forms manufactured and managed given their relationship to 
fraud? Presumably the engraving and dye-stamping technologies used in the 
production of paper bills and coins were a mechanism for knowledge transfer here 
too. As such, who designed stationery and did changes in those designs have any 
correspondence to those produced for other commercial institutions like the Bank of 
England or mint? How was the “stationery cupboard” at Customs House, East India 
House or private Banks run and how did forms delineate internal hierarchies within 
smaller firms? How widespread was the use of stationery outside the giants of the 
City and how does this scribal culture compare to those described by Miles Ogborn 
and others? The archives investigated for this dissertation have much more to say 
about these important tools as would a more concerted effort to investigate the 
stationers’ trade. 
! Finally, it seems important to reflect on why the emergence of utilitarian 
architecture in the City proved such an elusive target. Investigations of networks 
tend to draw attention away from building types, towards geographies, spaces, 
connections and flows. Buildings essentially function to accumulate ‘things’ in this 
view—scientific instruments in laboratories, academic texts in universities or 
children in an orphanage. Architectural historians have stressed that representing 
new building types, either through visual or narrative conventions, has a huge effect 
on how they are subsequently understood. Formalising the jargon that surrounds 
buildings is, of course, a major part of establishing them amongst the architectural 
profession, alerting potential consumers to their existence and giving them 
meaning.731 More work remains to be done on the transformation of buildings used 
in the productive or distributive sectors of the economy, from vernacular outgrowths 
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to architecturally recognised forms. Warehouses, docks and insurance are part of 
this story because they provided important points of contact between commercial 
patrons and expertise in London. It was here that concepts were most likely to be 
taken on board by teaching institutions like the Royal Academy, the Architects’ Club 
and other professional associations. Yet Jupp’s career did not get me far enough. 
Whilst this is to reiterate the point made earlier about Latour’s networks telling you 
something, but not necessarily what you want to know, a more rounded enquiry 
would involve casting the net differently. An investigation of surveyors’ networks 
nationally and their relationships to large ‘utilities’ like insurance and rail and canal 
companies that put them into contact with factories and other vernacular forms 
would no doubt yield more results. 
! City merchants have never been considered philosophers. This gap between 
commercial theory and practice was not lost on eighteenth-century readers, as 
James Boswell wrote: 
! Sir John Pringle had the night before given his opinion that Smith, who had never 
! been in trade, could not be expected to write well on that subject, any more than I 
! upon physic, I stated this to Dr. Johnson. He thought that a man who had never 
! traded himself might write well upon trade, and he said there was nothing that more 
! required to be illustrated by philosophy.732
What this dissertation has tried to show is that, even when armed with Smith’s 
critical philosophy, City merchants had a hard task realising it, both because 
property was involved and because propertied interests were networked so as to 
make it intractable. In that this reflects on the shrill outcries against “bankers” that 
have been ongoing since I started this PhD, the suggestion is that moral derision 
and fiscal regulation are unlikely to be effective unless coupled with new trading 
software. Philosophy is not the problem, making it work is.  
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Appendix 1- The Sun Insurance Ledgers
Across the fire insurance industry, how accurately the sums covered reflected 
policyholders’ wealth was open to interpretation.733 Credit, debt, cash and 
investments like stocks and bonds were invisible to the insurance companies, only 
real property. Further, ‘Fire Offices’ put a maximum cap on policies to limit their 
liability, though these ceilings were approximately industrial in scale and well above 
the average coverage in most trades. Customers could insure larger capitals with 
multiple offices, a factor assiduously noted in the policy documents as an 
acknowledgement of split liabilities between the companies was necessary. 
Identifying systematic under- or overvaluation is impossible, yet customers’ self-
appreciation of their capital was crude, which suggests the insurance offices’ 
surveyors were also guiding them. Values tended to be given to the nearest £50 or 
£100, and inflation, even sharp wartime hikes, rarely seems to have moved policy 
holders to revise their coverage. Conversely, by the 1770s individual policies were 
distinguishing a broad range of items, categorised as real estate, household goods, 
stock and utensils, books, plate, apparel, and china and glass. Also, items like 
carriages or sawpits were specified by underwriters, which Company surveyors 
were unlikely to be able to value accurately. Despite increasing distinctions between 
goods, an indistinct blanket approach was also operative when insuring movable 
property. A frequent blending of categories (most often household goods with 
utensils and stock) makes any statement as to their aggregate importance to a 
specific trade subject to the qualification that they be understood as minimal 
constituents of the total amount covered. Nonetheless, policies varied considerably 
in terms of total coverage and types of goods insured, even within a single 
occupational group. Accepting that the values of goods stated in the policies were 
subject to distortions of customary valuations and pragmatic accounting, these were 
ubiquitous weaknesses on the part of policyholders and do not disqualify the 
policies as registers of difference in perceived wealth at any given moment. That is, 
valuations drawn from fire insurance policies, whilst perhaps lagging behind market 
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values, are internally consistent enough to be comparable and thus convertible to 
real-values using a price index series.    
! Relentlessly generic, insurance policies do not make for absorbing reading 
and are tricky to process en masse without a high boredom threshold, head for 
numbers or a computer. This is a direct consequence of the Sun bookkeepers 
running several ledgers at once, each with a different clerk. Thus individual volumes 
of policies were neither chronological or alphabetically arranged, or indexed. 
Squeezing information from the ledgers is hugely time consuming as a result, 
individuals or particular industries being hard to locate. A number of attempts have 
been made to use them systematically in a way that touches on this study, most of 
which have compensated for the labour-intensive work of using the ledgers by 
producing extensive surveys. The earliest comprises an analysis of 300,000 the Sun 
and Royal Exchange Assurance records from the period 1777-86, pan-occupational 
and national in scope.734 Published by the Social Sciences Research Council in the 
early 1980s as computer-tape, it has been subsequently digitised for the London 
Lives project. The second was David Barnett’s use of several companies’ records 
for the inelegantly titled but very thorough London, Hub of the Industrial Revolution. 
A Revisionary History, 1775-1825. He contrasted metropolitan Sun policies from 
1769 to 1777 with policies from several firms from 1819 to 1825, amounting to 
around 30,000 datum from 1,300 occupations.735 Barnett has not published his 
database in full, but did produce an exhaustive set of abstracts for each industry, 
organised by a modern ‘Standard Industrial Classification’. Both resources are 
excellent in terms of providing an anchoring period for the decade around 1776 from 
which comparisons can be drawn between trades or districts, as in tables 4.5 and 
4.6. However, neither chose to distinguish the categories of underwritten goods, 
both favour the latter part of the century, and in utilising a wide-angle “snapshot” 
approach they privilege the synchronic over the diachronic. 
! The final attempt to employ the ledgers was the most Sisyphean, being 
heroically labourious, ultimately failing to produce any published content, and was 
unable to make the ledgers any more accessible. In 1986 a group of volunteers 
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committed to a card index transcriptions of each policy in the Sun registers from 
1710 to the 1840s that mentioned any trade. Their coverage was both national and 
spanned the entire century. Sadly, in the mid-2000s the death of the members saw 
the project fall into abeyance, causing the collection to be broken up between 
several institutions- National Maritime Museum, Royal Armouries, Goldsmith’s 
Library, Museum of London, V&A Museum- with a specialist interests in the 
industries transcribed. If this project had been undertaken in the age of laptops 
there is a good chance this comprehensive database (over half a million entries by 
my estimate) would be online presently, rather than split, uncatalogued, between 
several busy and cramped museums. However, because these transcriptions are 
indexed by occupation and county, include details of all categories of insured goods, 
and encompass the entire period, I culled data from the V&A for silk and Museum of 
London for iron in order to focus on specific London trades across the century. A trip 
to the Armories in Leeds would no doubt yield more valuable information on the 
specialist metalworking trades around London.
! In attempting to get an impression of London’s changing ‘clusters’ it seemed 
pragmatic to process a relatively large sample base with the onus on historical 
development initially. It also occurred as expedient to study one industry which is 
fairly well understood historically, and which speaks directly to the evidence 
deployed by recent retail historians, who have been interested on the convergence 
of fashionably designed objects, the circulation of information and geography. To 
this end, the policies of silk related occupations were transcribed, encompassing 
mercantile, industrial and retail processes: ‘silkmen’ (merchants), throwsters, and 
mercers. Iron seemed a suitable second as ironmongery was similarly reliant on 
shops, though its London geographies are less well understood and it was not so 
highly capitalised as mercery.736 Founders and ironmongers formed the basis of this 
sample. Time pressure forced a reduction in the scope of the study, so the database 
comprises policies taken out in the first five years of any given decade between 
1710 and 1814 (1710-4, 1720-4, etc.) with additional notes on policyholders who 
revised their coverage outside those years. The resulting 1,200 policies provide a 
statistically sound spine of the development of silk and iron for the whole period with 
a cartilage 200 of other or unusual policies filling in the gaps between.
! Like Nicola Phillips’s study of female policy holders across the eighteenth 
century, the diachronic approach throws up questions over how representative the 
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Sun policies are over time.737 Phillips, who searched for patterns in female 
entrepreneurship across all trades, noted changes in the business and cost of 
insurance at the end of the century would significantly reduce the occupational 
scope and economic depth of her sample because women tended to be relegated 
to less well-capitalised and vulnerable work, and perhaps rendered unable to insure 
as a result. Although many of the same caveats apply here, their effect would be 
less evident in the search for clusters and their relative wealth, because the few 
occupations examined here all required fixed plant (shops, warehouses, mills) and 
therefore were more highly capitalised. Sun Insurance grew considerably from its 
foundation in 1710, underwriting £74 million of a national market of £260 million in 
1805. It was well out in front of its nearest rivals, the Phoenix who covered £47 
million that year, and the Royal Exchange covering £35 million. Nevertheless, it 
experienced severe competition in the provinces after this date and, alongside the 
Phoenix and Royal Exchange, their proportion of national market fell from about 
68% in 1806 to 30% in the 1820s.738 Likewise, in London the Sun brand was strong, 
covering 53% of the market in 1783, its next nearest competitor, the Hand in Hand 
managing just 16%.739 This probably represents a high-water mark, however, as 
new London agencies entered the market with increasing rapidity after 1800, when 
the Sun had been pegged back to 38% of the London market. In addition, from 
1782 stamp duty was placed on policies issued by every company that similarly 
would have dissuaded customers, and this ad valorem tax rose significantly during 
the Napoleonic Wars hitting policy holders covering low risk shops and houses the 
hardest.740 Exacerbated by the loss of some of the Sun ledgers after 1800, the 
evidence is best for the earlier period, where the Sun had a near monopoly on 
Commercial Property. Evidence for the period after 1790 is probably weighted 
towards the wealthier ends of the occupations under examination and numbers 
lower than when the Sun had less competitors. Consequently, whilst the figures 
here suggest a ‘decline’ in London mercery this may well be an exaggeration 
caused by these biases. On the other hand, mercers were well capitalised which 
would have made them less nervous about the growing cost of insurance than 
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poorer trades, and numbers of less well-off ironmongers grew rapidly in late 
eighteenth century London, according to these records. Although counter-intuitive, 
the expansion of the poorer trade suggests that the occupations forming the sample 
were both above a threshold of wealth that makes the registers a rather more 
accurate depiction of the state of these industries than, for example, the more easily  
impoverished trades Phillips has investigated. Moreover, the timing of the silk 
industry’s contraction as whole coincides with those suggested in histories, 
suggesting that the records need to be treated cautiously, as indicative rather than 
absolute, although not discounted after in the late-eighteenth century. !  
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Appendix 2- Real Property Coverage in the Sample
The bald figures drawn from the policies tell a story of two very different industries, 
one rising and one contracting, which match well enough with what is known about 
these sectors of the economy themselves. All the policy holders had London 
addresses but it is moot how essential to a firm the clothes or plate they insured 
were to their business prospects. The will of mercer William Tresillian suggests a 
certain fluidity between business and social capital: ‘I give and bequeath to my dear 
wife Elizabeth Tresillian all my household goods and furniture, wearing apparel, 
linen, plate, jewels, watches and rings (save and except such jewels and other 
things as shall be in my possession at my decease as a pawn or pledge for serving 
any sum or sums of money)’.741 Real estate property stands out as the most easily 
identifiable category that would skew the average policy as a measure of 
capitalisation, as property other than the policyholders’ address was routinely noted 
as being outside of London. It is not clear how Barnett or Schwarz dealt with the 
issue, though it seems they discounted it from their sums, whereas Chapman and 
Phillips have made extensive use of the types, date and locations of properties 
covered by tradesmen and -women they investigated in order to explore their 
business strategies.742 The following section will do both, and examine the 
properties covered within this sample by way of assessing what kind of adjustment 
might be made to the aggregate figures.            
! The types of property covered were various, as three properties insured by 
mercers in the 1760s and 1770s illustrate. Thomas King insured the Turks Head, 
King Street, Covent Garden for £1,000 in 1763, alongside £500 of stock and 
household goods and £100 of apparel.743 With no mention of another address in the 
policy it is likely King had simply insured his shop and goods, representing a straight 
forward shoring up of his business interests. This we must consider a legitimate 
components of the mercers’ capital for the 1760s. The second example suggests 
rural roots or reach of many Londoners. Samuel Walker of Spital Square 
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simultaneously insured a property there, in Waltham Abbey, Essex, and Beeson, 
Bedfordshire.744 Waltham Abbey was known for its silk and calico printing, so 
Walker’s interests here may well have had an industrial rather than recreational 
aspect, though the policy does not tell.745 Finally, Benjamin Day of Tavistock Street, 
Covent Garden insured six tenement properties in the local area for £2,700, 
smacking of property speculation outside of any direct involvement in the silk 
trade.746 Day’s policy could probably be excluded from the total capital constituting 
the mercers in this period. Despite permutations and the unavoidable problems 
deciphering some policies, it is possible to describe the properties insured as falling 
into one of three categories:  
7) working London addresses, in which the property insured appears to be the 
same as the policyholder’s like King’s 
2) non-London properties such as Walker’s in Waltham Abbey 
3) investment properties other than the policy holders’ given address, noted in the 
documentation as ‘in tenure’ or as large numbers of addresses of the speculative 
sort like Day’s. 
The two largest samples, ironmongers and mercers, would suggest certain rhythms 
to activity in this field.  In line with Robin Pearson’s findings both groups invested in 
the building booms of the 1720s -‘30s, 1780s-1790s and 1800s, in which years we 
see spikes in property coverage, mostly made up of type 1 and 3 properties in 
London.747 The trend is particularly marked amongst the throwsters, all of whom 
insured property in the 1770s, especially around the East End, presumably in 
search of cheap large sheds. Clearly too, rates of coverage were propelled by 
London’s expansion after 1765, sustaining mercer investment in property despite 
faltering fortunes in the trade, whilst causing thriving ironmongers exploit 
opportunities assiduously. Of 499 mercers across the whole period, 99 invested in 
property, marginally more frequently when the trade was buoyant in the sample 
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periods between 1720 and 1764. Proportionally the ironmongers insured rather 
more, with 149 out of 458 policies covering real estate, a trend becoming more 
pronounced in the later periods: 80 of these properties were covered between 1790 
and 1814.
! Looking more closely at the distribution of the types of properties outlined 
above within the mercer and ironmonger samples, differences in their prerogatives 
can clearly be discerned, moving from the smallest subcategory to the largest. One 
fifth of the mercers insuring property, 21, took out policies type 2 properties, those 
outside of London, compared to only 9 ironmongers. On occasion an industrial 
building easily linked to the policy holders’ occupation is present, as in mercers Van 
Sommer, Paul & Paul covering a house and watermill in Taunton in February 1781 
or ironmongers and founders Joseph Wright and William Pickett who insured a 
casting house, granary and stables in Lambhurst, Surrey. A handful more of the 
policies can be situated within the trades’ industrial geographies; Warwickshire and 
Wolverhampton being notable for the ironmongers, Worcestershire and Essex for 
the mercers. However, most of these policies comprised of non-descript dwellings 
or collections of properties in the Home Counties, especially Surrey and Kent 
representing, one assumes, ancestral holdings, investments or recreational 
properties. Given the disproportionately small number of this kind of policy taken by 
ironmongers, the trade certainly seemed less inclined to divert their wealth into non- 
or low- returning agricultural holdings, and less likely to look into Britain’s hinterland 
than the mercers. This is surprising when we consider that their goods originated in 
Britain’s midlands whereas silk came from abroad.   
! The type 3 property insured by the sample further suggest the importance of 
locality in shaping the business ventures both trades embarked on. Whether that 
meant the investment properties ironmongers and mercers insured predated entry 
into their respective trades, or that wealth accrued there was diverted into them, 
these buildings were usually sited close by the policy holder’s business address. 
Mercer John Everrett was typical, insuring two properties at Cock Alley for £400 in 
1734, both let, and a short stroll from his address on Ludgate Hill. Some properties 
were clearly speculative ventures, built from scratch, and were noted as 
‘incomplete’ or empty on the policy documents. The coincidence of this kind of 
policy with the building cycle has already been noted, but the local nature of the 
capital forwarded to the master-builders is remarkable. The assumption seems to 
have been that reliable tenants were those close at hand. For the mercers, a tying 
together of two key areas, Covent Garden and Spitalfields can be discerned in the 
288
1773 and 1774 policies of William Hinchcliffe, who insured a shop in Covent Garden 
and warehousing in Hoxton but this was exceptional.748 Likewise, Cripplegate 
mercer Elisa Colish insured six dwellings in Bankside, Southwark, for £300 in 1721, 
a policy which stands out for the distance between the addresses, which even 
broached London’s north-south divide.749 Elisa may not have been a practicing 
trader and therefore could have been sinking capital into property to provide her 
with an income in a more hard-headed way than was common.750  Elisa’s economic 
rationalism is the exception, showing that for the majority of policyholders the 
attraction of property was that it was a potentially profitable way of shaping their 
communities.
! For both the mercers and ironmongers, just over half of the properties they 
insured were of type 1, those that appear to be business addresses. More often 
than not the ironmongers’ policies describe some semi-specialist commercial 
building being underwritten like a warehouse, separate workshop or wharfage. A 
number of policies point at an obviously specialist pieces of industrial equipment like 
the complex of coal-sheds, workshops, coach houses and foundry, insured by 
Edward Berry of St Paul’s Churchyard in 1772, or the mill-house at Rotherithe Stairs 
insured by Alexander French nine years earlier. By contrast mercers were less likely  
to be involved in underwriting either specialist industrial premises or semi-specialist 
items like warehouses. The comparative richness of the descriptions in the 
ironmongers’ properties  would suggest they inhabited a range of building types 
and, conversely that the mercers’ shop was more common amongst London’s 
building stock, which underwriters could forgo describing. 
! Differentiation in the type of premises most commonly used by both these 
trades points towards two themes developed throughout in chapter 1. Foremost, 
ironmongers appear to have had a far more varied set of roles in their sector, able 
to exploit retail markets, engage in founding and productive activities, and to 
facilitate the distribution of iron goods around the county or overseas. These were 
by no means mutually exclusive occupations but did require a greater range of 
buildings. West End Mercers, rather, seem to have been focused on retail and less 
able to integrate backwards or usurp the City silkmen and throwsters who 
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maintained their grip on the mercantile and productive part of the trade. If the 
division of labour was inflexible in the silk trades, this had a sharp geographic 
dimension too. Mercery was heavily concentrated in two areas, Cheapside in the 
City, and Covent Garden father West, just as weaving was confined to Spitalfields. 
! Broadly, the majority of the properties in London seem to have had some 
business function directly related to mercery or ironmongery, or that cannot be 
discounted on the basis of the policy documents alone. Of the type 2 properties, it is 
less easy to be sure of their relationship to the capitals insured, though they 
represent the smallest subcategory. The type 3 properties, extraneous to the trade 
itself might be sensibly excluded from the abstracts for each trade, though often 
they came tagged on to coverage of the policy holders own address and chattels. 
Deducting these parts of the policies from the aggregate capitals insured by either 
the mercers or ironmonger would not, however, do much to change the overall 
picture of the trades outlined in the aggregate statistics. Table App. 1.1 shows that 
for the mercers investment properties were smaller than the average policy, so 
removing them tends to raise the average policy by 1-6% in each sample period. 
For the ironmongers, however, the change moves us in the other direction: the 
values of investment properties were larger than the average policy in most periods 
after 1750-4, thereby lowering the average policy by between 2 and 10%, except in 
1770-4 and 1790-4 when there removal causes a small rise of no more that 2%. 
! As such, these alterations appear to marginally widen the gap between the 
silk and iron industries if measured in terms of pure capital. This underlines the fact 
that setting up as a mercer was more expensive than in the iron trade. Property, 
even if combined with the other underwritten categories like plate, books, and 
apparel was a relatively peripheral feature when compared to the stock and 
household goods that represented, in terms of investment in either trade, between 
70-90% of the capital covered. 
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 Table App. 1.1, Adjustments for property in the retail sector
Total PoliciesUnadjusted coverageTotal Policies DiscqualifiedTotal coverag  isqualifiedRevised averageUnadjusted Averagedifference (%)
Mercers
1710-14 79
1720-24 88 56016 6 2034 658 637 3.2
1730-34 44 61818 1405 1405
1740-44 31 47807 2 1028 1613 1519 5.8
1750-54 22 36038 1638 1638
1760-64 37 78944 1 1277 2157 2077 3.7
1770-74 52 112350 4 8266 2168 2161 0.3
1780-84 38 82984 2 831 2282 2243 1.7
1790-94 59 92260 1 496 1582 1564 1.1
1800-04 20 32610 1631 1630
1810-14 29 42982 1 437 1519 1438 5.4
Ironmongers
1710-14 28
1720-24 30 1308 3 979 475 460 3.2
1730-34 22 20976 1 769 962 953 1
1740-44 28 19888 1 233 728 710 2.5
1750-54 19 17897 942 942
1760-64 53 45579 5 3577 875 894 -2.2
1770-74 58 68192 3 2115 1201 1176 2.1
1780-84 28 27310 3 5278 881 975 10.6
1790-94 84 88931 9 9971 1053 1046 0.6
1800-04 41 34690 4 5640 785 867 -10.4
1810-14 67 76958 1 3146 1118 1149 -2.7
Source: V&A Sun and ML Sun.
!        
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Appendix 3 
Old Bailey Cases in which gangsmen and ticket-porters formed part of the 
prosecution, 1740-1800 
Date Accused Crime Commodity Sentence
11 Sep. 1745 G James Leppard Theft Tobacco Transportation
17 Oct. 1750 G Edward Evans, George 
Potts
Theft Ginger Transportation
4 Dec. 1755 T John Clayton Theft Sugar Transportation
20 Apr. 1757 T Samuel Bolton Theft Spanish 
Wool
Acquitted
25 Apr. 1759 G William Pope Theft Sugar Acquitted
21 Oct. 1761 G James Adams Theft Sugar Transportation
14 Jan. 1763 G John Cox Theft Sugar Branding
11 Dec. 1765 G James Smith Theft Sugar Transportation
19 Feb. 1766 G William Crawford Theft Sugar Transportation
17 Dec. 1766 G Timothy M’Namara Theft Wolf skins Transportation
9 Sep. 1767 T James Young, 
Elizabeth Morgan
Theft Copper 
bound for 
Jamaica
Transportation
9 Sep. 1767 G John Edwards, John 
Row, Peter smith, Peter 
Price, James Devereux
Theft Sugar Acquitted except 
Edwards, 
Transportation
21 Oct. 1767 G Stephen Taylor Theft Sugar Acquitted
6 Jul. 1768 G John Pipson Theft Sugar Transportation
7th Sep 1768 G James Whittaker Theft Antiguan 
Beads
Transportation
18 Oct. 1769 G Samuel Barnton Theft Sugar Whipped
25 Apr. 1770 G Abraham Myer Theft Sugar Transportation
3 Jul. 1771 G Laurence Wallace Theft Sugar Transportation
23 Oct. 1771 G Anthony Watson Theft Coffee Transportation
21 Oct. 1772 G Thomas Apps Theft Sugar Transportation
16 Sep. 1778 T Thomas Crouch Theft Sugar Branding
23 Feb. 1785 G James Thomas Theft Aniseed Whipped
28 Oct. 1789 G James Davis Theft Sugar Whipped
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Date Accused Crime Commodity Sentence
9 Dec. 1789 G John Howarth Theft Sugar Whipped
9 Dec. 1789 G George Barlow Theft Sugar Whipped
8 Jun. 1791 G William Abbott Theft Bees Wax Whipped
15 Jan. 1794 G Thomas Howard Theft Sugar Not guilty
15 Jan. 1794 G James Miller Theft Sugar Not guilty
11 Nov. 1794 G Thomas Ford Theft Ginger Imprisoned 6 
months
8 Dec. 1794 G Edmund Oldfield Theft Sugar Whipped
13 Jan. 1796 G Richard Broomfield Theft Sugar Transportation
17 Feb. 1769 G Alexander Casey Theft Iron nails Imprisoned 1 
month
22 Jun. 1796 G Peter Warrington Theft Linen Imprisoned 1 
month
20 Sep. 1797 G John Smith Theft Sugar Transportation
25 Oct. 1797 G Robert Sparkes Theft Sugar Not guilty
6 Dec. 1797 G Henry Cam Theft Sugar Transportation
18 Apr. 1798 G Matthew Quirk Theft Saddle Death
3 Apr. 1799 G Thomas Connor, 
Richard Buster
Theft Sugar Whipped
30 Apr. 1799 G Jacob Abraham Theft Sugar Transportation
30 Oct. 1799 G James Roberts Theft Sugar
19 Feb. 1800 G William Hall Theft Sugar Imprisoned 1 
month
17 Sep. 1800 G Francis Gorman Theft Iron chains Whipped
17 Sep. 1800 G William Cobb Theft Yarn Whipped
17 Sep. 1800 G John Watkins Theft Tobacco Whipped
G= Gangsman, T= Ticket porter
                
!  
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